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Abstract 
This thesis sets Philo of Alexandria and the apostle Paul in conversation on divine 
grace. While scholars have occasionally observed that Philo and Paul both speak about 
God’s generosity, studies and comparisons of their particular theologies of grace have 
been rare. And such work has often placed Philo and Paul in either strong continuity or 
stark discontinuity without probing into the theological logic that animates the 
particularities of their thought. By contrast, this work argues that Philo and Paul both 
could speak of divine gifts emphatically and in formally similar ways while making 
materially different theological judgments. That is, their theologies of grace are neither 
identical nor antithetical. 
 Part One sets forth Philo’s view of divine generosity. Chapter One explores Philo’s 
doctrine of God, considering how the different aspects of his Theology proper relate 
and contribute to his belief that God is a lover of gifts and giving. Chapter Two focuses 
on what kind of human is worthy to receive divine gifts and what constitutes a human 
as worthy. It is argued throughout that Philo’s concept of both God’s generosity and 
human worth must be situated within the context of God’s creative acts: human worth 
is constituted by the God who creates all good things, and God’s giving is rational and 
just, in line with the patterns of the cosmos established by God’s Law and Logos. 
 Part Two turns to Paul, placing portions of his letters in dialogue with Philo. 
Chapter Three traces how Paul’s view of divine grace is concentrated in and explicated 
by the Christ-event; Chapter Four explores how the gift is given and received, with a 
focus on the apostle’s role; and Chapter Five examines the relationship between divine 
and human generosity within community. The main consequence of the comparison in 
Part Two is the conclusion that Philo’s and Paul’s beliefs about divine grace are both 
emphatic and different, and the relationship between them is interesting because of that 
fact. Philo’s theology stresses that in creation God is revealed to be abundantly gracious 
to humans who should live virtuously through the use of God’s creational gifts. Paul’s 
theology stresses that the divine act of Jesus’ death and resurrection for the ungodly, 
which effects new creation, is the supreme manifestation of divine generosity.
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Introduction 
 
The idea of grace had been so much on my mind, grace as a sort of ecstatic 
fire that takes things down to essentials.1 
What could be more intriguing than to juxtapose the near-contemporaries 
Philo and Paul?2 
1.  The Aim of this Thesis 
This thesis sets the apostle Paul in conversation with his Jewish near-contemporary 
Philo of Alexandria on the theme of divine and human grace.3 The relationship between 
these two figures on the subject of grace has often been dictated by scholarly trends: 
either Paul speaks of grace and Philo does not, or both speak of grace without real 
difference. Yet, my argument, which will be explicated and defended in the exegesis 
offered in the following chapters, is that Paul and Philo both speak of God’s gifts and of 
God as a gift-giver – that is, both stress divine grace – but they configure that grace 
differently; not antithetically, but differently. Thus, this work investigates what it 
might mean to say that two first-century figures such as Philo and Paul both thought of 
God’s interactions with the world in terms of divine generosity – that they could both 
speak of divine gifts so frequently and in formally similar ways, while making 
materially different theological judgments in the context of their concrete historical 
settings and larger theological frameworks. It is precisely the similarities between, yet 
ultimate incommensurability of, Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of divine grace that 
constitutes both the promise and the problem of this study.  
 In this introduction, I will (1) briefly set forth how this comparison between Philo 
and Paul relates to larger scholarly trends on the relation between Judaism and early 
Christianity; (2) clarify how this study is positioned in relation to previous scholarship 
                                                        
1 M. Robinson, Gilead (London: Virago, 2005), 224. 
2 D.T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993), 66. 
3 I use the word “grace” here as a synonym with “gift.” These words will thus appear 
interchangeably to denote basic divine (and sometimes human) generosity. Any additional connotations 
(e.g. “undeserved grace”) are contextually determined and are not built into χάρις as “grace.” 
Furthermore, it should be noted that χάρις does not always mean “grace” and that this study is not on 
the word χάρις itself but on the concept of gift-giving; see further section 4. 
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on the topic and thus what gap this work is intended to fill; (3) address methodological 
issues; and (4) provide an overview of the thesis. 
2.  Two Paradigms: Grace (or not) in Judaism and Christianity 
It is not a secret that scholarly views on the relationship between Judaism and 
Christianity changed – or were, at least, significantly challenged – with the publication 
of Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism in 1977.4 The purpose of this section is not to 
chronicle pre- and post-Sanders scholarship; others have done that work well.5 Rather, 
in broad strokes, I will describe the two dominant paradigms on Paul and Judaism that 
scholars have been rejecting, propounding, or nuancing for the last thirty-plus years. 
Ultimately, I will argue that neither of the paradigms are adequate for understanding 
the relationship of Philo to Paul, because both paradigms pre-define what grace is and 
must be for it to be present in a system of thought, thus placing Paul and Philo in an 
artificial relationship.6 
2.1 Paul and Grace, Judaism and not Grace 
The aim of Sanders’ work was to “destroy” the view that Judaism – and especially 
Rabbinic Judaism – was legalistic, in antithesis to Christianity.7 Following the work of 
Moore,8 Sanders attributed the genesis of this antithetical approach to Weber.9 Weber 
approached the Rabbinic writings with Protestant categories.10 For example, with 
regard to “Rechtfertigung” one can speak of “zwei Momente” – “daß der göttlichen 
Forderung Genüge geleistet worden sei, und daß man infolge dessen Anspruch auf Lohn 
                                                        
4 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1977). 
5 See S. Westerholm, “The ‘New Perspective’ at Twenty-Five,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism: 
Volume II, The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. D.A. Carson et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 1–38 and J.D.G. 
Dunn, The New Perspective on Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 1–98. 
6 The basic layout and questions of this section are in certain respects parallel to J.A. Linebaugh, God, 
Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation (Leiden: 
Brill, forthcoming), chapter 1. 
7 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, xii. 
8 G.F. Moore, “Christian Writers on Judaism,” HTR 14 (1921): 197–254. 
9 Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 33. F. Weber, Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und 
Verwandter Schriften (ed. F. Delitzsch and G. Schnedermann; 2nd ed.; Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1897).  
10 Cf. Moore, “Christian Writers,” 229: “The fundamental criticism to be made of Weber's ‘System’ is 
precisely that it is a system of theology, and not an ancient Jewish system but a modern German system. 
...the system brings its logic with it and imposes it upon the materials.” 
 14 
habe.”11 In this schema, human “Pflichterfüllung” appears to be a “Gabe an Gott” and 
the reward or payment (Lohn) for the work as “Gottes Gegengabe.”12 God has ordered 
life so that his graciousness depends (abhängen) on prior human “Leistung.” 
Consequently, “der Gnadenweg ist der außerordentliche.”13 Every salvific act of God has 
“zur Voraussetzung ein menschliches Verhalten.”14 This approach – where grace, as a 
reward, is a divine response to human activity – was used by many who followed Weber,15 
and it became a common understanding not only of Rabbinic Judaism but of Judaism in 
toto.16 Grace responds to work, and real grace – without work – is außerordentlich. 
 Philo was also understood in this way.17 Thus, Windisch could separate Philo’s 
theology under two divergent headings. Under “Die Selbsterlösung,” Windisch stated: 
“Die Frage ist nun die: kann der Mensch sich selbst lösen und reinigen, kann er sich 
selbst wieder zu Gott erheben? Es scheint, als setzte Philo diese Fähigkeit voraus und 
forderte einen Selbstaufschwung des Menschen.”18 Windisch is clear: “Es ist die 
Forderung der Bekehrung, die er erhebt, die Forderung der Selbsterlösung.”19 Philo’s 
theology is thus defined by Selbstaufschwung, Selbsterlösung, Selbstreinigung.20 Later, 
Windisch makes a different claim under “Die Gnadenerlösung:” “Die Erinnerung an die 
Massenhaftigkeit des menschlichen Schmutzes löst die Forderung der Selbstreinigung 
auf.”21 The paradoxical presentation of the contrasting yet simultaneously present 
viewpoints of Selbsterlösung and Gnadenerlösung – or rather, the ability to separate 
the two when reading Philo – is due to a Protestant framework, where grace is by 
definition separate from works and worth. There can be no deep coherence between 
these two Anschauungen; in their essence, they are antinomies because 
                                                        
11 Weber, Jüdische Theologie, 277. 
12 Weber, Jüdische Theologie, 303. 
13 Weber, Jüdische Theologie, 304. 
14 Weber, Jüdische Theologie, 307. 
15 E.g. W. Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter (2nd ed.; Berlin: Reuther 
und Reichard, 1906). 
16 A common example here is R. Bultmann. 
17 Cf., e.g., Bousset, Religion des Judentums, 505. 
18 H. Windisch, Die Frömmigkeit Philos und ihre Bedeutung für das Christentum: Eine Religionsgeschichtliche 
Studie (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1909), 10. 
19 Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 11. 
20 Windisch thus makes the erroneous claim that “Völlig sündlos muß der Mensch geworden sein, 
der Gnade bei Gott finden will” (Frömmigkeit Philos, 12). 
21 Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 15–16. In this mode of thought, Philo “polemisiert...ausdrücklich 
gegen den Gedanken der Selbsterlösung und des Selbstaufschwunges” (20). 
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Gnadenerlösung should not contain any hint of Selbsterlösung. As Windisch noted, 
both Philo and Paul believed in Gnadenerfahrung, but Windisch cleanly separated Philo 
from Paul. The question is what should be stressed, “göttliche oder menschliche 
Kausalität?” Unfortunately, unlike Paul, “Diese Anschauung von einem Ineinander 
beider Kausalitäten ist Philo fremd; bei ihm schaffen entweder die Menschen oder die 
Kräfte Gottes.” 
 Variations of this paradigm for understanding Philo still exist. Two examples will 
suffice. In his brief treatment of Abraham’s election in Philo, VanLandingham notes 
how God’s grace matches Abraham’s worth; thus, he states: “Considering what ‘grace’ 
means, Philo’s portrayal of Abraham’s election cannot be characterized as such.”22 The 
implicit logic is that since we know (from Paul) that grace is given to humans despite 
their unworthiness – “freely” – then what Philo calls grace cannot actually be grace. 
Similarly, Carson argues that Philo has no concept of election by “sheer grace.” Thus, 
when he explores why Noah “found favor (χάρις) before the Lord God” (Gen 6.8), it is 
because “he had attracted the ‘grace’ (sic) of God to him by his consistently righteous 
life.”23 The incredulous “sic” is revealing. Likewise, discussing Abraham’s election, 
Carson states: “Here, ‘elect’ has almost certainly lost any overtones of grace. If 
Abraham is chosen it is because he is choice.”24 Since Philo affirms that grace goes to 
the worthy, he does “not reflect any of the discriminating, electing, transforming grace 
dominant in Paul. There is a graciousness to positive divine ultimacy that affects 
election not a whit.”25 Yet that is precisely what Philo, on his terms, thought election 
was: gracious and discriminating. To place a sic next to Philo’s statements about grace is 
to place a sic over the whole Philonic corpus. Accordingly, where Windisch found an 
irreconcilable tension between grace and works in Philo, others have nearly denied 
Philo the use of the concept of grace. 
                                                        
22 C. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2006), 27. 
23 D.A. Carson, “Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo: Analysis and Method,” NovT 
23 (1981): 160. 
24 Carson, “Divine Sovereignty,” 160. 
25 Carson, “Divine Sovereignty,” 161. Carson refrains from attributing to Philo a “merit theology.” 
Whether or not merit is a problematic concept, it is often used as a value judgment against Judaism, and 
it does not do justice to Philo. For an interesting discussion of merit in relation to grace, see J.P. 
Wawrykow, God’s Grace & Human Action: “Merit” in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: UND Press, 
1995). 
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 Consequently, scholars in this paradigm work with presupposed definitions and 
logic. Judaism in general, and Philo in particular, are measured according to Paul’s 
understanding of grace apart from works and worth.26 The tendency is thus to delimit 
grace to something nearing its Pauline expression. Therefore, one either cannot find 
grace in a thinker such as Philo, or if one can, it is impossible to make proper 
connections to other aspects of his thought. 
2.2 Paul and Grace, Judaism and the Same Grace 
In contrast to the first paradigm, Sanders argued that what characterized Palestinian 
Judaism was “covenantal nomism,” where “obedience maintains one's position in the 
covenant, but it does not earn God's grace as such.”27 Human works are in response to 
God’s prior grace in election, rather than God’s grace being in response to human 
works. To quote Sanders:  
the perception of God's grace and the requirement of obedience...indicates 
that ‘grace’ and ‘works’ were not considered as opposed to each other in any 
way. ...the notion that God's grace is in any way contradictory to human 
endeavour is totally foreign to Palestinian Judaism. The reason for this is 
that grace and works were not considered alternative roads to salvation. 
Salvation...is always by the grace of God, embodied in the covenant. The 
terms of the covenant, however, require obedience.28 
Sanders’ distinction between “getting in” the covenant by grace, but “staying in” 
through obedience, such that all obedience occurs within a context of grace, was a 
salutary, if ultimately deficient, corrective in the study of Judaism. Grace and works are 
not in tension, but neither are they allowed to be configured in relation to one another 
such that both contribute to salvation. Reading Jewish texts within this framework, 
Sanders maintained that “the gift and demand of God were kept in a healthy 
relationship with each other.”29 Accordingly, “on the point at which many have found 
the decisive contrast between Paul and Judaism - grace and works - Paul is in 
agreement with Palestinian Judaism.”30 Whereas the scholars in the first paradigm saw 
                                                        
26 Cf. the early warning of H. Chadwick, “St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria,” BJRL 48 (1966): 300. 
27 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 420; cf. 422. See also E.P. Sanders, “Judaism and the Grand 
‘Christian’ Abstractions: Love, Mercy, and Grace,” Interp 39 (1985): 357–72. 
28 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 297. 
29 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 427. 
30 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 543. 
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grace in Paul, but could not see Pauline grace in Judaism, Sanders saw the same grace in 
both. 
 Sanders’ argument was subsequently developed by other scholars, and the view 
that Judaism and Paul believed in grace “equally” has become a standard opinion 
among many.31 For example, the judgment of Dunn: “The Judaism of what Sanders 
christened as ‘covenantal nomism’ can now be seen to preach good Protestant doctrine: 
that grace is always prior; that human effort is ever the response to divine initiative; 
that good works are the fruit and not the root of salvation.”32 The question for Dunn, 
then, has little to do with Judaism; rather, now that Judaism has been salvaged, “where 
does that leave Paul?” Against what was Paul arguing in a letter such as Galatians, if no 
Jews believed in something like justification by works? The typical answer to this 
question within this paradigm is that Paul’s target was some form of ethnocentrism.33 
As Wright states, justification by faith is “a polemical doctrine, whose target is not the 
usual Lutheran one of ‘nomism’ or ‘Menschenwerke,’ but the Pauline one of Jewish 
national pride.”34 The various scholars who work within this “New Perspective” 
disagree on many things, but their basic agreement is that Sanders got something 
fundamentally right: Judaism is a religion of grace, and therefore Paul’s problem with 
Judaism could not have been a lack of grace. 
 Sanders made little use of Philo (his book was large enough already), and the brief 
comparison he did draw between Philo and Paul focused largely on the dissimilarity of 
                                                        
31 As Sanders would point out, there were also significant precursors to his work: e.g., W.D. Davies, 
Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology (London: SPCK, 1948). For works that 
have sought to support Sanders’ appraisal of Judaism, see, e.g., D.B. Garlington, “The Obedience of Faith”: A 
Pauline Phrase in Historical Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991); K.L. Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment 
According to Deeds (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). T. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2000), 14 presupposes Sanders’ basic argument. 
The critique of Sanders’ reading of Judaism has also been significant and helpful in many regards; cf. 
S.J. Gathercole, Where Is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1–5 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002); M.A. Seifrid, Justification by Faith: The Origin and Development of a Central Pauline Theme 
(Leiden: Brill, 1992); F. Avemarie, Tora und Leben: Untersuchungen zur Heilsbedeutung der Tora in der frühen 
Rabbinischen Literatur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); and the essays in D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and 
M.A. Seifrid, eds., Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 1, The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001).  
32 J.D.G. Dunn, “The Justice of God: A Renewed Perspective on Justification by Faith,” JTS 43 (1992): 8. 
33 See, e.g., N.T. Wright, “The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith,” TynB 29 (1978): 61–88; J.D.G. 
Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). 
34 Wright, “Paul of History,” 71. 
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their understandings of the human predicament.35 Since Sanders, few have explored 
Philo’s understanding of grace,36 perhaps because it is assumed that the question of 
grace in Judaism has been settled, or Philo can at times appear to be an odd Jew whose 
writings are not helpful for understanding Paul,37 which largely still rests on an older 
view that made strong distinctions between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism.38 Indeed, 
the sheer volume of Philo’s writings alone makes him (counter-intuitively) easy to 
overlook. Yet the why of Philo’s absence is not as important here as the fact of his 
absence. 
 As already noted, correcting the view that Judaism was a religion of some sort of 
thoughtless works-righteousness, devoid of grace, was a healthy step for scholarship. 
Within this paradigm, Judaism is founded on divine grace, because one enters the 
people of God solely through God’s grace, which is not merited by works; works are 
only a condition of staying in the family. Consequently, one can find grace in Judaism 
because it is “free,” “unmerited,” “unconditional.” That is, for the post-Sanders 
paradigm, just as for the pre-Sanders paradigm, grace is defined to the exclusion of 
human action or worth. As different as the two paradigms are, they are fundamentally 
identical in the definition of grace: the question is still, can we find this grace in 
Judaism? In this way, the post-Sanders interpretive stream found a temporary solution 
to the problem (e.g. that Judaism is not legalistic); but ultimately it only reframed the 
problem, because it did not break out of inherited concepts and definitions.39 
                                                        
35 Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 552–556. Sanders had planned a project comparing the 
“pious practices” of the rabbis and Philo before he wrote Paul and Palestinian Judaism; cf. E.P. Sanders, 
“Comparing Judaism and Christianity: An Academic Autobiography,” in Redefining First-Century Jewish and 
Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders (ed. F.E. Udoh et al.; Notre Dame: UND Press, 2008), 
17. Sanders ends that piece: “I continue to hope for more and better comparative studies. They are not all 
that easy, but they are an awful lot of fun” (33). 
36 Though I will discuss below those that have; see section 3.2. 
37 Cf., for example, Gathercole, Where Is Boasting?, 29: “...in the current climate, the use of Philo by the 
last generation of Pauline scholars...has given way to a more skeptical view of Philo’s value for 
understanding Paul’s view of faith and justification.” 
38 The obligatory reference here is M. Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus: Studien zu ihrer Begegnung 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts vor Christus (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1969), which showed that the distinction is problematic. 
39 Thus, the early critique of Sanders by J. Neusner, “The Use of Later Rabbinic Evidence for the Study 
of Paul,” in Approaches to Ancient Judaism, Volume II (ed. W.S. Green; Chicago: Scholars Press, 1980), 50 that 
Sanders forced “questions of Pauline-Lutheran theology, important to Sanders and New Testament 
scholarship” upon the Jewish texts. 
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2.3 Conclusion: The Assumed Quantity and Missing Particularity 
Both of the paradigms above have valuable insights. The first paradigm is right to 
emphasize the particularity of the Pauline understanding of grace, though their 
method for doing so is dubious; the second paradigm is correct to emphasize that both 
Judaism and Christianity had developed understandings of grace, though they do so at 
the expense of the particularities of different figures and writings in Judaism (and the 
particularity of Paul, as well). Consequently, what hampers both paradigms is an 
essentialist view of grace, which defines grace by Paul and then uses that definition to 
measure Judaism; and then, rather circularly, reads Paul in light of Judaism. There has 
been little room for seeing different kinds of grace – that is, different gifts and 
configurations of grace – in Paul and Judaism.40 Grace, then, is an assumed quantity and 
the potential particularity of thought in each corpus is missing. I hope to show that a 
break from such essentialist logic – grace is this – is necessary by exploring how the 
specific individuals Paul and Philo define grace and configure it in relation to works, 
worth, etc. by placing grace in a larger context for each. 
Against the post-Sanders paradigm, I will contend that we twist Philo’s thought if 
we turn him into a Protestant; his theology, understandably, hangs together in a 
decidedly unProtestant way.41 Yet, against the pre-Sanders paradigm, we do equal 
damage to Philo’s thought if we deny him the concept of grace outright or make it an 
inconsistent facet of his writings. Philo, just like Paul, had a robust sense of God’s 
generosity towards the world. Yet, even if both figures speak of divine grace, I contend 
that that in itself tells us very little; rather, the particularity of their thought on divine 
grace is key and it is that particularity which demonstrates the insufficiencies of both 
paradigms. Through comparing the fundamental theological grammar of both figures, 
my intention is to raise new questions and interpretations of both Paul and Philo by 
themselves and in relation to one another. Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of divine 
                                                        
40 The missing particularity perhaps stems from an older view of God’s grace as “graciousness,” a 
disposition of favour towards humanity. For a critique of this view, see R. Bultmann, Theology of the New 
Testament, Volume 1 (trans. K. Grobel; London: SCM Press, 1956), 288–292. 
41 Conversely, note also S. Westerholm, “Law, Grace and the ‘Soteriology’ of Judaism,” in Law in 
Religious Communities in the Roman Period: The Debate Over Torah and Nomos in Post-Biblical Judaism and Early 
Christianity (ed. P. Richardson and S. Westerholm; Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier, 1991), 71–72: “Paul’s writings 
are misused when their theological nature is overlooked and he is thought to be depicting, rightly or 
wrongly, soteriology as understood by contemporary Jews themselves.” 
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grace are neither antithetical nor identical, and a comparison between the two is 
interesting precisely because they are comparable but different.42  
3.  A Brief History of Scholarship 
Grace has been and remains one of those topics that almost every study of Paul touches 
on briefly, but the amount of scholarship dedicated explicitly to exploring grace in 
Paul, as well as Philo, is rather small. Here we may note two groups of literature and 
representative studies of each: 1) anthropological, philosophical, and classical studies 
on gift-giving; and 2) comparative studies on Philo and Paul, and particularly those on 
grace in Philo and Paul. 
3.1 “The Gift” 
Since the publication of Mauss’ seminal work The Gift in 1925, anthropological and 
classical studies of gift-giving have flourished.43 One of Mauss’ key insights was that 
gifts compel reciprocity; since gifts build and further relationships, a gift that “does 
nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.”44 Thus, there is no “free gift,” because 
all gifts expect a return. Mauss’ work stood as a corrective to the study of Malinowski, 
who conducted his study on gift-giving with a distinction between gift-giving (free, 
with no obligation to return) and commerce (calculated giving and return).45 For Mauss, 
such a distinction made no sense of his ethnographical observations: gifts are never 
separable from their giver, and to receive the other in the gift requires a counter-gift.46 
Gifts create and sustain social bonds, and to refuse to reciprocate means not only a loss 
of honor, but also of relations. Mauss thus set a trend of attempting to define gift-giving 
as it functions within particular contexts and without the baggage of cultural 
                                                        
42 Thus, as Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, chap. 1 states, “theologies of grace should not be 
compared based on degree – what text emphasises grace more – but must ask after definition.” 
43 M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (trans. W.D. Halls; London: 
Routledge, 1990). For an extensive discussion of this field of study, see J.M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming), chapter 1. The work of Mauss and others mentioned in this 
section will not appear explicitly throughout this thesis; I mention them here, instead, because they 
demonstrate the interest in the modern conversation on gift-giving, they put pressure on 
presuppositions about gift concepts, they clearly outline the common features of gift-giving and 
reciprocity, and they raise important questions for our study. 
44 M. Douglas, “Foreword,” in The Gift (London: Routledge, 1990), vii. 
45 B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge, 1922). 
46 See, e.g., Mauss, The Gift, 10–14. 
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assumptions about gifts: the ever-present key elements were the obligations to give, to 
receive, and to reciprocate. It is not that every form of social exchange is gift-giving;47 
but rather, gift-exchange was a more pervasive, and less self-contained, aspect of the 
cultures Mauss explored.48 Furthermore, as Sahlins then demonstrated, different kinds 
of exchange were restricted to different kinds of people with whom one desired 
different kinds of relations.49 Since gifts set one in relation with another, one needed to 
be careful to give to particular people, for particular ends/relations. Indiscriminate 
gift-giving is unwise gift-giving. 
 Mauss’ work has been much debated and developed since it first came out.50 The 
critique by Derrida is noteworthy here, because it stands as an interesting bridge 
between anthropological-philosophical studies of gift-giving and the work of biblical 
scholars noted above. Derrida’s response to Mauss’ work was that it “speaks of 
everything but the gift: It deals with economy, exchange, contract.”51 Mauss was not 
determining what a gift is, but rather how the word “gift” is used. For Derrida, Mauss’ 
account of gift-giving implied a circular economy, whereas, in his view, a gift was 
supposed to “keep a relation of foreignness to the circle,” to disrupt the circle and any 
form of symmetry, and thus be aneconomic.52 A gift is not impossible – rather, in a 
typically Derridean statement, it is “the very figure of the impossible.”53 For a gift to be 
a gift it cannot be known as such; neither giver nor recipient can know the object as 
gift, since that could cause feelings of gratitude or debt, consequently nullifying the 
gift. Thus, there must be a forgetting of the gift by both parties, yet not only a 
forgetting of the gift, but also a forgetting of forgetting – effectively, the death of the 
giver is necessary.54 Derrida’s reaction to Mauss is parallel to the reaction of Carson to 
χάρις in Philo: as Carson places a sic against Philo’s gift, so Derrida does for Mauss. But 
                                                        
47 See, for example, the distinction Philo makes between giving and selling in chapter 1, section 3.1.1. 
48 Mauss, The Gift, 28–29. 
49 M. Sahlins, Stone-Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Press, 1972), 193–195. 
50 See esp. the essays in A.D. Schrift, ed., The Logic of the Gift: Towards an Ethic of Generosity (New York: 
Routledge, 1997); M. Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift (trans. N. Scott; Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).   
51 J. Derrida, “The Time of the King,” in The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity (ed. A.D. 
Schrift; London: Routledge, 1997), 138. 
52 Derrida, “Time,” 124. 
53 J. Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money (trans. P. Kamuf; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 7. 
54 Derrida, “Time,” 132–133. See further J. Derrida, The Gift of Death (trans. D. Willis; London: 
University of Chicago, 1995). 
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here again, it is arbitrary to pre-define what a gift is against all evidence for how (what 
most humans consider to be) gifts actually function.55 
 What one sees from studies such as Mauss, and the conversation that has followed 
him, is that gift-giving is not typically a “disinterested” activity, where “free” gifts are 
given to individuals or groups who are undeserving; on the contrary, givers are very 
interested in the identity of the gift-recipient, gifts are given for particular purposes, 
with particular expectations that hinge on the quality of the recipient and the 
obligations inherent to the gift-exchange. The value of these studies, for our purposes, 
is both the questions and concepts these studies provide and the specific focus on 
studying gift-giving within discrete contexts – of making context paramount for 
diverse configurations of grace.  
 With regard to gift-exchange in the Greco-Roman world, the literature is vast: for 
example, on gift-exchange in Greece,56 or Roman benefaction and patron-client 
relationships.57 These studies largely confirm the basic points of the anthropological 
studies: one should give carefully, gifts expect reciprocation either materially or 
through gratitude, and so forth. All of these studies – some more directly than others – 
sketch the environment in which Philo and Paul discussed divine gift-giving. For 
example, around the time of Paul and Philo we can see the common rules and 
understanding of ancient gift-giving epitomized and explored in Seneca’s De Beneficiis. 
The ancient world – particularly philosophers and those who had means – reflected on 
the problems, possibilities, and power of gift-giving. We should assume first that Philo 
and Paul reflect the ideas of their time rather than assuming that they do not; if they 
prove otherwise, then that is significant and should be explored. What these studies 
profitably do for us, though, is show what was typical of ancient gift-exchange. 
                                                        
55 Further, as J. Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” MT 
11 (1995): 130 has argued, there is an underlying assumption of a Kantian distinction between duty and 
desire where the purity of the gift is what determines whether it is a gift. As with merit, there is nothing 
wrong with Kant; but this distinction, when applied to gift-giving, envisages a kind of human that cannot 
be proved ever to have existed. 
56 C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite, and R. Seaford, eds., Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford: OUP, 1998); S. von 
Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece (London: Routledge, 1995). 
57 R.P. Saller, Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 1982); A. Wallace-Hadrill, ed., 
Patronage in Ancient Society (London: Routledge, 1989); F.W. Danker, Benefactor. Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-
Roman and New Testament Semantic Field (St. Louis: Clayton, 1982); also the classic P. Veyne, Bread and 
Circuses (trans. B. Pearce; London: Penguin, 1990). The relationship between benefaction and patronage, 
is debated; I list them together here, as largely Roman forms of gift-exchange, for simplicity. 
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Additionally, they call into question many of our presuppositions about what a gift is 
and how gift-giving should work. All of these tools can be used in this study, and the 
focus on gift-giving in these fields gives support for such a study. 
3.2 Philo and Paul 
There are enough similarities between the writings of Philo and Paul that comparisons 
of their thought, or dependency claims of one on the other, are numerous.58 With a 
corpus as large as Philo’s, the possibility for overlap of any kind is high.59 The repeated 
juxtaposition of Philo and Paul is significant because it betrays a belief that Philo and 
Paul are worth juxtaposing and it shows interest in such study. Yet work that tries to 
prove dependency of Paul on Philo, or tries to find echoes of Philo in Paul’s letters, is 
tangential to the focus here.60 Rather, what we will look at below are a handful of 
studies that have explored the topic of grace in Philo and Paul, as well as those that 
have compared Philo and Paul to gain a clearer grasp of the two figures themselves. 
 The early work of Moffatt explored the dynamics of grace in both Philo and Paul.61 
Moffatt is one of the few pre-Sanders works that places a strong emphasis on the 
importance of grace in Philo’s thought.62 However, Moffat’s treatment of Philo was 
                                                        
58 To avoid needlessly inflating footnotes, I will point to the discussion and literature cited in Runia, 
Philo in Early Christian Literature, 66–74; F. Siegert, “Philo and the New Testament,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Philo (ed. A. Kamesar; Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 183–191. Reviews of scholarship on Philo can 
be found in: P. Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria: a Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research Since World 
War II,” in ANRW 2.21 (Hellenistisches Judentum in Römischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus) (ed. W. Haase; Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 233–82; D.T. Runia and R. Radice, Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography 
1937-1986 (Leiden: Brill, 1992); D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography 1987-1996, with 
Addenda for 1937-1986 (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 
59 For an early catalogue of parallels, see Chadwick, “Paul and Philo.”  
60 Note S. Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” JBL 81 (1962): 2: “Abstractly, Qumran might have influenced the 
NT, or abstractly, it might not have,... or Philo Paul. The issue for the student is not the abstraction but 
the specific. Detailed study is the criterion, and the detailed study ought to respect the context and not 
be limited to juxtaposing mere excerpts. Two passages may sound the same in splendid isolation from 
their context, but when seen in context reflect difference rather than similarity.” 
61 See also the works of G.P. Wetter, Charis: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ältesten Christentums (Leipzig: 
Druck von O. Brandstetter, 1913) and J. Wobbe, Der Charis-Gedanke bei Paulus: Ein Beitrag zur 
neutestamentlichen Theologie (Münster, 1932). A more thematic work is M. Theobald, Die Überströmende 
Gnade: Studien zu einem Paulinischen Motivfeld (Würzburg, 1982), which focuses on the theme of 
“superabundance” in Paul. Cf. also the more recent B. Eastman, The Significance of Grace in the Letters of 
Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), which looks at grace throughout Paul’s letters under broad headings 
like “Dependence on God” and “Human Responsibility.”  
62 E.g., J. Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), 47: “Nothing is 
more characteristic of Philo than this emphasis upon the grace of God.” Note also H.A.A. Kennedy, Philo’s 
Contribution to Religion (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919). 
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quite short,63 and his comparisons of Philo and Paul even shorter, and were, despite 
Moffat’s charitable reading of Philo, still prone to measuring Philo against Christian 
theology.64 Additionally, Moffat raised an ostensible problematic in Philo’s thought – 
“Grace comes freely to any man...and yet somehow the reception of it does depend 
upon a certain capacity” – that he believed Philo left unresolved. However, as I will seek 
to show, this “ultimate myster[y] of religion” is not in fact so mysterious.65 
 The closest work to this study is Zeller’s Charis bei Philon und Paulus.66 Zeller’s work is 
what the title suggests – a focused comparison of Philo and Paul on grace. Zeller makes 
the distinction that for Philo, the place where grace is experienced is “die Welt als 
Schöpfung Gottes,” a kind of “ontologische Gnade,” while for Paul God’s grace is bound 
up with “die an den endgeschichtlichen Kairos des Kreuzesgeschehens.”67 This leads to 
very different explicating systems for divine grace: for Philo, grace in creation 
establishes a “Wohltätigkeitsethik” which determines how gifts are given, most often 
“an die Würdigen.”68 By contrast, the “Heilsgeschehen” that is Christ’s death and 
resurrection establishes a disjunction between faith/grace and works. Grace thus 
comes “gerade dem Sünder,” not according to any ethic. Zeller’s study is very helpful, 
and I have no desire to disparage any of its contents to make space for my own work; 
rather, I believe my work will both complement and develop Zeller’s (though there will 
also be differences in argument and, especially, of emphasis).69 Nevertheless, there are 
at least two reasons why this study is justified in the light of Zeller’s work. First, 
although it was written in 1990, Zeller makes no mention of the New Perspective, which 
is a strange omission. On a related note, Zeller’s study is now over twenty years old, and 
although there should be no prejudice against aging works, scholarship on Philo, Paul, 
and gift-giving have advanced since then. Second, and more important, is that Zeller’s 
                                                        
63 Moffatt, Grace, 45–51. 
64 For example, Moffatt, Grace, 45 states that “Philo’s transcendentalism prevented him from 
realizing that God could give Himself to men.” 
65 Moffatt, Grace, 49. Cf. also É. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie (2nd 
ed.; Paris, 1925), 278. 
66 D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990). 
67 Zeller, Charis, 197 and 36. 
68 Zeller, Charis, 198. 
69 For example, I place more emphasis on why and how exactly Paul and Philo differ on their 
understandings of God’s gifts to the worthy/unworthy; see the brief discussion in Zeller, Charis, 65–72. 
Additionally, I would challenge Zeller’s assertion that the “Gratuität” of Paul’s understanding of grace is 
“weit radikaler als Philon.” 
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work is quite brief, with a significant amount of space devoted to grace in antiquity, 
Greek-speaking Judaism, pre- and post-Pauline NT traditions, as well as considerations 
of what traditions may have influenced Philo or Paul (e.g. Philo and the wisdom 
tradition). Consequently, the resulting space to set forth both Philo and Paul on grace, 
and to put them in conversation, is limited; sustained exegesis of individual texts, 
especially for Philo, is therefore also limited. Setting the ancient context for Philo and 
Paul is important, but it often precludes more extensive engagement with the authors 
themselves. Thus, while Zeller’s work is commendable, plenty of work – and nuancing – 
on this topic is still required. 
 Works by Watson and Barclay have also sought to place Philo and Paul in 
conversation.70 Watson’s study is focused “on a single point: the fact that Paul and his 
fellow-Jews read the same texts, yet read them differently.”71 Watson thus seeks to set a 
“three-way conversation” between the biblical text, Paul, and a fellow Second Temple 
figure such as Philo. Watson’s approach both enables dialogue between the different 
figures and thus also illuminates their dissimilar hermeneutical practices.  For example, 
in their readings of the Abraham story in Genesis, Philo believes “Abraham not only 
observed the law,” but also his “acts of obedience are heightened and celebrated, and 
actions about which questions might be raised are rewritten to ensure that such 
questions are not raised.” By contrast, Paul takes “Genesis 15.6 at face value: Abraham’s 
righteousness is constituted merely by his acceptance of God’s promise to act on his 
behalf.”72 Or in their readings of Exodus, Philo displays an “enlightened humanism” in 
which the Law provides a “framework capable of comprehending human life in its 
entirety,” while Paul revels in “paradox,” the fact that there is a “fundamental contrast 
between the old [order] and new.”73 For Watson, then, Philo and Paul read scripture in 
remarkably divergent ways. What cannot be fully addressed – though Watson does 
                                                        
70 The relation of my project to that of Watson and Barclay is, again, similar to Linebaugh, God, Grace, 
and Righteousness, which is a parallel project. The differences stem from the fact that Linebaugh is 
comparing Paul with Wisdom, not Philo; and more specifically, he is comparing Romans with Wisdom, 
whereas I will be using all of Paul’s letters. The different comparison partners and thus fields of analysis 
raise different questions and place the emphasis in different areas. 
71 F. Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T&T Clark, 2004), ix. 
72 Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 268. 
73 Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 312–313. 
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provide direction – is the why of Philo’s and Paul’s dissimilar readings of the same texts; 
nor is there a direct focus on grace.  
 Two studies by Barclay address that question quite specifically, yet are restricted in 
scope and length.74 For example, Barclay compares Philo’s Leg. 3.65-106 with Romans 9 
to determine “as precisely as possible in what respects Paul’s theology of grace was 
radical and of such revolutionary potential for later interpreters.”75 Noting the 
discrepancies between Philo’s God, who acts in giving to uphold a moral order, and 
Paul’s God, whose gift disrupts precisely that order, Barclay summarizes: “the issue 
between Paul and this particular Jewish contemporary is not whether God acts in grace, 
but whether it is either possible or helpful to think that God acted in grace in Christ in a 
way that went beyond reason and surpassed systems of ‘worth.’”76 In a similar study, 
Barclay examines the relationship between divine and human agency in relation to 
grace.77 Accordingly, Barclay traces how grace drives Philo’s understanding of human 
virtue, and how for Paul the Christ-event is the supreme act of grace that reconstitutes 
human agency. Here Barclay notes that deciding which of the two have a more radical 
notion of grace would be fruitless; both press the priority of divine grace to such an 
extent where, for Philo, human action seems unnecessary or illusory, and for Paul, 
divine election makes God seem “willfully arbitrary.”78 Barclay presses the point that 
Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of grace are in many ways similar, but the 
“theological framework[s] in which they place this grace” are quite different. In each 
study, the smaller field of investigation is argued to be indicative of Philo’s and Paul’s 
larger theologies, and Barclay repeatedly stresses that what separates Philo and Paul is 
precisely the differing particularities of grace. Barclay’s work thus signals the 
opportunity for a project that places Philo and Paul in conversation on grace more 
comprehensively, which can more fully probe into the argumentative logic and 
similarity-in-contrast between these two figures. 
                                                        
74 A fuller treatment is forthcoming, which will dovetail with the emphases here; Barclay, Gift. 
75 J.M.G. Barclay, “Grace Within and Beyond Reason:  Philo and Paul in Dialogue,” in Paul, Grace and 
Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches (ed. P. Middleton et al.; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 9. 
76 Barclay, “Grace Within and Beyond,” 20. 
77 J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in 
Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; 
London: T&T Clark, 2008), 140–57 
78 Cf. Barclay, “Grace and Agency,” 156–157. 
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 A final set of studies that should be mentioned are those that set Paul’s 
understanding of grace within the context of ancient benefaction. The most helpful and 
relevant work in this category is that of Harrison.79 Harrison’s thesis is that “the 
Graeco-Roman benefaction context of χάρις is the backdrop for Paul’s understanding of 
divine and human grace.”80 Harrison is thorough both in his overview of literature on 
the topic and also, more impressively, in his extensive treatment of χάρις throughout 
the ancient world; he examines the inscriptions, papyri, Jewish literature (Philo 
included),81 and the ancient philosophers, before turning to Paul. Thus engaging a vast 
amount of historical evidence, Harrison is successful in painting a rich, multifaceted 
context for understanding Paul, for which all scholars should be grateful. But his work 
is not without its issues. First, Harrison regularly identifies – or perhaps, confuses – 
discussions of context and influence with the interpretation of texts. That is, when 
Harrison turns to a Pauline text, the discussion of that Pauline text is typically 
overwhelmed by discussions of potential background topics, with the Pauline text itself 
receiving little direct attention. Accordingly, the value of Harrison’s study is in his 
historical work, not in close readings of the Pauline texts themselves.  
 Second, Harrison’s work tries to prove, or assumes, a spectrum, particularly from 
the inscriptions to Philo (and Josephus) and finally to Paul, where gift-giving is more 
and more purified from reciprocity. In the first-century, as attested especially by the 
inscriptions, we see an “ethos of reciprocity,” in which there is a constant giving and 
receiving, a bond between human relations and relations with the gods that demands 
gratitude and counter-gifts.82 However, in Philo we see a critique of gift-giving in its 
benefaction context (e.g. Cher. 122-123).83 Thus, “Philo’s understanding of χάρις and the 
ethos of reciprocity is largely typical of his times, with the exception of his stronger 
                                                        
79 J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 
Note also Z.A. Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, And Conversion In The Religions Of The 
Ancient Mediterranean (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004); S. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and 
Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). A helpful overview is D.A. DeSilva, 
“Patronage and Reciprocity: The Context of Grace in the New Testament,” ATJ 31 (1999): 32–84. 
80 Harrison, Grace, 1. 
81 See Harrison, Grace, 114–133. 
82 See throughout Harrison, Grace, 26–96. 
83 I read this text somewhat differently than Harrison; see chapter 5, section 4.1. 
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emphasis on the unilateral nature of divine grace.”84 Further, “Paul’s emphasis on the 
unilateral nature of grace was directed against the idea that God was compelled by acts 
of human piety to reciprocate beneficently.”85 In a move parallel to Derrida’s concern to 
uphold the (modern) concept of a “pure,” non-reciprocal gift, Harrison asks why Paul 
would use χάρις, which could possibly misrepresent “God’s unilateral grace as some 
type of reciprocal contract?”86 Paul could be overturning the do ut des sensibilities of 
ancient benefaction or the idea that humans can properly requite God’s generosity. 
Harrison even believes it possible that Paul used χάρις instead of ἔλεος because the 
Hebrew ןח perhaps “better preserved for Paul the nuance of a unilateral transaction,” 
as opposed to דסח, which might have an “overtone of reciprocity.”87 
 It is strange that Harrison is at such pains to paint Paul’s context and to say that he 
is best understood within that context, only then to assert that he does not really fit on 
one of its most central aspects.88 While I have no problem with arguing that Paul 
sometimes sits awkwardly in his context (and we will see that, occasionally, he does) or 
that he would have had issues with many facets of Graeco-Roman gift-giving, the 
problem here is the word “unilateral.” It is true that neither Philo nor Paul espouse 
some sort of crude do ut des, nor is the process of reciprocity mechanical; but is it 
possible that both Philo and Paul construe the motivations, manners, and ends of 
reciprocity differently than most in their contexts, while still fitting their context just 
fine? There is no need to “purify” Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of gift-giving. 
 A final point of critique – directed more at Crook than Harrison – is important for 
this work. Both scholars see part of their duty as peeling off the traditional theological 
significance of grace by focusing on Paul’s understanding of grace within the Greco-
                                                        
84 Harrison, Grace, 133. 
85 Harrison, Grace, 18. 
86 Harrison, Grace, 35. See also 284. 
87 Harrison, Grace, 286–287. Some scholars have questioned whether Graeco-Roman benefaction is 
the proper backdrop for Paul; for example, C. Breytenbach, Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death of Christ 
in Graeco-Roman Metaphors (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 207–238 unconvincingly argues that “Paul’s notion of the 
χάρις of God has its foundation in this important and influential biblical tradition, and not in the 
benefactor ideology of the Roman Empire” (226). Ancient benefaction only “provides the metaphor” for 
Paul’s understanding of divine mercy. The notion that χάρις and ἔλεος can be conceptually distinguished 
such that one can, essentially, stand for Graeco-Roman benefaction and the other for a Jewish 
understanding of God is suspect. 
88 Harrison, Grace, 285 even notes that divine grace “animates and impels human beneficence,” which 
is “highly unusual in Graeco-Roman religion.” 
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Roman world of gift-exchange. For Harrison, past studies are dogged by the double-
problem of being too theological, of using “abstract ideological categories,” while also 
lacking proper historical rigor.89 Scholars have made grace a timeless construct and 
have not therefore let theological questions arise organically from Paul’s own 
concerns.90 Similarly, for Crook, the problem is “theological χάρις,” which emphasizes 
that grace is for sinners, in relation to justification, forgiveness, and so forth, all of 
which “likely has more to do with the result of centuries of Christian handling of the 
term” rather than a reading of Paul as one who received an unrequested benefaction 
from his divine patron.91 The first problem, of course, is that “theological χάρις” is the 
result of even a cursory reading of Paul, not of absorbing post-Reformation dogmatics. 
Any theologizing that cannot be explained, for example, by the picture of ancient 
benefaction system that Crook constructs is to be avoided as theological distortion. Yet, 
by de-theologizing the texts, Crook essentially boils Paul down to the lowest common 
denominator: standard patron-client relationships.92 Thus, what he cannot do is handle 
the particularity of Paul. We need not proclaim Paul to be sui generis in all his thought; 
yet, while some theological interpreters certainly do over-read theology into terms 
(“free gift,” etc.), they are at least trying to make sense of the particularity of Paul’s 
vision. 
 The historical context of Paul’s letters (or Philo’s treatises) is illuminating, but it 
can also serve as a straightjacket to determine what Paul can say. There is always a 
danger of both contextual, as well as theological, over-determination. Accordingly, we 
must start and finish with the texts themselves, whose own logics are our first concern. 
 None of these critiques are meant to deny the real contribution of, especially, 
Harrison’s book; rather, I want to emphasize precisely where it is significant. Informed 
by Harrison’s excellent historical work, I will argue that the theology of Paul’s 
understanding of gift needs to be reopened by proceeding with a historically-informed 
theological study, in conversation with Philo. In the following pages, we will not leave 
historical work behind; as I have already stated, I believe Philo and Paul make the most 
                                                        
89 J.R. Harrison, “Paul, Theologian of Electing Grace,” in Paul and His Theology (ed. S.E. Porter; Leiden: 
Brill, 2006), 107. Cf. Harrison, Grace, 8–13. 
90 Harrison, Grace, 8–13; Harrison, “Theologian of Electing Grace,” 79–80. 
91 Crook, Conversion, 164. 
92 Cf. Crook, Conversion, 193. 
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sense as first-century figures. But as Paul was a historical figure who employed the 
concept of grace within his historical context, it had meaning for him historically and 
socially insofar as it was theologically interpreted. 
3.3 Summary and Prospect 
In sections two and three we have seen how, because of either theological or 
historical/contextual presuppositions, much of scholarship has placed Philo and Paul 
into a strained relationship of either identity or antithesis. What these earlier historical 
and theological studies invite, therefore, is a deeper and more focused study of the 
Philonic and Pauline texts both in themselves and also in relation to one another. That 
is, there is still plenty of room for a full, nuanced comparison of grace in Philo and Paul, 
and my intention is to build on these earlier studies with the hope of advancing the 
conversation.93 If either identity or antithesis have been the options for understanding 
the relationship of Philo to Paul – they are either fully compatible or fully incompatible 
on the question of grace – the purpose of this study is to use Philo and Paul as 
paradigm-cases for a comparison where grace, for both individuals, is both emphatic 
and different. Thus, I will seek to chart new terrain between identity and antithesis, 
which will call into question many of the presuppositions of earlier studies on the 
relationship of Paul and Judaism (both Old and New Perspectives), as well as historical 
and theological studies on grace which assume that “grace” is a static concept. 
 Accordingly, throughout the following chapters we must ask both Philo and Paul: 
why does God give gifts and what gifts does God give? To whom are these gifts given 
and what results from receiving them? 
4.  Methodological Issues 
Although I believe the following chapters will substantiate why Philo is a valid object of 
study in himself and for comparison with Paul, the relative absence of Philo from 
                                                        
93 There are other works related to financial matters in Paul that are important, but not wholly 
relevant for this study; see P. Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relations with the 
Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987); G.W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-
Exchange and Christian Giving (Cambridge: CUP, 1997); and now esp. D. Briones, “Paul’s Financial Policy: A 
Socio-Theological Approach” (PhD, Durham University, 2011). 
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discussions of Paul and Judaism both gives space for such an investigation of Philo but 
also calls it into question.94 Two main reasons can justify the presence of Philo here. 
First, as noted above, Philo has often suffered from being considered anything other 
than what he was: a diaspora Jew. As Boccaccini notes, many have approached Philo 
with “historically determined prejudices” that he fits best with the Church Fathers or 
Greek philosophers, but not with “the culture and faith of his people in his time.”95 Yet, 
as Boccaccini also notes, the simple biographical facts of Philo’s life suffice to prove his 
Jewish credentials.96 Additionally, recent studies have addressed the issue of Philo’s 
Jewish identity, arguing that, rather straightforwardly, Philo was a Greek-speaking Jew 
of the Second Temple Period.97 Such a reassessment of Philo’s Jewish identity makes 
him immediately relevant for this topic in reappraising the place of grace in Paul and 
Judaism; indeed, Philo may be all the more important because of his relative absence 
from such discussions thus far. Second, there is a huge proliferation of gift-language 
and concepts in Philo; it would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to find an author 
who speaks about, references, or structures his thought on divine grace more than 
Philo. Accordingly, the similarity-in-contrast between Philo and Paul – both 
biographically and theologically – renders the why of this comparison somewhat 
superfluous. Paul and Philo were two diaspora Jews who interpreted scripture and 
believed divine generosity was paramount for understanding who God is and how God 
relates to the world: they are obvious objects of comparison on this topic. 
 A second issue to clarify is the nature of this comparison. In the following five 
chapters, I will attempt to set forth Philo’s, then Paul’s, understandings of divine grace, 
allowing their respective positions to illuminate and question the other. I will thus seek 
to follow what Engberg-Pedersen has termed the lex Malherbe: “comparison...requires a 
thorough knowledge of each figure to be compared in his own right and on his own 
                                                        
94 For the relevance of Philo for NT studies, see the essays by Sterling, Nickelsburg, and Hurtado in R. 
Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr, eds., Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen, I. 
Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judeo-Hellenisticum (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004). 
95 G. Boccaccini, Middle Judaism: Jewish Thought, 300 B.C.E. to 200 C.E (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 
189–190. 
96 For the view that Philo was, first and foremost, an interpreter of scripture, see P. Borgen, Philo of 
Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (Leiden: Brill, 1997). Cf. also V. Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de 
l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie (Leiden: Brill, 1977). 
97 See, for example, D.T. Runia, “Philo, Alexandrian and Jew,” in Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo 
of Alexandria (Hampshire: Variorum, 1990), 4–5. 
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premises.98 More groundwork will be necessary for Philo – a lesser known quantity to 
most – to show how grace functions in his thought, and once that groundwork is laid, 
Philo will be used as a conversation partner for Paul on a range of interrelated topics.  
 However, comparisons between ancient figures can be problematic. As Sanders 
argued, difficulties of both “imbalance” and “imposition” can skew a comparison.99 
First, by imbalance, Sanders referred to the problem of comparing one individual, Paul, 
with essentially the whole of Palestinian Jewish literature. While this difficulty in our 
case is not quite as severe, we have exponentially more Philonic material than Pauline. 
Yet, as Sanders concluded, “There seems, however, to be no choice.”100 Fortunately, on 
the topic of grace, I believe, and will argue, that Philo is quite consistent. Accordingly, 
by approaching Philo largely thematically, I will seek to interpret and explain as many 
Philonic texts as possible; but there would be no benefit to looking at them all. This will 
further attenuate the problem of imbalance.101 Second, imposition, for Sanders, 
referred to the potential homogenizing of a “rich a profusion of views” by “deriv[ing] a 
pattern of religion” from a body of literature, imposing an “artificial pattern.”102 For 
this project, the problem of imposition is not so much of forcing consistency on Philo 
or Paul, but of letting the agenda of one impose certain questions or interpretive 
options onto the other. I will seek to avoid this pitfall by setting forth the views of Philo 
and Paul in themselves, but the reader will be the ultimate judge of success or failure 
on this count. 
                                                        
98 T. Engberg-Pedersen, “Self-Sufficiency and Power: Divine and Human Agency in Epictetus and 
Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency, 118. Engberg-Pedersen is referring, of course, to the work and method 
of A.J. Malherbe; see, e.g., A.J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1989). 
99 Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 19–20. 
100 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 19. 
101 Although Philo is considered by many to be a “prolix and seemingly incoherent author,” as D.T. 
Runia, Philo and the Church Fathers (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 188 notes, the following chapters can be viewed as 
an argument for a general coherence to his thought. This is not to claim that Philo never contradicted 
himself, but I echo the judgment of J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to 
Trajan (323 BCE - 117 CE) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 164: “Occasionally Philo incorporates extraneous or 
inconsistent material, but he is generally in control of his own theology and critical of ideas he cannot 
harmonize with Scripture.” 
102 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 20. 
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 A third methodological issue is that of words and concepts.103 Here we need only 
note two things. First, this is not a study of the word χάρις but of the concept of gift-
giving in Philo and Paul, both of whom almost always – though sometimes not – 
expound the concept through the use of various gift-words (e.g. χάρις, δωρεά). Second, 
I make the basic assumption that words can have different meanings in different 
contexts – i.e., a word such as χάρις can mean something different in Paul’s compared 
to Philo’s writings. It will have different connotations because of its dissimilar 
syntactical connections and rhetorical-theological purposes.104 Thus, I will not assume 
from the start that gift-language is or points to a known quantity. As Cohen has argued, 
the vocabulary of “Hellenistic-Jewish texts,” such as Philo’s, largely underwent 
“Christian re-definitions,” which were “until fairly recently...accepted as their primary 
connotations by scholars of these texts.”105 This, in turn, has often led to a misreading 
of those texts. There is no inherent meaning to a word like χάρις; rather, we must let 
each author define their own use of it and make their own connections. Only then will a 
comparison between the two be fruitful. 
 Finally, I should make clear what Philonic and Pauline texts I will use and how I will 
approach them. For Philo, I will make use of the full range of his writings, including a 
few fragments not included in his collected works.106 It is notoriously difficult to date 
Philo’s individual treatises, or to plot chronological, thematic, theological or other 
kinds of development in Philo’s thought. Consequently, and since I believe Philo’s core 
theological commitments about divine generosity are consistent throughout his works, 
there would be no profit to dividing his thought chronologically or by genre; thus, I will 
take all of his works together. For Paul, I will assume the standard seven letters 
                                                        
103 The essential study here is J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: OUP, 1962). See 
further M. Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics (rev. ed.; Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1994). 
104 Cf. N.G. Cohen, “Context and Connotation. Greek Words for Jewish Concepts in Philo,” in Shem in 
the Tents of Japhet: Essays on the Encounter of Judaism and Hellenism (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 31: “...an important 
dimension of their writings is missed unless their words are also read in the same semantic field in which 
they were written.” 
105 Cohen, “Context and Connotation,” 32. 
106 The standard Greek text of Philo is L. Cohn, P. Wendland, and S. Reiter, eds., Philonis Alexandrini 
Opera Quae Supersunt (6 vols.; Berlin, 1896-1914), which is followed almost completely by the Loeb 
Classical Library; F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker, and R. Marcus, eds., Philo (Cambridge, MA, 1929-1962). I have 
used the LCL texts and provide references to other texts as needed. All translations of Philo and Paul are 
my own unless otherwise noted. 
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(Romans, 1-2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, Philemon).107 The 
main focus here will be on Romans, 1-2 Corinthians, and Galatians – with glances at 
other letters – in order to follow Paul where he speaks most explicitly about divine (and 
human) gift-giving. There will ultimately be some discrepancy between the ways 
Philo’s and Paul’s texts are used, which relates to the problem of “imbalance” that 
Sanders noted. That is, with Paul interpreters have the benefit of being able to work 
slowly verse-by-verse. The amount of material in Philo, however, precludes such an 
approach; consequently, the chapters on Philo will alternate between exegesis of 
specific texts and discussions of multiple texts. 
5.  Overview of the Thesis 
This study has three main objectives. 
 In Part One, in order to avoid asking Pauline questions of Philo, I will set forth 
Philo’s understanding of divine generosity. In chapter one, I will explore the major 
facets of Philo’s doctrine of God to examine if and how they contribute to his notion of 
God as one who is wholly generous. For Philo, God is nothing if not φιλόδωρος, a lover 
of gifts and giving. But how do the other aspects of God’s being relate to his generosity? 
The focus will therefore be Philo’s language and logic for God’s munificence. The final 
section will raise the issue of how God is both inexplicably gracious yet also a rationally 
discriminate giver. In chapter two, I will explore this potential discrepancy further by 
examining how exactly Philo constructs his concept of worth. As I will argue, to be 
virtuous is to be worthy to receive gifts; but what is the source of virtue? To answer 
this question, I will investigate the congruence of cosmology and ethics in Philo’s 
thought.  
 In Part Two, I will turn to Paul. Chapters three and four largely mirror the first two 
chapters on Philo. Thus, in chapter three I will trace how Paul locates God’s generosity 
                                                        
107 However, I do not believe the differences or possible trajectories between the authentic Paulines 
and the others are that great with respect to the theme of grace. Broadly put, one possible development 
is that while Paul typically understands God’s grace as the Christ-event, the author(s) of the deutero-
Paulines and Pastorals – Paul or otherwise – also links grace with pre-temporal election or a salvation to-
be-revealed; cf., e.g., 2 Tim 1.9: God’s grace was “given to us in Christ Jesus before eternal times” (χάριν 
τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων). The moves are subtle and could reasonably be 
either a development by Paul of his own thought, an attempt to address certain aporiae in Paul’s 
thought, or a maximizing of Paul’s grace-works antithesis. 
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in, and explicates that generosity by, the event of Christ’s death and resurrection. 
Accordingly, if Philo’s theology works from the creational foundation of the gift-nature 
of all things, what is the effect of working from the foundation of the Christ-event for 
Paul’s understanding of his present time and his reading of scriptural history?108 
Chapter four will explore how the Christ-gift is given and how it is received, asking 
specifically, what role does Paul as apostle play in divine gift-giving? I will thus study 
how Paul’s testimony encapsulates three important facets of divine giving: the 
unfitting recipient, apostleship as a gift, and apostolic proclamation as inherent to the 
reception of the gift. Finally, in chapter five I will investigate how for Paul the divine 
gift ultimately founds and binds together a social reality, and I will then probe certain 
aspects of that social reality. For example, what role in gift-giving is there for human 
recipients of the Christ-gift?  
 As already stated, the overarching aim is to place Philo and Paul in conversation. 
While Part One sets out Philo sans Paul, Philo is present throughout Part Two, 
questioning the logic of Paul’s thought and serving as a conversation partner. Philo’s 
appearances throughout the Paul chapters will be varied. In chapter three, he is a 
consistent voice that interrogates Paul. In chapter four, he has little to say throughout 
the chapter – on apostolic mediation! – but appears at the end in the discussion of gifts 
to the (un)worthy. Finally, in chapter five, a significant portion of the chapter is spent 
elaborating Philo’s views on human giving, community, and thanksgiving in relation to 
Paul. The comparison between Philo and Paul is never lost from view, but each chapter 
in Part Two approaches the comparison differently. 
 As we will see, both Philo and Paul, in Sanders’ words, keep “the gift and demand of 
God...in a healthy relationship with each other.”109 But, we might say, each defines, 
configures, and understands “gift,” “demand,” “healthy,” and “relationship” 
differently. The intention – and hope – of this study is to shed clarifying light on divine 
                                                        
108 Of course, it should be noted that Philo’s and Paul’s theologies of gift-giving are not abstract 
concepts formed apart from their social realities, but are inextricably tied to their own social conditions 
and purposes. Thus, for example, Philo’s understanding of God’s abundant generosity cannot be detached 
from his existence in Alexandria as a wealthy and politically important Jew; and Paul’s understanding of 
the Christ-gift as a gift that is incongruous to its recipients cannot be separated from either his own 
experience or the experience and practice of the Gentile mission. 
109 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 427. 
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grace in Philo, Paul, and on how the fundamental theological structures and logic of 
their thought relate to each other. 
Chapter 1:  The Perfect God who Gives 
 
The devout Philo believed in God the giver. No one in his day urged this religious 
conviction with more power and moving passion.1 
 
1.  Introduction 
For Philo, the hallmark of piety is to “attribute everything to God” (ἅπαντα δὲ 
προσάπτει θεῷ).2 At its core, Philo’s oeuvre can be understood as an attempt to do just 
that. Philo’s God is the perfect Cause of all reality, the creating Being who overflows 
with goods upon the cosmos: everything is credited to God and considered a gift. 
Accordingly, a primary metaphor Philo uses to characterize God is that of a giver — a 
point that has received insufficient attention from interpreters.3 Thus, in this chapter I 
will demonstrate how the principal themes of Philo’s doctrine of God contribute to and 
propel his understanding of divine generosity. As Moffatt states, “this Alexandrian sage 
and saint is never tired of speaking about God, and he never speaks very long about any 
aspect of God without introducing grace.”4 I will argue that three axioms constitute 
Philo’s view of divine beneficence, serving as grammatical rules for how one properly 
speaks about God’s generosity: God is 1) creator and cause of all things, 2) by nature 
hyper-generous, and 3) in his actions a perfect and incommensurate giver.5 These three 
axioms are interrelated and build on each other, and they must be interpreted in 
relation to one central rule: God is wise and rational, and therefore gives gifts according 
to who the recipient is and what is needed. Furthermore, the order of the axioms is 
important: Philo situates God’s generosity in his creative activity, and the way he 
                                                        
1 J. Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), 45. 
2 Leg. 3.29.  
3 Some notable exceptions are Kennedy, Moffatt, Zeller. The problem has not been that scholars did 
not notice Philo’s emphasis on divine generosity, but rather they have tended to attempt to situate Philo 
in his historical-philosophical context rather than work out the logic of his own thought. 
4 Moffatt, Grace, 48. 
5 Cf. D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 433: “Philo’s doctrine of 
God is the coping stone of his thought. ...an understanding of Philo’s views on the nature and activity of 
God will ensure that the other aspects of his thinking will settle securely into place.” Or M. Hadas-Lebel, 
Philo of Alexandria: A Thinker in the Jewish Diaspora (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 181: “[t]hree themes constitute the 
very essence of his doctrine: God, the Law, and spiritual advancement.” In this scheme, this chapter deals 
with the first theme and the next chapter will explore the latter two. 
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speaks of divine giving must be examined from this perspective. Divine grace is 
cosmological and causative: God’s first and greatest gift is creation, and all other gifts 
bring the recipient in line with the order God has built into the cosmos. Therefore, in 
this chapter I will present how and why, for Philo, everything is a movement of divine 
generosity from a good God who needs nothing and therefore gives to his creation, 
while in the next chapter I will delineate more specifically the theological and 
philosophical constructs that frame Philo’s understanding of gift-giving (e.g. Law of 
Nature, virtue). 
2.  God as Cause and Creator of All  Things 
Philo uses two concepts to explain how all created reality originates from God: the 
(primarily) philosophical concept of God as cause and the (primarily) biblical concept of 
God as creator. Philo uses whichever he needs as the situation calls for it, because both 
ideas point to the same truth in slightly different ways. Therefore, we will explore them 
sometimes together and sometimes separately, as needed by the evidence. The idea 
that God is the source of all reality – that God brings existence from nonexistence, 
order from chaos – provides the foundation and framework for Philo’s understanding 
of God’s generosity.  
2.1 Piety and Proper Understanding of God’s Causation 
Philo aligns human piety with belief in God’s causation, because it is fundamental to his 
thought that God alone created everything.6 The wise person’s belief in God as cause is 
the confirmation of piety (εὐσεβείας βεβαίωσις).7 For example, by leaving his astrology-
ridden homeland, Abraham learned that all things are governed by the cause who 
created them, not by fate.8 Similarly, Abraham refused to receive from the king of 
                                                        
6 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in 
Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; 
London: T&T Clark, 2008), 142: “God’s gracious causation of all that exists is of critical importance for 
Philo in distinguishing his philosophy from impious alternatives, and in motivating the central core of 
piety, gratitude to God.” 
7 Mut. 155. 
8 Abr. 78. Cf. P. Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 128; S. 
Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 61; for a broader discussion, see W.L. 
Knox, “Abraham and the Quest for God,” HTR 28 (1935): 55–60; and the response by S. Sandmel, 
“Abraham’s Knowledge of the Existence of God,” HTR 44 (1951): 137–39. 
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Sodom (Gen 14.21-23), which exemplifies Abraham’s belief that “all things come from 
the only wise God,” not from created things.9 Likewise, the essence of the “Great Vow” 
(cf. Num 6.2) is the belief that “God himself and from himself is the cause of good 
things” (τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸν ἀφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ).10 Confessing God as cause is such a 
great work (ἔργον) that it cannot be properly viewed as a work of the soul but of God 
who “shines thanksgiving” in the soul.11 The result of such belief is the presentation of 
offerings to God. Thus, Abel offered the firstborn in confession that even the older 
causes are held together according to the oldest of the causes, God.12 
By contrast, disavowing God’s causation is an unmistakable sign of impiety. Thus, 
some proudly consider “themselves the causes of the good things which happen,”13 
which is essentially self-deification, “hiding God who is the true Cause of creation” (τὸν 
ὡς ἀληθῶς αἴτιον γενέσεως ὄντα θεόν),14 and idolatry.15 The minds of such people are 
blinded—they cannot see God but only the world and what is in the world.16 Pharaoh is 
a leading instantiation of this primarily Egyptian error of “being ignorant of the cause” 
because he loves the “material.”17 Yet Cain is the archetype of this impiety: Philo links 
Cain to Protagoras’ statement that “man is the measure of all things,” which means 
                                                        
9 Ebr. 105-107. 
10 Deus 87. D. Winston and J. Dillon, Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary on De Gigantibus 
and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 325 note Plato’s definition in Laws 801a: εὐχαὶ 
παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσίν; Plato also clarifies that it is particularly a seeking of something good (ὡς 
ἀγαθὸν αἰτούμενοι). Cf. Agr. 99; Sacr. 53, where Philo states that the intent of a vow is “seeking good 
things from God.” For vows in Philo, see J. Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001), 117–124; on the great vow, A. Cacciari, “Philo and the Nazirite,” in Italian Studies on Philo of 
Alexandria (ed. F. Calabi; Boston: Brill, 2003), 147–64. 
11 Leg. 1.82. On knowing God as cause: Post. 167-169. 
12 Conf. 124. Cf. Spec. 2.171-180, 204; Her. 113-124. 
13 Sacr. 54-57. Cf. Conf. 123. In response, Philo cites Deut 8.17-18a, which claims God as the one who 
“gives strength to you in order to obtain power.” Agr. 173 and Mut. 221 connect self-love with neglect of 
viewing God as Cause. Cf. D.T. Runia and A. Geljon, Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, 
Translation and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 253–254. 
14 Spec. 1.10. 
15 Self-deification is “ingratitude to the Benefactor of the whole world, who by his own power gives a 
bountiful surplus of goods to every part of the universe” (Legat. 118). 
16 Ebr. 108-110. Cf. similarly, Migr. 179-181; Spec. 1.13. 
17 Leg. 3.243. Cf. S. Pearce, The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo’s Representation of Egypt (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007), 144, 155. 
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that humans generate all things.18 Cain’s essential “offence is not to give God His due, 
which...is equivalent to the skeptic’s denial of God’s creative power.”19  
Causation can be improperly located in humanity, polytheism, or the created 
universe,20 but all who do so are like archers who, “aiming at many things and not 
aiming skillfully at any mark, put forward innumerable sources and causes of the 
creation of the universe, all of which are false, and are ignorant of the one Creator and 
Father of the universe.”21 Accordingly, belief in God as the Origin of all reality is of the 
utmost importance for Philo’s thought,22 for those who ascribe all things to God’s grace 
are truly noble.23 But there are very particular ways that God is to be understood as 
Cause. 
2.2 God’s Goodness and the Origin of Creation 
In Cher. 124-130, Philo is interpreting the declaration in Genesis 4.1, “I have obtained a 
man through God.” Philo believes that Adam has spoken improperly, because “God is 
cause, not instrument” (ὁ θεὸς αἴτιον, οὐκ ὄργανον). Adam stated that he obtained a 
man διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, where Philo believes ὑπό, παρά, and sometimes ἐκ can describe God’s 
action, but not διά.24 Whatever comes into existence is “through an instrument, but by a 
cause.” Adam mistakes the Cause for the instrument, thus making himself the cause.25 
                                                        
18 Cf. Post. 33-39; H. Najman, “Cain and Abel as Character Traits: A Study in the Allegorical Typology 
of Philo of Alexandria,” in Eve’s Children (ed. G.P. Luttikhuizen; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 107–18; A.C. Geljon, 
“Philonic Elements in Didymus the Blind’s Exegesis of the Story of Cain and Abel,” VC 61 (2007): 282–312. 
19 Leonhardt, Jewish Worship, 198. Cf. J. LaPorte, Eucharistia in Philo (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1983), 
133: “the Cain-Protagoras pair represents the chief enemy to a disposition of mind which refers 
everything to God.” 
20 Cf. Spec. 2.198. 
21 Conf. 144. Cf. Leg. 3.29-31; Somn. 2.75-77. 
22 This is consistent with Philo’s understanding of Genesis not “as a theological or cosmological tract, 
but as the preface to a document of ethical and religious content.” R. Radice, “Philo’s Theology and 
Theory of Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (ed. A. Kamesar; Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 125. 
23 Post. 42. 
24 Though see Leg. 1.41 where Philo states that some things come into existence by (ὑπό) and through 
(διά) God. Runia, Timaeus, 104, 133, 171-174 draws attention to Philo’s location in the development of 
“prepositional metaphysics” in Middle Platonism, “in which the Aristotelian doctrine of causes is 
adapted to the requirements of Platonic doctrine.” Cf. R.R. Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in 
Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 43–51; T.H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: 
Philo and the History of Interpretation (Washington D.C.: CBAA, 1983), 67–72. The term was popularized by J. 
Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 138, who was 
himself following W. Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin: Weidmann, 1964). For a helpful 
overview, see G.E. Sterling, “Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early 
Christological Hymns,” StPhA 9 (1997): 219–38. Cf. also QG 1.58; Prov. 1.23. In this latter text, the final 
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Philo’s Aristotelian understanding of causation guides his interpretation of this 
text.26 God is the first or efficient cause (τὸ ὑφ᾿ οὗ), and everything exists by him.27 The 
four elements are the material cause (τὸ ἐξ οὗ), from which the world was 
“compounded.” The instrument is the Logos (τὸ δι᾿ οὗ), which constructs or prepares 
the materials. And the final cause (τὸ δι᾿ ὅ) is the “goodness of the Demiurge” — the “for 
the sake of which” or end goal of causation.28 God is thus τὸ αἴτιον and his goodness is ἡ 
αἰτία; thus, beyond demarcating God’s role in causation, this text associates God’s 
causation and goodness.29 
Philo makes this link often. Philo asserts, “Therefore, if someone were to ask me 
what the cause of the creation of the world was (τίς αἰτία γενέσεως κόσμου), having 
learned from Moses, I would respond that the goodness of the Existent One, which is 
the eldest of the graces, is in itself the cause” (ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθότης, ἥτις ἐστὶ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cause is “the model.” Thus, as Sterling notes, Philo’s use of πρὸς ὅ rather than δι᾿ ὃ “suggests that Philo 
knows more than one analysis” (227-228). 
25 Parents do play a role in childbirth in connection with God’s causation. In Her. 171-172, parents are 
instruments of creation (ὄργανα γενέσεως). Mortal parents imitate the divine powers of creation, such 
that God is the “beginning of creation” (ἀρχὴ γενέσεως) and human parents are the end (τέλος). 
Similarly, Decal. 51; Ebr. 73; Cher. 43-46; Spec. 2.2; Cf. M. Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 170. Parents are similarly compared to God as the benefactors of their 
children; cf. Spec. 2.229-231; Decal. 165-166; Opif. 77. A.S. Carman, “Philo’s Doctrine of the Divine Father 
and the Virgin Mother,” The American Journal of Theology 9 (1905): 491–518 provides a near-comprehensive 
catalogue of passages relating to divine and human parenting. 
26 D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: CUP, 
2004), 62 clarifies that God’s causation in Aristotle is an inward activity, while, for Philo, causation is an 
“avenue by which God may be known.” 
27 Cf. Fug. 12: γέγονέ τε γὰρ ὁ κόσμος καὶ πάντως ὑπ᾿ αἰτίου τινὸς γέγονεν. As R.J. Hankinson, Cause 
and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (OUP, 2001), 342 argues, making the efficient cause the true cause 
is effectively Stoic. This is based on the idea that everything can be categorized as either an active or 
passive principle, an idea seen in Philo. For example, in Opif. 7-9 Philo distinguishes between God as 
δραστήριον αἴτιον and the world as τὸ παθητόν. On this text, see D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the 
Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Brill: Leiden, 2001), 115–
117. I agree with Runia and G. Reydams-Schils, “Stoicized Readings of Plato’s Timaeus in Philo of 
Alexandria,” StPhA 7 (1995): 89 against H. Weiss, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Hellenistischen und 
Palästinischen Judentums (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 42, that τὸ παθητόν should not be read with an 
implied αἴτιον. God causes passive created material to exist. Runia, On the Creation, 119 also links Philo’s 
insistence on God alone as highest cause to Homer’s line (Illiad 2.204-205; quoted in Conf. 170), “It is not 
good that many lords should rule, let there be one lord, one king.” Cf. E. Koskenniemi, “Philo and Greek 
Poets,” JSJ 41 (2010): 306: “Homer is now used to rebuke polytheism and to support monotheism.” 
28C.A. Anderson, Philo of Alexandria’s Views of the Physical World (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 77 
notes that “here Philo follows Plato (Tim. 29e)... But as is typical, Philo also finds a biblical basis for this 
position” in Gen 6.8. See further below. QG 1.58 omits a final cause. 
29 Runia, Timaeus, 135 claims that “Philo is the first thinker to associate the goodness of Plato’s 
demiurge with the Judaeo-Christian conception of God the creator, an event of enormous significance in 
the history of ideas.” 
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πρεσβυτάτη τῶν χαρίτων οὖσα ἑαυτῇ).30 God’s ἀγαθότης induces God’s causation.31 Philo 
often prefaces his answer with a phrase like “if anyone wants to know.”32 Philo admits 
that he is speculating, yet Platonic philosophy and the biblical language of grace permit 
him to reply. In one context, Philo says that a person would not “miss the mark” by 
answering as one of the ancients did, “that the Father and Creator is good” (ἀγαθὸν 
εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν).33 Plato is not explicitly named, though he is clearly the 
foremost of the “ancients” Philo has in mind. Elsewhere, Philo asserts that the “just 
man” learns that everything exists because of God’s grace (χάριν ὄντα τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ 
σύμπαντα); in contemplating the origin of creation (ἀρχὴ γενέσεως), one rightly says 
that it is the “goodness and grace of God, which he has given” to humanity (ἀγαθότης 
καὶ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ, ἣν ἐχαρίσατο).34 Even though he needed nothing, God created 
because he was “good and bounteous” (ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόδωρος ἦν).35 The world is thus 
not “an end in itself, for it owes its existence to the benevolent and loving creator.”36 
An amalgamation of Aristotelian and Platonic thought thus provides guidelines to 
specify God’s role in causation: God stands at the beginning of all causation, because of 
his goodness. Understanding God’s causation properly is important because this 
causation is not merely what God does but is who God is.37 Creating is God’s ἴδιον: “For 
                                                        
30 Deus 108. There is a textual issue in the phrase ἥτις ἐστὶ πρεσβυτάτη *** τῶν χαρίτων οὖσα ἑαυτῇ in 
Deus 108. P. Wendland, “Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe,” in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen 
Philosophie und Religion (ed. P. Wendland and O. Kern; Berlin: Reimer Verlag, 1895), 1–75, argued that the 
text should read πρεσβυτάτη τῶν θεοῦ δυναμέων τῶν χαρίτων οὖσα ἑαυτῇ, reflecting the idea of the 
Powers as the origin of gifts/Graces. In the Loeb edition, Colson and Whitaker 65-66 (cf. 488) supply 
πρεσβυτάτη χαρίτων, πηγή τῶν χαρίτων οὖσα ἑαυτῇ, translating it, “that goodness which is the oldest of 
His bounties and itself the source of others.” They point to Leg. 3.78 as support that goodness is itself a 
χάρις. Winston and Dillon, Two Treatises, 331 propose that as the question being asked is τίς αἰτία 
γενέσεως κόσμου, then “αἰτιῶν might be a more suitable supplement.” Both F. Calabi, God’s Acting, Man’s 
Acting: Tradition and Philosophy in Philo of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 21–22 and Zeller,  Charis, 36–37 
n.22 follow Colson and Whitaker. 
31 The question arises, then, whether God’s creating activity was necessary or freely willed. How can 
this good God not create necessarily? Runia, Timaeus, 445–446 tentatively argues for a freely willed act, 
yet he notes that God’s will cannot “be the subject of philosophical investigation,” for then one is asking 
“what God is” – an unanswerable question for Philo. 
32 Cf. Opif. 21; Leg. 3.78; Deus 108. 
33 Opif. 21. 
34 Leg. 3.78. 
35 Mut. 46. Cf. QG 2.13. 
36 P.L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: OUP, 
2006), 43. 
37 Radice, “Theory of Creation,” 124–125 notes that, in distinction from the philosophical 
methodologies of Plato, Aristotle, and Stoicism, when speaking of God (specifically as cause/creator), 
Philo does not “follow the logical sequence of problems; for example, instead of asking the question of 
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God never ceases creating, but as it is the ἴδιον of fire to burn and of snow to make cold, 
so also it is God’s ἴδιον to create.”38 Creation is God’s ἴδιον alone (ἴδιον μὲν δὴ θεοῦ τὸ 
ποιεῖν), while the ἴδιον of created beings is to suffer (ἴδιον δὲ γενητοῦ τὸ πάσχειν) or be 
acted upon, not to ποιεῖν.39 Since Philo identifies creating so closely with God’s being, 
God cannot stop creating. Thus, when Philo interprets Gen 2.2-3 – about God’s “resting” 
– Philo distinguishes between “resting” (καταπαύω), which means “cause to rest,” and 
“ceasing” (παύω). God does not cease creating but causes created things to rest, and on 
the seventh day, God ceases creating mortal things and turns to creating divine things. 
God changes activity but does not stop.40 “We have made clear that God never ceases 
from creating, but begins the creation (γενέσεως ἄρχεται)41 of other things, since he is 
not only Craftsman but also the Father of all existing things.”42  
Philo also links the cause of creation to God’s goodness qua Power: “For God is the 
name of Goodness, the Cause,” from which is clear that God caused all things not out of 
his Sovereignty but out of his Goodness.43 God is most properly understood as the 
“Existent One” – ὁ ὤν from Exodus 3.14 or, in philosophical parlance, τὸ ὄν. God is pure 
being.44 Therefore, Philo interprets “God” (ὁ θεός) and “Lord” (ὁ κύριος) not as different 
names for the Existent One, but as designating his Powers.45 The Powers bridge the gap 
between the transcendent Existent One and the actions Philo sees him performing in 
creation, as told in the Scriptures.46 As Zeller states, “[d]urch den Einsatz der Kräfte 
gelingt Philo ein philosophischer Balance-akt: er kann alles vom Seinsprinzip abhängig 
                                                                                                                                                                     
whether God exists or what He is, he rather takes for granted that God exists and that His nature is that 
of a creator.” Radice thus dubs Philo’s method “‘allegorical’ or ‘exegetical.’” 
38 Leg. 1.5. Philo picked up this use of ἴδιον from Aristotle; cf. W.E. Mann, “Immutability and 
Predication: What Aristotle Taught Philo and Augustine,” IJPR 22 (1987): 22–24. 
39 Cher. 77. 
40 Cf. Leg. 1.5-16. 
41 A.P. Bos, “Philo of Alexandria: A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle,” StPhA 10 (1998): 
66–86 argues that ἀρχὴ γενέσεως replaces Platonic concepts of God as Maker for Philo.  
42 Leg. 1.18. On God’s perpetual creative activity, see Fug. 177, 198; Her. 36, 172; Mos. 2.100; Somn. 1.76; 
Spec. 4.187. 
43 Leg. 3.73. 
44 Consequently, God cannot be named; Mos. 1.75. 
45 H.A.A. Kennedy, Philo’s Contribution to Religion (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919), 144 calls Philo’s 
doctrine of the Powers one of “those ingenious verbal distinctions to which he is so strongly addicted.” 
We will return to the Powers periodically; but for a fuller treatment, see Calabi, God’s Acting, 73–109. One 
of Philo’s favorite allegories for the Powers is the Cherubim from Genesis; cf. Cher. and F. Strickert, “Philo 
on the Cherubim,” StPhA 8 (1996): 40–57. See also the fragment De Deo; for a translation, F. Siegert, “The 
Philonian Fragment De Deo: First English Translation,” StPhA 10 (1998): 1–33. 
46 Cf. e.g. Post. 20. 
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sein lassen, ohne es in alles hineinzuziehen.”47 “God” designates the “creative power” 
(ἡ ποιητικὴ δύναμις), through which “the Father begat and crafted all things” (διὰ γὰρ 
ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως ἔθηκε τὰ πάντα ὁ γεννήσας καὶ τεχνιτεύσας πατήρ); this is why 
the statement “I am your God” is equivalent to “I am your Creator and Maker.”48 Philo 
is unequivocal that “God” is the creative and beneficent Power by which all things have 
come into existence, such that God the Power can simply be called “Goodness” 
(ἀγαθότητι τὸ πᾶν γεγεννηκέναι).49 God is δύναμις...ἡ κοσμοποιητική.50 In Moses’ 
creation account only θεός is used, and this θεός gives “always and continually” and 
acts as a benefactor constantly (ὁ ἀδιαστάτως εὐεργετῶν).51 Accordingly, “all things in 
the world and the world itself are a gift and benefaction and grace of God”52 because the 
Existent One creates by God the Power “according to which He is beneficent.” Indeed, 
in as much as God is “God,” his fitting acts are to give “graces and gifts and benefits” 
(χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ εὐεργεσίας) because he is “by nature good and bountiful” 
(ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόδωρον ὄντα φύσει).53 God not only creates because of his goodness, 
but he creates by his Goodness and it is through Goodness that he is beneficent. Thus, 
being beneficent is also a property belonging to God: θεοῦ δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν ἴδιον.54 The 
Existent One’s acts of creating and giving are located in the same power, as creation is 
the primal example and paradigm of God’s flexing his beneficent powers. Accordingly, 
God’s creating-goodness and gift-giving cannot be separated. On this link, Runia states:  
Plato’s doctrine is now explicitly attributed to Moses, but is at the same time connected 
with the unPlatonic theme of God’s grace. Indeed the goodness and the grace of God are 
                                                        
47 Zeller, Charis, 45. 
48 Mut. 29. Cf. Spec. 1.307. Because Philo connects God’s creative activity with his goodness, he also 
has a strong doctrine of providence; cf. Frick, Divine Providence; R. Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic World: 
Philo (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 36–37; A. Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish Identity (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 
46–47. In Philo, cf. esp. Opif. 9, 171-172; Sobr. 63. 
49 Cher. 27. As Hadas-Lebel, Philo of Alexandria, 184 says, God “acts in contradictory directions by the 
intermediary of his two potencies.” However, as we will discuss in the next chapter, the Powers are 
united by their location in God’s Logos. E.R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic 
Judaism (New Haven: YUP, 1935), 41–44 probably presses the unity of the Powers too far but serves as a 
corrective to exaggerations about Philo’s understanding of God’s diverse actions in the world.  
50 Opif. 21. 
51 Plant. 86, 89. 
52 Leg. 3.78. 
53 Fug. 66. See also Mos. 2.238; QE 2.51. J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 121 says “the impetus for God’s beneficence stems from His dual 
Potencies,” which seems incorrect; the impetus is God’s generous being that is expressed through the 
agency of the beneficent power alone. 
54 Mut. 129. Cf. Plant. 130: οἰκειότατόν ἐστιν ἔργον θεῷ μὲν εὐεργετεῖν. Cf also Deo 7. 
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so closely associated in Philo’s mind that the word χάρις in the Biblical text induces 
him, without any support from the context, to recollect the creational account.55  
But the goodness of Plato’s Demiurge and Philo’s God should not be confused. To quote 
Runia again, “Platonic goodness is essentially metaphysical, signifying excellence of 
being, whereas the goodness of the God of the Bible is best described in terms of grace, 
the lovingkindness and forebearance shown by a father to his children.”56 Philo’s God is 
the beneficent Creator God, who gives the world as his first and greatest εὐεργεσία. 
 God’s unceasing creative activity57 and his ultimate causation of all things place him 
in close relation to creation. However, a further and perhaps more critical specification 
relating to God’s causation goes past the “how” and “why,” to clarify what is meant 
when God’s generation of all things is affirmed. If God causes all things because of and 
by his goodness, can he create all things? The “why” of God’s creating determines the 
“how” – which should determine the “what.” Yet, Philo affirms the existence of sin and 
evil. What, then, does God create? 
2.3 What “all things” come from God?  
God is clearly the “cause of all things,”58 but set alongside this assertion is the 
superseding belief that God causes only the good.59 Philo states the issue plainly in Agr. 
128-129:  
There are some who think it pious to claim that all things exist by God, both the good 
things and the opposite things. To these we may say that part of your opinion is 
praiseworthy, but...the other is blameworthy: ...blameworthy insofar as your opinion is 
without distinction or division. For it is necessary not to mix and mingle everything 
indiscriminately while declaring [God] the cause; but with distinction confess God the 
cause of good things only. 
Few other things could be more damning than to assert God as the origin of evil,60 
because Moses “inserts in all parts of his legislation that the Deity is not the cause of 
                                                        
55 Runia, Timaeus, 133. Cf. also Anderson, Physical World, 77.  
56 Runia, Timaeus, 441. Philo’s God is also metaphysically good; the distinction is simply that Philo 
insists on this fact by pointing to how God’s goodness overflows into creation.  
57 On which, see the discussion in D. Winston, “Philo’s Theory of Eternal Creation: ‘De Prov.’ 1.6-9,” 
PAAJR 46/47 (1980): 593–606; A. Lebedev, “Xenophanes on the Immutability of God: A Neglected Fragment 
in Philo Alexandrinus,” Hermes 128 (2000): 385–386; S. Lauer, “Philo’s Concept of Time,” JJS 19 (1958): 39–
46. 
58 Fug. 141; Cf. Spec. 3.178; Ebr. 61; Det. 147; Her. 35; Decal. 52. 
59 Cf. Plato’s Republic 2.379. P. Karavites, Evil, Freedom, & the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 17–28 provides a helpful overview of positions on the origin of evil, starting with the 
ANE and ending with Philo. 
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evil.”61 Other texts speak of God simply not choosing to cause evil. God is the “cause of 
all things, able to do all things but willing only the best” (τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ καὶ 
δυναμένῳ μὲν πάντα, βουλομένῳ δὲ τὰ ἄριστα), as indeed he is the “non-production of 
evils” (ἀφορία κακῶν).62 Philo understands God’s creation of an ordered universe from 
disorder as proof that God’s wish is only to do good things, even though he can do 
otherwise.63 As Radice notes, even if “God has the power to do both good and evil, from 
an ethical perspective He neither wills evil nor has responsibility for it, because He is 
good in an absolute sense.”64 That is, God’s ontological goodness necessarily delimits 
how God acts, but it cannot then be asserted that something is beyond God’s power; it is 
not out of God’s power to give something imperfectly good, but it is out of his nature.  
 Accordingly, Philo makes certain distinctions: of all created things, “some come 
into existence by (ὑπό) God and through (διά) God, but others by God but not through 
God; the best things came into existence both by him and through him.”65 God employs 
his Powers and other subordinates to be the cause of the “opposite things” (τὰ 
ἐναντία).66 Thus, in Gen 1.26, when God says, “Let us make,”67 Philo concedes that only 
God knows why he spoke in the plural, but Philo conjectures that the plural indicates 
that God was speaking to his subordinate Powers.68 Although God is superior to 
everything, he fittingly associates with his Powers,69 because their presence is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
60 Fug. 84. Philo provides no solution to the question of the origin of evil – it just does not come from 
God. However, he does attribute it either to subordinate powers or humanity, which is an act of 
theological legerdemain. Radice, “Theory of Creation,” 144 views this as one of the more pressing 
problems for Philo’s doctrine of grace and God’s goodness. Cf. O. Leaman, Evil and Suffering in Jewish 
Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 33–47.  
61 QG 1.68. 
62 Abr. 268. 
63 Spec. 4.187. Cf. differently Leg. 3.105; Fug. 79. That God brought order from disorder is an important 
aspect of Philo’s debate with Platonist understandings of creation; cf. Winston, “Philo’s Theory of Eternal 
Creation,” 599. 
64 Radice, “Theory of Creation,” 131. 
65 Leg. 1.41. 
66 Abr. 143. Cf. Fug. 66; QG 4.42; QE 1.23. 
67 See Opif. 72-75; Conf. 169-181; Fug. 68-72; and Mut. 30-31 in which the same themes are present in 
different configurations. On these texts, cf. Runia, Timaeus, 243–245. 
68 Cf. Opif. 72. 
69 Conf. 175. Calabi, God’s Acting, 17–38 has demonstrated the problems of speaking with any 
specificity about “how ‘He who is’ is related to the powers.” The Powers can have no existence separate 
from the Existent One, but Philo uses them precisely to distance the Existent One from creation. While H. 
Conzelmann, “Χάρις Κτλ,” in TDNT (vol. 9; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 390 goes too far in stating that 
Philo develops “the notion of the δυνάμεις to the point of hypostatization,” Calabi (35-37) claims that the 
Powers primarily represent “different degrees of capacity in terms of human perception” of God; which 
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necessary due to the mixed nature of humans. While some beings participate in neither 
virtue nor vice (e.g. plants) and others only in virtue (e.g. stars), humans are capable of 
good and evil.70 Each human is μεθόριος, “on the border,” and can go either way.71 With 
this dual-capability, humans often choose evil.72 And since humans are a mix, it was 
only partly appropriate for God to create them.73 Accordingly, if humans do evil, it is 
not attributed to God, because he did not cause what made the evil possible; if humans 
do good, it is because of God’s involvement.74 
 Creation itself is thus good and perfect insofar as it reflects God’s perfection. The 
world has been created in such a way that it is a “complete work...worthy of the 
Demiurge” (παντελὲς ἔργον ἄξιόν...τοῦ δημιουργοῦ).75 Indeed, when God finished 
creating, he asked his subordinates if anything was left to be done, and one replied that 
everything was “perfect and complete,” but asked for the gift of reason, which God also 
gave.76 Yet perfection is not inherent to creation but is found in creation on account of 
the “grace of the Cause,”77 in that God shared of his own excellent nature (ἀρίστης 
αὑτοῦ φύσεως),78 and because creation was made to be in harmony with its own parts.79 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is true, of course. But this does not fix the problem that if perception is the real issue, then Philo has not 
truly safeguarded God from evil. 
70 Opif. 73. 
71 C. Termini, “Philo’s Thought Within the Context of Middle Judaism,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Philo, 104. But this understanding of human nature does not imply a robust sense of human free will; see 
below. Contra H. Windisch, Die Frömmigkeit Philos und ihre Bedeutung für das Christentum: Eine 
Religionsgeschichtliche Studie (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1909), 16, we also cannot say: “Die Erinnerung 
an die Massenhaftigkeit des menschlichen Schmutzes löst die Forderung der Selbstreinung auf.” Humans 
are fully dependent on God’s gifts for virtuous living while they live virtuously. Windisch is working in 
Protestant categories where the Law’s demand drives the sinful human to God’s grace, which, as we will 
see, is not a helpful way to approach Philo. 
72 Conf. 178: ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην αἱρεῖται μὲν πολλάκις τὰ φαυλότατα. 
73 Opif. 74. Cf. Fug. 72. 
74 Opif. 75; Mut. 31; Conf. 175-181. 
75 Cher. 112. 
76 Plant. 127-128. On this text, see Runia, Timaeus, 114–115. Cf. also Opif. 77. 
77 Plant. 93. 
78 Opif. 21. Cf. Runia, Timaeus, 438: “God, as absolute being, gives a share of his being to the cosmos 
and its parts, thereby granting his creatures existence but at the same time making his own existence 
known.” Philo also has a strong Creator-created distinction. God is beyond time and place and has 
created everything in subjection to himself (Post. 14). The “Craftsman is better than the crafted” (Decal. 
69. Cf. Leg. 2.3; Deus 80; Opif. 8-9). God is immovable, creation is moveable (Somn. 1.249; Leg. 2.83. But see 
Somn. 2.220). And God, according to his essence, is separate from everything created (τῷ πάσης γενέσεως 
διεζευγμένῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν θεῷ; Somn. 2.28. Cf. Post. 20). 
79 Cf. Spec. 4.187; Cher. 112; Post. 14; and esp. Cher. 110-112. Yet, rightly, T.H. Billings, The Platonism of 
Philo Judaeus (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1919), 13: “...this power that shapes in the physical world 
the images of His own thought cannot make those images perfect. Matter is always to some extent 
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2.4 Conclusion: God’s Gracious Creative Work 
God does not create indiscriminately: God’s goodness is itself the cause and thus he 
creates what is good. Thus, for Philo, it is vital not only to specify precisely God’s role in 
causation but also to delineate what God does and does not create—and how this is so. 
Importantly, this section demonstrates that all things – except evil – have to be 
attributed to God. Thus, unsurprisingly, Philo makes a link between goodness and 
creating and creating and gift-giving. God creates because of and by his goodness, his 
beneficent Power by which he gives gifts. Creation, then, is gift – and everything in the 
created realm is gift. Philo’s theology of creation means that literally everything that is 
not evil has to be considered through the prism of divine grace. And as we will see, 
divine grace has to be considered through the lens of creation. 
3.  God’s Hyper-Generous Nature 
3.1 God as Sole Owner of All Reality 
Philo’s logic runs as follows: since God created everything, he owns everything and 
needs nothing. There is “no room for a grudging or envious spirit in the divine,” which 
means that God can be openhanded with his creation.80 In this section I will explain 
how Philo connects God’s ownership of all things to his beneficent nature. Thus, this 
section connects the previous section to what follows. 
In Cher. 84-123 Philo uses two texts to affirm God’s undivided possession of all 
things.81 Philo begins with Numbers 28.2: “Command the sons of Israel and say to them, 
‘my gifts (δῶρα), my presents (δόματα), my burnt offerings (καρπώματα) for a fragrant 
aroma you will maintain to offer to me in my feasts.’” What entices Philo about this 
passage is the frequency of the possessive pronouns and the gift-vocabulary, which 
prompts Philo to use further gift-language, χάρις, δόσις, and δωρεά, to interpret the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
recalcitrant. Physical necessity limits God’s activity and distorts His work.” For a nuanced discussion of 
the issue, see Anderson, Physical World. 
80 Runia, Timaeus, 136. Of course, for most of his life Philo had little reason to question his belief in 
God’s abundant grace; as J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE 
- 117 CE) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 160 writes: “Everything Philo writes, and indeed the leisure he has 
to write it, reflects that cushion of wealth which protects him from the harsh realities experienced by 
‘the common herd.’” 
81 Nevertheless, we must also here qualify the “all:” “there is no good thing that does not belong to 
God and is not divine” (Sacr. 63). 
 49 
verse. Before the verse itself, Philo adds, “‘All things are mine,’ God says,” and Numbers 
28.2 thus explicates the “all things.”82 Of all existing things (ὅλα), some things are 
considered worthy (ἀξιόω) of the lower status of “giving” (δόσις) and others of the 
higher status are given the special name of “gift” or “bounty” (δωρεά). Others still are 
benefits of a kind that produce virtue as their fruits, which nourish the contemplative 
soul.83 The person who understands the gift-nature of all things that results from God’s 
sole ownership of all things will offer to God the “blameless and most beautiful 
offering,” faith (πίστις), at God’s feasts.84 
Next, Leviticus 25.23 reads: “And the land shall not be sold permanently, for all the 
land is mine, because you are strangers and sojourners before me.” Philo adds πᾶσα to 
the second clause, which accentuates the text as the clearest proof that “all things are 
in God’s possession (κτήσει μὲν τὰ πάντα θεοῦ),” while created beings only have use of 
them as a loan (χρήσει δὲ μόνον γενέσεώς ἐστι). For Philo, “all the land is mine” is 
equivalent to “every created thing is mine.” Nothing can be sold in perpetuity, then, 
because God owns everything. But immediately following is this: “But the one who 
possesses his own work has given, because he does not need” (τὸ δὲ ἔργον τὸ ἴδιον ὁ 
κεκτημένος δεδώρηται, ὅτι οὐ δεῖται). God’s giving does not make humans possessors, 
because everything is still God’s; but it shows that God is a “giver of all things” 
(δωρητικὸς τῶν ἁπάντων) that he possesses.85 Recognizing this fact leads to proper care 
of one’s things and even provides comfort in knowing that “the world and everything 
in the world are both the works and possessions of the one who begat them.”86 Humans 
do not even own those things of which they consist: soul, body, mind, etc.  
                                                        
82 Cf. Leg. 3.195: ἐπειδὴ μόνῳ ἁρμόττει θεῷ λέγειν τὸ ἐμόν, αὐτοῦ γὰρ ὄντως κτήματα μόνου τὰ 
πάντα. 
83 Philo’s distinctions between types of gifts is clearer in Leg. 3.195-196 where he is also interpreting 
Numbers 28.2: a “gift” (δῶρον) means a perfect and good thing that “God gives to the perfect,” while a 
“present” (δόμα) is prepared for a shorter time/purpose, of which the “practicers of a good nature who 
are advancing partake.” 
84 The proper attitude for offerings is thus to understand that “you bring a possession of God, not of 
yourself” (τὸ θεοῦ προσάξεις κτῆμα, οὐ τὸ σαυτοῦ; Sacr. 97). See also Plant. 130; Spec. 2.180. Humans 
should give offerings of gratitude to their beneficent Giver, which is central to piety. Indeed, “although 
needing nothing, God commands to offer to him the things that are his own because of his excessive 
beneficence for our race” (Deus 7; cf. Decal. 81; Spec. 2.218-219). On this connection, see esp. LaPorte, 
Eucharistia, 44. Cain’s error is that he believes himself to possess all things; indeed, “Cain’s name 
interpreted means ‘possession’” (Cher. 52). Cf. Geljon, “Philonic Elements,” 288–289. 
85 Cher. 123. Also Leg. 3.33; Cher. 83; Ebr. 107. Cf. Zeller, Charis, 39. 
86 Cher. 119. 
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 The corollary is that since the “God who possesses all things needs nothing” (ὁ μὲν 
γὰρ θεὸς πάντα κεκτημένος οὐδενὸς δεῖται),87 he benefits others unstintingly.88 Philo 
thus takes it as fact that each person, upon birth, “finds the great gift of God, the entire 
world” (εὐθὺς εὑρίσκει τὸ μέγα δῶρον θεοῦ τὸν παντελῆ κόσμον).89 Interestingly, one of 
Philo’s explanations for why humans were created last was so that God could prepare 
every other thing as a gift for human flourishing; those who “go deepest into the Laws” 
know this.90 God’s possessiveness is matched by his generosity. 
Interpreting God’s words to Abraham in Gen 15.9, “take for me” (λάβε μοι), Philo 
says this means humans possess nothing good of their own and that everything comes 
from another; thus, “all things are the possession of [the] God who gives” (θεοῦ τοῦ 
διδόντος κτήματα πάντα).91 As Philo quips, “you came naked and you will depart again 
naked, having received the use of the time between birth and death from God.”92 Life 
itself is on loan from God, and at death the “parts resolve into their elements” – the 
“loan that was lent to each is repaid” (ἀποδίδωμι) to Nature.93 Consequently, 
everything humans have (not possess) in this life is a gift-loan from God, and thus 
humans only have use of the things they have.94 God’s ownership of all things reaffirms 
that creation is an act of giving.  Philo can say that “the universal Ruler of heaven and 
earth has and bestows his good things on whomever he pleases’ (ἔχει καὶ παρέχει οἷς ἂν 
ἐθέλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ), because God formerly created and now never ceases holding it 
together.95 God creates everything, and thus owns everything; thus everything is gift.96 
                                                        
87 Mos. 1.157. Cf. Cher. 123; Post. 4; Spec. 1.294-295. 
88 Det. 54-55. 
89 Ebr. 118. 
90 Opif. 77. Cf. Mos. 2.148. 
91 Her. 102-103. For a exposition of the importance of this distinction for Philo, see further C. Noack, 
“Haben oder Empfangen. Antithetische Charakterisierungen von Torheit und Weisheit bei Philo und 
Paulus,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen, I. Internationales Symposium zum 
Corpus Judeo-Hellenisticum (WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 283–307. 
92 Spec. 1.295. Noack, “Haben oder Empfangen,” 306: “Bei Philo erkennt der Weise, dass das, was er 
scheinbar besitz, Gabe des Schöpfers ist, er erkennt sich als Geschöpf.” 
93 Post. 5. 
94 Cf. Sacr. 97; Cher. 108-109. 
95 Sacr. 40. The connection is also made in Deus 57; God “has everything as a possession, but gives by 
using the Logos as minister of his gifts” (τὰ σύμπαντα ἔχει κτήματα, δίδωσι δὲ λόγῳ χρώμενος ὑπηρέτῃ 
δωρεῶν). 
96 Cf. again Runia, Timaeus, 137. See also Deo 12: “As for envy, as I have already said many times, he 
banished it by his munificence, because he is immensely generous.” 
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3.1.1 Selling versus Giving 
One further point to note on divine possession vis-à-vis beneficence is Philo’s 
distinction between divine giving and human selling. In his interpretation of Leviticus 
25.23, Philo reads the text thus: “the land shall not be sold by selling.”97 This wooden 
translation highlights how Philo adapts the phrase from “the land will not be sold εἰς 
βεβαίωσιν,” which means “forever” or “in perpetuity,” to what he writes here: “the 
land will not be sold πράσει,” the dative of πρᾶσις, meaning “sale” or “transaction.” 
Philo’s change focuses on human selling, because, as Philo notes, the text is silent about 
the “by whom” of the selling, and the reader is instructed to look around and take stock 
of human interactions that pose as gift-giving: “all who are said to give (χαρίζομαι) are 
actually selling (πιπράσκω) rather than giving gifts (δωρέω), and those whom we think 
to receive gifts (λαμβάνειν χάριτας) are in truth buying (ὠνέομαι).” The sellers, 
because they are looking for repayment though “praise or honor,” are actually “seeking 
a return for the gift” (ζητοῦντες χάριτος ἀντίδοσιν), and consequently the exchange is 
made as a gift only in name, while in essence the action is a sale. Likewise, the 
recipients of the gifts “take care to pay back by repaying at the right time” (μελετῶντες 
ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ καιρὸν ἀποδιδόντες), thus acting as purchasers.98 
 By contrast, “God is not a cheap market seller, but a giver of all things (δωρητικὸς 
δὲ τῶν ἁπάντων), pouring forth everlasting springs of gifts (ἀενάους χαρίτων πηγὰς 
ἀναχέων), not desiring recompense. For he is neither needy (οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιδεὴς αὐτός) 
nor is any created thing able to repay him a gift (οὔτε τις τῶν γεγονότων ἱκανὸς 
ἀντιδοῦναι δωρεάν).” Consequently, God’s giving is set against human giving (as well as 
improper construals of divine benefaction), in what must have appeared to be a 
critique of the benefaction system.99 Although this is not all Philo has to say about 
human giving and its relation to divine beneficence, this passage provides grounds for 
seeing the benefaction system as “subject to theological re-evaluation” in Philo’s 
                                                        
97 Cher. 121-123. 
98 Cf. Harrison, Grace, 131: For Philo, Greco-Roman “benefaction is at heart a financial transaction, in 
spite of the specious nature of its terminology.” Harrison notes that “[p]repositions such as ἀπο and ἀντί, 
which preface verbs such as ἀποδιδόναι and ἀντιδιδόναι, sharpen our focus on the projected return in 
the transaction, as does reciprocation terminology like ἀμοιβή.” 
99 As Harrison, Grace, 132 states, “Philo’s approach to beneficence is unusual in ancient literature by 
virtue of his unabashed criticism of an institution which was viewed in a positive light.” 
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mind.100 In context, the passage is set in an argument about God being the sole 
possessor of all reality. Thus, the theological principle to deduce is that one can only 
give what one owns, and as God owns all things, only God can give. Human “giving” is a 
self-interested passing around of Another’s goods.101 Only God, by nature, is a giver. 
3.2 The Overflowing Perfection of God 
God’s sole possession of all things is an aspect of Philo’s conception of divine 
perfection. God’s fullness contains all and lacks nothing:  
For the Existent One...is full of himself and is sufficient for himself, and is the same 
before the creation of the world and after the creation of everything. For he is 
immutable and unchangeable, and needs nothing other at all, so that all things are his, 
but properly he belongs to no one.102 
God’s perfection means that God is superior to everything else not God, in every way, 
being both superior to the good and also “the most perfect good” (τελειότατον 
ἀγαθόν).103 God is “beyond time and place” and above all created reality in subjection to 
him.104 God is thus sui generis — classifying him is impossible because no category can 
contain his perfections.105 As Winston says, “God’s superiority to such attributes 
undoubtedly signifies for Philo that they are applied to him only equivocally.”106 God is 
so inexpressible (ἄρρητος) that it is improper to name him: thus, he is revealed as ἐγώ 
εἰμι ὁ ὤν.107 Consequently, God’s essence is unknown but various things can be 
predicated of his existence.108  
                                                        
100 Harrison, Grace, 132. 
101 Yet, as we will see later, Philo sees human giving mostly in a positive light, insofar as it is a 
reflection of God’s giving. 
102 Mut. 27-28. Cf. Virt. 9. 
103 Conf. 180. Cf. Decal. 81. 
104 Post. 14. Cf. Conf. 170; Congr. 107 
105 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 156: Philo often “indulg[es] in flights of negative theology,” to extents 
further than most of predecessors. 
106 D. Winston, “Philo’s Conception of the Divine Nature,” in Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought (ed. L.E. 
Goodman; Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 23. 
107 Cf. all of Mut. 7-30. As R. Radice, “The ‘Nameless Principle’ from Philo to Plotinus. An Outline of 
Research,” in Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria (ed. F. Calabi; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 174 notes, names in 
Philo have a “metaphysico-theological foundedness:” God’s name, therefore, expresses his being. 
108 Cf. Praem. 36-46. See Leg. 2.2; Post. 4-6; Deus 55, 57; Mut. 3-6. On questions of inconsistency in Philo’s 
arguments – that he believes God is unknowable while still attributing to God so much – see Winston, 
“Philo’s Conception”; and Calabi, God’s Acting, 17–38. See further Leg. 1.51; Cher. 67; Congr. 61. 
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 God is ἄποιος, without qualities.109 Furthermore, God’s graces110 and Powers111 are 
ἄποιοι, and God’s creative activity is making “qualities out of things without qualities” 
(ἐξ ἀποίων ποιότητας).112 God’s being ἄποιος means he is without “accidental qualities” 
as the “most generic” of all things (τὸ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ θεός).113 Instead of “quality,” 
Philo’s preferred term is ἴδιον: there are certain properties that belong particularly to 
God, and are “derivative” but not defining of his essence.114 Not to sin, nor to be 
affected by passions,115 but rather to act (ἴδιον...θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν),116 to “stretch forth good 
things,”117 to be tranquil and have stability,118 and to foretell the future.119 And, as noted 
above, being beneficent is an ἴδιον θεοῦ.120 This list is not exhaustive but hints at how 
Philo is comfortable predicating certain acts and attributes to God without 
contradicting God’s nature as ἄποιος, and how Philo creates space to make certain 
claims about God’s being.121 
 God’s perfection manifests itself in that God “partakes of nothing other for 
improvement, but imparts of his own to all particular beings from the fountain of 
                                                        
109 E.g. Leg. 1.36.  
110 Leg. 2.80. 
111 Spec. 1.47. 
112 Spec. 4.187. 
113 H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Volume 2 
(Cambridge: HUP, 1948), 109; Leg. 2.86. Cf. also Winston, “Philo’s Conception,” 22 and Sandmel, Philo, 93. 
As Mann, “Immutability and Predication,” 23 argues, this affirmation “conveys, among other things, the 
belief that no other being is the same kind of being that God is.” H. Guyot, L’infinité divine depuis Philon le 
juif jusque’ à Plotin (Thèse; Paris, 1906) argued that God is ἄποιος and thus infinite, because he understood 
ἄποιος to mean “without limit and determination.” But as A.-K. Geljon, “Divine Infinity in Gregory of 
Nyssa and Philo of Alexandria,” VC 59 (2005): 169–170 says in rebuttal, by “predicating ἄποιος of God, 
Philo wishes to show that God does not have anything comparable with the human body.” Cf. Leg. 1.36; 
3.36. 
114 Winston, “Philo’s Conception,” 22. 
115 Cf. Fug. 157; Virt. 177; Deus 52. 
116 Cher. 177. Winston, “Philo’s Conception,” 22 claims Philo “reduces all divine properties to a single 
one, that of acting.” Cf. also Wolfson, Philo Vol. 2, 133–134. But acting is not the only ἴδιον Philo attributes 
to God. Winston seems to say more about the divine essence than Philo felt comfortable doing. 
117 Leg. 3.105. 
118 Post. 29. 
119 Somn. 1.181. 
120 Mut. 129. 
121 Philo does not always distinguish between God the Power and God the Existent One – who “towers 
in brooding mystery even beyond the Logos (Goodenough, By Light, Light, 71) – when he speaks of the 
ἴδιον of “God.” Thus, Philo’s saying that beneficence is an ἴδιον of God the Power should not be read as 
Philo’s not making a claim about who the Existent One is. As Dillon, Middle Platonists, 157 states: “When 
one has established a totally transcendent God, there straight-way arises in an acute form the problem of 
his relations with the universe.” When Philo speaks of divine giving, he is speaking of the Existent’s 
beneficence through God the Power. 
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beauty, himself” (τὸ ἴδιον μεταδεδωκὼς ἅπασι τοῖς ἐν μέρει τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ πηγῆς, 
ἑαυτοῦ).122 Indeed, Philo says that “the beautiful things in the world would never have 
been, if they were not represented on an Archetype who is truly beautiful, uncreated, 
and blessed, and imperishable.” For Philo, God is so perfect that, needing nothing, he 
rather emits, in the manner of a fountain, what is good from his being into creation; 
and what is emitted is perfect insofar as it is modeled after him. The metaphor of God 
as a fountain is particularly illuminating. 
 Philo says that a “fountain is spoken of in many ways,” and one of these is “the 
Creator and Father of the universe” (ὁ τῶν ὅλων ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ).123 God is the 
“highest and best fountain” (περὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἀρίστης πηγῆς), who spoke about 
himself through Jeremiah: “They forsook me, the fountain of living water, and dug out 
broken cisterns for themselves, which will not be able to hold water” (2.13). From this 
text, Philo argues that God is the “eldest fountain” (ἡ πρεσβυτάτη πηγή) and the world 
is like rain from him. Thus, he is the fountain of life, for “God alone is the cause of soul 
and life and especially of rational soul and of the wise life. For matter is dead, but God is 
something more than life; he is, as he said, the everlasting fountain of living” (πηγὴ τοῦ 
ζῆν...ἀένναος).124 Hence, Philo argues that God as a fountain is supremely creative: from 
creation to the end, all life overflows from God’s perfection. 
 But even more than life itself comes from God. God is also the fountain “from 
whom...all particular goods are showered on the world and those in it” (ἀφ᾿ οὗ τρόπον 
πηγῆς ἄρδεται τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀγαθά).125 Some of these 
particular goods are Philo’s favorite items: virtue, wisdom, justice, reason, and light.126 
This imagery is also connected to God’s graces: God says, “I myself am the beginning 
                                                        
122 Cher. 86. Moffatt, Grace, 45 claims that the “religious philosophy of Philo had no place for a 
dynamic conception of ‘grace’ ... which he confined to the inner disposition of God as Good or to specific 
favours bestowed upon mankind in creation and providence.” Although God pours out gifts from his 
being, for Moffatt since God does not give of his own being, Philo does not actually speak of grace. Philo’s 
“transcendentalism prevented him from realizing that God could give Himself to men.” But this is to 
measure Philo with a very specific Christian yardstick. 
123 Fug. 177. Sections 177-201 discuss different meanings of “fountain.” 
124 Fug. 197-198. 
125 Decal. 81. Cf. Deus 155. 
126 Spec. 1.303; 277. Cf. Mut. 3-6; Post. 127; QG 4.8; Cher. 86-90; Fug. 97; Post. 69, 136; Somn. 1.115. On God 
as archetypal light, see Somn. 1.72-76; Praem. 45-46; Mut. 6; Cher. 96-97. 
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and fountain of all graces” (ἡ πασῶν χαρίτων ἀρχή τε καὶ πηγὴ αὐτός εἰμι ἐγώ).127 
Similarly, God “pours the everlasting fountains of his graces,”128 which are so abundant 
that they would easily overflow the earth.129 Beyond the specific language of God as ἡ 
πηγή, Philo coordinates God’s perfection with his beneficence more generally. God has 
“showered on heaven and earth the particular good things” because he himself is “the 
good,” indeed, is “full of perfect goods” (πλήρης ἀγαθῶν τελείων).130 Since God is the 
perfect good, humans cannot benefit God in any way, for God is full in himself (ὁ 
πλήρης θεός) and needs nothing. Consequently, rather than being benefitted 
(ὠφελεῖται γὰρ ὑπ᾿ οὐδενός), he is “continually and unceasingly benefitting all things” 
(τὰ σύμπαντα συνεχῶς καὶ ἀπαύστως ὠφελεῖ). Accordingly, humans should draw near 
to him and benefit from his perfection.131 God’s act of creating was a giving of his own 
nature to a nature that had no beauty in itself,132 and thus, though “perfection is found 
in no created thing,” it does appear in them through the “gift of the Cause.”133 
 God’s perfection sets him apart from humanity in every way: God is everything 
good that humanity in itself is not. But this perfection that distinguishes God from 
humanity is also what causes him to overflow with gifts to humanity, first in creating 
the universe and then in supporting, nourishing, and leading creation back to his 
perfection. We saw in relation to God as Cause and Creator that only the good could be 
attributed to God, and the same is applicable here. But whereas earlier Philo left the 
good attributed to God simply as whatever is good, here the good is only the highest, or 
most perfect, of goods: life, virtue, wisdom, etc. God’s perfection leads him to give 
perfect gifts, in that he is perfect to such a degree that he naturally overflows with 
goods from, and consonant with, his own being.134 
                                                        
127 Mut. 58. 
128 Cher. 123. Cf. Virt. 79. 
129 Ebr. 32.  
130 Spec. 2.53. 
131 Det. 54-56. On Plato’s Euthyphro as a potential background for this text, see J. Glucker, “Piety, Dogs 
and a Platonic Reminiscence: Philo, Quod Deterius 54-56 and Plato, Euthyphro 12e-15a,” Illinois Classical 
Studies 18 (1993): 131–38. 
132 Opif. 21. 
133 Plant. 93. 
134 Speaking of God’s justice, Goodenough, By Light, Light, 62 notes that in one passage Philo does not 
simply say “God Himself is just,” but rather affirms that “God is αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ, entirely sufficient 
unto Himself, and then makes Him the πηγὴ δικαιοσύνης.” The same logic holds true here: standing 
behind any statement that “God is generous” is the affirmation that God is perfect in himself, containing 
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3.3 A Bountiful God 
Consequently, for Philo, God is φιλόδωρος: a lover of gifts and giving, a bountiful God. 
As we have seen, this is why God creates: “Why did he create that which did not exist? 
Because he was good and loves to give” (ὅτι ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόδωρος ἦν).135 God creates 
because he is φιλόδωρος and his continuing activity is giving: it is “fitting for him to 
bestow his graces and gifts and benefactions as he is good and bountiful by nature.”136 
φιλόδωρος is thus not simply a description of what God does, but of who God is 
immutably; God is generous in himself. Philo makes this sentiment clear in his writings 
with his frequent use of φιλόδωρος, which appears twenty-five times.137 Similarly, Philo 
calls God ὁ μόνος πάμπλουτος θεός,138 or “wealth bringing” (πλουτοφόρος) and 
“munificent” (μεγαλόδωρος).139 Yet, while Philo emphatically depicts God as a generous 
giver, he knows that this is difficult to understand: “What soul could ever suppose that 
the Master and Ruler of the universe, without changing anything of his own nature, but 
remaining the same, is continually good and bountiful without ceasing” (ἀγαθός ἐστι 
συνεχῶς καὶ φιλόδωρος ἀνελλιπῶς)? This disjunction between God’s being φιλόδωρος 
and human incomprehension leads Philo to doxology: “O bountiful God, your unlimited 
graces have no boundary or end, pouring forth like fountains!”140 
God’s giving is entirely due to his own generosity – nothing else explains it – and is 
immeasurably abundant. Accordingly, Philo often speaks of God’s gifts such that they 
are “unlimited and have no boundary or end” (ἀπερίγραφοι καὶ ὅρον ἢ τελευτὴν οὐκ 
ἔχουσαι).141 While this implies an exhaustive quantitative or spatial aspect, Philo is 
equally insistent on their temporal infinitude. God’s fountains are of “everlasting gifts” 
(πηγὰς τῶν ἀεννάων αὐτοῦ χαρίτων)142 as the fountains from which God’s gifts flow are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and possessing all things, from which he gives. For Goodenough, however, the point is that justice is not 
part of God’s nature; but being generous is. 
135 Mut. 46. 
136 Fug. 66. 
137 In addition to the texts already cited, see Leg. 3.106, 166; Cher. 20, 29; Det. 138; Post. 26; Agr. 173; 
Plant. 37, 88, 91; Ebr. 82; Fug. 62; Abr. 254; Spec. 1.221, 298; Praem. 126. φιλόδωρος can also be used of the 
Powers; cf. Conf. 182. 
138 Migr. 121. 
139 Congr. 171. See also Post. 32, where God is πλουτοδότης. 
140 Her. 31. φιλόδωρος is used here substantively; cf. also Leg. 3.40; Migr. 30. 
141 Her. 31. Cf. Sacr. 124; Leg. 3.39. 
142 Conf. 182. Cf. Plant. 91; Spec. 1.285; Spec. 2.180. 
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themselves also everlasting (τὰς τῶν χαρίτων αὐτοῦ πηγὰς ἀενάους).143 In essence, 
then, God gives gifts appropriate to his being: “God wills to give great and immortal 
things instead of small and perishable (ἀντὶ μικρῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν μεγάλα καὶ ἀθάνατα 
χαρίζεσθαι), and this work is appropriate for him.”144 “All of God’s gifts are good” 
(δωρεαὶ δ᾿ αἱ τοῦ θεοῦ καλαὶ πᾶσαι).145 
Philo speaks about the purity of God’s gifts most clearly in his use of personified 
Graces (Χάριτες).146 Three points explain Philo’s understanding of the Graces while also 
demonstrating that personifications - not simply plural gifts – are in view. First, the 
Graces are called God’s virgin daughters (παρθένοι θυγατέρες).147 As Philo asks, “How 
then may any good be wanting when the all-accomplishing God is present with his 
Graces, his virgin daughters (μετὰ χαρίτων τῶν παρθένων αὐτοῦ θυγατέρων), which 
the Father begat uncorrupted and undefiled?”148 The Graces are so pure that they are 
“immaterial, being themselves ideas and without qualities” (ἄυλοι, ἰδέαι, ἄποιοι).149 
This signals that “die Wohltaten unverfälscht von Nebenabsichten sein sollen.”150 
Second, the Graces represent God. Those who seek God’s nature will not seek what 
is imperfect because God will honor them by “going forward to meet because of his 
merciful nature in his virgin Graces and displaying himself (προϋπαντῶντος διὰ τὴν ἵλεω 
φύσιν ἑαυτοῦ ταῖς παρθένοις χάρισι καὶ ἐπιδεικνυμένου ἑαυτόν) to those who are eager 
                                                        
143 Virt. 79; Cher. 123. 
144 Mut. 79; Migr. 73. 
145 Post. 80; cf. Migr. 181-183; Congr. 182. 
146 For background, see Zeller, Charis, 17–18. 
147 Cf. e.g. Post. 32; Migr. 30-31; Fug. 141; QE 2.61; Mos. 2.7. Harrison, Grace, 123 (and n.142) believes this 
attribution “may have bordered on the mythological” for Philo’s readers, because παρθένος was “an 
epithet used elsewhere...to the ‘virgin’ Χάριτες, the daughters of Zeus.” Contrast A. Jaubert, La notion 
d’alliance dans le judaïsme aux abords de l’ère chrétienne (Paris, 1963), 431, for whom the appellation 
aggrandizes the utter purity of God’s grace. Harrison notes that hypostasized “virgin” graces might have 
caught his reader’s attention, but with Jaubert I do not believe Philo develops this idea enough to call 
Philo’s use of it “mythological.” Yet, Harrison is correct: “to dub grace παρθένος – even if Philo’s use is 
symbolic – was bold on his part” (124). Zeller, Charis, 18 strikes the right balance: Philo “liebt 
gelegentliche Anspielungen auf die griechische Mythologie, setzt aber die stoische Allegorese der 
Göttinnen voraus.” See further Y. Amir, “Philo’s Religious Interpretation of a Philosophical Concept,” 
Imm 17 (1983): 22–29; Y. Amir, “The Transference of Greek Allegories to Biblical Motifs in Philo,” in 
Nourished with Peace: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel (ed. F.E. Greenspahn; Chico: 
Scholars Press, 1984), 18–20; Dillon, Middle Platonists, 152–153. 
148 Migr. 30-31. 
149 Leg. 2.80. 
150 Zeller, Charis, 34. 
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to see.”151 God cannot be seen as he is, thus he employs his Graces by going forth and 
being displayed in them.152 It is significant that Philo understands personified gifts as 
representatives of God,153 in the way seen in God’s relation to the Powers. 
Third, the Graces correspond to particular human natures. Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob – allegorically those who learn by instruction, nature, and practice – are what 
“people call by another name, the three Graces.” Philo says this naming is either from 
God’s having given (κεχαρίσθαι) the natures to humans or because “they have given 
themselves” (αὗται δεδώρηνται...ἑαυτάς).154 God’s giving to effect “perfection of life” 
corresponds with the Graces’ giving so that the “eternal name” would be used in 
conjunction with these natures and not three humans: God of Abraham (instruction), 
Isaac (nature), and Jacob (practice).155 Accordingly, the three Graces reflect the gifting 
of virtuous natures to humans by which humans are able to be further gifted.156 
Hence, the Graces signify the purity of God’s gifts and their close relation to him. 
Likewise, the Graces correspond to certain human natures that, if possessed, make the 
recipient worthy of further gifting – though the reception of the nature is itself a gift. It 
is these Graces that God “rains down” (ὕοντος τοῦ πλουτοδότου θεοῦ τὰς παρθένους καὶ 
ἀθανάτους χάριτας αὑτοῦ),157 as the “perfect gifts of God” are inspired by the “most 
ancient Graces.”158  
                                                        
151 Fug. 141. As Dillon, Middle Platonists, 163 notes, Philo can often ”equate” the Graces with God’s 
beneficent Power, which is the same kind of move found in Stoics like Cornutus. 
152 Cf. Fug. 141-142. Zeller, Charis, 34 asks: “Will er mit dem Attribut die Initiative Gottes 
unterstreichen?” He answers: “Philon interessieren die χάριτες nicht in erster Linie als 
zwischenmenschliche Vollzüge, sondern als Äußerungen Gottes.” But are the Graces not “Äußerungen 
Gottes” that emphasize “die Initiative Gottes”? The distinction seems unnecessary. 
153 Cf. also QE. 2.61. 
154 Abr. 54. Cf. S. Sandmel, Philo’s Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature 
(New York: Ktav Publishing, 1971), 143: “the capacities, as part of the endowment of the individual are 
innate; as ‘graces,’ they are the gift of God, or else, Philo tells us, the gift to the reasonable soul from the 
capacity itself.” Cf. also Noack, “Haben oder Empfangen,” 288. 
155 Cf. also Mos. 2.7. 
156 Cf. M.D. van Veldhuizen, “‘Philanthropia’ in Philo of Alexandria: A Scriptural Perspective” (PhD, 
University of Notre Dame, 1982), 87: “The three Graces, then...are part of the accommodation of God to 
man’s understanding.” 
157 Post. 32. 
158 Congr. 138. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The preceding sections have built to this point. All aspects of Philo’s understanding of 
God start general and universal: God causes, creates, overflows in perfection, and thus 
gives – everything. God is φιλόδωρος because he is creator and perfect in himself, 
owning all things in his fullness. That is, the various aspects discussed in section two 
are dependent on section one, as section one leads to two. But each aspect has to be 
qualified. God causes and creates, but only the good. Likewise, God gives everything and 
gives generously, but there are particular reasons why he gives. Consequently, the 
question lurks, why and to whom does God give? God’s hyper-generous nature has to 
be disambiguated in actual acts of giving. Philo’s concept of divine beneficence has 
given some interpreters problems in understanding how he can describe God’s giving 
in “typical” (i.e. Pauline) ways, such that grace is unwarranted and undeserved. Yet 
then he explains that God gives according to worth and the capacity of the human 
receiving the gift.159 I will now try to set forth both strands and propose an explanation 
of how they fit together – and according to Philo, they simply do fit together – though 
this task will stretch through the next chapter. In Philo’s mind, that God is a 
profligately generous giver who gives according to worth holds in balance two ideas: 
God is generous and he is also wise and rational. 
4.  God’s Perfect and Incommensurate Giving 
In the first section I explained why everything has its origin in God, and in the second 
section I elaborated on the nature of God’s generous being; in this section, then, I will 
                                                        
159 Conzelmann, “Χάρις,” 390 summarizes well: “some see in Philo a ‘Catholic’ vacillation between 
grace and man’s own work, while others speak of Hell.-Jewish synergism to the degree that grace is in 
fact a help in the attainment of virtue.” See an overview of major interpretations in Zeller, Charis, 65–72. 
Zeller specifically highlights Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, for whom the “demand of the Law” drives 
incapable humans to God’s mercy, and W. Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien: Eine 
Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1938), for whom Philo is a “naïver 
Synergist.” As will become clear, neither a Protestant law-versus-grace scheme nor synergism make 
sense of Philo’s view. Of course, some interpreters find it simply incredible that Philo actually speaks of 
grace: cf. e.g., D.A. Carson, “Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo: Analysis and Method,” 
NovT 23 (1981): 160–162; C. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 2006), 27. N.G. Cohen, “Context and Connotation. Greek Words for Jewish 
Concepts in Philo,” in Shem in the Tents of Japhet: Essays on the Encounter of Judaism and Hellenism (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 60 demonstrates how a number of terms were used “by early Christianity to express its own 
agenda in the language of Judaism,” which is thus “why these words have so often been misconstrued by 
scholars of Philo.” 
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set forth some important clarifications for how God actually goes about giving. The 
tension we have seen in the last two sections – everything comes from God as gift, but 
only the good comes from God – is sublimated into a new issue here. If God is the 
bountiful source of all things, and everything is gift, does God give to all people 
indiscriminately? The principle I suggested in the introduction – that God is wise and 
rational – has interacted with the first two axioms primarily by qualifying what God 
gives (e.g. God causes and creates only the good, only pure gifts overflow from his 
perfection). However, the principle is at work most clearly in the third axiom, for here 
it qualifies how God gives and to whom, though even here it is in tension with the 
uncontainable generosity of God’s being – the asymmetrical divine-human relationship. 
For Philo, it is important that God not only be unbounded in generosity but also wise 
and rational in his creating and giving, instilling order in creation and not 
transgressing that order in giving. Thus, because God is a perfect giver, he gives both 
rationally (according to order) and incommensurately (according to his being). 
4.1 “And Noah found grace before the Lord God” 
We can set out many themes of Philo’s concept of God’s giving by describing two 
passages where Philo interprets Genesis 6.8, the first occurrence of χάρις in the LXX: 
“Noah found grace before the Lord God” (Νωε δὲ εὗρεν χάριν ἐναντίον κυρίου τοῦ 
θεοῦ).160 Leg. 3.78-106 and Deus 86-110 present clearly two sides of Philo’s thought – 
excessive and calculated giving – which could seem to be in tension.161 
In Leg. 3.78-106, Philo discusses various kinds of God-given natural endowments.162 
Before, in sections 65-76, Philo explained why the Serpent (Pleasure) was given no 
chance to defend itself but Eve (Sense Perception) was. Sense Perception is neither 
                                                        
160 As Calabi, God’s Acting, 19 n.13 remarks, χάρις here “is undoubtedly a complex and polyvalent 
[term]... it is precisely this multivalency which is indicative of the different levels at which Philo’s 
argument is set.” On the semantic shifts in χάρις throughout Deus 86-110, see Calabi 21 n.23. Conzelmann, 
“Χάρις,” 389 claims that “χάρις is never a theological word in the LXX,” which is wrong in whatever 
sense Conzelmann means by “theological.” Certainly, for Philo, χάρις in Gen 6.8 – and everywhere else in 
the LXX – is absolutely theological. 
161 A third interpretation can be found in QG 1.96. Here Philo explains that Noah found grace because 
he was grateful, while all others were not. 
162 Cf. P. Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 51–56 on the form of 
this passage, as one of Philo’s many “lists of biblical examples.” 
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good nor bad in itself, but depends on how it is used by Man (Mind).163 Since it is not 
inherently bad, it is allowed to defend itself. Pleasure, however, is “wretched of itself 
(ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐστι μοχθηρά); and therefore there is no reason to let it defend itself, 
because its presence necessitates a guilty verdict. Philo concludes that God has created 
in the soul some natures “faulty and blameworthy” and others “excellent and 
praiseworthy.”164 This is what precedes and concludes this interpretation of Gen 6.8. 
Consequently, Philo says that if anyone asks what Gen 6.8 means, that “Noah found 
favor before the Lord God” without doing anything prior (μηδὲν πρότερον 
ἐργασάμενον),165 the answer is that Noah has a “praiseworthy constitution and nature, 
for Noah means ‘rest’ or ‘righteous.’”166 It is necessary (ἀνάγκη) that such a nature finds 
favor with God, and what Noah finds is that God has given all things (χάριν ὄντα τοῦ 
θεοῦ τὰ σύμπαντα), that grace is only suitably attributed to God (διὸ καὶ μόνου τὴν 
χάριν οἰκεῖον). God created because of his “goodness and grace” – for “all things in the 
world and the world itself are a gift and benefit and favor of God” (δωρεὰ γὰρ καὶ 
εὐεργεσία καὶ χάρισμα θεοῦ τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος ἐστί).167 Noah 
finds grace because his nature – not actions – constitutes him as worthy. 
The successive sections follow a similar pattern:168 a person receives something 
from God – apparently without doing anything to deserve it – so Philo locates the gift’s 
appropriateness in the person’s nature as seen in the person’s name.169 The enigmatic 
                                                        
163 See also Cher. 58-60. 
164 For whatever reason, for Philo, saying that God creates souls with bad natures is not the same as 
attributing evil to God. Carson, “Divine Sovereignty,” 156 is correct that Philo does not solve the problem 
of the origin of evil or divine sovereignty/human freedom, but he takes too much glee in pointing this 
out. 
165 Or, “at least as far as we know” (ὅσα γε εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπίγνωσιν). 
166 Leg. 3.77. 
167 Leg. 3.78. 
168 Philo moves from verse to verse to make sense of Gen 6.8; D.T. Runia, “The Structure of Philo’s 
Allegorical Treatises: A Review of Two Recent Studies and Some Additional Comments,” VC 38 (1984): 238 
thus distinguishes between “primary exegesis, which concentrates on direct exegesis of the main biblical 
lemma, and...secondary exegesis, which gives exegesis of subordinate biblical lemma to the extent the 
exegete deems fit for the full understanding of the main biblical text.” 
169 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, “Grace Within and Beyond Reason:  Philo and Paul in Dialogue,” in Paul, Grace 
and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches (ed. P. Middleton et al.; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 10: “The 
seven figures in this catalogue...vary a little in detail, but have in common the fact that some divine 
blessing or promise was given to them before the text records any work.” As J.K. Riches, “Paul, Grace and 
Freedom: A Response,” in Paul, Grace and Freedom, 195 comments, Philo attempts to “discern the hidden 
rationale of God’s gift-giving, that which renders the recipient worthy of such a gift and the gift 
appropriate to the receiver.” 
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Melchizedek is the “King of Peace” and God’s own Priest not because of any prefigured 
work (οὐδὲν ἔργον αὐτοῦ προδιατυπώσας) but because God makes Melchizedek worthy 
(ἄξιος) of these positions and attributions first (πρῶτον), as they reflect the meaning of 
his name.170  
Philo frontloads the issue with regard to Abram: “But what good had Abram already 
done” that prompted God’s call to leave his fatherland? The land is an example of God’s 
“great and precious gifts,” but Abram does nothing to merit it, because beforehand 
“God begat this character having an image worthy of zeal” (ἐγέννησε τύπον ἔχοντα 
σπουδῆς ἄξιον).171 Abram’s name means “lofty father,” being one who soars high and 
contemplates God and his nature, in line with his God-given nature.172 Similarly, Isaac 
was “molded and appointed and chosen to have the best lot before birth.”173 Isaac’s 
name was determined before birth (cf. Gen 17.19) and thus both nature and name were 
given to Isaac before birth, before doing anything, and so provide appropriate grounds 
for God’s praise.  
The choice of Jacob is handled differently. God’s foreknowledge of the nature and 
future deeds of Jacob and Esau determines his judgment on them. Philo states: “for 
altogether, a certain small breeze of virtue evidences rule and authority, not freedom 
alone, and by contrast, the ordinary existence of wickedness enslaves the reason, even 
if its offspring are not fully developed.”174 There is a hint of virtue and vice in utero in 
Jacob and Esau, respectively, and God’s actions reflect that.175 
Bezalel is the final character discussed to whom God gave without a clear reason 
why in the text (cf. Ex 31.2ff.). For Philo, this must mean that “God engraved on this 
form in the soul in the manner of an approved coin.”176 The key to understanding this 
engraving is in Bezalel’s name, which means “in the shadow of God.” Since God’s 
shadow is the Logos, the Logos was impressed upon Bezalel. Philo then contrasts two 
kinds of people: those who know God, the Artificer, from his works – “through a 
                                                        
170 Leg. 3.79-80. 
171 Cf. Sandmel, Philo’s Place, 144–145. 
172 Leg. 3.83-84. 
173 Leg. 3.85-87. 
174 Leg. 3.89. For a reading of this text in dialogue with Paul in Romans 9, see Barclay, “Grace Within 
and Beyond.” 
175 Cf. Leg. 3.90-94 on Ephraim and Manasseh. 
176 Leg. 3.95.  
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shadow” (Bezalel) – and those who have a clear vision of God and his shadow (Moses).177 
Bezalel is a character gifted because of his nature, but even his gifting pales in 
comparison to Moses. 
Philo thus states: “we have found there are two natures created and molded and 
engraved completely by God,” one blameworthy and one praiseworthy.178 This leads to 
Moses’ prayer for God to “open for us his own treasury” (Deut 28.12) and to close the 
treasuries of evil things.179 Philo is constrained to believe that God has treasuries of 
both good and evil because of Deut 32.34-35, but God’s goodness means that the 
treasuries of evil are left closed: “For it is God’s ἴδιον to bestow good things and to give 
in anticipation (φθάνειν δωρούμενον), but to be slow in bringing evil things.”180 Since 
God is a “lover of gifts and bounteous” (φιλόδωρος καί χαριστικός), God keeps the 
treasuries of evil sealed even when “the soul falls out of step with right reason, even 
when it was fitting to consider it worthy of punishment” (ὁπότε καὶ ἄξιον ἦν αὐτὴν 
δίκης ἀξιοῦσθαι).181 God will provide “time for repentance and the fixing of the false 
step and restoration.” 
Philo is concerned to safeguard the appropriateness of God’s generosity – that God 
gives for a reason, to fitting recipients. We see in this passage a logic for why God gives, 
which is that those who are worthy to receive have been given a worthy nature by God 
beforehand. God is characterized as one who does not give haphazardly but to the ἄξιοι 
(cf. 79, 83, 106; ἀξιόω in 87, 93, 94, 106). Yet it is God who molds and shapes their 
natures into a worthy state: God’s giving is why the recipients are worthy of the gift. 
Philo does not see in this logic a simple determinism;182 it is an opportunity to praise 
                                                        
177 Cf. Leg. 3.97-103. 
178 Leg. 3.104. 
179 Borgen, Exegete, 54 calls this a “didactic epilogue.” 
180 Leg. 3.105. 
181 Leg. 3.106. 
182 Sandmel, “Abraham’s Knowledge,” 138; contrast Knox, “Quest for God.” For the larger issue, see 
also H.A. Wolfson, “Philo on Free Will. And the Historical Influence of His View,” HTR 35 (1942): 131–69 
and the rebuttal by D. Winston, “Freedom and Determinism in Philo of Alexandria,” StPhA 3 (1975): 47–70. 
Winston argues that “the general tone of Philo’s ethical thought is evidently deterministic” (70), which is 
likely right. Since God alone is cause and active, and humans are passive, there is necessarily a sense of 
God’s controlling all things. Accordingly, Winston affirms a “relative free will,” but not absolute free will 
(so Wolfson). Consequently, while Leg. 3.78-106 does not evince a simple determinism, it is clear here that 
God has predetermined worth. This point is one generally underestimated by those who attribute a 
“merit theology” to Philo. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 166 acutely states that Philo “[l]ike any other Platonist 
...must resist Stoic determinism, and yet reconcile the doctrine of the freedom of the will with that of the 
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God for his munificent nature and to pray for God’s continual support and mercy.183 
Everything is thus attributed to God, even the conditions that God gives to humans by 
which he gives gifts. 
In Deus 86-110, Philo begins by differentiating between “finding” (εὕρεσις) and “re-
finding” (ἀνεύρεσις).184 The “Great Vow” is an example of ἀνεύρεσις – indicative of an 
understanding that “God himself and by himself is the cause of good things,” though it 
may appear that the Earth produces them.185 An example of εὕρεσις is the gift of cities 
and houses (Deut 6.10-11),186 which symbolically represent “generic and specific 
virtues.”187 The way these gifts are received is likened to a person waking from sleep to 
find a gift – an unexpected discovery.188 Likewise, it is also a toil-free discovery for the 
naturally blessed soul, in contrast to those who labor and work, the “sluggish and slow 
of soul.”189 This latter group renders insincere worship to God because they are 
impious. 
This contrast – between those who find grace easily and recognize God as cause, 
and the impure who toil but never find – sets up the discussion of Noah. Earlier, in 70ff., 
Philo had already set Noah apart as one who exists by God’s grace, while the evil exist 
by God’s wrath. God does not annihilate humanity because of his goodness, as Noah’s 
finding grace allows for God to “mix saving mercy with the judgment against sinners.” 
Philo quotes Psalm 100.1 for corroboration and reflects further on the relation, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Providence of God.” Dillon points to Cher. 128 as a passage against which every affirmation of free will in 
Philo must be read. One thing all sides agree on, however, is that humans only choose to do what is good 
because of God’s gift of the Logos at work in them. What to do with evil, as already noted, remains an 
open question. See e.g. H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, Volume 1 (Cambridge: HUP, 1947), 446–447. Cf. Zeller, Charis, 72: “Das ist die Konsequenz der 
Allwirksamkeit des Schöpfers, daß jede anscheinende Tätigkeit des Menschen zum Guten in Wahrheit 
Tat Gottes in creatio continua ist.” 
183 Cf. Borgen, Exegete, 54.  
184 On this distinction, see D.T. Runia, “Mosaic and Platonist Exegesis: Philo on ‘Finding’ and 
‘Refinding’,” VC 40 (1986): 209–17. For a helpful breakdown of Philo’s exegetical moves and transitions in 
this text, see Runia, “Structure,” 242–243. 
185 Deus 86-87. Borgen, Exegete, 117 explains that Philo’s use of the Great Vow gives “a needed 
specification of the contexts indicated in the answer.” 
186 D. Gooding and V. Nikiprowetzky, “Philo’s Bible in the De Gigantibus and Quod Deus,” in Two 
Treatises of Philo of Alexandria (ed. D. Winston and J. Dillon; Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 94–118 provide a 
full discussion of Philo’s citations in this text. 
187 Deus 95. 
188 Cf. Deus 92-93, 97-98. 
189 See also Fug. 120-177, where Philo discusses the difference between “finding” and “seeking.” For a 
comparison of these two passages, see Winston and Dillon, Two Treatises, 321. 
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predominance, of divine mercy over judgment; but the point is that Noah is under 
God’s grace vis-à-vis the rest of humanity and is thus properly considered someone 
who “finds grace.” 
Philo proposes two possibilities for the meaning of Noah’s finding grace. First, that 
Noah “obtained grace” (χάριτος ἔτυχεν), which Philo considers unreasonable since 
Noah received nothing beyond what all others have (τί γὰρ αὐτῷ πλέον δεδώρηται 
πάντων). All other beings, even “simple elementary natures,” have been considered 
worthy of divine grace (χάριτος ἠξιωμένων θείας).190 Second, that “the Cause judges 
worthy of his gifts (κρίνοντος τοῦ αἰτίου δωρεῶν ἀξίους) those who do not destroy the 
divine coin in them...with disgraceful practices.”191 But Philo wavers, “perhaps this is 
not true.”192 Philo’s reasoning is important: “For how great must a person be who will 
be judged worthy of grace before God? For I hardly consider that the whole world could 
obtain such a thing, and yet the world is indeed the first and greatest and most perfect 
of the divine works.”193 Noah could not have deserved God’s grace, because not even the 
world itself is worthy of it; in fact, nothing and no one is worthy of God’s grace.194 All 
have been considered worthy of divine grace, but none are inherently worthy of it. 
A third option is deemed the most appropriate. Noah is the “cultivated 
individual”195 (ὁ ἀστεῖος) who has searched and found the greatest truth: “all things are 
a gift of God” (χάριν ὄντα θεοῦ τὰ πάντα). Philo goes on: 
                                                        
190 Deus 104. 
191 Deus 105. 
192 Thus, Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 18 states: “Heilige Menschen der Vorzeit  scheinen vor anderen 
das Prädikat der Würdigkeit zu verdienen; Philo erteilt es ihnen auch gelegentlich; aber an anderen 
Orten steigen ihm Bedenken auf, und er nimmt sein Wort zurück.” We might say, however, that the issue 
is from which perspective Philo is approaching the topic, not whether Philo “takes back” his word. If 
Philo needs to emphasize the rationality of God’s beneficence, then Noah must be worthy; if he needs to 
emphasize the incommensurable nature of God’s generosity, then Noah is unworthy. Human worth or 
unworth is a secondary consideration to proper speech about God. 
193 According to Zeller, Charis, 35, this moving of “das gnädige Walten Gottes” away from the 
individual and into “den Kosmos und seine Anfänge” evidences Stoic influence. 
194 Pace Harrison, Grace, 124, one cannot simply say that “χάρις is restricted to those who are ἄξιοι.” 
Even though God typically gives to the worthy, how worth is constituted is not straightforward – the 
statement needs more nuance. 
195 Philo is concerned to be faithful to the text – that Noah was a “righteous man, perfect among his 
generation” who “pleased God” (Gen 6.9) – while upholding the truism that ultimately no one is 
deserving of divine generosity. His understanding of Noah as ὁ ἀστεῖος is one way of balancing the two. 
L.H. Feldman, “Questions About the Great Flood, as Viewed by Philo, Pseudo-Philo, Josephus, and the 
Rabbis,” ZAW 115 (2003): 414 points out Philo’s worry that the text calls Moses “righteous” without 
providing any examples of righteous actions. On Gen 6.8-9 and Noah’s worthiness in Philo and other 
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God has given nothing to himself for he needs nothing, but the world to the world and 
its parts to each other and one another, and also to the universe. Although considering 
nothing worthy of grace, he has given good things in abundance to the whole (world) 
and to all its parts, rather looking to his eternal goodness196 and thinking that to give 
benefits belongs to his blessed and happy nature.197  
Everything is a gift given from God not because anyone deserves it, but because God is 
generous. Consequently, Philo explicates Noah’s finding grace as discovering that 
everything exists because of God’s grace and that everything is grace. Philo sets God’s 
beneficence over worth: humans are not worthy to receive—not even the world, the 
greatest good, is worthy.198 As God creates because of his goodness, he gives because of 
his goodness and not because of any external cause or condition.199 God’s overflowing 
generosity cannot be bound in any way in this interpretation of Gen 6.8. Grace causes 
grace. 
Are these interpretations of Genesis 6.8 inconsistent?200 In the briefer Deus 
interpretation, Philo passes over worth by concluding that nothing is worthy. In Leg., 
God gives precisely according to the worth that God establishes. In this chapter and the 
next, I will argue that these two ideas are not in tension – not that Philo never 
contradicts himself! – and that they fit together when viewed against the backdrop of 
Philo’s larger doctrine of God. My basic argument is that God can give in an orderly 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Jewish authors, see L.H. Feldman, “Josephus’ Portrait of Noah and Its Parallels in Philo, Pseudo-Philo’s 
‘Biblical Antiquities’, and Rabbinic Midrashim,” PAAJR 55 (1998): 43–44. 
196 Winston and Dillon, Two Treatises, 331 say this is “an adaptation of the Demiurge’s looking to the 
Paradigm.” This broaches the issue of whether God creates/gives by “looking to eternal goodness” as 
something proper to his being or external to it. Cf. Calabi, God’s Acting, 24: “In the first case, the supreme 
Being watches Himself as He carries out an action and holds that this is worthy of determination; in the 
second case, what He is looking to is a power that seems to have some sort of role as an autonomous 
being. Both hypotheses pose a problem.” The former problematizes divine simplicity, while the latter 
hypostasizes something essential to God’s nature. Calabi thinks the problem cannot finally be solved, 
though she argues that God “looks to the eternal goodness that is within God’s mind and is ἀΐδιον.” For 
our purposes, the point is that the initiative is with God, not the human. 
197 Zeller, Charis, 36 calls this “ontologische Gnade.” 
198 And yet, Moses is worthy! Cf. Deus 109-110. 
199 Leg. 3.78. As Runia, Timaeus, 133 states, “Grace to the righteous man is placed in the larger context 
of grace to the entire cosmos, of which man is part.” 
200 As noted above, many believe they are. Cf. Moffatt, Grace, 49:  
“Grace comes freely to any man, not for the sake of merit on his part, and yet somehow 
the reception of it does depend upon a certain capacity. How these two truths are to be 
reconciled, we are not told. ...for the first time the consciousness of this antinomy 
begins to be felt in his pages, perhaps more by his readers than by himself.” 
Almost precisely the same thing is found in É. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon 
d’Alexandrie (2nd ed.; Paris, 1925), 278, who calls this tension “la contradiction fondamentale” with which 
subsequent thinkers have to deal. Cf. also Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 17. 
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fashion only because of his prior overflowing generosity. In and of themselves, no 
created being can ever be worthy of God’s gifts unless God himself imbues the person 
with worth in an act of creation. God’s grace is prior to and causative of human worth. 
Thus, in their own ways, both expositions point to the importance of human worth for 
Philo. We will now examine more methodically how Philo describes these two aspects 
of God’s giving before systematizing them. Philo does not spell out how the two aspects 
cohere, but this does not mean that that coherence cannot be explained. 
4.2 God’s Overflowing and Orderly Giving: A Preliminary Sketch 
4.2.1. Overflowing Giving 
Creation itself is an act of overflowing giving, according to no external worth or 
condition beyond God’s generosity. Philo believes that the world itself is also then 
unable to contain God’s immeasurable gifts, like a shallow channel filled to 
overflowing.201 Indeed, God bestows gifts “always and incessantly,” never missing a 
chance to give.202 Philo makes many sweeping statements about God’s universal 
blessings: God has “showered particular goods on heaven and earth,”203 and as a 
benefactor “gives out a bountiful abundance of goods to every part of the universe.”204 
Thus, “no one is in lack” for all have the “interminable riches of nature for a supplier,” 
and “all everywhere enjoy in great abundance.”205 God provides the things necessary 
for life to all, as he gives life to each individual: Philo testifies, “he has given me to 
myself and every living person to himself.”206 If Philo apprehends everything as gift, the 
correlation is that gifts are given to all, sometimes despite the recipient’s 
unworthiness. Thus, Philo can immediately disqualify the reading that Noah found 
grace as a worthy individual, for Noah’s discovery is actually the gift-nature of all 
                                                        
201 Ebr. 31-32. 
202 Plant. 89. 
203 Spec. 2.53. 
204 Legat. 118. Cf. Decal. 81, 178. For Philo, giver and benefactor are two appellations that interpret the 
same reality. Philo uses the εὐεργ- word group no less than 156 times to describe God (εὐεργέτης), how 
God acts (εὐεργετικός), and what God gives (εὐεργεσία). Note the way gifts and benefits are often listed 
together: e.g. Fug. 66; Plant. 89. For a discussion of benefaction in Philo, see Harrison, Grace, 120–133; see 
also J.H. Neyrey, “God, Benefactor and Patron: The Major Cultural Model for Interpreting the Deity in 
Greco-Roman Antiquity,” JSNT 27 (2005): 465–92. 
205 Virt. 6. Cf. differently Migr. 31-32. 
206 Somn. 2.224. Cf. Spec. 2.198. 
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things.207 But these texts do not assert anything past a common gifting; is there more 
that all people enjoy beyond their mere existence?208 
Elsewhere, Philo occasionally speaks of God’s giving in spite of unworthiness. For 
example, in the creation account Philo questions why the divine breath is given to the 
earthly man and not the heavenly man who is made after God’s image.209 Philo answers 
that “God, being bountiful, gives good things to all, even those who are not perfect 
(φιλόδωρος ὢν ὁ θεὸς χαρίζεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς μὴ τελείοις), calling them forth 
into participation and zeal for virtue and at the same time exhibiting his excessive 
riches, because this suffices for those who will not be greatly benefited by it.”210 God 
causes rain to fall upon the springs in the desert, which gives no real benefit and does 
nothing but prove the “abundance of his own riches and goodness.” For this reason, 
“no soul [is] barren of good, even if the use of the good may be impossible to some.” 
Accordingly, the earthly man is a type of unworthy recipient: the gift does not fit but 
constitutes the recipient as worthy, drawing the recipient towards a better status. God 
gives to the unworthy because of his generosity and despite their unworthiness, from a 
desire to see the unworthy become worthy. Since God’s gifts have this causative 
function, there can be an inherent sense of a lack of fit to his gifts. By giving, God 
instills desire for virtue, the possession of which makes the beneficence fitting. All 
originally stand in need of this proto-gifting and thus all receive gifts. Hence, parents 
do not overlook their “unruly children” but rather care for them and often “give in 
abundance more to these than the self-controlled” (πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τούτοις μᾶλλον ἢ 
τοῖς σώφροσιν ἐπιδαψιλευόμενοι χαρίζονται) because they know that the latter have 
certain resources for life in themselves, while the unruly have nothing but the 
                                                        
207 Deus 104-106. 
208 Zeller, Charis, 34–35 rightly notes that Philo, like the Stoics, distinguished between “‘großen 
Geschenk Gottes,’ das jeder bei der Geburt vorfindet, der vollständigen Welt und den ‘speziellen 
Geschenken’, die Gott gibt und die Menschen frei empfangen.” 
209 On Philo’s understanding of the two men, see A.J.M. Wedderburn, “Philo’s ‘Heavenly Man’,” NovT 
15 (1973): 301–26. For whether this tradition was used by Paul, see the conflicting essays of B. Schaller, 
“Adam und Christus bei Paulus: oder: Über Brauch und Fehlbrauch von Philo in der neutestamentlichen 
Forschung,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen, I. Internationales Symposium zum 
Corpus Judeo-Hellenisticum (ed. R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 143–153 and 
S. Nordgaard, “Paul’s Appropriation of Philo’s Theory of ‘Two Men’ in 1 Corinthians 15.45–49,” NTS 57 
(2011): 348–65. Tobin, Creation of Man provides the fullest exposition of the creation of humans in Philo. 
210 Leg. 1.34. This distinction between perfect and progressing is key for Philo’s understanding of 
worth; see further the next chapter. 
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parents.211 Analogously (τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον), God as Father, while caring for all creation, 
“provides for those living blameful lives ... giving them an opportunity for restoration, 
while also not exceeding his merciful nature.”212 
This posture is particularly visible in two passages about creation. In Spec. 4.187, 
Philo describes how God’s creating brought order out of disorder, existence out of 
nonexistence. The point is that God and “his beneficent powers are always anxious to 
remodel the trespass of the bad that exists and to convert it to the better.” Likewise, at 
creation God benefitted with “unlimited and rich gifts (εὐεργετεῖν ἀταμιεύτοις καὶ 
πλουσίαις χάρισι) the nature that without the divine gift (τὴν ἄνευ δωρεᾶς θείας φύσιν) 
would be unable to obtain any good by itself.”213 The world itself is unworthy, and that 
which is in the world is unworthy and incapable of good—unless God gives.214 
Consequently, God gives to the unworthy so that they can become worthy. By 
necessity, then, recipients are unworthy of at least their first gifting. Furthermore, as 
“every wise man is a ransom for an evil man,” so also does God give “his infinite and 
unlimited riches for the sake of the worthy even to the unworthy.”215 Thus, God gives to 
the unworthy not only for their wellbeing, but to benefit the worthy. 
There are also passages where God gives without consideration of worth or any 
supervening reasons. The major example of this is God’s provision for those of lowest 
status in society. Philo says that opening fallow fields to the poor – “widows and 
orphaned children and all others who are neglected and unseen because of their not 
having enough” – causes them to “abound in surplus” and be “made rich suddenly by 
the gifts of God” (ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ δωρεαῖς ἐξαπιναίως πεπλουτηκότες). These people do 
not receive God’s gifts because of their intrinsic worth, but are “called to participation 
with the owners in the sacred number seven.”216 Yet, in Decal. 40-42 Philo asserts that 
God the King does not overlook even the lowest persons but considers them worthy 
(ἠξίωσεν) and provides for them sacred laws. But Philo uses this argument to make a 
                                                        
211 Prov. 2.2-6. Cf. similarly Opif. 9-11; also, differently, Decal. 81. 
212 As Feldman, “Questions about the Great Flood,” 405 states: “Philo is convinced, however, that God 
not only combines mercy with judgment but that His mercy precedes His judgment and that, in fact, he 
shows His mercy in doing kindness even to those who are unworthy.” Cf. further Zeller, Charis, 49–59. 
213 Opif. 23. 
214 Cf. Mut. 139-142, 154-156. 
215 Sacr. 121-124. 
216 Spec. 2.108.  
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point about how virtuous humans should not overlook those who are disgraced or in 
terrible situations. God’s giving to these lowest is not because of their worth but is an 
act of unconditioned generosity, for their sake. And to anyone who considers him- or 
herself deserving of God’s gift (ὁ ἀξιόχρεων ἑαυτὸν ὑπολαμβάνων), Philo quotes Deut 
9.5: “Not because of your righteousness nor because of the holiness of your heart do 
you enter the land to inherit it...”217 As Windisch notes, “die Gnadenverheißung, die von 
menschlichem Verhalten unabhängig gegeben wurde, muß eben erfüllt werden.”218 
Therefore, God gives to the unworthy so they may become virtuous, and God can be 
generous without worth being an expressed condition, proving that God’s generosity is 
not bound by any explicating system.219 God gives because he is a God that loves to give; 
worth may be a condition of his giving, but it is not a cause, and thus God can give 
contrary to, or without regard for, worth – in exceptional cases – because it is not the 
motivating principle of his generosity. But we must keep in mind, first, that these texts 
are sparse compared to the texts that speak of giving according to worth – God’s 
generosity is often channeled towards the deserving – and second, that these passages 
play a specific role in Philo’s theology. God’s giving to the unworthy does more than 
shake up Philo’s neat distinctions in his gift-giving schema. It displays Philo’s anxiety 
about making the Giver-recipient relationship symmetrical, when it is entirely 
asymmetrical. God always condescends to give, even to the “worthy.” Furthermore, it 
displays that all at some point receive while being unworthy. Although this idea is 
infrequently stated in Philo’s texts, it stands behind every text that speaks of God’s 
giving to the worthy: they are only worthy because God transforms the unworthy into 
the worthy through his generosity, which then makes his giving fitting. Consequently, 
this strand of thought has an important role to play in re-conceptualizing the relation 
of worth and grace in Philo’s thought. It is not a simple correspondence between 
human worth and divine response (reward); rather, divine giving is itself constitutive 
                                                        
217 Sacr. 54-57. Consequently, a constitutive element of worth is considering oneself to be unworthy. 
See LaPorte, Eucharistia, 43. Also, Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 17: “Der Mensch kann und soll sich nicht 
würdig machen; gerade das Bekenntnis seiner Unwürdigkeit wird von ihm gefordert.” 
218 Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 19. 
219 Kennedy, Philo’s Contribution, 145. Cf. also Zeller, Charis, 42: “Die Freigebigkeit Gottes ist auch der 
Grund dafür, daß Gott seine Güter auch dem leibverhafteten, zum Bösen geneigten Menschen mitteilt.” 
 71 
of human worth, because God is the cause of all good things. God’s act in creation of 
taking chaos and making order is paralleled by God’s giving to the unworthy.220 
4.2.2. Orderly Giving 
Philo customarily speaks of God giving gifts measured to fit the worthy recipient’s 
capacity.221 We will look at this point here briefly, as the next chapter will elaborate on 
how and why God gives this way. 
Philo asserts that all creation “would not be able to hold the riches of God if he 
willed to display them.” God’s giving too little or too much is akin to either drought or 
flooding, both of which can kill humans.222 God gives to creatures for “whom a 
continual enjoyment of similar gifts would harm rather than benefit.” God, therefore, 
carefully weighs his gifts, not giving so that beneficiaries grow insolent, but continually 
replacing new blessings for old (αἰεὶ νέας ἀντὶ παλαιοτέρων).223 Accordingly, the 
creature “never has no share in the gifts of God, since then he would be destroyed by all 
means;” but by contrast, the creature is “unable to bear” an abundance of such gifts. 
Thus, because “God desires an advantage for us, he measures out the things given to 
benefit in proportion to the strength of those who receive” (ὁ θεὸς ὠφελεῖν πρὸς τὴν 
τῶν λαμβανόντων ἰσχὺν τὰ διδόμενα σταθμᾶται).224 
God does not give according to his own infinite power but according to the capacity 
of the recipient.225 Heavenly charity must be measured, for “the things which God is 
able to give are not possible for a human to receive” (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἃ δοῦναι θεῷ, ταῦτα καὶ 
ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν δυνατόν).226 In some ways, then, God’s restraint is a merciful gift 
                                                        
220 Thus, Moffatt, Grace, 48 rightly observes that the “universal range of divine grace” stems directly 
from Philo’s “view of creation.” 
221 Geljon, “Divine Infinity,” 177 calls this Philo’s “principle of measurement.” There are two aspects 
to this: “God’s goodness has to be distributed and measured out to its recipients in a manner commensurate 
to their capacity for accepting it.” Runia, Timaeus, 137 (italics original). That is, God gives to particular 
individuals and gives precise amounts to each. 
222 Similar metaphors about rain appear frequently to illustrate this principle. Cf. Post. 143-145; Her. 
31-33; Ebr. 32; differently, Praem. 100-102.  
223 Harrison, Grace, 122: “These initial gifts of God are stored up for future benefactions, and are 
progressively re-introduced to replace existing gifts.” 
224 Post. 143-145. Kennedy, Philo’s Contribution, 155: “The only limit to the grace of God lies in the 
narrowness of men’s capacity to receive it.” Runia, Timaeus, 137–138, 441, argues that the Logos, as 
“premeasurer of all things” (QG 1.4), does the work of measuring God’s gifts to fit their recipients. 
225 But cf. Her. 99. 
226 Mut. 218. Cf. Somn. 1.143. Cf. Ebr. 32 for a similar argument. 
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itself.227 Since the capacities of humans differ from person to person God gives 
(χαρίζομαι) by measuring the soul of each person, giving in proportion to each (τὸ 
ἀνάλογον ἑκάστοις).228 As van Veldenhuizen states, “God meets people at all levels...and 
apportions his goodness in a way appropriate to the capacities of those who receive 
it.”229 This idea stresses the finite creatureliness of humans vis-à-vis God’s infinite 
power to give, displaying God to be a perfect and incommensurate giver.230 Thus, in this 
way “Philo indicates the great gap between God and man, emphasizing God’s 
transcendence.”231  
4.2.3. Summary 
“Orderly giving” is not the same thing as “gifts to the worthy.” Philo can work in the 
binary categories of worthy/unworthy, yet he often speaks of a spectrum of worth – 
from evil to perfect – along which humans may exist at many different points. Those 
who are perfect, or progressing that way, are the most suitable recipients of God’s 
generosity – of his giving. As Sandmel states, “Grace can most readily come to the man 
whose virtue puts him into the position of receiving it.”232 Thus, while God’s primal act 
of giving in creation is an overflowing, incongruous gift due to his own goodness, God 
structures the creation to make possible orderly giving (e.g. natural law) because God is 
rational and wise. Consequently, Philo speaks primarily of a more discreet beneficence, 
                                                        
227 Cf. esp. Opif. 23. Runia, Timaeus, 137 notes that this notion of divine restraint could signal that “the 
intractability of the chaotic matter” could be what “partially frustrates the divine purpose” in giving but 
that Philo does not take this route. 
228 Mut. 232. Cf. Deus 80. Commenting on the Deus passage, J. Dillon, “The Nature of God in the ‘Quod 
Deus’,” in Two Treatises, 223 suggests that this aspect of Philo’s thought “seems to be a version of the later 
Neoplatonic doctrine of ‘suitability for reception.’” The difference between the two, as Dillon explains 
the Neoplatonic tradition, is that the Neoplatonists believed the gods to be “constantly benevolent in 
their bestowal of benefits and wisdom, but creatures can only receive as much as they are 
constitutionally able to absorb.” By contrast, for Philo God measures his gifts concisely. Indeed, Philo 
implies that humans would die from divine grace if they could “absorb” as much as possible. 
229 van Veldhuizen, “Philanthropia,” 103. 
230 Cf. Spec. 1.43-44. On this text (and theme), Harrison, Grace, 127 states that “all [God’s] benefaction 
exclusively reside[s] in His sovereign freedom and grace, and not in the initiative of His servants.” 
Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 19 has a nice phrase, saying Philo has an insight into “die eigne 
Unwürdigkeit allem Gotterleben.” 
231 Geljon, “Divine Infinity,” 176. Cf. Zeller, Charis, 72: “Jede geschaffene Vollkommenheit schwindet 
dahin vor der unendlichen Vollkommenheit der Schöpfers.” 
232 S. Sandmel, “Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, His Writings, and His Significance,” in 
ANRW 2.21 (Hellenistisches Judentum in Römischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus) (ed. W. Haase; New York: De 
Gruyter, 1984), 28. 
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where suitable gifts are given to suitable beneficiaries. And ultimately, while Philo is 
worried about making the Giver-recipient relationship appear symmetrical, he is also 
concerned not to portray God as an arbitrary benefactor. Orderly giving results from 
God’s unbounded generosity – human worth never necessitates God’s giving, but God 
“rejoices in giving, whenever the recipients are worthy of the gift.”233 As it stands, these 
two aspects of God’s giving – overflowing and orderly – do not conflict as they have 
been construed so far.234 Giving to the worthy is the norm, but there would be none 
worthy if God had not made them so. The next chapter will further describe how God 
constitutes worth in humans.  
5.  Conclusion 
God creates and God gives: creation is gift, and giving is viewed from the vantage point 
of God’s creative work. God is generous towards what he has created.  
 I have arranged this chapter to show how the major aspects of Philo’s 
understanding of God, as epitomized in my three axioms or “grammatical rules,” 
contribute to Philo’s view that God primarily and fundamentally is a gift-giver. For 
Philo, God is the hyper-generous Creator from whom all things come into existence. 
Therefore, God’s giving needs to be understood as an aspect of God’s creative activity—
of bringing order to disorder, making better what was bad. Since everything has been 
created, everything is a gift that has, by grace, moved from worse to better. Related to 
this, the cause of God’s generosity is his goodness, not human worthiness: human 
worth is often an important condition, but is not the cause, of God’s benefactions, for 
even human worth is a gift. Since everything is and comes from this creative divine 
generosity, giving to the worthy is always predicated on a prior giving to the unworthy. 
 This way of framing God’s generosity within the context of his creative work 
alleviates the seeming discrepancies between God’s overflowing giving in creation and 
to the unworthy and God’s orderly giving according to the recipient’s capacity and 
worth. But this chapter, by focusing on God’s creative generosity, has necessarily given 
                                                        
233 Somn. 2.177. 
234 Even though Windisch, Frömmigkeit Philos, 18 can talk about “auch die Unwürdigen” partaking 
(teilhaben) in God’s gifts, I am proposing that this is not a contradiction of Philo’s system of divine 
benefaction but rather an aspect of it. 
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greater attention to God’s overflowing, incommensurate giving. Thus, we must now 
examine more closely how, for Philo, God has wisely ordered the world to make orderly 
giving possible. 
Chapter 2:  Cosmological Ethics,  Gifted Virtue,  and Worth 
 
...philosophy is above all the art of human life; and engagement in it that is not 
properly anchored to the business of living well is regarded as empty and vain.1 
 
1.  Introduction: Locating Human Agency and Constructing Worth 
The previous chapter leaves us with a theological problem: if all good things must be 
attributed to God’s causation, what then of virtuous human action, those good deeds 
that constitute one as worthy to receive divine gifts? For Philo, the following statement 
is not empty piety but the incontrovertible foundation of ethics:  
it is necessary for the soul not to bring to himself the labor in behalf of virtue but to 
take it away from himself and to offer it up to God (ἀφελεῖν ἀφ᾿ ἑαυτῆς καὶ θεῷ 
ἀνενεγκεῖν), confessing that not its strength nor its power obtained the good but the 
One who gives even the love for it (ὁ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα χαρισάμενος).2  
What then does “worth” mean when it is necessary always for humans to attribute all 
good things to God? Wolfson argues that “man proves himself worthy of [divine 
intervention] by trying by his own power of free will with which God has endowed all 
men to avoid evil and choose good.”3 While God is the “ultimate cause of the free will” 
that God has gifted to the human race, God is only the “auxiliary cause of certain 
particular acts of the choice of good where man has proved himself worthy.” By 
contrast, Winston insists that the “‘worthy’ may simply be those whom God in his 
infinite wisdom has predetermined to be his chosen ones.”4 Since humans have only a 
limited free will, worth for receiving divine gifts cannot be attributed to the actions 
that humans do not freely do. The disagreement between Wolfson and Winston stems 
from their readings of the fragment from Leg. 4 and how they understand free will in 
Philo. This text can provide a starting point for the rest of this chapter: 
                                                        
1 M.C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: PUP, 1994), 
15. 
2 Leg. 3.136. 
3 H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Volume 1 
(Cambridge: HUP, 1947), 446. 
4 D. Winston, “Freedom and Determinism in Philo of Alexandria,” StPhA 3 (1975): 55. There is merit to 
Winston’s argument (cf. Leg. 3.77-106). While I am disagreeing with Wolfson’s thesis, I am trying to 
reframe that of Winston’s. 
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It is a happy thing for the soul to have the power to choose the better of the two 
choices put forward by the Creator, but it is happier not for the soul to choose, but for 
the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it. For, strictly speaking, the human 
mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the 
thoughtfulness of God, since he bestows the best things upon the worthy. For two main 
principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that, on the one hand, God does not govern 
all things as a man, and that, on the other, he trains and educates us as a man. 
Accordingly, when he maintains the second principle, namely, that God acts as a man, 
he introduces that which is in our power as the competence to know something, will, 
choose and avoid. But when he affirms that first and better principle, namely, that God 
acts not as a man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all things to God, leaving no 
work for a created being but showing it to be inactive (ἄπρακτον) and passive (πάσχον). 
He explains this when he says in other words that “God has known those who are his 
and those who are holy and he has brought them near to himself.” But if selections and 
rejections are, strictly speaking, made by the one cause, why do you advise me, 
Lawgiver, to choose life or death, as though I were in control of my choice (ὡς τῆς 
αἱρέσεως αὐτοκράτορι)? But he would answer: Of such things hear a rather elementary 
explanation, namely, such things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in 
the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the 
exceeding nothingness of the created.5 
Moral exhortations to humans are heuristic: through the performance of the exhorted 
action, the individual learns that it was not himself but God who caused it. Philo 
stressed human activity because he desired to explain why the Law of Moses 
commanded humans to live according to God’s will and how they could repent when 
they failed to do so; but that does not mean human agency is relocated or distinct from 
God’s causation.6 Deus 53-54 makes the same point about the “two principles.” Only the 
first principle – that God is not as a man – is “established in the most certain truth” 
(ἀληθείᾳ βεβαιοτάτῃ πεπίστωται), while the second exists only for instruction. God by 
nature is not like a “father who will instruct his son” but is rather the almighty Cause.7 
Accordingly, since Philo’s theology is centered upon how one may advance in the 
knowledge of God – indeed, attain the visio Dei – it is significant that he declares that 
once one reaches the summit, he learns that he has no reason for pride: God is the 
cause of all good things. No work is left for the “passive” and “inactive” human being.8 
                                                        
5 J.R. Harris, Fragments from Philo Judaeus (Cambridge: CUP, 1886), 8.  
6 D.M. Hay, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism: Volume 1, The Complexities of 
Second Temple Judaism (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2001), 378 states, “Despite this emphasis on grace, Philo does not hesitate to affirm that there are 
rewards for the righteous and punishments for the wicked.” As we will see, this way of framing the issue 
– separating grace and reward – is not helpful.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 Thus, rightly, D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 
72: “Mögen auch die moralisierenden Ausführungen Philons quantitativ überwiegen, so haben sie doch 
nicht das sachliche Gewicht dieser Erkenntnis.” 
8 Indeed, countering Philo on this point might lead to being named “Cain” (Sacr. 2). 
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What, then, is human worth? To quote Barclay: “...‘worthiness’ does not have the 
strong sense of earning or deserving God’s grace, but the weaker sense of being a fitting 
or appropriate recipient of that goodness (see, e.g. Spec. 1.43). Philo is concerned to 
show that God’s gifts are neither arbitrary nor squandered.”9 Human worth consists in 
not considering oneself worthy and in attributing all good things to God; it is about 
remaining an appropriate recipient rather than struggling to earn God’s favor. Thus, 
human worthiness consists in properly enjoying divine gifts, which must be attributed 
to God. By contrast, human unworthiness is rejection and misuse of divine gifts, which 
must be attributed to the human. Ultimately, when the various aspects of Philo’s 
theology are put together, something has to give way; and for Philo, human agency is 
demoted first, not divine causation. We must be careful to note that Philo does not 
dissolve human agency; rather, he locates it either inside or outside of divine agency. 
Any virtuous human action is located within, aligned with, and thus constituted by 
divine agency; any evil action is outside.10 Thus, virtuous human agency and worth is 
comprised of the appropriate enjoyment of divine generosity, of not rejecting or 
abusing God’s benefactions. Any hint of struggling or striving is phenomenological, a 
façade stripped away upon attaining to the higher mysteries of philosophy. 
Accordingly, in this chapter I will explore how Philo arrives at this construction of 
human agency and worth. To do this I will develop the previous chapter’s three axioms 
for how one speaks properly of divine generosity into the larger framework in which 
Philo considers both divine beneficence and human activity.  
First, the God who causes and creates all good things has placed humans in a well-
ordered and, therefore, beneficent context: the cosmos, his first and greatest gift.11 
Nature, Law, and Logos order the world so that it reflects God’s beneficent nature, 
while providing both the standards for being virtuous and the specific matrix in which 
worth is constituted. Second, the God who by nature is hyper-generous is the creator of 
                                                        
9 J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in 
Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; 
London: T&T Clark, 2008), 143–144. Thus, contra J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman 
Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 125, it is improper to smuggle in the notion of “merit.” 
10 Thus, Philo’s inability to speak to the problem of evil. 
11 R. Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics. Reflections on the Idea of Freedom,” in Philo of Alexandria and 
Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (ed. F. Calabi; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 144: “Philo’s moral thought is connected with 
an original creative act, a supreme grace...which is that of the cosmos.” 
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the virtues, which are the natures given to humans, the impetus for doing good, and 
what one attains as a result of virtuous living. Human virtue is divine grace, all the way 
down: it is provoked, enabled, and carried through by God’s gifts of human nature, 
right reason, Law, virtue. Third, God is a perfect and incommensurate giver who 
consequently gives to the worthy, where worth is constituted not by human striving 
but as a part of divine generosity itself. The only proper response is faith and 
thanksgiving to the unstintingly generous Creator. 
Thus, divine grace is cosmological and causative: God’s grace as the cause of the 
cosmos is also the cause of all good human activity that occurs in his generously 
ordered world. Further, virtuous living is nothing other than a living in accordance 
with the Nature of the cosmos: living in line with God’s first gift. God orders all things 
in humanity’s favor: divine grace is antecedent to, causative of, and, in the end, 
constitutive of, all good human life and action. 
2.  Generously Ordering the World:  Nature,  Logos,  and Law 
For Philo, God’s wise ordering of all things is macro- and microcosmic: a congruence 
between cosmos and individual should exist. Nature, Logos, and Law both permeate the 
world and are received by human beings for their flourishing in virtue. I shall examine 
each aspect in turn to show how God has created humans within a context ordered for 
their benefit. 
2.1 Nature as Gift-Giver 
Nature (φύσις) is an important concept for Philo.12 The categories of nature – 
particularly of the cosmos and of humans – are interrelated.13 Like the nature of the 
cosmos, human nature is given by God and is ordered in such a way as to effect a life 
                                                        
12 J.W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (Leiden: Brill, 
2003), 68–77 overviews the main meanings of φύσις in Greek thought, all of which are in Philo. First, 
φύσις is the “power of growth and life” – a “creative force.” Second, φύσις is the “inherent character in 
things.” The nature of a thing is what defines it, its particular abilities and qualities; even God has a 
particular nature. Third, φύσις is the “order of the cosmos.” In creating, God ordered the world 
intentionally, immutably, and in harmony with all of its parts. 
13 Cf. C.A. Anderson, Philo of Alexandria’s Views of the Physical World (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 
113: “...a thing has its φύσις by virtue of the creative work of φύσις.” 
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lived toward virtue, in accordance with cosmic Nature. Nature itself is beneficent, 
seeking the benefit and harmony of those who inhabit the cosmos. 
 The world is God’s first and greatest gift.14 Moreover, God gives through creation: 
the earth is rightly called “Demeter,” which combines earth and mother (Δη-μήτρα), for 
she is the “mother of all things and fruit-bearer and giver of all things” (πανδώρα) who 
causes the birth and preservation of all living things.15 Similarly, Philo lauds the poets 
for naming earth Pandora, for she “gives all things” (πάντα δωρουμένη).16 Yet, God 
alone causes good things, without assistance: not the earth in growing produce, nor the 
rain in nourishing plants.17 Rather, God shows his munificence through earthly means,18 
in a reciprocal relationship: God gives to the earth to produce and the earth produces 
to God.19 But Philo clarifies that God stands behind the appearance of creation’s giving: 
a created thing cannot give like God. Language about creation giving, however, slides 
into talk of Nature giving, where the relationship between Nature and God is more 
complicated. As Bockmuehl notes, “rather than distinguishing between ‘nature’ and 
‘God’, Philo links these two terms closely. Nature often means the nature of God; indeed 
sometimes the two become virtually interchangeable.”20 Or as Anderson states, “the 
two main functions of φύσις as principle – to create and to govern – overlap with what 
God does.”21 What then is the relationship between God and Nature in gift-giving and 
how does this speak to God’s ordering of the world?22 
                                                        
14 Philo uses a variety of terms to describe the world as a gift: χάρις, χάρισμα, δῶρον, δωρεά, 
εὐεργεσία. Cf. Ebr. 117-119, Deus 106-108, Leg. 3.78, Mut. 46, Somn. 1.243. 
15 Opif. 133. Cf. H. Koester, “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought,” in 
Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 531: 
“In Philo, the Aristotelian conception of the natura creatrix was combined with the Jewish belief in the 
Creator God.” 
16 Aet. 63. 
17 Deus 87-88. 
18 Leg. 1.34. Cf. Mut. 59, 259-260. 
19 Spec. 2.96-97; cf. 219.  
20M. Bockmuehl, “Natural Law in Second Temple Judaism,” VT 45 (1995): 40. 
21 Anderson, Physical World, 153. 
22 The overall relation between God and Nature cannot be explored here; see the helpful work of 
Anderson, Physical World, 103–154. The traditional interpretation of the relationship held that Philo was 
essentially a Stoic: Nature is synonymous with God; cf., inter alia, E.R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The 
Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven: YUP, 1935), 51–52. For an alternative reading, which 
strongly differentiates the two, see Martens, One God, One Law.  Anderson cuts a middle path, arguing – 
rightly, in my opinion – that God and φύσις can neither be entirely identified nor differentiated. 
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 First, Nature’s gifts can point to God as the ultimate Giver.23 For example, Nature 
chooses humans according to merit and “calls [them] to participation in her own 
things;” and yet, “for these things it is right for God the host to be both praised and 
admired” because God has made the earth hospitable.24 Everything Nature gives has 
been caused by God; Nature is the table God has set for humanity. Philo sees that 
Nature has prepared appropriate nourishment for offspring from their mothers, which 
demonstrates God’s providence so that “no one holds back the beneficent and salvific 
gifts of God” (τὰς εὐεργέτιδας καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ θεοῦ δωρεάς).25 
Second, Nature’s giving can be parallel with God’s giving. Philo says those who 
desire the “gifts of Nature” (τὰ φύσεως δῶρα) rather than vain opinion will have 
plenty, which is confirmed by Lev 26.3-4: “If you walk in my statutes and keep my 
commandments and do them, I will give (δώσω) to you rain in its time, and the earth 
will give (ἡ γῆ δώσει) its produce...”26 God gives rain to the earth so that Nature can 
produce its own gifts, and desiring Nature’s gifts is linked to obeying God. Philo takes 
advantage of a hermeneutical opening in Lev 26.3-4, which has both God and the earth 
giving; the earth is dependent on God but it is still the agent that produces the “gifts of 
Nature.” On the seventh year, the fields lay fallow and the poor are allowed to enjoy the 
“gift of Nature” (δώρημα φύσεως) that grows spontaneously. The lands are left 
uncultivated so that the produce might be understood as gifts from God (αἱ χάριτες ἐκ 
θεοῦ) for the needy.27 From uncultivated lands, produce comes forth as Nature’s gift; 
yet lands are left uncultivated so that produce is understood as God’s grace. Similarly, 
Philo states that God has given “speech to man as a most excellent gift,” for just as 
Nature has given all other creatures their own defenses, so also “has [Nature] given 
(δέδωκεν) the greatest guard and most impregnable stronghold to humans.”28 
                                                        
23 Anderson, Physical World, 109–112 provides an account of Philo’s view of Nature as a “creative 
power;” this means that Nature’s activity must always finally be contextualized within divine creative 
activity. Nature is not a second cause alongside God. 
24 Spec. 2.171-173; cf. 198. 
25 Virt. 133. As Anderson, Physical World, 110 states, “Nature is responsible for every stage of human 
life and nearly every aspect of a person.” 
26 Praem. 100-101. Cf. also Agr. 168. 
27 Virt. 97-98. 
28 Somn. 1.102-115, esp. 103 and 108. 
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Finally, Philo can speak of Nature’s generosity without reference to God. Nature 
provides humanity with gift after gift (ἡ φύσις τὸν αἰῶνα ἄλλας ἐπ᾿ ἄλλαις ἀμείβει 
δωρεάς) of whatever the earth can give to aid human life.29 Therefore, all have the 
“interminable riches of Nature as supplier.”30 While humans often attribute the fruits of 
labor to themselves, it is all due to Nature’s “giving rich gifts” for human use.31 All of 
created reality is a source of gifts from Nature.32 Nature is a lover of living things;33 in 
some cases, it is even appropriate to call Nature “saving” (σωτήριος).34 Nature provides 
humans with their bodies and the capacities and senses that go along with them.35 
Thus, Nature gives a multitude of things of which she has no share (δωρέω...ὧν 
ἀμέτοχος): birth, food, growth, age, an organic body, and various sense abilities. These 
“confessedly good” things must be attributed to Nature.36 As humans come from Nature 
and receive all things necessary for life from Nature, Philo can speak of death as 
“Nature receiving her suitable legal fine” (τὸ οἰκεῖον ὄφλημα).37 Consequently, the gifts 
of Nature are something to rejoice about (χαρτὸν ... τὰ φύσεως δῶρα).38 
Since God is a generous giver, his greatest gift is a gift that keeps on giving. Nature 
as a personified force orders creation and gives like God.39 Accordingly, Nature and God 
can be described in similar ways; but Nature is neither God nor a synonym for God. God 
and Nature act the same way functionally towards humanity, because God’s perfect 
creation reflects the Creator. As Anderson states, “When φύσις operates as the creative 
and governing principle in the sensible realm, it does so on God’s behalf as his agent.”40 
It is important that we see here the beneficent nature of Nature, as it were, because God 
is similarly generous in his creation and ordering of human natures, both of general 
human nature (humanity) and specific human natures (soul types). Cosmic Nature and 
                                                        
29 Spec. 1.172. Cf. also Spec. 2.158-159; differently, Opif. 133; Virt. 129-130; Opif. 38. 
30 Virt. 6. 
31 Virt. 93-94. Anderson, Physical World, 109 notes Philo’s emphasis on the “results of natura creatrix 
over those of human effort.” 
32 Cf. Mos. 2.222; Congr. 4. 
33 Spec. 2.205. 
34 Ebr. 172. 
35 Spec. 3.111. Cf. Agr. 168. 
36 Sacr. 98-99. Cf. Virt. 8; Spec. 2.6, 100. 
37 Ios. 24. 
38 Praem. 50. 
39 Cf. R.A. Horsley, “The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero,” HTR 71 (1978): 53: “Even nature must be 
understood in a metaphysical sense as ‘Being,’ almost in the sense of ‘divine existence’ (or even ‘God’).” 
40 Anderson, Physical World, 153. 
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human nature are not unrelated. As Martens states, “Everything partakes in a true 
nature... Nature means not simply the natural world, but the nature of all things, 
namely, nature as the order of the cosmos. Every particular nature shares in the nature 
of the whole.”41 Thus, when we return to human natures below, we know that the 
Nature which fashions humanity and in which all particular natures share is an 
especially beneficent Nature, reflecting its Creator. God orders creation and humanity 
such that humans may live according to its patterns and so become virtuous.42  
The created order is controlled by God’s agency, through Logos and Law, which are 
both of Nature.43 Thus, Philo often explicates God’s creational ordering with the 
language of Logos and Law, which also speaks to how the cosmos is structured by gift-
giving standards.44 Accordingly, both Logos and Law are beneficently disposed towards 
humanity, as we shall now see. 
2.2 The Logos in the Cosmos and the Individual 
The Logos was God’s instrument in creating the world;45 and for Philo, the Logos is 
thereafter the agent by which God structures and holds together the world.46 As Philo 
states, “the Logos of the living One, being the bond of all things (δεσμὸς ὢν τῶν 
ἁπάντων)...both holds together all the parts (συνέχει τὰ μέρη πάντα) and binds tight by 
preventing them from breaking up.”47 Numerous statements confirm this to be a 
fundamental belief for Philo. “The everlasting Logos of the eternal God is the strongest 
and firmest foundation of the universe.”48 The Logos is the “glue and bond that has 
                                                        
41 Martens, One God, One Law, 73. 
42 Thus, to borrow a phrase from Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics,” 144, Philo believes in an “ethical 
cosmos.” Cf. G.H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and 
Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 
192–195: “assimilation to the cosmos” can be at the same time “assimilation to God.” 
43 Cf. P. Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 57–88.  
44 As Anderson, Physical World, 143–146 argues, Logos and φύσις are closely related but cannot be 
equated.  
45 Cf. C. Termini, “Philo’s Thought Within the Context of Middle Judaism,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Philo (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 98. 
46 See D. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1985), 23-25. 
For a brief, helpful overview of the Logos in Philo, see D.G. Robertson, “Mind and Language in Philo,” JHI 
67 (2006): 424–428. 
47 Fug. 112. 
48 Plant. 8-10. As D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 448 notes, in 
place of Plato’s “cosmic soul” the Logos “is assigned the function of representing the immanent presence 
of the divine in the cosmos.” 
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filled all things with essence” (πάντα τῆς οὐσίας ἐκπεπληρωκώς)49 – “essence” here 
most likely meaning the Logos’ own essence, for the Logos “appears in all things.”50 
Having brought order from disorder in creation, God’s Logos permeates the universe to 
ensure it does not return to its pre-creation chaos.51 
The Logos is also the means by which God governs the universe. Thus, God the 
“helmsman” uses the Logos as a “rudder” to steer all things.52 Furthermore, the Logos 
can be called the “ruler and helmsman of the universe,” a conceptual-terminological 
overlap that manifests the intimate God-Logos relationship.53 God rules “according to 
justice and Law, by setting before his right reason (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος), his firstborn son, 
who is to receive care of this sacred flock” as God’s lieutenant. Philo appeals to Exodus 
23.20 for support: “Behold, I send my messenger into your presence to guard you on the 
way.” The world, God’s “most perfect flock,” should respond with Psalm 23: “The Lord 
is my shepherd, and he shall make me lack nothing.”54 God is shepherd, but God 
shepherds by sending forth the Logos.55 
 Therefore, the Logos is an intermediary between God and the world. God “gave a 
special gift to the archangelic and eldest Logos” so that it could stand on the border 
(μεθόριος) between God and humanity.56 The Logos is a suppliant for mortals to the 
imperishable God, and the ambassador of God to his subjects. According to Philo, the 
Logos rejoices in this gift (ἀγάλλεται ἐπὶ τῇ δωρεᾷ), taking up the words of Deut 5.5: 
“And I stood between the Lord and you.” The Logos is neither created like humans, nor 
uncreated like God; thus, the Logos is a hostage to both: to God as a pledge (πίστις) that 
the created world will never choose disorder over order (ἀκοσμίαν ἀντὶ κόσμου), to 
                                                        
49 Her. 188. T.H. Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1919), 36 notes 
the Stoic ring to this idea but argues that Philo’s Logos fulfills this function differently because it is not 
material. Cf. R. Radice, “Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo, 
137–138; Wolfson, Philo Vol. 1, 325–328. 
50 Cher. 28. 
51 Cf. Somn. 1.241. 
52 Migr. 5-6. Cf. Aet. 83. 
53 Cher. 36; Sacr. 51. 
54 Agr. 51-52. 
55 D. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1985), 50: the 
Logos is “the face of God turned toward creation.” 
56 Her. 205-206. In Deus 57 Philo calls the Logos the minister of God’s gifts; cf. D. Winston and J. Dillon, 
Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary on De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis (Chico: 
Scholars Press, 1983), 306. 
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humanity as a sustainer of the hope that God will not forget his work.57 Furthermore, 
the Logos guides God’s relations to humanity by dividing and directing God’s Powers.58 
The fullest text is QE 2.68, in which Philo provides a hierarchy: the Existent One stands 
above all things, and next is the Logos, “the truly seminal substance of existing things.” 
From the Logos, “as from a spring, there divide and break forth two Powers,” the 
beneficent creative God and the sovereign ruling Lord. The Logos is the origin of the 
Powers and the agent that divides them.59 If the two Powers are the Cherubim at the 
Garden of Eden, the Logos is the flaming sword between and around them. As the Logos 
was before all things and appears in all things, the Logos originates and encircles all of 
God’s activities towards humanity.60 
As Winston states, “Philo takes great delight in depicting the polymorphic 
activities” of the Logos.61 Philo’s Logos functions in three ways that are important for 
our purposes: 1) structuring the world and preventing it from falling apart; 2) 
mediating between God and humanity;62 and 3) defining and dividing God’s actions 
towards the world. The Logos, then, is an ever-present, providential facet of God’s 
ongoing creative activity. Remarkably, all humans are endowed with reason as a divine 
gift: God gives a “seal, a beautiful gift (πάγκαλον δῶρον) to the soul” to demonstrate 
that he has given form to formless things.63 Being sealed by the immutable Logos, 
humans always retain the quality (ποιός) they received at creation.64 The human is thus 
                                                        
57 Her. 206. Runia, Timaeus, 449 says the Logos is “a kind of divine Factotum, summoned whenever 
and wherever God comes into contact with the sense-perceptible cosmos.” 
58 Cf. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, 19: the Powers “may thus be seen as expressions of the one 
Logos that constitutes the manifestation of God as thinking-acting.” 
59 The idea of the Logos as the “divider” or “cutter” is important for Philo; see Her. 140ff. M. Hadas-
Lebel, Philo of Alexandria: A Thinker in the Jewish Diaspora (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 187; D.M. Hay, “Philo’s 
Treatise on the Logos-Cutter,” StPhA 2 (1973): 9–22.  
60 Cher. 28. 
61 Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, 16. Termini, “Philo’s Thought,” 99 notes the difficulty of 
categorizing Philo’s uses of the Logos. Cf. also Runia, Timaeus, 446–447. 
62 Indeed, the Logos is God’s “interpreter” (ὁ ὑποφήτης αὐτοῦ λόγος; Mut. 18). J. Dillon, “Ganymede as 
the Logos: Traces of a Forgotten Allegorization in Philo?,” CQ 31 (1981): 184–185 notes Somn. 2.249, where 
Philo calls the Logos God’s “wine-steward” who pours “cupfuls of true gladness into the intellect of the 
righteous man;” the Logos does not differ from the drink being poured. 
63 Somn. 2.45. Cf. D.T. Runia, “God and Man in Philo of Alexandria,” JTS 39 (1988): 72–73 on the 
problem of the relation of the “transcendent” Logos with God and the “immanent” Logos in humanity. 
64 Fug. 12-13. 
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connected to creation through the indwelling Logos that binds all things together.65 
Furthermore, the Logos connects one to God, because it is an “impression, fragment, or 
radiance” of God’s nature.66 The human soul is a coin “formed by the seal of God, the 
impression of which is the eternal Logos.” God breathed life into man, and it follows 
necessarily (ὥστε ἀνάγκη) that the recipient must represent the one who gave the 
breath.67 And because man was formed after the “image of God,” it follows (ἀκόλουθον 
οὖν) that man was made “according to the archetypal Logos of the Cause.”68 
Consequently, Philo believes that human nature is unable to do anything good without 
the divine gift (ἄνευ δωρεᾶς θείας).69 Thus, Runia: “when the nature of man is analysed, 
it emerges that he does possess a divine part, a part through which he is related to God 
and is able to emulate God in right living to some degree.”70 
 Interpreting Deuteronomy 30.15, “Behold, I have set before your face life and death, 
good and evil; choose life,” Philo states that each person is responsible for choosing 
good because they have “reason in themselves as an incorruptible judge” 
(λογισμὸν...δικαστὴν ἀδωροδόκητον); they should accept the good “right reason 
suggests.”71 While the Logos is a guide for all humans, it is especially so for good 
humans who let the Logos guide them and critique their erring ways.72 Accordingly, 
right reason stands in the position of a Father to humans, commanding them to pursue 
truth and obey reason,73 and thus uphold the Laws of Nature.74 Since the Logos guides 
and provides standards for human life, it directs humanity to virtue. Right reason is 
                                                        
65 Opif. 146. As Horsley, “Law of Nature,” 47 states, this “twofold conception of law as the right reason 
of universal nature and as the mature reason in the human mind is the basic assumption and structure of 
Philo’s thought.” 
66 Cf. also Mut. 223. 
67 As Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, 28 states, “Philo’s confidence in the higher reaches of the 
human mind rests on the self-assurance of the Platonist in him that the human intellect is intimately 
related to the divine Logos.” 
68 Plant. 18-20. Cf. Opif. 139. 
69 Opif. 23. Cf. Praem. 163. Horsley, “Law of Nature,” 55. 
70 Runia, “God and Man,” 71; cf. Robertson, “Mind and Language,” 429. 
71 Deus 50. Cf. Leg. 3.80. Thus, right reason is effectively the human’s conscience; cf. Hay, “Philo of 
Alexandria,” 377. See further P. Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word 
Group (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 181–190. 
72 Cf. e.g. Cher. 9, 128. 
73 Ebr. 33-34. 
74 Cf. Ebr. 65-68, 80. Thus, as Horsley, “Law of Nature,” 54–55 puts it, right reason is the “means of 
‘revelation’” of God’s Logos and the Law of Nature. 
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part of the immutable fabric of the universe;75 living out of step with it is equal to 
overturning the Laws of Nature that Nature itself has set for humanity’s good.76 Thus, 
Philo states, “every person who loves the passions abhors right reason as navigator and 
guide of good things.”77 Wicked men are right reason’s adversaries,78 because love for 
the passions is antithetical to virtue.79 Thus, right reason, the “husband” of the soul, 
can be willfully divorced.80 When this happens, the human loses his “leader” and is left 
to his own devices, wandering like a shepherd-less flock, and consequently dies.81 Adam 
demonstrates this error by listening to Eve rather than God and thus living contrary to 
right reason.82 Consequently, Adam was kicked out of Eden, a “symbolic expression for 
right and divine reason.”83 By contrast, Moses, who had “excellent reason in himself as 
a teacher,” took as his “sole aim the right reason of nature, which is the only beginning 
and fountain of virtues” (ὃς μόνος ἐστὶν ἀρετῶν ἀρχή τε καὶ πηγή).84 Therefore, the 
Logos, as the standard for virtue, guides humans to virtue because it is the source of 
virtue.85 
All humans will live according to right reason – what connects them to God and 
structures the created order – or rebel against their own reasoning capability. The 
question, then, is: will they let themselves be guided by the divine gift? As Anderson 
states, “Because right reason is shared by human beings and the κόσμος, the entire 
structure of the universe from top to bottom is inherently moral.”86 Hence, the Logos is 
important for Philo because it binds all things together and provides ethical guidance 
for humanity. The Logos, however, is identified with the Law in its multiple forms.87 
                                                        
75 Ebr. 142. 
76 Decal. 132; Migr. 128. 
77 Sacr. 51. 
78 Leg. 3.1. 
79 Leg. 3.148-150; Sacr. 51. These men do not know the “daughters” of right reason, virtues; Gig. 17. 
See further Leg. 3.252; Post 24; Somn. 2.198. 
80 Det. 149. Cf. D. Zeller, “The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria,” StPhA 7 (1995): 21: 
“the entire vehicle of the soul shall come to ruin if the driver—reason—is lacking.” 
81 Post. 68. Cf. also Spec. 2.31. 
82 Plant. 60. 
83 Post. 32. 
84 Mos. 1.48; Plant. 121; cf. Gig. 48; also Mos. 1.48. On Noah, see Gig. 5. 
85 See also Virt. 127; Leg. 3.168; Somn. 1.119; Conf. 43; Plant. 60, 121; Deus 45-50; Sacr. 51; Mos 1.48; 
differently Conf. 43. 
86 Anderson, Physical World, 146. 
87 Cf. Hadas-Lebel, Philo of Alexandria, 188–190; D. Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” in ANRW 2.21, 
381. 
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Goodenough states, “The Law is connected with God...by Philo’s identifying it fully with 
the Logos.”88 Indeed, God’s Laws are everlasting because “right reason, which is Law, is 
imperishable.”89 Living according to Law is living according to right reason,90 and 
abandoning right reason is abandoning Law.91 Consequently, the Law plays an 
important role in Philo’s understanding of gift-giving, and we must now briefly 
examine Philo’s threefold conception of Law. 
2.3 Philo’s Threefold Form of Law 
Philo’s threefold form of Law results from his understanding of the sequence of the 
Pentateuch. Philo states that Genesis fittingly begins with the creation of the world, 
and it is thus necessary to postpone study of the particular written Laws, which are 
copies of the “more universal Laws,” the models.92 Philo follows the appropriate order 
(κατὰ τὰ ἀκόλουθα ἑξῆς) by moving from unwritten to written Law.93 That is, in the 
Pentateuch, the creation of the world is first; the lives of the Patriarchs are second; and 
the giving of the Mosaic Law is third. Philo’s self-appointed task is to set forth each 
form of Law and to demonstrate their interrelation. 
 The most essential form of Law is the Law of Nature.94 While none would now claim 
that Philo invented this idea,95 few would dispute Philo’s unprecedented use of the 
concept. For Philo, Moses proves two principles in the Pentateuch: first, that the 
creator God is also lawgiver, and therefore, second, that the person who does the Law 
“lives according to the order of the universe with harmony and union” (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ 
                                                        
88 Goodenough, By Light, Light, 54. Cf. also M.A. Jackson-McCabe, Logos and Law in the Letter of James: The 
Law of Nature, the Law of Moses, and the Law of Freedom (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 89–90. 
89 Ebr. 142; Migr. 130; Praem. 55; Ios. 174. Martens, One God, One Law, 28. Cf. H. Najman, Seconding Sinai: 
The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 83. 
90 Prob. 62. 
91 Leg. 3.148. Cf. Agr. 51-52; Ebr. 65-68; Virt. 127. On the world-city metaphor, cf. Ios. 29 and Opif. 143. 
92 Abr. 1-3. 
93 Decal. 1. 
94 Anderson, Physical World, 136 clarifies that the Law of Nature “makes explicit what is already 
present in Philo’s understanding of φύσις” in terms of the ethical regulations of Nature.  
95 Koester, “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ” proposed this idea. Horsley, “Law of Nature” first refuted Koester’s 
argument, claiming that Philo and Cicero were recipients of a Stoic tradition reinterpreted by eclectic 
Platonists. J. Barton, “Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the Old Testament,” JTS 30 (1979): 1–14 argues 
that natural law in its “weaker” and “stronger” senses can be found in the OT itself. Cf. Bockmuehl, 
“Natural Law,” 44: “Philo's development of natural law theory is in fact indebted...to a well-documented 
and long-standing tradition within Second Temple Judaism itself.” 
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ὅλου διάταξιν ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ).96 The world is like a city with its own 
constitution, and all of these Laws “aim for the harmony of the universe” insofar as 
they agree with the “Logos of eternal Nature” (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀιδίου φύσεως). The Logos 
of Nature thus dictates what one should and should not do.97 Adam was the first citizen 
of the world, and since “every well-ordered (εὔνομος) city has a constitution,” the 
world needed “the right reason of Nature, which is most suitably called...a divine Law 
(νόμος θεῖος).”98 
 In QE 2.42, Philo concertinas the cosmic nature of the Law into its instantiation as 
Israel’s Law, only then to expand Israel into a “likeness of the world,” such that as the 
Law relates to God’s people it also relates to God’s creation.99 Thus, there is a discernible 
“order in nature” and a “constitution that the world uses.”100 Elsewhere, Moses shows 
that “the world is in accordance with the Law and the Law with the world” (τοῦ κόσμου 
τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῦ νόμου τῷ κόσμῳ συνᾴδοντος). The person who obeys the Law lives 
with the grain of the universe, “with the intention of Nature, according to which the 
whole world is regulated.”101 Thus, the world and the Law are in an inextricably close 
relationship. Everything in creation is governed and regulated by the Laws of Nature, as 
the Logos pervades and orders everything.   
 Thus, Philo unites the notions of God as creator and lawgiver by insisting that the 
God who created the cosmos has put in place his Logos-Law to order all things.102 But 
what is the Law of Nature? In essence, the Law of Nature is identical with the Mosaic 
                                                        
96 Mos. 2.48-52. Bockmuehl, “Natural Law,” 43: “Creation, rightly perceived..., manifests the purposes 
of God.” As Najman, Seconding Sinai, 83 states, “Philo’s interest in creation is never merely an exercise in 
theoretical cosmology, but is always also practical. To understand Moses’ account of creation is at the 
same time to see that God cares for the world and deserves to be obeyed.” 
97 Ios. 29. 
98 Opif. 142-143. Cf. D.T. Runia, “The Idea and the Reality of the City in the Thought of Philo of 
Alexandria,” JHI 61 (2000): 365. 
99 Thus, H. Najman, “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law,” StPhA 11 (1999): 55 claims 
Philo both “had to authorize his interpretations of the Mosaic law” and “to underwrite the authority of the 
Mosaic law.” On how Philo “inscribes” Jewish culture in Nature itself, see M. Niehoff, Philo on Jewish 
Identity and Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 247–266. 
100 Abr. 61. 
101 Opif. 3. 
102 Cf. H.A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Volume 2 
(Cambridge: HUP, 1948), 189–192; V. Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie 
(Leiden: Brill, 1977), 117–155. 
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Law.103 Those who are “enrolled in [Moses’] sacred commonwealth” are “busy with the 
ordinances of Nature.”104 The Law of Nature also binds together Moses’ roles as king, 
lawgiver, prophet, and priest; accordingly, all of Moses’ acts are stamped with the “seal 
of Nature” (σφραγὶς φύσεως).105 And Moses portrays God creating in six days and 
resting on the seventh, “according to the ordinances of Nature” (κατὰ φύσεως 
θεσμούς).106 
 The Laws of Nature manifest and govern the order of creation and establish the way 
humans should act.107 The Law “is laid down” so that humans might “pursue what is 
just in a just manner” – “justice and every virtue with their corresponding actions” 
(πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τοῖς συγγενέσιν ἔργοις αὐτῆς).108 The Ten Commandments direct 
humanity towards the virtues,109 and the whole Law anoints people for the height of 
virtue.110 Nature has placed hope as the “gatekeeper” of the virtues; therefore, 
lawgivers seek to fill human souls with hope.111  The Mosaic Law is identical to the Laws 
of Nature, because the former is the latter’s visual representation.112 Yet the Law of 
Nature is an esoteric form of Law, unknowable to most humans. Importantly, then, 
Philo relates the Law of Nature to other forms of Law—most curiously, the Patriarchs. 
                                                        
103 Cf. Koester, “ΝΟΜΟΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ,” 537–540; Bockmuehl, “Natural Law,” 40. The relation between 
written and unwritten Law in Philo is important, but we cannot examine it here. In my opinion, Najman 
handles the issue the best: H. Najman, “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?,” 
StPhA 15 (2003): 54–63; Najman, “Law of Nature.” On the relation of particular to universal, see P. Borgen, 
Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 146–148. See also Anderson, Physical World, 
140 who draws attention to Spec. 3.136, which seems to question the harmony between the Laws of 
Nature and Moses. 
104 Mos. 2.211. Cf. Ebr. 37. Termini, “Philo’s Thought,” 113: Philo displays the “tendency to project the 
validity of the Sinaitic Torah backward, to the time of creation.” 
105 Mos. 2.4-14. Cf. differently Prob. 30. 
106 Spec. 2.57-59. Cf. Opif. 13-14. 
107 Cf. Mos. 2.48-52. See also Spec. 4.232; Prov. 2.23. 
108 Det. 18. Cf. Somn. 2.175-176. 
109 Spec. 4.133-134. 
110 Spec. 4.179. Cf. Spec. 2.13; 1.305-306. 
111 Abr. 15-16. 
112 Thus, H. Najman, “Cain and Abel as Character Traits: A Study in the Allegorical Typology of Philo 
of Alexandria,” in Eve’s Children (ed. G.P. Luttikhuizen; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 118 speaks of “the intimate 
relationship between cosmic structures and Mosaic laws, which both stem from a single creator and from 
a perfect paradigm.” 
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 According to Philo, the Patriarchs lived “blamelessly and well” according to the Law 
of Nature.113 They are “embodied and rational Laws” (ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι), 
highlighted by Moses for two reasons: first, to show that Moses’ commands are not “out 
of tune” with Nature; and second, to demonstrate that living according to the Law is 
not impossible, for these men did it without written Laws.114 Having no one to teach 
them, these men were “self-taught” (αὐτομαθεῖς), for they “embraced following 
Nature” and made themselves Laws. Philo notices that in Gen 26.5 God says, “Abraham 
did all of my Law,” before the written Law existed.115 Where the LXX reads, “Abraham 
obeyed my voice...my decrees...my commandments...my requirements...my laws,” Philo 
subsumes each term under “all of my Law,” which is explicated as the “divine Logos” 
that superintends human activity. Concluding his treatise on Abraham, Philo returns to 
Gen 26.5, stating, “this man did all of the divine Law and the divine decrees,” having 
been taught not by written documents but by “unwritten Nature.”116 Consequently, 
Abraham is an “unwritten Law and ordinance.” Likewise, as Moses was chosen to be the 
lawgiver (νομοθέτης), he also providentially became an “embodied and rational Law.”117 
Indeed, Moses could compile the written Laws because the Laws were within himself.118 
Since the role of the king is to command what ought to be done, as the Law does, the 
                                                        
113 In Prob. 62, Philo lays out the hallmarks of these men as: 1) outdoing their contemporaries in 
virtue, 2) having God alone as guide, and 3) living according to Law, the right reason of Nature. Cf. the 
counterexample of Gaius in Legat. 119. 
114 Abr. 4-6. A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1982), 62 
notes that Philo places the Patriarchs at “the center of an education system which places a premium on 
imitation.” Cf. E.R. Goodenough, “Philo’s Exposition of the Law and His De Vita Mosis,” HTR 26 (1933): 
111–112 puts it, “Moses did not write history...for the entertainment of his readers.” 
115 Migr. 130; cf. also QG 4.184. On Abraham as “exemplar,” see A.Y. Reed, “The Construction and 
Subversion of Patriarchal Perfection: Abraham and Exemplarity in Philo, Josephus, and the Testament of 
Abraham,” JSJ 40 (2009): 186–195. As M. Böhm, “Abraham und die Erzväter bei Philo. Überlegungen zur 
Exegese und Hermeneutik im frühen Judentum,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige 
Wahrnehmungen, I. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judeo-Hellenisticum (ed. R. Deines and K.-W. 
Niebuhr; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 386 puts it, “Abraham wird von Philo sowohl auf der historisch-
konkreten wie auf der universal-allgemeingültigen Interpretationsebene immer in einer dreifachen 
inhaltlichen Beziehungs-struktur gesehen.” 
116 Abr. 275-276. 
117 Mos. 1.162. 
118 Cf. Mos. 2.11ff. D. Winston, “Sage and Super-sage in Philo of Alexandria,” in Pomegranates and 
Golden Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom (ed. 
D.P. Wright; Ann Arbor: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 816: “Philo’s man of perfection is in need of no external 
authority but always acts spontaneously and unbidden out of his own inner resources.” 
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king is the Law. Thus, Moses is king, and the king an embodied Law, and the Law a just 
king.119 Both Abraham and Moses are ἔμψυχοι νόμοι, but Moses is so par excellence.  
 The relation between the Law of Nature and the patriarchs as embodied Laws is not 
complicated in itself. The Law is not a perishable Law written on anything material, but 
is rather formed “by immortal Nature in the immortal Mind.”120 Both the Law of Nature 
and the Logos are, by nature, unwritten. Accordingly, the Patriarchs followed only the 
unwritten Law, before any of the particular Laws were written down, and became 
themselves “unwritten Law.”121 The first volume of the Pentateuch is dedicated to the 
Patriarchs, and their memories are inscribed not primarily in written records but in 
immortal nature itself (ἐν ἀθανάτῳ τῇ φύσει).122 Since the Patriarchs “were zealous for 
virtue,” they hold a special place in Philo’s worldview.123  
2.4 Conclusion: The Moral Fabric of the Cosmos 
In this first section I have explored Philo’s understanding of God’s wise ordering of the 
world through Nature, Logos, and Law. We see where humans are located and begin to 
see with what God has equipped humans for the possibility of living virtuously. What is 
important for us, as Martens notes, is that the “world, its physical and ethical 
components, is one.”124 God’s first and greatest gift is a moral cosmos, generously 
ordered. Everything God does in relation to the world aims at harmony between the 
different aspects of creation.125 Accordingly, Philo exhorts each person to “repudiate 
self-love” and instead to seek to please “God, the world, Nature, the Laws, and wise 
men” (θεῷ, κόσμῳ, φύσει, νόμοις, σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι).126 Excluding God and the Laws, the 
other terms could seem out of place; but our investigation has detailed the coherence 
between each. 
                                                        
119 Mos. 2.4. See esp. R. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics. Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism,” in ANRW 
2.21, 487–491. and E.R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” Yale Classical 
Studies 1 (1928): 55–102. 
120 Prob. 46. 
121 Cf. Abr. 5, 16, 276; Virt. 194; Spec. 4.149-150; Decal. 1. 
122 Abr. 11; 16. 
123 Virt. 194; cf. Spec. 1.324; Mos. 2.11. Cher. 40; Abr. 4-6, 60, and 11. 
124 Martens, One God, One Law, 76. 
125 Cf. e.g. Spec. 4.187; Post. 14; Cher. 110-112. 
126 Spec. 4.131. Thus, cf. Anderson, Physical World, 146: “Whether as φύσις or νόμος φύσεως” – and, I 
might add, λόγος φύσεως – “this cosmic order leads ultimately to virtue and knowledge of God.” 
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This deep cosmological-ethical coherence is significant, because it constitutes the 
matrix in which humans may become virtuous; and virtue is what establishes a person 
as worthy to receive divine gifts. Accordingly, Nature, Logos, and Law not only order 
the cosmos but also the human: virtue is found in the congruence between cosmology 
and anthropology. Nature is not only the beneficent ordering of the world, but also that 
which forms individual human natures so that they can partake of virtue; the Logos is 
not only the instrument by which God orders and governs the world, but also the 
instrument, the divinely-inspired reasoning power, by which virtuous action occurs;127 
and the Law not only provides ordering to the universe and external guidance for 
humans, but the Patriarchs as “embodied Laws” exemplify the human natures (or soul 
types) that make possible virtuous life, and these natures are granted by God. Virtue, 
then, is living in accordance with the created order, for “virtue is and will be and has 
been in all things.”128 To live in accordance with one – Nature, Logos, Law, virtue – is to 
live in accordance with all.129 Consequently, from cosmos to individual, Philo proclaims 
a congruent moral and cosmological framework. Having set the cosmological stage, we 
must now explore the makeup of its human actors, where everything converges on the 
concept of virtue and its relation to the human soul. And as we might expect, for Philo, 
virtues are truly nothing other than divine gifts. 
3.  Virtue and the Constitution of Human Worth 
Philo’s aretology places a strong emphasis on protology and teleology: God is creator of 
the virtues and the pinnacle of virtue is the visio Dei. Here I will focus on God’s role in 
creating and bestowing virtue upon humans, how virtue relates to human nature, and 
how humans through growth in virtue – living out their divinely given nature – become 
worthy of divine beneficence. 
                                                        
127 Zeller, “Life and Death,” 21: “Virtue essentially is the exercise of reason.” 
128 Migr. 126. 
129 Cf. Migr. 128. Cf. Anderson, Physical World, 132–133. 
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3.1 God as Creator of the Virtues 
“For God caused all virtue [to exist],” (πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀρετὴν παρέσχετο), says Philo.130 Given 
Philo’s understanding of divine omni-causality, this is unsurprising; but virtue holds a 
special place among God’s creation: “the complete virtues are the suitable progeny of 
God.”131 Humans should not then assume causation of the virtues nor attribute their 
labor in virtue to themselves, because God is the source of the virtues and the one who 
gives the love for virtue (ὁ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα χαρισάμενος).132 This two-sided relation of 
God to the virtues is important for construing how divine generosity relates to human 
worth in Philo’s thought. In Spec. 2.29, Philo explains the role of God as husband and 
father of the virtues: the husband sows the seed of the virtues in the soul, while the 
father brings forth good intentions and excellent actions.133 Thus, God not only gives 
virtue to humans, but ensures that growth in virtue is accomplished: “there are 
particular gifts that are proper for God to give and humans to receive, and these would 
be the virtues and the actions in accordance with them” (αὗται δ᾿ ἂν εἶεν ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ 
κατ᾿ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι).134 If virtuous action is life according to Nature/Logos/Law, God is 
the one who gives the desire for such living and brings it to fruition. 
 Philo reads Deut 6.11 allegorically as speaking about the virtues given to humans.135 
The cities and houses God provides symbolically signify the “generic and specific 
virtues,” and the cisterns prepared beforehand (by God) are the rewards (ἆθλα) given 
to some because of their labor. They are “treasures prepared for the safekeeping of the 
virtues.” Again, here God provides humans with the virtues as well as what is necessary 
for growth in those virtues. Furthermore, in Genesis 18.9, when God asks Abraham, 
                                                        
130 Leg. 3.10. Cf. Migr. 181-183. 
131 Deus 4. Cf. QG 3.1. 
132 Leg. 3.136-137. 
133 Barclay, “Grace and Agency,” 144 states, commenting on Leg. 3.137, Philo “does not deny the soul 
the action, but attributes the love for virtue, and the strength to achieve it, to God.” While it is true that 
Philo “does not deny the soul the action,” he would still attribute it to God. 
134 Ebr. 119. This connection can also be seen in Cher. 84, where God’s gifts are of a kind that produce 
virtue as their fruits, as well as in Cher. 42-51 and Leg. 3.180, which discuss God’s impregnating the 
matriarchs (allegorical virtues) to bring forth further offspring. Cf. C. Lévy, “Philo’s Ethics,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Philo, 153. 
135 Deus 93-96. 
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“Where is Sarah your wife?” Philo interprets it as God asking, “Where is virtue?”136 
Abraham wisely answers that she is “in the tent, that is, the soul.”137 Abraham has 
virtue for himself, and for that he is happy; but as Philo states, it is not possession of 
virtue that brings happiness, but the “use and enjoyment of virtue.” For Abraham, God 
has dropped the seeds of virtue from heaven to impregnate virtue, Sarah, and this 
results in the birth of Isaac. But here Isaac is not a child; Isaac as εὐδαιμονία is the “use 
of perfect virtue in a perfect life.” Isaac was a generous gift to Abraham. 
But how, specifically, does God give virtue to the human soul? How does the human 
soul then relate to virtue? Philo’s idea of God as giver and cultivator of the virtues 
receives clarity in his allegorical exposition of Genesis 2-3.138 As Satlow states, “Philo 
reads the story of Genesis 2-3 not as a drama of disobedience to God, sin, and the loss of 
immortality...but as a story of the formation of human nature.”139  
According to Leg. 1.43-73, Gen 2.8-9 describes God’s placing Adam (Mind) in Eden 
(virtue).140 God set the Mind in virtue because God’s most suitable work (οἰκειότατον 
ἔργον) was forming the human race for virtue, so that the Mind might dedicate itself to 
cultivating the garden. Philo introduces here the injunction against planting groves of 
Deut 16.21 to reaffirm that God plants and builds the virtues in the soul, and it is 
therefore not man’s job – indeed, the attempt would place humans on par with God. As 
the Garden is itself virtue, the trees God causes to grow in the garden are “the 
particular virtues and the actions in accordance with them.” The tree of life is the most 
“generic virtue” from which all practical virtues are derived.  For this reason, it is 
situated in the center of the Garden, while the location of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil is less clear.141 The four rivers of Genesis 2.10-14 are the four virtues, 
                                                        
136 Cf. M.L. Satlow, “Philo on Human Perfection,” JTS 59 (2008): 510 on the wives of the patriarchs as 
virtues. Cf. further Ebr. 59ff. (also Fug. 128 and Her. 57-62), Fug. 154-160, 194; Leg. 2.46-50; 3.180, 217-219, 
245; Mut. 132-150; Post. 134; Sacr. 20-21; Lévy, “Philo’s Ethics,” 153–154. 
137 Det. 59-61. 
138 A. Kovelman, “Hellenistic Judaism on the Perfection of the Human Body,” JJS 61 (2010): 216: 
“...under the surface of Platonic spirituality, there is an astonishing exegetical tradition in Philo.” 
139 Satlow, “Human Perfection,” 502. This is an oversimplification, though, because Philo is 
concerned with Adam’s disobedience; it is simply not the main focus. See below. 
140 Cf. esp. T.H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation (Washington D.C.: CBAA, 
1983), 134–154. See further Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics,” 150–151 who notes Philo’s uniqueness in 
placing man within virtue, which happens because of “exegetical constraint.” 
141 As Najman, “Cain and Abel,” 117–118 notes, Cain and Abel “exemplify the ways in which the 
archetypes of virtue and vice” – the two trees – “may come to leave their copies upon the human soul.” 
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which come from the main river flowing from Eden, generic virtue, which is 
goodness.142 Interestingly, at the beginning of the exposition, Philo explains that God 
placed humans in the Garden because of the evils they encounter. The Garden faces the 
rising sun because right reason never sets, and virtue, like the sun, illuminates all 
things and dispels the darkness.143 
In Opif. 153-160, somewhat differently, God plants trees (virtues) in the Garden, 
which is understood as the “ruling power of the soul” (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν).144 The 
tree of life is the “greatest of the virtues, godliness.” The Serpent is “pleasure”145 that 
lures the woman (Sense Perception) into wickedness, dragging along also the man 
(Mind). As a result, God banishes them from the Garden, and thus they miss their 
chance to have the “consummation of virtue” and an immortal, happy life. Instead, 
they now live through a “time of demonic evil,” being constantly tempted and pulled 
down by wickedness rather than living purely in relation to virtue. The Serpent 
“altered the boundaries of the soul” by placing in it the tree of death, thus making the 
soul a lover of the passions rather than of virtue (ἀντὶ φιλαρέτου φιλοπαθῆ).146 The soul 
has three parts: reason in the head; passion in the chest; and desire in the stomach.147 
The soul is in harmony when this order is maintained. But passion and desire can 
overthrow reason like an unskilled charioteer, if one gives into vice or wickedness.148 
Pleasure “encloses itself around all of the irrational parts of the soul”149 and seeks to 
upset this critical balance, by steering humans away from the path of virtue. Created 
naked, Adam and Eve were created without either virtue or vice, which are likened to 
robes that cover the body.150 The woman (Sense Perception) was created to be a helper 
                                                        
142 Leg. 1.63-73. 
143 Leg. 1.45-46. Cf. Plant. 27-32; Kovelman, “Hellenistic Judaism,” 213–216. 
144 As C. Markschies, “Die Platonische Metapher vom ‘Inneren Menschen’: Eine Brücke zwischen 
antiker Philosophie und altchristlicher Theologie,” IJCT 1 (1995): 8 notes, “Philon bezeichnet den von 
Gott geschaffenen ‘vernünftigen’ Seelenteil gelegentlich einfach als ‘Menschen.’” 
145 On Philo’s link between pleasure and evil, see A.P. Booth, “The Voice of the Serpent: Philo’s 
Epicureanism,” in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response Within the Greco-Roman World (ed. W.E. 
Helleman; Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 163–164. 
146 Leg. 3.107. Cf. Termini, “Philo’s Thought,” 105–106 for a brief discussion of how Philo’s 
understanding of Adam and sin relates to other Jewish readings (e.g. Jubilees, 4 Ezra). 
147 Cf. e.g. Conf. 21; Leg. 1.70-71. 
148 Leg. 1.72-73. 
149 Leg. 2.75. 
150 Leg. 2.53; on which, cf. Termini, “Philo’s Thought,” 104; F. Calabi, God’s Acting, Man’s Acting: 
Tradition and Philosophy in Philo of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 128–130. 
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for the man (Mind).151 The Serpent (Pleasure), however, brings these two together into 
a mutual relationship, to perceive external sense objects.152 The “Fall” in the Garden, 
consequently, has a real, but not irreparable, effect on the human soul.153 Additionally, 
Philo argues that “the everlasting fountains of God’s gifts have been held back” (αἱ 
ἀέναοι πηγαὶ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χαρίτων ἐπεσχέθησαν) precisely so that the unworthy might 
not receive them (ἵνα μὴ ὡς ἀναξίοις χορηγῶσιν).154 There existed originally a more 
perfect relationship between God and humanity where gifts where given excessively 
because there was no unworthiness, but such a relationship has been forfeited. 
Yet, however it is construed, Philo believes that God plants virtues in the soul as a 
gift along with their corresponding actions and the motivation to act them out.155 In his 
hortatory mode of speech, Philo understands that, given the delicate constitution of 
the human soul and its tendency to be ordered improperly, living virtuously is 
complex. As Radice states, “every kind of man, through God’s grace, is originally in 
Paradise: but staying there depends on him and the choice he makes.”156 Remaining in 
the Garden is not a matter of self-achievement but of profitably enjoying God’s gifts 
rather than rejecting them. God’s giving the virtues is thus the starting point, but the 
picture is incomplete without an understanding of how human nature exists between 
virtue and vice—how humans can overcome the passions to live worthily of God’s gifts. 
                                                        
151 Cf. e.g. Leg. 2.24. Unsurprisingly, Philo is often charged with misogyny; cf. e.g. W.A. Meeks, “The 
Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity,” HR 13 (1974): 176–177; D. 
Boyarin, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 30–35; 
D. Sly, Philo’s Perception of Women (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 58. For a response, that Philo was 
“androcentric” but not entirely misogynistic, see D. Winston, “Philo and the Rabbis on Sex and the 
Body,” Poetics Today 19 (1998): 41–62. See also the nuanced feminist critique of S.L. Mattila, “Wisdom, 
Sense Perception, Nature, and Philo’s Gender Gradient,” HTR 89 (1996): 103–29. 
152 Leg. 2.71-75. Cf. Tobin, Creation of Man, 146. On the Mind/Sense Perception-Male/Female relation, 
see A. van den Hoek, “Endowed with Reason or Glued to the Sense: Philo’s Thoughts on Adam and Eve,” 
in The Creation of Man and Woman. Interpretations of the Biblical Narratives in Jewish and Christian Traditions 
(ed. G.P. Luttikhuizen; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 63–75. 
153 Thus, to borrow a phrase from J. Glucker, “Critolaus’ Scale and Philo,” CQ 42 (1992): 144, there is a 
“frailty of virtue” in human life. Among others, Glucker points to Sacr. 122; Post. 100; Migr. 148; Mos. 2.228, 
248; Mut. 185. See also P. Graffigna, “The Stability of Perfection: The Image of the Scales in Philo of 
Alexandria,” in Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria (ed. F. Calabi; Boston: Brill, 2003), 131–46. 
154 Opif. 168. 
155 Cf. Plant. 37. Wolfson, Philo Vol. 2, 205–208 explains that this distinction between “the possession 
(κτῆσις) of virtue and its use (χρῆσις)” is Aristotelian in origin. 
156 Radice, “Philo and Stoic Ethics,” 158. 
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3.2 Virtue and the Defeat of Vice 
As Zeller states, “Philo rules out the idea of a neutral soul; the decay of virtue means 
the acquisition of wickedness.”157 For Philo, humans have the appropriate knowledge to 
choose to live virtuously or wickedly.158 Humans have received the most excellent gifts 
of mind and thought, and God has “loosened the bonds of necessity,” giving the “most 
suitable and appropriate possession,” which is voluntary will. Man thus acts of his own 
accord and receives the due recompense:  
For he made him unrestrained and free, able to use his energies voluntarily 
and intentionally...so that, knowing anew both good and evil and...those 
things that proceed from virtue and wickedness, he might choose the better 
things and avoid their opposites.159 
The implication, besides the fact that humans choose their actions, is that humans 
should advance towards virtue; good actions should be natural. Thus, speaking about 
Noah’s contemporaries, Philo claims that God was angry because they were wicked 
when they ought to have pursued virtue.160 Even after the expulsion from the Garden, 
virtue is to be expected, though it is certainly not the norm – a point Philo saw proved 
daily by his Egyptian neighbors.161 Yet, as I have already argued, we cannot attribute to 
Philo an “absolute free will” (so Wolfson); rather, the extent of a human’s free will is his 
ability either to reject God’s gifts and be dragged into wickedness or to enjoy God’s gifts 
and be swept towards virtue. The latter can be attributed to man; the former must be 
attributed to God. 
 The man devoted to pleasure suffers from the evils that plagued the Serpent: 
difficulty raising the head, being weighed and pulled down by intemperance.162 He feeds 
not on heavenly wisdom but on what the earth provides, which leads to drunkenness 
and gluttony. However, God helps humans overcome the passions and their disastrous 
                                                        
157 Zeller, “Life and Death,” 22. Cf. Mendelson, Secular Education, 48–51 for a typology of three types of 
humans (cf. Leg. 1.92-94; Her. 45-45). The perfect individual by nature does what is good; those in the 
middle can choose virtue or vice, acknowledging that there “can be no progress without the active aid of 
God” (59); and wicked humans are dragged down into evil without hope of escape. 
158 Deus 45-50. 
159 Deus 49. Cf. Praem. 62. 
160 Abr. 41 (cf. 37-47). 
161 See S. Pearce, “Belonging and Not Belonging: Local Perspectives in Philo of Alexandria,” in Jewish 
Local Patriotism and Self-Identification in the Graeco-Roman Period (ed. S. Jones; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998); S. Pearce, The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo’s Representation of Egypt (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007). 
162 Opif. 157-162. 
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consequences.163 To begin, Philo states that the ability of man to clean out the belly, the 
home of the desires, is a “sufficient gift from God to the lover of virtue” (ἱκανὴ γὰρ καὶ 
αὕτη παρὰ θεοῦ τῷ φιλαρέτῳ δωρεά). Furthermore, God descends – without changing 
place – to lead suppliant souls from the “Hades of the passions to the Olympian ground 
of virtue.”164 God gives to and helps those who desire to live virtuously, enabling them 
to do what they could not without his care. 
What God provides to humans for their struggle with the passions are, 
unsurprisingly, Logos, Law, and virtue itself. Thus, Philo can say, if “any of the charms 
of pleasure call out to you,” the soul should turn itself away and look only at the “pure 
beauty of virtue.”165 The virtues should lure people away from vice by the sheer fact of 
their existence. And whereas the kingly mind is guided by right reason, the “tyrannical 
mind” acts according to vice and indulges in the passions.166 Likewise, the Law supposes 
that all who adhere to it should be free from every irrational passion.167 
In Exod 15, Moses praises God for throwing the “horse and his rider into the sea,” 
which means Moses praises God for throwing the four passions and their rider, the 
miserable mind, into the bottomless pit.168 God gives victory over the passions. For 
Philo, this is the point of the song to which all the parts refer, because “if freedom from 
the passions occupies the soul, it will be perfectly happy.”169 Humans are responsible 
for their actions, whether virtuous or otherwise, and thus receive rewards or judgment; 
but the praise for living virtuously must be given to God, because God has given the 
means and empowerment for such living, and indeed, caused it.170 
                                                        
163 Cf. D.C. Aune, “Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabbes and Earliest Christianity,” in 
Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response Within the Greco-Roman World (ed. W.E. Helleman; 
Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 125–58. Philo believed in the possibility of human 
repentance for evil (cf. e.g. Virt. 175-185). Thus, Moses being a “lover of virtue” and “humanity” sets forth 
“great rewards for those who repent” (ἆθλα προτιθεὶς...μεγάλα τοῖς μετανοοῦσι; Virt. 175). 
164 Post. 30-31; cf. Somn. 1.173. 
165 Gig. 44. 
166 Leg. 3.80 
167 Spec. 4.55. 
168 Leg. 2.102. Cf. Migr. 62-63. Zeller, Charis, 75: “Philon gibt der Exodustat eine allgemein-menschliche 
Bedeutung.” 
169 Cf. also Her. 70. 
170 Cf. A. Mendelson, “Philo’s Dialectic of Reward and Punishment,” StPhA 9 (1997): 105: “A person 
achieves virtue only by the grace of God.” Mendelson is speaking specifically about Virt., but the 
statement is applicable here as well. Mendelson argues that in Virt. and Praem. Philo has a 
deuteronomistic concept of justice, a quid pro quo where God rewards the virtuous and punishes the 
wicked. By contrast, particularly in the “Cain Trilogy,” Philo questions rather than simply affirms the 
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In the quest for virtuous living, the Patriarchs are exemplars. Moses is the 
inimitable, perfect example, while Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are allegories for the 
virtuous natures that God gives to humanity.171 
3.3 Moses, the Patriarchs, and the Road to Perfection 
Moses was the “greatest and most perfect” and the “most pious” human to live.172 
Although Abraham is wonderful, his journey towards perfection ends where Moses’ 
begins: “this highest wisdom [of Abraham] is the first training of Moses.”173 This division 
between perfection and those advancing towards perfection is a key tenet.174 
 In Leg. 140-147, Philo directs his reader to observe the difference between the 
perfect man (τέλειος) and the man who is progressing (προκόπτων) towards 
perfection.175 The perfect man, Moses, is able to “cut off the whole passion of the 
quarrelsome soul” and to make it submissive and peaceable. Thus, Moses has been 
“thoroughly cleansed and has shaken off the pleasures;” his soul is offered to God 
without blemish. As Philo points out, Moses did not cut out the body part capable of 
passion, the belly; rather, Moses purifies the belly and is so contemptuous of passion 
that it is not an issue. This purification itself is a gift from God to the lover of virtue. 
Furthermore, Moses washes his feet, that which supports pleasure. Accordingly, in 
Leviticus 19 Moses commands those who are progressing to “wash the bowels and 
feet,” yet not the belly, because the one who is progressing is incapable of outright 
denial of the passions. The virtuous man moves towards virtue and its appropriate 
actions of his own inclination (τὸν τέλειον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν 
ἐνεργείας), whereas the one who is progressing is under the guidance and command of 
reason. The former has overcome the passions; the latter is struggling to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
deuteronomistic concept. Instead of postulating a development in Philo’s thought, Mendelson views 
these two positions as a “dialectic,” where “either one element or the other dominates, depending on 
contingencies” relevant to the context (125). 
171 Cf. Zeller, Charis, 59: “Dabei werden heilsgeschichtliche Themen allegorisch auf die Ebene des 
Einzelnen transponiert.” 
172 Mos. 1.1;  2.9-11, 192; Det. 132; Praem. 52-56. 
173 Post. 174. 
174 Cf. Anderson, Physical World, 164: “Most people reside in this land of progress, and Philo directs his 
attention to helping them improve.” 
175 Leg. 3.140. 
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 Thus, the difference consists in how each relates to their passions; and this has 
implications for how God relates to the individual.176 God is Lord and Master (κύριος καὶ 
δεσπότης) of evil humans,177 seeking to strike terror in them about their way of life. To 
those who are progressing, God is God, the beneficent power, who helps them progress 
towards perfection by receiving benefactions (ὑπὸ θεοῦ εὐεργετεῖσθαι ὅπως ταῖς 
εὐποιίαις τελειότητος ἐφίκηται). For the perfect person God is both Lord and God, 
because such a person is worthy to relate to God as he fully is toward humanity.178 
Furthermore, perfect people receive perfect gifts from God, while those who are 
progressing receive less perfect, or temporary, gifts.179 Accordingly, Moses is God180 to 
Pharaoh because the perfect man is neither God nor man.181 Attaining a likeness to God 
is the proper goal of humanity.182 Thus, if perfection is found in no created thing but 
appears at times because of God’s grace,183 Moses is a unique recipient of God’s gifts, 
existing in a sublime reciprocal state of being perfect through God’s gifting and 
receiving gifts from God for being perfect.184 However, such a status is unattainable for 
the rest of humanity, for whom Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are the models for how one 
progresses towards perfection.185 
                                                        
176 For this idea, see esp. Mut. 19-24. 
177 E.g. Pharaoh. 
178 Thus, Termini, “Philo’s Thought,” 101 states, “the powers foster progress in one’s knowledge of 
God, beginning from fear and moving toward friendly commerce, offered by God Himself as a gift.” 
179 Leg. 3.196. 
180 Cf. Sacr. 8-9; Det. 161; QE 2.29. On the issue of calling Moses “God,” Runia, “God and Man,” 73 notes 
that Philo can approach the question in two ways. Theologically, since no name is “indicative of [God’s] 
essence,” to call Moses “God” is not a claim about divinization but a relational claim. Philosophically, 
because the Logos indwells humans, it is difficult for Philo “to give a clear indication of where God’s true 
divinity ends and man’s derived divinity starts.” See also V. Nikiprowetzky, “‘Moyses Palpans Vel 
Liniens’: On Some Explanations of the Name of Moses in Philo of Alexandria,” in Nourished with Peace: 
Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel (ed. F.E. Greenspahn; Chico: Scholars Press, 1984), 
126–128; Richard Bauckham, “Moses as ‘God’ in Philo of Alexandria: A Precedent for Christology?,” in The 
Spirit and Christ in the New Testament and Christian Theology: Essays in Honor of Max Turner (eds. I.H. Marshall, 
V. Rabers, and C. Bennema; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 246–65. 
181 Somn. 2.234.  
182 Opif. 144. 
183 Plant. 93. Cf. Mos. 2.288. 
184 H. Najman, Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in 
Jewish Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 226–228 argues that it is possible for all humans, like Moses, “to be 
liberated through death.”  
185 Cf. Satlow, “Human Perfection,” 508. On the Patriarchs in Philo, see esp. M. Böhm, Rezeption und 
Funktion der Vätererzählungen bei Philo von Alexandria: Zum Zusammenhang von Kontext, Hermeneutik und 
Exegese im frühen Judentum (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005). 
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Therefore, properly, has [Moses] joined together the kinship of these three, 
who are nominally men, but are in truth...virtues: nature, instruction, and 
practice, which men call by another name, the three Graces, either from 
God’s giving to our race the three powers that lead towards perfection of life 
or because they have given themselves to the rational soul, a perfect and 
most beautiful gift...186 
God is the “God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob.” But God has not attached himself to 
mere men but to these virtues, which are the natures, or soul-types, that God gifts to 
humans for the pursuit of virtue. 
 Each Patriarch is different, yet each is pressing towards the same end—perfection.187 
None is named for having one of the natures/powers alone; rather, each receives his 
name from the power that “increases according to mastery.”188 As Philo argues, 
instruction cannot be perfected without nature or practice, nor nature without 
instruction and practice, and so forth.189 There is an essential congruence (οἰκειότης) 
between the three. But Philo still distinguishes and prioritizes between the types. For 
example, Philo groups Abraham and Jacob as more practical types, and Isaac (and by 
extension Moses) as theoretical. As instruction, Abraham has to learn many things, 
some of which are “genuine according to understanding” while others are “illegitimate 
principles according to encyclical instruction.” Abraham’s learning takes him from 
astronomical speculation to the knowledge of God, for which he is dependent on God’s 
revelation of himself.190 Thus, it is not that Abraham “sees God” but that “God appeared 
to the wise man.” Jacob, who is made perfect by practice, relies on exercises consisting 
in doctrines of different qualities. Although the Jacob-soul toils, he receives the 
“portion of Isaac” and thus “by necessity puts away labor” because of the “excesses of 
things prepared” and the “good things” which are the “causes of non-exertion.” 
Naturally, the “fountain from which these good things rain is the presence of the 
bountiful God,” who promises, “I will be with you.”191 Accordingly, when Jacob declares, 
“God has taken mercy on me, and all things are mine” (Gen 33.11), this is an instructive 
                                                        
186 Abr. 54. 
187 Abr. 49. 
188 J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 152: 
“If any of these conditions be lacking, perfect virtue will not be achieved.” 
189 Cf. Böhm, “Abraham und die Erzväter,” 386: Abraham “steht...immer in einem Verhältnis zu Isaak 
und Jakob...” 
190 Cf. Abr. 79-80. As the one who achieves virtue through instruction, Abraham is the model for all 
proselytes; see Zeller, Charis, 86–87. 
191 Migr. 30. 
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doctrine because in this utterance he “anchors all things in the mercy of God.”192 
Finally, Isaac, a member of the self-taught race (τὸ αὐτομαθὲς γένος), is not in need of 
practice or instruction, for he does not need the “concubine sciences” or illegitimate 
doctrines.193 Isaac has received a pure and unmixed nature from God, as God showered 
upon Isaac the virtues of being self-taught (αὐτοδίδακτον).194 Philo can even interpret 
Isaac’s birth to mean that “God is the father of perfect nature.”195 Isaac thus attains 
virtue without labor.196 To be αὐτομαθής is to be taught by God, enjoying the virtuous 
soul with which God has benefitted the individual.197 
 As Satlow notes, “Philo identifies philosophy and practice as the two paths to 
human perfection. Philosophy seems to be the superior path, as it involves an 
ontological change in the way that the soul deals with the passions. Practice is less 
certain.”198 There is certainly subordination within the unity of the three patriarchs, 
but the point is this: one takes the way of Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob – or rather, a mix of 
all three – to become Moses-like.199 One receives their particular human nature from 
God and should seek to allow God to work through it to bring the individual to 
perfection. As Anderson states, “φύσις as intrinsic character is...very positive” in this 
regard for Philo, as “it effortlessly leads a person to perfection, because God works 
through it.”200 Thus, Philo plunders the stories of the Patriarchs for clues about how 
humans live to please God.201 As Philo reads it, “there were men long ago who surpassed 
their contemporaries in virtue, who took God alone as guide and lived according to the 
Law, the right reason of nature” and were not only free themselves, but also instilled 
                                                        
192 Sacr. 42. 
193 Thus, Isaac is the only patriarch to have one wife and no concubines. P. Borgen, Bread from Heaven: 
An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 
119 notes that the one who is self-taught by Nature refers to “the one who is the object of divine grace.” 
194 See Anderson, Physical World, 116–118. 
195 Leg. 3.219. 
196 Congr. 34-38. 
197 As Billings, Platonism of Philo, 82 puts it, Isaac is a “spontaneously virtuous man.” Cf. Hadas-Lebel, 
Philo of Alexandria, 136. 
198 Satlow, “Human Perfection,” 515. 
199 Cf. also Abr. 25-26. Abraham’s story in Genesis is fertile ground for Philo, because he can allegorize 
Abraham’s migration as his relationship with God. Cf. O. McFarland, “Whose Abraham, Which Promise? 
Genesis 15.6 in Philo’s De Virtutibus and Romans 4,” JSNT 35 (2012): 109–114. 
200 Anderson, Physical World, 118. Cf. esp. Fug. 168-172. 
201 Cf. A. Kamesar, “Biblical Interpretation in Philo,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo, 85–86. 
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freedom in others.202 God gives these virtuous human natures to individuals, and “God 
alone, the most perfect nature, is able to bring one to the heights of perfection.”203 It 
should not be surprising that Philo can identify the Patriarchs not only with virtues 
given to humans as human natures, but also as the Graces. Thus, the “friend of virtue” – 
the one who is properly disposed to receive – should pray for all good things to be 
implanted in him: learning, progress, perfection (εὐμάθεια, προκοπή, τελειότης).204 
Accordingly, Barclay states, “Philo’s theology of grace thus extends across the whole 
human journey, from creation to perfection.”205 The virtuous man is made to 
participate in the utter tranquility and firmness of God’s perfect nature – and this only 
by God’s power.206 
3.4 Conclusion: The Gift of Virtue 
For Philo, humans are gifted with all of the resources necessary for being virtuous, 
where being virtuous is having a properly ordered soul by controlling or defeating the 
passions. An ordered soul in an ordered universe – all in line with God’s creative 
purposes. As Zeller states, it is clear “daß bei Philon Ontologie und Soteriologie 
ineinander übergehen.”207 What is important for our purposes is that being virtuous is 
what constitutes a person as worthy to receive gifts from God: living in accordance 
with God’s gifts enables one to receive other gifts. And as should be clear, being 
virtuous is nothing other than a gift from God, for God causes all good things. The one 
who seeks perfection through learning achieves it only through God’s revelation of 
himself; the one who practices is made to rest in God’s tranquility; and the one blessed 
with the nature of being self-taught is spontaneously virtuous. Consequently, the soul 
cannot attribute virtue to itself but must attribute the “labor in behalf of virtue” to 
                                                        
202 Prob. 62. 
203 Fug. 172. Anderson, Physical World, 118 rightly notes that “conceptually φύσις and God are 
equivalent means for attaining virtue, but Philo is reticent to make that link explicit.” 
204 Agr. 168; Fug. 137-139. As Zeller, Charis, 83 states: “...Tugend immer schon durch das göttliche 
Element im Menschen ermöglicht ist.” Cf. Mut. 258-260. 
205 Barclay, “Grace and Agency,” 147. Further: “It would be hard to find stronger expressions of the 
priority of divine grace: any hint that human activity was a prior cause of virtue or spiritual vision would 
suggest to Philo the grossest impiety.” 
206 Post. 28. Philo is interpreting Deut 5.31: “And you yourself, stand with me.” Anderson, Physical 
World, 118 states that “God imparts virtue, even if phenomenologically it appears to come entirely 
naturally from within a person.” 
207 Zeller, Charis, 72. 
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God;208 for God alone leads the soul out of Egypt, “quickly taking pity” on the tempted 
soul, which he causes to love labor in virtue while also making the “rough and steep 
way” level and easy;209 thus, those who desire virtue “disregard their strength,” trusting 
God to raise the fruits of virtue like produce from a field.210 Such examples could be 
multiplied ad nauseam: Philo believes that God, in every respect, causes virtue; humans 
must only not reject God’s gifts. 
4.  God’s Generosity to the Worthy 
We now return to where this chapter began: the concept of worth. While in one respect 
virtue and worth are two sides of the same coin, it is more correct to say that Philo’s 
virtue-spectrum unpacks the category of worth. That is, the binary categories of 
unworthy and worthy translate into the categories of evil, those who are progressing – 
from those with only a scrap of virtue yet with desire to grow, all the way through to 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – and perfect. Worth, then, encompasses this wide spectrum 
of progressing to perfect. Consequently, being worthy of divine gifts is not the result of 
struggling to please God but rather of not rejecting God’s gifts and of attributing all 
growth in virtue to God. This last section will fill out the picture and confirm what has 
come before, demonstrating the various ways Philo talks about God’s giving to the 
virtuous and the worthy. But, crucially, what I have argued so far should put these texts 
in a different light: an understanding that virtue and worth is not something 
accomplished by humans, but is a gift from God. One is worthy because God gives 
virtue, impels virtuous living, and sees such living achieved in those who desire it. 
Since all growth in virtue must be attributed to God, only rejection of God’s gifts can be 
attributed to the human. 
 We will first explore the way Philo speaks of God’s generosity to the virtuous, and 
then God’s giving to the worthy. The worthy are virtuous, but God’s giving to the 
virtuous is what makes them worthy. 
                                                        
208 Leg. 3.136. 
209 Post. 154-157. 
210 Det. 114. 
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4.1 Gifts to the Virtuous and the Constitution of Worth 
Since God gives people what they need to live virtuously, God has different gift-giving 
relations with different people, both rewarding them based on their use of those gifts 
and giving further to aid their progress. Thus, when Philo distinguishes between “gifts” 
and “offerings” in his interpretation of Numbers 28.2, gifts are the perfect good things 
God gives to the perfect while offerings are lesser gifts given to those who are 
advancing in virtue.211 As stated above, God relates to those progressing only as God the 
gracious power, so that through God’s benefactions the person might become perfect; 
by contrast, the perfect person is ruled by the Lord and benefited by God, and as such 
he is unchangeable, wholly a man of God.212 All who are progressing – who have set 
their face towards virtue, not rejecting God’s gifts – are supplicants; and God gives 
unstintingly to all supplicants, and even if there is only a glimmer of virtue (τὸ 
βραχύτατον ἀρετῆς) God will still give for the purpose of making the recipient resemble 
himself. Philo employs an analogy of fire: if the smallest spark is ignited, a fire can grow 
and give light to all around it. In the same way, the person with only a hint of virtue 
receives from God in order to improve and give light through a virtuous life to all those 
around. God gives so people may become perfect, and living perfectly is living in 
accordance with nature (τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν), achieved by walking the path of 
virtue (εἰς τὴν ἀρετῆς ἀτραπὸν ἐλθών), in the footsteps of right reason (κατ᾿ ἴχνος 
ὀρθοῦ λόγου), and keeping God’s commandments.213 God gives to the just person 
because he prays to receive from God whatever he lacks, not because he already has 
what he needs. Thus, God’s gifts to the virtuous show the individual’s dependence on 
God. Consequently, one does not have to be perfect to be worthy of divine gifting. The 
only condition is that one longs for virtue; and yet, that longing is also given by God. 
 Interpreting Exodus 16.4, God’s declaration that he will rain down bread on Israel 
from heaven, Philo states that this bread is actually heavenly wisdom, which is not 
rained down on everyone but upon “those souls that have a longing for virtue.”214 This 
                                                        
211 Leg. 3.196. 
212 Mut. 24; cf. 18-19. However, the godless person stands under judgment and does not receive any 
assistance in his endeavors, in order that he might fail; cf. Det. 114. 
213 Mut. 120-128. 
214 Mut. 259-260. 
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is indicative of Philo’s understanding that God “gives a bountiful multitude of good 
things” (πλῆθος ἄφθονον ἀγαθῶν δεδώρηται) to the person who has an excellent 
soul.215 As Philo states, the “fountains of God’s graces are everlasting, but are not given 
to all men, but rather to supplicants alone” (μόνοις ἱκέταις).216 Unsurprisingly, 
supplicants are those “who love nobility of character” (οἱ καλοκἀγαθίας ἐρῶντες).217 
Beyond gifting the virtuous person’s intellect with wisdom, God also rewards the 
virtuous with freedom from all diseases, because as the body is the house of the soul, 
“God has thought it right to give the virtuous a reward” of a well-built house.218 The 
virtuous person must then give thanks for the gifts God has given, because “the gifts 
are given to the virtuous” (σπουδαίῳ γὰρ ἐδόθησαν αἱ χάριτες) and the person who 
wants to receive in the future must be worthy of the gifting.219  
The pinnacle of the gifts given to the virtuous is the visio Dei, which constitutes the 
individual as Israel.220 Israel is God’s chosen people; but for Philo, Israel is not simply 
Israel but those “who see God.”221 According to Gen 32, Jacob wrestles with God and is 
given the new name Israel; he then names the place Peniel, saying, “For I have seen 
God” (εἶδον γὰρ θεόν).222 Jacob thus allegorically represents the person who exercises 
their soul and lives prudently, with the reward of seeing the true God who manifests 
                                                        
215 Leg. 3.203.  
216 On this theme, and the role of prayer in Philo, see C.W. Larson, “Prayer of Petition in Philo,” JBL 65 
(1946): 185–203. 
217 On supplicants, see esp. Zeller, Charis, 60–61: “Der ἱκέτης ist der Mensch bzw. die Seele oder die 
Vernunft, die zu Gott ihre Zuflucht nimmt.” Zeller draws attention specifically to Mos. 1.72. 
218 Praem. 119-120. 
219 Spec. 1.283-284. Cf. also Det. 114. 
220 On the question of Philo’s mysticism, see, inter alia, D. Winston, “Philo’s Mysticism,” StPhA 8 (1996): 
74–82; D. Winston, “Was Philo a Mystic?,” in Studies in Jewish Mysticism (eds. J. Dan and F. Talmage; 
Cambridge, MA, 1982); the classic study is Goodenough, By Light, Light. For a more recent treatment, see C. 
Noack, Gottesbewußtsein: Exegetische Studien zur Soteriologie und Mystik bei Philo von Alexandria (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2000). 
221 Cf. e.g. Conf. 56; Congr. 51; Abr. 57; Legat. 4; QE 2.51. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to 
the question of Israel and Jewish identity in Philo. Philo’s allegory to some extent – but not completely 
(see below) – removes the “Jewishness” of Israel such that any person can be Israel. On the issue, see esp. 
E. Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996); 
more broadly, Niehoff, Jewish Identity; J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to 
Trajan (323 BCE - 117 CE) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 170–180. On Philo’s terminology for Israel and the 
Jewish people, see L.R. Ubigli, “The Image of Israel in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria,” in Italian 
Studies on Philo of Alexandria (ed. F. Calabi; Boston: Brill, 2003), 53–59. 
222 On Philo’s interpretations of Gen 32, see C.T.R. Hayward, “Philo, the Septuagint of Genesis 32:24–
32 and the Name ‘Israel’: Fighting the Passions, Inspiration and the Vision of God,” JJS 51 (2000): 209–26. 
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himself to the worthy.223 Being Israel is thus not solely a Jewish distinctive but a 
distinctive of the virtuous soul.224 This is because Israel is constituted by those who 
voluntarily acquired virtue and are thus considered worthy of rewards and gifts 
(μισθῶν καὶ δωρεῶν ἀξιωθέντας).225 Israel is the “first-fruits” of the human race to God, 
who has mercy and compassion on them.226 Thus, the visio Dei is contingent on the 
cultivation of a pure soul, development in virtue.227 But “seeing God is entirely God’s 
gift,” as should be clear by now, because God is the one who gives Israel eyes to see and 
is the cause of all good things.228 As Philo states, it would be impossible for any person, 
by himself, to comprehend the “truly living One” unless he “disclose and display 
himself.”229 What is necessary from humans is desire and openness to receive from 
God.230 
God’s relation to Israel is thus explicated in terms of a gift to the worthy. God has 
“given a special gift to the race that is able to see” (χάριν ἔδωκας ἐξαίρετον τῷ 
                                                        
223 On Jacob, cf. Migr. 201; Somn. 1.171; Praem. 44; Mut. 81; Post. 63; Fug. 208; Her. 78; Abr. 52-54. For a 
discussion of what the virtuous person is actually seeing, cf. S.D. Mackie, “Seeing God in Philo of 
Alexandria: The Logos, the Powers, or the Existent One?,” StPhA 21 (2009): 25–47. 
224 Somn. 2.173. But, rightly, G. Delling, “The ‘One Who Sees God’ in Philo,” in Nourished with Peace: 
Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel (ed. F.E. Greenspahn; Chico: Scholars Press, 1984), 
35: “The gift of seeing God is bound up with the particular relationship to God that God accords the Jews, 
accords them as the company which worships him, the one God.” Or, as A. Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish 
Identity (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 131 notes, “Philo regarded the spiritual supremacy of his nation as 
a fact of life.” Thus, while his understanding of “Israel” does have a de-particularizing tendency, we 
should assume that it is not simply a de-Judaizing tendency. 
225 Ebr. 94. 
226 Spec. 4.179-180. See esp. Decal. 81. Cf. on the benefaction relationship to Israel: Leg. 2.56; Sacr. 127; 
Virt. 41; Mos. 2.41, among others. 
227 S.D. Mackie, “Seeing God in Philo of Alexandria: Means, Methods, and Mysticism,” JSJ 43 (2012): 
152–158 rightly emphasizes the presence of human agency in becoming virtuous. But he employs a 
simplistic monergism/synergism distinction such that the presence of human agency can imply 
synergism or human action alone. Consequently, Mackie gives insufficient weight to: 1) Philo’s 
commitment to divine omni-causality; 2) Philo’s belief that humans, if they do anything good, do it by 
the power of divine gifting in them; and 3) Philo’s insistence that good actions can never be attributed to 
oneself but to God. Virtuous human activity is never achieved by the human alone, nor is it synergistic; it 
is the proper outworking of receiving God’s gifts, of not rejecting them. That is, Mackie is unable to 
contextualize human agency. However, Mackie is helpful when discussing the “means” of the visio Dei. 
228 Delling, “‘One Who Sees God’,” 34. Also, Barclay, “Grace and Agency,” 146: “at every stage, and in 
every dimension of this soul-journey, the soul is dependent on the grace of God in revealing himself; 
and...the highest or climactic reaches of this ascent always end in the ‘rest’ or inactivity of the soul, 
where the soul comes to its limits and experiences the pure agency of God.” 
229 Abr. 80. See also Praem. 84. 
230 Cf. Zeller, Charis, 75–79 on “die himmlische Eros” God implants in humans, which makes them 
desire virtue. Mos. 2.67. 
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διορατικῷ γένει);231 to the “pure and sure-sighted race” the “Father of the universe 
gives the greatest of all gifts” (ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατὴρ...μεγίστην πασῶν χαρίζεται 
δωρεάν).232 That is, “Israel” expresses the truism that God benefits the worthy.233 
Persons who reject virtue – and thus live out of step with the cosmos – God looks upon 
as enemies, while those who live virtuously receive good things from God. For Philo, it 
only makes sense that the locus of such virtuous living and gift-giving would be Israel. 
4.2 God’s Gifts to the Worthy 
“God rejoices in giving,” Philo claims, “whenever they who receive are worthy of the 
gift” (διδοὺς γάρ, ὅταν ἄξιοι χάριτος ὦσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες).234 The bountiful God 
rewards (γεραίρω) people who do the Law, because of the likeness of “good things” to 
God’s own self.235  Yet, being worthy is not being perfect; rather, they are worthy of his 
gifts who lie anywhere on the spectrum from progressing to perfect. In the immediate 
context Philo is interpreting Deut. 30.9, that God will return to and rejoice in those who 
obey his Law. Philo asks, what could instill a greater desire for virtue? God’s gifts 
provoke one to progress in virtue instead of solely being the reward for perfection. The 
other side of Philo’s pronouncement is not that God gives unhappily to the unworthy. 
For Philo, giving to the unworthy specifically entails giving to those who are incapable 
of receiving because they misuse what they have already received. While I have argued 
that God can give to the unworthy, since, from a certain perspective, all are unworthy, 
it is more typical for Philo to say God does not give to the unworthy in the sense of 
those who are willfully disobedient, who misuse God’s gifts, who face the opposite 
direction from virtue. 
                                                        
231 Her. 36. 
232 Migr. 46. 
233 One implication of Philo’s de-historicized and universalized interpretation of Israel is that the 
concept of covenant takes on new meanings – it is de-historicized as well. If Israel is no longer strictly an 
historical collective, it does not make sense that God would make agreements and promises to such a 
group in history. Philo transforms the covenants into God’s generosity to worthy humans, as, for 
example, the Patriarchs were allegorical representations of types of virtuous humans. Cf. Philo’s 
exposition of Genesis 17 in Mut. 47-60; for the covenant with Isaac, Mut. 252-263; also Leg. 3.85. For Noah, 
Somn. 2.219-225, 237. 
234 Somn. 2.175-177.  
235 Praem. 126. 
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 Those who are worthy are obedient to God. Interpreting Psalm 23.1, Philo argues 
that the meaning of “The Lord is my shepherd, and he will cause me to lack nothing,” is 
that God takes care of his obedient flock.236 As Philo states elsewhere, “God gives 
nothing imperfect to those who are obedient” (χαρίζεται δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἀτελὲς 
οὐδέν).237 God comes near to those who are worthy of being benefitted, those who love 
wisdom and knowledge: the divine riches (θεῖος πλοῦτος) are poured out upon the 
worthy.238 Yet, God gives specifically according to the capacity of the recipient, 
depending on where he lies on the spectrum of worthiness. One of Philo’s dictum about 
giving is, “do not give as much as you are able...but as much as the recipient is able to 
receive” (μὴ ὅσα δύνασαι χαρίζου...ἀλλ᾿ ὅσα ἱκανὸς ὁ δεόμενός ἐστι δέξασθαι).239 God 
gives not according to his own power but with a view towards what the recipient can 
handle, for their betterment.240   
One could exponentially multiply example texts for this discussion, but Philo is 
remarkably consistent in his understanding of God as a giver to the worthy.241 But as I 
have tried to show, we must re-think what “worth” was for Philo. Worth for Philo is a 
broad – and therefore, somewhat vague – category that receives definition by paying 
attention to his understanding of virtue. Furthermore, another important facet of 
worth is that humans must not consider themselves worthy to receive.242 Philo 
discusses three errors humans often have in relation to God as Cause and Giver: first, 
due to forgetfulness, some are not thankful;243 second, some overestimate their own 
power and consider themselves the source of the good things they have;244 and third, 
some people consider themselves worthy to receive gifts from God because of their 
manifest virtue (ὥστε ἄξιοι διὰ ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ θεῷ χαρίτων νομισθῆναι).245 In response 
to this third error, Philo quotes Deut 9.5: “Not because of your righteousness nor 
                                                        
236 Mut. 115. 
237 Migr. 73. 
238 Migr. 56-58 and Post. 139. Cf. Praem. 100-101; Spec. 2.218-219. 
239 Post. 142-145. 
240 Cf. Deus 80. 
241 Cf. e.g. also Ebr. 106; Plant. 91-93; Praem. 116; Leg. 2.86; 3.163-164. 
242 Cf. Her. 33. 
243 Deut 8.18 rights this error, as Philo says the moment that one does not forget God is whenever one 
does not forget oneself. To remember oneself is to contemplate one’s own nothingness (οὐδένεια) and 
God’s exceeding greatness. 
244 For the second, Moses reproves such humans in Deut 8.17: it is the “Lord God who gives strength.” 
245 Sacr. 54-57. 
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because of the holiness of your heart did you enter this land to inherit it,” but because 
God has chosen to destroy the wickedness of the nations that inhabit them and “so that 
God might establish the covenant that he swore to your fathers,” which are 
symbolically God’s gifts (αἱ χάριτες αὐτοῦ). Consequently, it is not one’s worth that 
makes one worthy to receive from God; it is the realization of one’s God-given 
worthiness, which means that, no one is worthy of their own accord.246 Being virtuous 
and thus worthy is a condition for receiving gifts from God, but that condition is itself 
already a gift from God. 
As we have seen in the discussion of Leg. 3.77-106 in the previous chapter, Philo can 
and does press behind human acts that seem to constitute worth, as well as God’s giving 
in response to human acts, to show that there always exists a prior worthy nature given 
by God. Thus, Noah found grace before God not because of any prior deed (μηδὲν 
πρότερον ἐργασάμενον) but because Noah means “rest” or “just” – he has an excellent 
nature from birth. Likewise, with Abraham, Philo explains that he was given a new 
homeland not because of anything he had done prior – he was a sinful Chaldean – but 
rather because God birthed Abraham as a worthy figure. The other examples follow this 
same basic pattern: each person did nothing to warrant their favor from God but rather 
received a prior worthy and virtuous nature that constitutes them as worthy to receive. 
The virtuous lives of these great biblical characters who receive many gifts from God 
are simply an extension and development of that with which they had already been 
gifted. Worth and virtue precede receiving from God, but God’s implanting virtue 
within the soul and arousing the person towards perfection precede one’s being 
virtuous and thus, worthy. 
4.3 Faith and Thanksgiving 
At the end of Moses’ life, he sang a “hymn of praise” to God, his “final thanksgiving” 
(τελευταίαν...εὐχαριστίαν) in his physical body, thanking God for the “new and 
unprecedented gifts” (καιναῖς καὶ οὐ ταῖς ἐν ἔθει χάρισιν) God had granted him from 
                                                        
246 Thus, Zeller, Charis, 72: “Erlösung besteht letztlich, könnte man sagen, in der dankbaren  
Anerkennung  des alles  bewirkenden Schöpfers.” 
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his “birth until old age.”247 Moses sang his song before the assembly so that all might 
learn to give similar thanksgivings to God. From Moses’ song, and his Law, one learns 
the necessity of attributing all good things to God in faith and as thanksgiving.  
 Accordingly, for Philo the virtuous life is one of faith and thanksgiving; that is, the 
virtuous life is one that is always directed towards God in gratitude.248 Thus, Philo can 
call faith “the most perfect of the virtues” (τὴν τελειοτάτην ἀρετῶν, πίστιν);249 
Abraham, when he came to an “unswerving and firm conception” of God as the 
supreme cause, was the first to believe in God. He thus acquired faith, “the most certain 
of the virtues.”250 Philo interprets Deut 10.20 – “you shall cleave to him” – as referring 
to faith and piety, for “these virtues adapt and unite the mind to imperishable 
nature.”251 Perfect piety dispels self-love and admires the true source of gifts.252 Those 
who ascribe all things to divine grace are those who love virtue, being the progeny of 
Seth and not Cain.253 In the end, even Abraham when he drew near to God “perceived 
that he was dust and ashes.”254 The human mind, then, should always seek to take leave 
of itself and to fly to the “mind of the universe,” the one true cause of all things.255 
Whatever stands in the way of faith that properly conceives of God as cause and in the 
way of thanksgiving for his causation must be eradicated from the soul. 
 As Philo states, “it is the most suitable work for God to give benefits and for created 
beings to give thanks” (εὐεργετεῖν... εὐχαριστεῖν).256 The faith that produces 
thanksgiving is itself a virtue, and therefore a gift from God. God’s grace is all-
encompassing: God creates humans, gives virtue and causes that virtue to come to 
fruition, by which they are worthy to receive from God, who loves to give; their faithful 
and grateful response to God’s giving, finally, then, is nothing other than a gift. As Philo 
states, gratitude is “not the work of the soul, but of the one who shines thanksgiving in 
                                                        
247 Virt. 72-74. 
248 On thanksgiving, see esp. J. LaPorte, Eucharistia in Philo (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1983); J. 
Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 175–189; Zeller, Charis, 
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249 Her. 91. 
250 Virt. 216. Cf. Abr. 270. 
251 Migr. 132. 
252 Cf. Congr. 130. 
253 Cf. Post. 35, 41-42. 
254 Deus 161. 
255 Leg. 3.29. 
256 Plant. 130. We will return to Philo’s understanding of thanksgiving in chapter 5. 
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it.”257 I began the first chapter by discussing how Philo’s piety centered upon 
recognizing and acknowledging God as the cause of all good things. After two chapters 
of putting various aspects of Philo’s theology in place we see that nothing needs to be 
altered: God causes and gives all good things, without exception. 
5.  Conclusion 
“Indeed, as the beginnings are God’s, so also the ends are God’s (ὥσπερ αἱ ἀρχαὶ θεοῦ, 
οὕτως καὶ τὰ τέλη θεοῦ).”258 Philo was a theologian of divine generosity: to explain who 
God is, what God’s greatest gift is, the makeup of human ontology, or how it is 
necessary to live, Philo would point to God’s acts of creative giving, which establish 
order from disorder. From beginning to end, all good things are gifts from the creator 
God. 
In this chapter I have argued three main points, which fill out the grammatical 
rules I proposed in chapter one and demonstrate how Philo can consider all good things 
– even human action, virtue, and worth – to be God’s gifts. First, the God who causes 
and creates all good things has placed humanity in a created sphere that is ordered for 
their benefit. Nature, Law, and Logos not only order the world but also enable and 
empower humans to live according the standards that God has built into the cosmos, 
the result of which is virtue. Philo unites cosmology and ethics vis-à-vis divine gift-
giving because his beneficent God is the Creator. Second, the hyper-generous God is 
also the creator and giver of the virtues: he plants virtue within the human soul and is 
the cause of their growth and fruition in virtuous living. God gives the standards for 
virtuous living and he is the one who brings about the fulfillment of those standards in 
worthy recipients. Third, since God is a God of order, and is a supremely wise God, he 
gives to those who are worthy of his gifts. However, “worth” is not the result of toil and 
striving to please a hypercritical God. Rather, it is an aspect of God’s own generosity. 
Thus, Philo’s view of divine grace can be summarized as cosmological and causative: God’s 
grace is the cause of the creation of the cosmos and it is constitutive of all good human 
                                                        
257 Leg. 1.82. 
258 Her. 120. 
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life and action, which is life according to the fabric of the cosmos.259 Divine grace is 
therefore prior to human worth, which is a condition, not cause, for God’s giving. 
Accordingly, when we speak about divine gifts to the “worthy,” we have to let Philo 
define the concept.260 Standing behind the concept of “worth” is a whole system of 
thought – as detailed in these two chapters – which asserts and assumes that all good 
things must be attributed to God the good cause, and therefore that humans are 
incapable of good on their own. Virtuous living is an unpacking of God’s gifts, the 
absence of abuse or rejection of divine generosity. Thus, I established an important 
point at the beginning: even in those texts in which it seems as though humans are 
striving for virtue, those who advance into the deeper mysteries learn that it is actually 
all God’s doing. Perhaps paradoxically, through virtuous living one learns that 
everything is God’s doing. Philo, therefore, cannot be labeled a synergist: one does not 
work with God, such that the divine and human agencies are separable. One enjoys – or 
rejects – God’s gifts, such that all good human actions are predicated on divine giving, 
while proper use of God’s gifts must be attributed to God, not the human agent. The 
only thing that humans cause is evil; everything else must be attributed to God. 
Thus, worth is constituted by divine generosity; and as I argued, Philo unpacks the 
binary categories of unworthy/worthy with his spectrum of evil, progressing, and 
perfect. It is only those who are not progressing at all that are unworthy of divine gifting; 
that is, one is unworthy through rejecting or misusing God’s generosity. There is always 
an essential unfit to God’s gifts for those who are not perfect, since in relation to God all 
are unworthy and the purpose of God’s gifts is the betterment of the recipient: the God 
who creates makes order from disorder. In relation to God, none are perfect and 
therefore none are worthy, and what divine gifts do is to increase that fit between God 
and the individual, by drawing them closer to God’s own perfection. 
                                                        
259 Cf. Cher. 28: humans are the “instruments” through which God the cause acts. As Dillon, Middle 
Platonists, 167 states, Philo is speaking about “Joseph’s dreams, but the application extends to all human 
activity.” 
260 This is the main issue with the treatment of Philo in D.A. Carson, “Divine Sovereignty and Human 
Responsibility in Philo: Analysis and Method,” NovT 23 (1981): 148–64, who has a tendency to rush into 
comparisons with Paul too quickly. Problematic also is the use of “merit” in Harrison, Grace, 114–133. 
Chapter 3:  The Christ-Event within the Divine Gift-Economy 
 
Grace that is not disruptive is not grace... Grace, strictly speaking, does not mean 
continuity but radical discontinuity, not reform but revolution... not the perfecting of 
virtues but the forgiveness of sins, not improvement but resurrection from the dead.1 
1.  Introduction 
Like his Alexandrian kin, Paul could argue for the gift-nature of all things: “For from 
him and through him and for him are all things” (Rom 11.36; cf. 1 Cor 8.6). Asking the 
Corinthians, “what do you have that you did not receive?” (1 Cor 4.7), the correct 
answer for Paul would have been, “nothing.” The Corinthians received all things as a 
gift in Christ: “in every way you have been made rich in him” (1 Cor 1.4-5). But this 
formulation points to the divergent aspect of Paul’s gift-theology when compared to 
Philo: for Philo humans have received all things as a gift because God is the creator of 
all things; for Paul believers receive all things because God has given Jesus.  
 This first chapter on Paul will mirror the first chapter on Philo, as will the second 
chapter on Paul the second on Philo. Chapter one examined in Philo who God is as 
Giver, what kinds of gifts God gives, and to whom God gives; this laid the groundwork 
for the argument that God for Philo is unquestionably a God who wisely and graciously 
gives, specifically to the worthy. This chapter will seek to place the corresponding 
focus on Paul’s understanding of grace: that God as Giver is the one who has given Jesus 
Christ for the ungodly, a gift which is also given by Jesus. As the first chapter on Philo 
set up the second to discuss the interrelated issues of human agency, how worth is 
construed, and how one becomes able to receive gifts, this chapter will set up the 
second chapter on Paul to examine more closely the problem of human unworthiness, 
human agency and sin, and how one receives the gift. We cannot force Philo and Paul 
into the same mold, but there is a similarity of structure to their thought that allows for 
orderly comparisons. 
Philo works from the preconception that everything is gift: the cosmos is God’s 
primary benefaction, and the purpose of divine giving is to bring humans in line with 
                                                        
1 G. Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 16. 
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the cosmic order. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that, in distinction from Philo, 
Paul works from the preconception that Christ is the gift, the supreme manifestation of 
divine grace, and divine giving for Paul is defined from the particularity of that event 
outwards. There is a concentration of generosity in the Christ-event, the fundamental 
gift within a matrix of gifts that are mutually interdependent on and related to God’s 
giving of Jesus. For Paul, the Christ-gift is so revolutionary and revelatory of who God is 
that, after the Christ-event, every gift is a Christ-shaped gift, and history is therefore 
interpreted by Paul through this event. God is identified not primarily as the cause and 
creator of all things nor by his gracious nature, but as the one who has given Jesus 
Christ. Accordingly, it is central for Paul that the Christ-event is the gift that effects the 
re-creation of its unworthy recipients through their reception of the Holy Spirit. God is 
an incommensurate giver not primarily because of his perfection, but because he 
inscrutably gives to the unworthy, and therefore without consideration of the normal 
standards of worth. If Philo’s gift-theology stresses the universality of gifts, the 
fittingness of the recipient, and divine rationality, Paul’s gift-theology stresses the 
particularity of the gift, the recipient’s lack of fit, and divine inscrutability.  
The bulk of this chapter will consist of exegesis of Paul – first Galatians, then 
Romans – to explore how Paul interprets the Christ-event as gift, examining the 
associations Paul makes between the Christ-event and the concept of gift, as well as 
how the Christ-event is related to other gifts (e.g., the Holy Spirit, righteousness). As we 
will see, Paul’s concept of divine generosity takes its shape from the particularity of the 
Christ-event as a gift given for and to the unworthy, and all other aspects of his 
thought on gift revolve around this point. Since this historical event is God’s grace, it is 
important for speaking about who God is and for interpreting God’s actions throughout 
history. Furthermore, it is equally significant that Paul situates Christ alongside God as 
the gift-giver. Philo will appear throughout for comparison, and the chapter will 
conclude by drawing together some points about how Paul and Philo relate on 
particular themes. 
 116 
2.  On Not Rejecting God’s Gift:  The Christ-Gift in Galatians 
Martyn has argued that Galatians answers two questions: “What time is it?” and “In 
what cosmos do we actually live?”2 If Philo were asked these questions, he might 
respond, somewhat quizzically, “today,” and “in God’s cosmos.” For Philo, the “name of 
eternity is today.”3 Time came into existence either concurrently with, or 
imperceptibly after, the creation of the world;4 while the perceptible world revolves, 
the “nature of time shines forth.” For God, time is neither future nor past but 
immutably “now” (μόνον ὑφέστηκεν), and though humans measure time, they live in 
this unending now, which is framed and ordered by the God who does not change.5 By 
contrast, for Paul, in Christ God has split history into two: there is a time “before faith 
came” and an “after” now that faith has come (3.23-25).6 For Philo, “before” and “after” 
are concepts used only to understand the “now.” For Paul, “before” is the time of this 
“present evil age” (1.4), when Paul persecuted the church (1.13-14) before “I” died to 
the Law (2.19-20); when Gentiles lived in servitude to false gods (4.8-9) and Jews were 
enslaved to the “elements of the world” (4.3); in short, the epoch during which 
“scripture confined all things under sin” (3.22). There is only the “before,” from which 
humans are rescued, and the “after,” when “God sent his son” at the “fullness of time” 
(4.4). The Christ-event creates this disjunctive time. 
 If Philo’s God is beneficent in his ordering of the world and time, Paul’s God is 
beneficent in his interruption of time, which recreates the world through crucifixion 
(6.14). Accordingly, for Paul and Philo, humans exist in different kinds of world-time, 
which is indicative of their different views of divine generosity. For Philo, the “age” of 
this world is ordered, and humans are capable of living virtuously and thus worthily of 
God’s gifts. For Paul, the age in which humans exist precludes the possibility of a fitting 
                                                        
2 J.L. Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New Haven: Doubleday, 
1997), 23. I am not arguing that temporal categories frame everything in Galatians; rather, Martyn’s 
questions provide a way into a comparison between Paul and Philo. 
3 Fug. 56-57. Cf. Leg. 3.25. 
4 Cf. Opif. 26. 
5 Deus 32. See esp. S. Lauer, “Philo’s Concept of Time,” JJS 19 (1958): 39–46. 
6 A. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (trans. R. Brassier; Stanford: SUP, 2003), 43: “The 
formula according to which God sent us his Son signifies primarily an intervention within History, one 
through which it is, as Nietzsche will put it, ‘broken in two,’ rather than governed by a transcendent 
reckoning in conformity with the laws of an epoch.” 
 117 
gift; the gift is inherently incongruous to its recipient because the sending of Christ is 
the solution to this age, neither a fitting gift nor the fulfillment of the “before.”7 
 Accordingly, when Paul speaks about divine χάρις in Galatians, he uses the word 
with a specific content. Paul argues that the Christ-event is the singular instantiation of 
God’s generosity in the cosmos and in history, and it is a gift given irrespective of 
worth, thus going to unfitting recipients, both Jew and Gentile. Paul thus strikes a 
Christocentric note to ensure that the Galatians understand where their allegiance 
should lie: in the truth of the gospel (2.14), not in Jewish or Gentile ways of living on 
their own or as a soteriological supplement to God’s act in Christ. Accordingly, 
Galatians opens and closes with Christological designations of grace, with four of the 
seven uses of χάρις relating to God’s gift of Christ to the undeserving (1.3-4; 2.21; 5.4; cf. 
6.18).8  
The Galatians receive grace and peace “from God our Father and the Lord Jesus 
Christ.” The single ἀπό designates God and Jesus as the united source. God is the one 
who “raised [Jesus] from the dead” (1.1),9 while Jesus is the one who “gave himself (τοῦ 
δόντος ἑαυτόν) for our sins,” to “rescue” humans from this “evil age” (1.4). Galatians 
1.1-4 thus presents a compact description of divine gift by defining who the Givers are 
and the need of the recipients: God who raises the crucified Jesus; Jesus who gave 
himself; and sinful humans. Hence, Paul begins to associate χάρις with the Christ-event 
that saves from sin and an evil age.10 As de Boer states, the “remainder of the 
letter...may be read as Paul’s unpacking of this encapsulation of the gospel for the 
Galatians.”11 
                                                        
7 On Paul’s anthropology in relation to other Second-Temple Jewish authors, see T. Laato, Paul and 
Judaism: An Anthological Approach (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995). I take Philo to be an example of the 
anthropological optimism Laato argues is characteristic of Judaism. Cf. also S. Westerholm, “Paul’s 
Anthropological ‘Pessimism’ in Its Jewish Context,” in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural 
Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 2008), 71–98. 
8 For the other three references (1.6, 15; 2.9), see next chapter. 
9 Thus, Martyn, Galatians, 85: “this one God has now identified himself by his act in Jesus Christ, 
making that act, indeed, the primal mark of his identity.” 
10 M. Winger, “From Grace to Sin: Names and Abstractions in Paul’s Letters,” NovT 41 (1999): 153–154 
claims that the introductory formulas convey a general sense of favor, but that since “the immediate 
contexts do not refer to any particular way in which this favor might be manifested, there is apparently 
no criterion of identity for this χάρις.” If this were true of any letter, it is not true of Galatians.  
11 M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 28. 
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In 2.15 Paul differentiates Jews “by nature” from Gentile “sinners.” Unlike most 
Jewish authors, Philo theoretically could not make this distinction.12 He could see the 
sinfulness of the Egyptians or Chaldeans, and therefore make a distinction, but his 
anthropology is universal: all are constructed the same way, all can live virtuously. 
Consequently, the way Paul removes the distinction also would not satisfy Philo: that 
no person (οὐ ἄνθρωπος) is justified by “works of the Law” (2.16). Although Philo did 
not use δικαιόω like Paul,13 Philo could neither say that all stand in need of justification 
nor that ἔργα νόμου would not achieve it. Though Philo’s wording is different, he uses 
similar phrases – for similar purposes – and remains a largely untapped comparison.  
As Philo notes, “good people” (ἄνθρωποι ἀγαθοί) accomplish the Laws “by works” 
(τοὺς νόμους ἔργοις ἐπιτελούντων), which are brought to perfection by God’s grace, of 
course (τελεσφορηθήσεσθαι χάριτι).14 God rewards “good things” for their similarity to 
himself.15 Thus, Noah found favor before God because he rested from injustice and sin 
(ἀδίκημα, ἁμάρτημα).16 Quoting Deut 16.20, Philo says that the Law has been given so 
that we might “pursue what is just in a just manner” (δικαίως τὸ δίκαιον διώκειν; cf. 
Deut 16.20; 1 Kings 8.32), to cultivate δικαιοσύνην καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τοῖς συγγενέσιν 
ἔργοις αὐτῆς – and not opposite actions.17 One hears the Law, but the ears cannot be 
trusted;18 it must be stamped on “the ruling part” and put into action by the hands 
without delay.19 It is God’s judgment (δικαιώσαντος θεοῦ) that effects the destruction of 
the ungodly (πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀπώλειαν),20 while God has “thought fit” to 
reward the virtuous (ἐδικαίωσε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς γέρας τῷ σπουδαίῳ παρασχεῖν).21 What 
happens to those who transgress the Laws? Curses. While God gladly welcomes and 
                                                        
12 Cf. e.g. Spec. 1.54, where it is “some from the Gentiles” who do not honor God properly. 
13 Philo can use δικαιόω with νόμος as subject, concerning what the Law deems fit for human life; cf. 
e.g. Spec. 1.298; 2.213; 3.180. 
14 Praem. 126. Cf. Det. 68. 
15 Accordingly, the “only just God” (Somn. 2.194) is the “defender and champion of the just” (Abr. 
232). 
16 Leg. 3.77. 
17 Det. 18. Cf. Spec. 2.13. 
18 Cf. Gal 3.1-5; Rom 10.17! 
19 Spec. 4.137-138. 
20 Mos. 1.94-96. 
21 Praem. 120. See also Somn. 2.174. 
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rewards the proselyte who comes to God willingly, the noble born who lives contrary to 
virtue (and therefore, Law) is dragged down into Tartarus, to be an example.22 
How, for Philo, is one worthy before God? No other Jew stressed divine grace more 
than Philo, but the answer would still be: by doing ἔργα νόμου, virtuous actions, the 
virtue itself traceable to God’s grace – a point that should be clear from the previous 
chapters. Philo never uses this precise phrase, but making exact phrasing a necessity only 
obscures the similarity of content: the one who receives God’s grace is the one who 
does the Law, who becomes a fitting recipient through the use of God’s gifts. The 
problem, for Paul, is that if God operated this way, he could give gifts to no one. 
Paul makes clear that ἔργα νόμου both cannot justify and are what set Jews apart 
from Gentiles: a disastrous combination.23 Rather, justification is by faith in Christ.24 
The contrast between 2.15-16 not only signals that the Jew-Gentile distinction is 
invalid, but it also links Jews with Gentiles as sinners who need to be justified. Jews are 
now identified with that “fundamental sinfulness” that is “characteristic of Gentiles,”25 
for all exist in this present evil age, under the power of the flesh. Justification by faith 
problematizes ethnic distinctions because justification reveals the problem of all 
humans to be sin.26 In 2.17 Paul further undercuts any distinction, saying “we” were 
found to be sinners in seeking to be justified in Christ, where “we” are Jewish 
Christians.27 Without the hamartiological distinction, there is no reason to deny table 
                                                        
22 Praem. 126, 152. 
23 As G. Stanton, “The Law of Moses and the Law of Christ - Galatians 3.1-6.2,” in Paul and the Mosaic 
Law (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 103–104 argues, “Paul’s first use of the phrase 
‘works of the law’ in 2:16a is triggered by the issues which dominate the preceding discussion in Gal 2, 
circumcision and food laws. But as the initial listeners heard the argument of the following verses unfold, 
they were left in no doubt that Paul was concerned about far more than these ‘test cases of Jewish 
distinctiveness over against Gentiles.’” 
24 The phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ is an exegetical hornets’ nest, and we need not enter into the debate 
here. To start, see the debate between R.B. Hays and J.D.G Dunn in R.B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The 
Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 249–298; the recent 
collection of essays in M.F. Bird and P.M. Sprinkle, eds., The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and 
Theological Studies (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010); and, to show my cards, R.B. Matlock, “The Rhetoric of 
Πίστις in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9,” JSNT 30 (2007): 173–102. 
25 J. Lambrecht, “Paul’s Reasoning in Galatians 2:11-21,” in Paul and the Mosaic Law, 58. 
26 Cf. T.G. Gombis, “The ‘Transgressor’ and the ‘Curse of the Law’: The Logic of Paul’s Argument in 
Galatians 2–3,” NTS 53 (2007): 87: “Jews must locate themselves alongside gentiles in seeking justification, 
and are therefore forced to fellowship along with these ‘sinners’ in the newly constituted people of God.” 
27 I view 2.17 as a realis. As D. Hunn, “Christ Versus the Law: Issues in Galatians 2:17-18,” CBQ 72 
(2010): 539–540 argues, Paul uses ἁμαρτωλοί in 2.15 and 17 in the same way; i.e., sin in 2.17 is not post-
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fellowship. Furthermore, this fellowship does not make Christ a minister of sin; rather, 
the issue is that rebuilding the Law makes one a transgressor: “by returning to the law 
at mealtimes, they rebuild what they once destroyed, the very system that handed 
them the guilty verdict.”28 
 In 2.19-20, death to and through the Law occurs through co-crucifixion with Christ. 
The “I” dies to the Law with Christ,29 in whose death the Law participated by cursing 
him (3.10-14).30 Only death with Christ to the Law makes life to God possible; the Law, 
again, has no power to make one worthy before God, or alive (cf. 3.21). In 2.20 Paul 
affirms that as faith in Christ results in death through the Law, so living to God is a new 
life in which the subject is reconstituted dialectically: I no longer live, but Christ lives in 
me, and the life I now live is one of faith in the self-giving of Christ.31 That is, life is now 
constituted in Christ and directed towards Christ in faith; it is cruciform and 
Christocentric. Paul’s definition of this subject-object figure is paramount: the Christ 
who lives in Paul and in whom Paul places his trust is “the son of God who loved me and 
gave himself for me” (τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν 
ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ). Thus, in 2.15-20, faith in Christ is faith in this Christ who lovingly gave 
himself, and it is by faith that one identifies with Christ’s self-giving and the unworthy 
individual is reconstituted (that is, justified) to live to God in Christ.32 
 In 2.21 Paul draws the argument of 2.15-20 to a conclusion. As commentators often 
note, for Paul’s challengers – as with Philo – the Law would be a constitutive element of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
conversion failure to do the law. For the alternative argument, see J.D.G. Dunn, The Epistle to The Galatians 
(London: A&C Black, 1993), 141. 
28 Hunn, “Christ Versus the Law,” 546. On the logic that the Law judges those whom it cannot justify, 
see 542. M. Bachmann, Sünder oder Übertreter. Studien zur Argumentation in Gal 2,15ff. (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1992), 73–77 and J. Lambrecht, “Transgressors by Nullifying God’s Grace,” Bib 72 (1991): 235 
argue that transgression refers to God’s will; showing oneself to be a transgressor (2.18) parallels 
rejecting God’s grace (2.20). This is not fully persuasive, but the connection is suggestive.  
29 Cf. Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 1535, Chapters 1-4 (LW 26; St. Louis: Concordia, 1963), 157: “He 
does not say: ‘I am free of, or liberated from, the Law for a while’ or ‘I am the lord of the Law.’ All he says 
is: ‘I have died to the Law.’” 
30 Pace de Boer, Galatians, 160. Cf. Martyn, Galatians, 257; Gombis, “Logic of Paul’s Argument,” 90. 
31 On the relationship between justification and participation in this text, see esp. S. Chester, “It Is No 
Longer I Who Live: Justification by Faith and Participation in Christ in Martin Luther’s Exegesis of 
Galatians,” NTS 55 (2009): 315–37. Cf. S. Schauf, “Galatians 2.20 in Context,” NTS 52 (2006): 99: “crucifixion 
with Christ is a common experience of Jewish and Gentile Christians, indeed, the common experience 
which justifies them before God.” 
32 Thus, Badiou, Saint Paul, 14: “The Christian subject does not preexist the event he declares... Thus, 
the extrinsic conditions of his existence or identity will be argued against.” 
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God’s grace. Torah observance – and thus a Jewish lifestyle – would be a necessary 
complement to faith in Christ.33 Paul would not need to argue that God gives gifts; 
probably not even that Christ is God’s grace. Rather, he must argue that Christ alone is 
God’s grace, which precludes grace in or by means of the Law. Given Paul’s statement – 
“I do not reject the grace of God” (τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ)34 – it is likely that Paul is 
responding not only to such a Law-plus-Christ position but also the claim that he skews 
justification by eliding the Law from the equation. As Martyn states, “For Paul...the 
locus of God’s grace is defined by the locus of God’s rectifying power.”35 That power is 
the Christ-event.36 If righteousness came διὰ νόμου, then Christ’s death would have 
been “in vain” (δωρεάν). Since both Jews and Gentiles die “to the Law” in order to “live 
to God,” it would be impossible to locate the operation of God’s grace in the Law; the 
interrelated singularity (without Law) and incongruity (for sinners) of the Christ-event 
leaves nothing for humans to do (or be) to make themselves worthy recipients of God’s 
gift. Accordingly, the Christ-event renders all soteriological and hamartiological 
distinctions between Jews and Gentiles null and void. Justification in Christ means that 
living Ἰουδαϊκῶς has no intrinsic preeminence over living ἐθνικῶς but that everything 
is measured by whether one walks in step with the truth of the gospel. Neither Law nor 
the absence of Law increase the fit between the individual and God’s grace. 
 This association of grace, Christ, and justification also occurs in 5.4.37 Paul asserts 
that Christ has set believers free “for freedom” (τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ; 5.1) and that the 
Galatians should not place themselves again under the “yoke of slavery.” Circumcision 
makes Christ of no worth and obligates the person “to do the whole Law” and therefore 
to seek to be justified in the Law (ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε). That person is then “estranged 
from Christ” (κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ) and has “fallen from grace” (τῆς χάριτος 
ἐξεπέσατε). Unsurprisingly, the two phrases are parallel descriptions of the 
                                                        
33 Cf. de Boer, Galatians, 144; J.L. Martyn, “A Law-Observant Mission to Gentiles,” in Theological Issues in 
the Letters of Paul (London: T&T Clark, 1997), 13: “Whatever [the Teachers] may be saying about Christ, the 
Law is itself both the foundation and the essence of their good news.” 
34 B. Eastman, The Significance of Grace in the Letters of Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 83 labels ἡ 
χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ a subjective genitive; but this is too limiting. 
35 Martyn, Galatians, 259–260. 
36 Pace Dunn, Galatians, 147: Paul “has in mind ‘the grace of God’ manifested in his calling and in his 
successful missionary work.” 
37 On this text, see esp. J.M.G. Barclay, “Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: 
Revisiting the Logic of Galatians,” ABR 58 (2010): 36–56. 
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consequences of locating justification in the Law, because doing so is a failure to 
understand Christ as God’s gift which is given to the unworthy, not those who locate 
worth in the Law. To reassert the position of the Law after the receipt of the Christ-gift 
would effectively be a denial of one’s participation in Christ’s crucifixion – through and 
to the Law – by which one lives to God as a reconstituted agent (2.19-20). Furthermore, 
“in Christ Jesus” it is not only circumcision that does not matter, but also 
uncircumcision (5.6). Again, neither Jewish (Torah) nor Gentile (non-Torah) ways of life 
can figure an individual as a fitting recipient of the incongruously given Christ-gift.  
 As an appropriate capstone, the letter ends where it began: “the grace of our Lord 
Jesus Christ...” (ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; 6.18). 
 In Galatians, nothing instigates the giving of the Christ-gift, establishing progress or 
fit between the “before” of enslaving sin and the “now” of the life-giving gift in the 
Spirit.38 Abraham believes and is justified because scripture “pre-proclaimed the good 
news” (προευηγελίσατο; 3.6-9), just as the promises were given to Abraham and to his 
seed, Christ (3.15-18).39 Abraham thus stands in relation to the gift, believing in the 
promise;40 and the Law does not intervene between the giving of the promise to 
Abraham and its fulfillment in Christ. Rather, “God has given to Abraham through the 
promise” (3.18). Likewise, Israel was not progressing in worthiness before God; she, like 
the Gentiles, was enslaved (4.3). Accordingly, when Christ is sent at the fullness of time, 
Israel is redeemed and receives her adoption (υἱοθεσία). Accordingly, history does not 
provide a foundation for the Christ-gift, in which individual and cosmos are crucified 
and new creation established (6.14-15).41 This newness of the Christ-gift is an aspect of 
its incongruity: the gift supports no systems of worth – Jewish or Gentile – because it is 
                                                        
38 Cf. K. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and The Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2001), 6: “New levels of God’s gifts are not predictable from previous ones – for example, God’s 
incarnation is not predictable from God’s gift of existence to creatures in creating them or from God’s 
gift of covenant fellowship with Israel.” 
39 Badiou, Saint Paul, 103: “Abraham...anticipates what could be called a universalism of the Jewish 
site; in other words, he anticipates Paul.” 
40 Cf. J.C. Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980), 
97: “In Galatians 3 the actual content of the promise is Christ (v. 19b)...” For other possibilities, see S.K. 
Williams, “Promise in Galatians: A Reading of Paul’s Reading of Scripture,” JBL 107 (1988): 709–20. 
41 Cf. Barclay, “Logic of Galatians,” 53: Paul “does not find any historical sequence of ‘believers’ from 
Abraham onwards, and the only continuity he traces before Christ is the continuity of the divine 
promise, not a covenant continuity stretching through Israel’s history.” Cf. S. Grindheim, “Not Salvation 
History, but Salvation Territory: The Main Subject Matter of Galatians,” NTS 59 (2013): 101.  
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not given as the fulfillment of any cultural system or trajectories but as an 
unconditionally fulfilled promise for those who believe.  
 If for Philo, doing the Law constitutes one as righteous (i.e. virtuous), and divine 
gifts are what enable such works, for Paul, works of the Law cannot justify sinful 
humans. Indeed, the Law (rightly) curses those sinners who transgress it. Similarly, for 
Philo the playing field for Jews and Gentiles is level; all can be virtuous, all can be 
“Israel.” For Paul, the playing field is level because all are sinners in need. Accordingly, 
in Galatians we find a strong identification of God’s grace as the Christ-event, the 
unfitting gift, that justifies Jews and Gentiles by reconstituting them as new creation.42 
Jesus gave himself for our sins and to rescue humanity from the present evil age and the 
Law with its curse. Consequently, inherent to the association between Christology and 
gift is the incongruity of the gift, which does not invite Gentile sinners to a Jewish party 
but addresses the problem of universal sin. All whom “scripture confined under sin” 
(3.22) may receive the gift by faith from the God of the Christ-event. 
3.  The Gift of God in Romans 
Turning from Galatians to Romans, one can note “a dramatic difference between the 
christocentrism of Galatians and the theocentrism of Romans.”43 But although Paul 
speaks in a “theocentric” register in Romans, his understanding of divine gift remains 
remarkably Christological. One event in history is where Paul locates God’s grace, and 
he understands all other points in history from the vantage point of this event, from 
the reality it both creates and reveals. We must pay attention again to how Paul 
identifies God’s grace in relation to Jesus. As in Galatians, in Romans 3.21-26 and 5.1-21 
Paul identifies divine grace as the Christ-event, given to unfitting recipients. This 
Christological identification then shapes his reading of Abraham (4.1-25) and Israel’s 
history (9-11). 
                                                        
42 That is, the gospel offers not simply a new way of life to its sinful recipients, but new life. Cf. A. 
Badiou, Ethics (London: Verso, 2001), 43 who speaks of the “subject” that was “absolutely nonexistent 
‘before’ the event.” See also J.L. Martyn, Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1997), passim; J.L. Martyn, “Epilogue: An Essay in Pauline Meta-Ethics,” in Divine and Human Agency, 178–
183. 
43 B.R. Gaventa, “The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians,” in Pauline Theology, Volume I 
(ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 150. 
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3.1 Romans 3.21-26: The Christ-Gift within the Theatre of Sin 
For Philo the κόσμος is the “first and greatest and most perfect” of God’s works, 
structured immutably by God’s Law according to which one may become virtuous.44 
When we turn to Romans 3, we see Paul using these concepts differently: the Law (ὁ 
νόμος) speaks so that “the whole world” (πᾶς ὁ κόσμος) might be accountable to God 
(3.19), for no one is righteous, no one seeks for God. Rather than providing a way for 
humans to be worthy before God, the Law displays that all are sinners. Since God’s 
judgment is just, he gives to all what they deserve: wrath and anger to those who do 
evil (2.8; cf. 2.2; 1.28-32), and glory, honor, and immortality to those who seek eternal 
life (2.7).45 God “will render to each according to his works.” The problem, however, is 
that “none are righteous” (3.10), and therefore all should come to ruin on the day of 
God’s judgment (2.16). Consequently, after letting scripture detail the fact that “both 
Jews and Gentiles are all under sin” (3.9-20), Paul interjects: “But now.” For Philo, as we 
saw above, νυνὶ δέ would be an assertion of the immutable present. For Paul, the νυνὶ 
δέ that opens 3.21-26 marks the intervention of divine grace into sin-caused 
hopelessness, pointing to the “impossible possibility” of the justification of sinners, a 
gift given to the unworthy.46  
Paul’s summary statement in 3.23 that “all have sinned and lack the glory of God” is 
paralleled by the dense response that all are “justified freely in his grace (that is) 
through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus” (δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι 
διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; 3.24).47 Paul thus speaks of justification as 
occurring as a gift and in the gift: “justified as a gift in his grace” (3.24). What is the 
relationship between δωρεάν and τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι vis-à-vis “being justified”?  
 Bultmann argued that δωρεάν “emphasizes the gift-character of grace” such that 
the “divine deed of grace is...a gift of grace.” If “grace” is the Christ-event – “God’s 
                                                        
44 Cf. Deus 106-108. 
45 On Romans 2, see esp. J.A. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), chap. 5. 
46 K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (trans. E.C. Hoskyns; 6th ed.; Oxford: OUP, 1968), 92. 
47 This righteousness is, as J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 223 calls it, “novel,” or in the helpful term of S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New 
on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 273, “extraordinary.” That is, it 
defies the normal means by which one would be righteous. The relationship between righteousness and 
grace in 3.24 is similar to what we will see in 5.15. 
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eschatological deed” by which he judges and therefore justifies sinners – then δωρεάν 
clarifies that this gift comes “without price.”48 In response, Doughty argued that the 
“real significance of the phrase...is precisely the reverse.”49 That is, δωρεάν shows the 
“grace-character of the gift.”50 Doughty thus agrees with Reumann that δωρεάν is 
essentially emphatic redundancy.51 Yet such assumed redundancy would not make 
sense in Paul’s context; no one would assume that saying a gift is given “as a gift” would 
mean it is given “freely,” that is, to the unworthy, without preconditions, etc.52  
 Philo rarely uses the adverb δωρεάν, but one of his uses is instructive. In Ios. 249, 
Philo describes the kindness of Joseph towards his brothers. Joseph not only did not kill 
them, but he also provided food for them “as a gift” (δωρεάν) as though they were 
“worthy of the gift” (ὡς χάριτος ἀξίοις).53 Joseph’s brothers, of course, did not deserve 
Joseph’s gift; but in giving to them Joseph acted as though they did. For Philo, then, 
δωρεάν describes gifts given to those who are worthy of it. If something is given “in the 
manner of a gift,” it is given to a fitting recipient. 
 Thus, as above, if Philo said justification were given “as a gift,” it would be κατὰ 
νόμον or according to the person’s ἀξίωμα. Justification would still be a gift, yet the 
manner of its giving would be conditioned according to Philo’s construction of worth 
vis-à-vis the divine Giver. Oppositely, for Paul, “being justified” is a result of the 
revelation of God’s righteousness in the Christ-event χωρὶς νόμου and it is given to 
sinners, those who have no ἀξίωμα, whether κατὰ νόμον or otherwise. Of course, Paul’s 
distinction in 3.21 between God’s righteousness being revealed χωρὶς νόμου yet being 
testified to ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου would be nonsensical to Philo. As Linebaugh argues, it is 
unlikely that the referent of νόμος is the same in the two phrases: “Paul is...saying that 
                                                        
48 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume 1 (trans. K. Grobel; London: SCM Press, 1956), 
289–290. 
49 D.J. Doughty, “The Priority of ΧΑΡΙΣ,” NTS 19 (1973): 169. 
50 Doughty, “Priority,” 170. 
51 J. Reumann, “The Gospel of the Righteousness of God,” Interp 20 (1966): 441. Cf. J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 
1-8 (Dallas: Word, 1988), 168; E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. G.W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994), 96. 
52 Pace Harrison, Grace, 224 n.44 who claims that δωρεάν was “standard benefaction parlance” for the 
“free gift.” What a “free gift” would be in the Greco-Roman benefaction system is, I think, different from 
what the “free gift” is in Paul. As D.A. DeSilva, “Patronage and Reciprocity: The Context of Grace in the 
New Testament,” ATJ 31 (1999): 53 rightly states, “what is surprising about God's grace...is not that God 
gives ‘freely and uncoerced’: every benefactor, in theory at least, did this.” What makes Paul unique is his 
belief not in God’s uncoerced giving, but his giving to the unworthy. 
53 See also Her. 78-80; Legat. 339-343. 
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the entire sacred corpus, including the Pentateuch (νόμος), witnesses to the revelation 
of God’s righteousness apart from the law given at Sinai (νόμος).”54 Scripture witnesses 
to God’s act in Christ (cf. 1 Cor 15.3-4), but God’s righteousness is revealed apart from 
the Law.55 This affirmation is fundamental for Paul – it grounds God’s grace as given to 
unfitting recipients – but it is unthinkable for Philo. For Philo, the Law both declares 
what virtue is (and righteousness is a key virtue)56 and also displays how one becomes 
virtuous.57 Accordingly, for Philo gifts are given κατὰ νόμον and thus to the worthy, 
while for Paul justification occurs χωρὶς νόμου and δωρεάν, thus given to all without 
distinction (3.22-23).58 Paul’s use of δωρεάν, then, is idiosyncratic. To say that sinners 
are justified “as a gift” (δωρεάν) means that they receive justification precisely as 
unfitting recipients.59 
 Justification “as a gift” occurs specifically τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, which denotes the gift as 
the location of justification: righteousness “has its origin in God’s grace—i.e. in His act 
of grace accomplished in Christ.”60 Jewett argues that τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι denotes the 
means by which humans are set right, while διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως denotes the agency 
through which humans are set right.61 Redemption, then, is a specification or 
explication of what the gift is. That is, both τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι and διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως 
τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ interpret the same event because the latter is the content of the 
former: sinful humans are justified as an unfitting gift in God’s grace, that is, through 
the redemption which is in Christ Jesus.  
 As we will see in 5.15-17, the relationship in 3.24 between the gift of righteousness 
and the Christ-event shows justification to be a gift given to humans by faith. One 
qualification in the present text, however, is that the Christ-gift effects both the 
                                                        
54 J.A. Linebaugh, “Debating Diagonal Δικαιοσύνη: The Epistle of Enoch and Paul in Theological 
Conversation,” EC 1 (2010): 121 n.43. Contrast R.B. Hays, “Three Dramatic Roles: The Law in Romans 3-4,” 
in Paul and the Mosaic Law (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 151–64, for whom ὁ νόμος 
always designates the “same collection of texts” but from different “hermeneutical perspectives,” as 
needed by Paul. 
55 Cf. Harrison, Grace, 224. 
56 Cf e.g. Leg. 1.72; 3.150; Post. 93, 128; Agr. 18. 
57 Det. 18. Cf. Somn. 2.175-176; Spec. 4.133-134, 179; 2.13; 1.305-306. 
58 Cf. Badiou, Saint Paul, 77: “There is for Paul an essential link between the ‘for all’ of the universal 
and the ‘without cause.’ ... Only what is absolutely gratuitous can be addressed to all.” 
59 Cf. T. Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1-8 on the Logic 
of God’s Χάρις and Its Human Response,” HTR 101 (2008): 25–26. 
60 Bultmann, New Testament, 284. 
61 R. Jewett, Romans (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2006), 282. 
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justification of sinners and the justification of God. The νυνὶ δέ of 3.21 anticipates ἐν τῷ 
νῦν καιρῷ in 3.26, as the time when God’s righteousness is manifested apart from the 
Law in God’s putting forth Jesus as ἱλαστήριον (3.25).62 This event – the gift through 
redemption – is the “proof” of God’s righteousness (ἔνδειξις; 3.25, 26) in the present 
time, which results in God’s being δίκαιος and ὁ δικαιῶν (3.26; cf. 4.5, 8.33). God’s 
righteousness is revealed in the gospel (1.17; 3.21-26), with the gift of Christ being 
precisely that revelation which justifies God in his words (3.4) and justifies sinful 
humans as an unfitting gift (3.24). Accordingly, God’s righteousness here is both God’s 
acting for salvation according to his righteous nature and the gift of that salvation, as 
the gift of “being justified” is the enactment of God’s righteousness in the 
eschatological “now” by the Christ-gift.63 Paul locates divine and human righteousness 
in the singular event of Christ, for God is shown to be just in his judgment – and 
justification – of sinners.64 
  In summary, in 3.21-26 grace is the Christ-event by which God and humans are 
justified. Accordingly, this single event is the reestablishment of the proper divine-
human relationship as a divine gift to unworthy recipients (e.g. 3.23). The 
Christological focus of this passage is emphatic: God’s grace is defined by the Christ-
event and this gift is specified as the manifestation, proof, and establishment of God’s 
righteousness. God’s righteousness given as a gift in Jesus lacks the correspondence 
between giver and fitting recipient because such correspondence is impossible for Paul; 
the gift itself is justification in Christ, which no one deserves.  
3.2 Romans 5.1-11: The Gift and Christian Hope 
In Romans 5.1-11 Paul clarifies and expands his understanding of gift in three ways. 
First, Paul uses an intriguing metaphor of believers “standing in grace” to describe the 
eschatological position of those for whom Christ has died. Second, Paul gives an 
                                                        
62 On the meaning of ἱλαστήριον, see esp. D.P. Bailey, “Jesus as Mercy Seat” (PhD, University of 
Cambridge, 1999). 
63 Cf. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 284–286. Pace Käsemann, Romans, 96. See now also D. Burk, 
“The Righteousness of God (Dikaiosunê Theou) and Verbal Genitives: A Grammatical Clarification,” JSNT 
34 (2012): 346–60. 
64 M.A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of Justification (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 2000), 66: “In faith, one takes the side of God in his claim against oneself, giving God justice.” 
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expansive description of divine love as Christ’s death for unworthy humans. Third, Paul 
introduces the role of the Holy Spirit in gift-giving. 
3.2.1 Romans 5.2: Living in the Christ-Gift 
In Romans 5.1-11 Paul discusses the gift within his already/not-yet scheme. Believers 
have been justified in Christ but await final salvation (5.1, 9-10). Therefore, a central 
theme is hope: God’s gift of justification in the Christ-event is the basis for the hope 
believers direct towards God’s eschatological rescue from final wrath. It is only “in 
grace” that one awaits salvation. 
  Summarizing 3.21-4.25,65 Paul states, “Therefore, being justified by faith, we have 
peace with God.”66 Justification occurs in Christ’s blood (5.9), and it is through Christ 
that believers “have access into this grace in which we stand” (τὴν προσαγωγὴν 
ἐσχήκαμεν [τῇ πίστει] εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν). As Dunn claims, “The use 
of χάρις here...is a quite natural extension of its more normal Pauline sense.”67 The 
presence of the pronoun ταύτην signals that a specific gift is in view, and this gift-
location is explicated in 5.5b-8. 5.9-11 describe the relation between the now of the gift 
and the to-be of salvation, while 3-5a describe the reality of believers’ lives in the 
eschatological now. The already/not-yet of 3-5a and 9-11 thus puts the stress on the 
ground for hope in 5-8, which is itself an explication of 5.1-2a and a springboard into 
the gift-language in 5.12-21. 
 Cranfield is correct that καυχώμεθα ἐπ᾿ ἐλπίδι is parallel to ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν 
and not syntactically subordinate to εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν.68 However, 
5.2b-5.5a is logically dependent on 5.1-5.2a. The state of affairs described in 5.1-2a is the 
eschatological “already” of 5.9-11: believers are justified by faith, stand in God’s grace, 
and are at peace with God. 5.2b-5.5a sets forth the way humans exist “between the 
                                                        
65 On the connections between 3.21-4.25 and 5.1-11, see P.M. McDonald, “Romans 5.1-11 as a 
Rhetorical Bridge,” JSNT 40 (1990): 81–87. 
66 I still follow the indicative reading of ἔχω in 5.1 because, among other reasons, I believe it fits best 
with 5.11. The possible parallel with 2 Cor 5-6 – that Paul could tell the Corinthians to “be reconciled to 
God” (2 Cor 5.20) after stating that “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself” (5.19) – does not 
seem legitimate since 2 Cor 5-6 is itself an appeal and Rom 5 is not (even under the subjunctive reading). 
67 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 248. 
68 C.E.B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1975), 259. 
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times” as those who are in grace but must endure θλῖψις. Believers boast not only in 
God’s glory, but in their present afflictions, which produce hope. It is this hope that 
“does not put to shame” (5.5a). The reason for this steadfast hope is elaborated in 5.5b: 
“the love of God” (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ) given through the Holy Spirit. Hope is unswerving 
in the midst of suffering because it is anchored in God’s love, which is not a timeless, 
abstract love, but a love historically enacted. This love is elaborated in 5.6-8 as the 
Christ-event, which unpacks the present reality of “being justified by faith” and 
“standing in grace.”69 Accordingly, to “stand in grace” speaks of the grounding of 
Christian hope in the eschatological “already,” in the justifying event of Christ’s death 
and resurrection, which determines one’s life towards final salvation.  
3.2.2 Romans 5.6-8: The Christ-Gift as God’s Love 
Thus, in Rom 5.6-8 Paul explicates the “grace-site” of 5.2 by stressing that Christ’s 
death, which is for the ungodly, defines divine grace.70 As Hays states, “These 
verses...reveal some of the deep presuppositional structures of Paul's soteriology. They 
answer the implicit question, ‘What do you mean by ‘God's love’ and on what basis do 
you claim to have received it?’”71 
 The γάρ of 5.6 signals that what follows explicates ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ.72 The double 
ἔτι, however, is not so clear. Käsemann seems correct to argue that the first ἔτι γάρ 
modifies the genitive absolute (ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν) and the second ἔτι modifies the 
verb (ἀπέθανεν).73 Thus, “while we were still weak, yet at that time Christ died for the 
ungodly.” This awkward construction emphatically marks the paradoxical time (κατὰ 
καιρόν) in which Christ died: ἔτι ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν. The first ἔτι signals the καιρός 
of universal sinfulness into which Christ came (cf. 5.12ff.), while the second marks the 
                                                        
69 Cf. Barth, Romans, 152: “I live, yet not I. This is the grace in which Paul stands.” 
70 The links between “grace” and “love” in 5.2-8 should be clear; cf. J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul 
the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 320.  
71 R.B. Hays, “Christ Died for the Ungodly: Narrative Soteriology in Paul?,” HBT 26 (2004): 58. 
72 As Käsemann, Romans, 135 notes, verses 6-8 “make it clear that ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ is not an objective 
genitive,” as argued by Augustine, Luther, and, surprisingly, N.T. Wright, The Letter to the Romans 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 517. Nearly all commentators, Wright excluded, take the genitive as 
subjective. 
73 Käsemann, Romans, 137. 
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nature of his death for the unworthy.74 The Christ-gift was given at a counterintuitive 
time to those who did not deserve it. 
 Even though Paul tries to underscore the incomprehensible nature of Christ’s death 
for the ungodly, a comparison with Philo can sharpen this emphasis. For Philo, the 
“lover of pleasure” who lives contrary to virtue is ungodly (ἀσεβής);75 and a few 
examples of God’s dealings with the ungodly will suffice. First, Cain, who “through one 
action” left “nothing of ungodliness” (οὐδὲν τῶν...ἀσεβῶν) neglected, is deserving not 
of a single death – a punishment devised by human reason – but to “live while always 
dying,” a punishment fitting of the “divine lawcourt.”76 Second, thunderbolts burnt up 
the ungodly of Sodom and Gomorrah with an “inexpressible” destruction. Accordingly, 
the “ungodly” (ἀσεβής) were punished for their actions and the virtuous received their 
deserving reward (ἆθλον).77 God sets the proper punishments for the ungodly.78 Third, 
against the Egyptians the “elements of the universe” (τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός) were 
made hostile to “destroy the land of the ungodly” (τὴν ἀσεβῶν χώραν φθαρῆναι).79 The 
God who created the elements can use them “when he wants” to destroy the ungodly. 
God is a distance removed from the ungodly but walks with the virtuous.80 
 Consequently, the genealogical section of Moses’ writings can be divided between 
the accounts of the punishments of the ungodly (περὶ κολάσεως ἀσεβῶν) and the 
honors of the just (περὶ τιμῆς δικαίων). For Philo, it is better to die with the pious than 
cavort with the ungodly, for the former will receive undying life (ἡ ἀθάνατος ζωή), 
while the latter will receive eternal death (ὁ ἀίδιος θάνατος).81 It is key that none of this 
violates God’s graciousness; rather, this logic only upholds the fact that God is 
                                                        
74 Although ἀσθενής and ἀσεβής are not synonyms, T.W. Martin, “The Good as God (Romans 5.7),” 
JSNT 25 (2002): 58 wrongly argues that Paul “refrains in v. 6 from directly admitting [the Roman 
Christians] are ungodly. Instead, he describes Christians as weak when Christ died for the ungodly.”  
75 Sacr. 32. 
76 Praem. 68-70. 
77 Mos. 2.56-57. 
78 Cf. Ebr. 223. 
79 Mos. 1.96. 
80 Mut. 265, interpreting Num 14.9. 
81 Post. 39. Cf. Congr. 87. 
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rationally gracious. Those who refuse his gifts must deal no longer with the God who 
gives but the Lord who punishes.82 
 Paul understands that Christ’s death for the ungodly is absurd – and he celebrates 
that fact (cf. 1 Cor 1.21-25). In 5.7 Paul digresses from 5.6 to set up an antithesis with 5.8 
to underscore further the illogicality (i.e. incongruity) of Christ’s death for the 
ungodly.83 As Paul states, “for in behalf of a righteous person (ὑπὲρ δικαίου) one would 
hardly die,” which is modified by Paul’s next statement that one might “perhaps dare 
to die for a good person (ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ).”84 Paul acknowledges that sacrifice for a 
person of particularly high quality is certainly possible, just as one would rightly give a 
gift to a fitting recipient. But for the ungodly? As above, Philo illustrates the received 
wisdom, that fathers should not even die for their sons, but those who have done things 
“worthy of death” (τῶν ἄξια θανάτου δεδρακότων) should be put to death by 
themselves.85 God prefers the smallest group of good people to countless ungodly 
people (τὸ σπάνιον ἀγαθὸν πρὸ μυρίων ἀδίκων).86 If dying for another person, one 
would want to ensure that the character of the “other” was worthy of such self-giving.87 
Accordingly, 5.6 describes the Christ-event as an unfitting gift, and 5.7 provides a 
counterexample of a fitting gift. The Christ-gift is “unmotivated love” because “there is 
                                                        
82 For close attention to Philo’s thought on divine punishment, see A. Mendelson, “Philo’s Dialectic of 
Reward and Punishment,” StPhA 9 (1997): 104–25. 
83 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 137: “The point is that Christ did his saving work at an unexpected and, 
morally considered, even inappropriate moment. Unworthy, genuinely ungodly people benefitted from 
it.” See also M. Winninge, Sinners and the Righteous: A Comparative Study of the Psalms of Solomon and Paul’s 
Letters (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1995), 306–307. 
84 It seems unlikely to me that Paul makes a strong distinction between δίκαιος and ἀγαθός; cf. F. 
Wisse, “The Righteous Man and the Good Man in Romans V.7,” NTS 19 (1973): 91–93; for distinction, see 
A.D. Clarke, “The Good and the Just in Romans 5.7,” TynB 41 (1990): 128–32. With Clarke, Harrison, Grace, 
225 sees ὁ ἀγαθός as a reference to a benefactor. More interesting is the argument of Martin, “Good as 
God,” that God is ὁ ἀγαθός. 
85 Spec. 3.153. Cf. Somn. 2.282: what is better than for “the good to live and the wicked to die?” 
86 Migr. 61. 
87 As Philo goes on to explain in Spec. 3.154-155, the commandment that fathers should not even die 
for their sons is given for those who out of excessive goodwill would give themselves for the guilty so 
that they would not be punished. But, as Philo says, to such a person one must explain, “there is no time 
for your goodwill” (ἡ εὔνοια ὑμῶν οὐκ ἔχει καιρόν); and those actions that are done out of their proper 
time are blameworthy. It is only right to love those who are worthy to attract love (χρὴ μέντοι φιλεῖν 
τοὺς ἄξια φιλίας δρῶντας), and no wicked people truly have friends. Accordingly, to die for the 
unworthy is not only nonsensical but also morally reprehensible, contrary to the commandment. 
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in the object to which it is directed nothing at all to which appeal can be made to 
explain this love.”88 
 With an adversative δέ,89 5.8 reaffirms that Christ did not give himself for the 
δίκαιος or ἀγαθός. Instead, “while we were still sinners, Christ died for us” (ἔτι 
ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν). As Keck states, “This is Paul’s 
Christology in a nutshell.”90 Paul makes the radical claim that the Christ-event is the 
demonstration of God’s love for all unfitting recipients: “but God has demonstrated his 
love for us” (συνίστησιν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός).91 This statement 
mirrors 5.5b, clarifying that ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ poured into human hearts by the Spirit 
can only be understood “from the perspective of Jesus’ passion.”92 Jesus’ death is the 
particular, historical instantiation of God’s love. Thus Nygren: “Nowhere else is there a 
revelation of God’s love like Christ’s death on the cross. There, and there alone, we 
learn to know the deepest meaning of God’s love.”93 Since God’s love is concretely 
demonstrated in Christ’s death – against all human logic – for the ungodly, it is clear 
that ἡ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει. 
 Thus, 5.6-8 sets forth the objects of God’s actions in Christ as ἀσθενής, ἀσεβής, and 
ἁμαρτωλός, who thus receive the Christ-gift as nothing but unfitting recipients. As 
Barth states, “In the death of Christ God has intervened on our behalf in the 
‘nevertheless’ of His free grace.”94 Barth’s “nevertheless” captures the incongruity of 
the Christ-gift, just like Paul’s “but now” (3.21). The gift is without pre-condition since 
                                                        
88 A. Nygren, Commentary on Romans (London: Bloomsbury, 1958), 201. Cf. also A.J. Hultgren, Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 211: “Christ’s dying for the weak and 
ungodly demonstrates a love that surpasses normal human experience. God’s love in Christ is not based 
on the worthiness of the object loved, but on the character of the one who loves. It is God’s nature so to 
love.” Thesis 28 of Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation seems to stand behind Hultgren’s statement 
(appropriately so): “The love of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. The love of 
man comes into being through that which is pleasing to it.” 
89 F. Godet, Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (ed. T.W. Chambers; Grand Rapids: Kregel, 
1977), 194. 
90 L.E. Keck, Romans (Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), 139. 
91 That God’s love is proved in Christ’s death speaks to “a mysterious fusion of agency between 
Father and Son.” R.B. Hays, “The Story of God’s Son: The Identity of Jesus in the Letters of Paul,” in 
Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage (ed. B.R. Gaventa and R.B. Hays; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 
186. For a discussion of Paul’s “for us” statements, see C. Breytenbach, Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The 
Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 59–79. 
92 Käsemann, Romans, 138. 
93 Nygren, Romans, 200. 
94 K. Barth, Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5 (trans. T.A. Smail; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 
2004), 2. 
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the recipients have no worth of which to speak; Paul’s argument precludes worth or fit. 
“Here is the power of God’s grace: that Christ did not die for the righteous, for the 
morally acceptable, for the noble of heart...”95 
3.2.3 Romans 5.5: The Role of the Holy Spirit in Gift-Giving 
But how do these unworthy recipients receive the gift? What is interesting here is that 
God’s love in the Christ-gift is poured out through the Holy Spirit (διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου) 
rather than the Holy Spirit being poured out as a result of the event. Indeed, the gift of 
the Spirit (πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν) is inseparable from the Christ-gift 
because the Spirit is what appropriates the past event as a present gift. The gift of the 
Spirit has an integral role in the gift-event of salvation. 
 For Käsemann, ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ could not be “God’s act of love” because “the verb 
speaks against this.”96 That is, the perfect tense of ἐκχέω precludes defining God’s love 
as a one-time act, the death of Christ; an aorist verb would have been used for this (5.6, 
8). But as Dunn states, “The present tense [of συνίστημι] complements the perfect of v 5 
and probably reflects the perspective of the preacher who referred back to the death of 
Christ as a timeless proof of God’s love.”97 As Paul explains in Gal 3.1-5, the “hearing of 
faith”98 effects the receipt of the Spirit from “the One who supplies to you the Spirit.”99 
It is thus only through proclamation that one receives the Spirit and thus believes – 
and so is justified.100 If for Philo the ears are untrustworthy and no credit is due to 
                                                        
95 J.L. Martyn, “From Paul to Flannery O’Connor with the Power of Grace,” in Theological Issues in the 
Letters of Paul (London: T&T Clark, 1997), 288. Cf. Harrison, Grace, 225 for how the “unworthiness of those 
who receive the benefits of Christ’s death...poses a problem for traditional benefaction ideology.” 
96 Käsemann, Romans, 135. 
97 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 256. For general hesitancy on reading too much into the tense-forms of the verbs 
here, see S.E. Porter, “Paul’s Concept of Reconciliation, Twice More,” in Paul and His Theology (ed. S.E. 
Porter; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 147. 
98 On this phrase, see esp. S.K. Williams, “The Hearing of Faith: AKOH ΠІΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3,” NTS 35 
(1989): 82–93. 
99 One common argument against the objective-genitive interpretation of πίστις Χριστοῦ is that it 
makes faith a condition for God’s acting (e.g. Martyn, Theological Issues, 151). Instead, Christ’s faith is prior 
to and causative of human faith. Though I am unsure to whom this critique applies, this argument is 
unnecessary. With the objective genitive, faith does not become a condition for God’s acting but rather is 
still the consequence of God’s act, specifically the proclamation of that act (cf. Gal 3.1-5; Rom 10.17) 
which comes as a gift in the Holy Spirit. Cf. G. Friedrich, “Glaube und Verkündigung bei Paulus,” in Glaube 
im Neuen Testament (ed. F. Hahn and H. Klein; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1982), 109–110. 
100 See further next chapter. 
 134 
hearing,101 for Paul it is only through hearing proclamation that one begins in the Spirit 
and so receives the gift. 
How does the Spirit make this gift present? Jewett gives a straightforward 
interpretation: “God’s love is conveyed ‘through the Holy Spirit given to us,’ whereby 
the object of the preposition διά should be understood as the agent enabling this 
communication.”102 However, Wolter has opposed this line of interpretation, arguing 
that an understanding of διά as “instrumental oder kausal” leaves the Spirit’s role 
unclear: it would be both “verliehenes Objekt” and “aktives, fast schon personal 
aufzufassendes vermittelndes Subjekt.”103 The Spirit cannot be both gift given and 
Giver. Rather, “διά can designate...the perceptible form in which the Spirit comes to 
expression.”104 The Spirit becomes “eine substanzhafte Hypostase” of God’s love, its 
“empirisch erfahrbare Gestalt.”105 
The problem with this view is that it depends on non-Pauline texts while stumbling 
on Romans 5.5.106 Paul does not speak of a “perceptible form” of divine love but the 
cross as the demonstration of God’s love. Wolter’s argument both overloads διά and also 
downgrades the Spirit’s role in the economy of salvation.107 As Wolter notes, Paul seems 
to make the Holy Spirit both “Geber” and “Gabe”: and removing either of those aspects 
distorts Paul’s view of the Spirit. Elsewhere Paul explains that only ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ 
can someone proclaim Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (1 Cor 12.3); in 2 Cor 4.13 Paul speaks of the 
πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως “in and with which faith comes,”108 as Paul both brought the gospel 
to the Thessalonians ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ and they received it μετὰ χαρᾶς πνεύματος 
ἁγίου (1 Thess 1.5-6).109 Faith comes from hearing the word (Rom 10.17; Gal 3.2) and the 
                                                        
101 Cf. Spec. 4.137. 
102 Jewett, Romans, 357. 
103 M. Wolter, Rechtfertigung und zukünftiges Heil: Untersuchungen zu Röm 5, 1-11 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1978), 161. 
104 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 253. 
105 Wolter, Rechtfertigung, 166. 
106 Cf. C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (2nd ed.; London: A&C Black, 1991), 105. 
107 Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and Friendship,” 35 argues that the Spirit “has no role to play...in 
5:1-11.” For Engberg-Pedersen, the Spirit is a “supernumerary idea” mentioned solely in anticipation of 
chapter 8 (38). By reading backwards, Engberg-Pedersen believes ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ also refers to human 
love for God. However, the Spirit is present in 5.5 and plays a role that fits coherently with Paul’s other 
statements about the Spirit, so I am reluctant both to downplay its significance and to let chapter 8 
overturn the straightforward subjective genitive in 5.5. 
108 Cf. V.P. Furnish, II Corinthians (New Haven: YUP, 2005), 258. 
109 Cf. also 1 Cor 12.9; 2.4-5. 
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word is proclaimed and received in the Spirit. Romans 5.5 is part-and-parcel of this 
thought.110 The gift is given “while we were still sinners,” that is, “apart from our 
capacity to receive it,”111 and therefore it is only through the gift of the Spirit that this 
love is received. Furthermore, “we received...the Spirit that comes from God, so that we 
might know the gifts God has given us” (ἐλάβομεν...τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα 
εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν; 1 Cor 2.12).112 God through the Spirit 
“instructs” about the salvation received in Christ, as God “has revealed to us through 
the Holy Spirit” the mystery of Christ crucified (1 Cor 2.10). No one knows “the things 
of God, except the Spirit of God,” and therefore God gives the Spirit to make intelligible, 
and effective, the Christ-gift. Consequently, the love of God in which believers have 
eschatological hope is received “through the Holy Spirit,” which God gives as a “down 
payment” (θεός, ὁ δοὺς ἡμῖν τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τοῦ πνεύματος; 2 Cor 5.5; cf. Rom 8.9-17). 
The Spirit is the agent through which the Christ-gift, that is, God’s love, is received by 
the human.113  
To paraphrase the benediction of 2 Corinthians 13.13: “The gift of the Lord Jesus 
Christ [which is] the love of God [received through] the participation of the Holy 
Spirit.” As an historical event, the Christ-gift precedes the giving of the Spirit (e.g. Gal 
3.13-14), but the Spirit appropriates the Christ-gift for the individual through faith so 
that they might “stand in this grace.” 
                                                        
110 Cf. F. Watson, “The Triune Divine Identity: Reflections on Pauline God-Language, in Disagreement 
with J.D.G. Dunn,” JSNT 80 (2000): 122: “The gift of the Spirit is not an additional divine action that can be 
contrasted with the death and resurrection of Jesus, in that the latter can only be believed whereas the 
former is directly experienced; it is rather the way in which the single divine action is brought to its telos, 
which is our own participation in the death that Jesus died to sin and the life he lives to God (cf. Rom. 
6.10).” 
111 Barth, Romans, 162. 
112 Cf. G.D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
1994), 103. 
113 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 329: “The love of God which is in 
Christ and directed to them is one event as it is gathered together in the ‘by the Holy Ghost.’” Cf. C.K. 
Rowe, “The Trinity in the Letters of St Paul and Hebrews,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity (ed. G. 
Emery and M. Levering; Oxford: OUP, 2011), 51 on the “Trinitarian pattern of speech” employed in 
Romans 5. Also, G.D. Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007), 
589. On these grounds, Didymus the Blind (On the Holy Spirit, 168; cf. 166-169) speaks of a “single reception 
of the Trinity.” 
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3.2.3 Conclusion 
This investigation of Romans 5.1-11 both confirms the interpretation of 3.21-26 while 
also nuancing Paul’s understanding of gift-giving. The Christ-event is the historical 
instantiation of God’s love incongruously given to unworthy humans through the 
reception of the gift of the Spirit. Accordingly, this passage provides an important 
foundation for Romans 5.12-21, where Paul’s gift-language is used with the most 
frequency but perhaps the least explication. 
3.3 Romans 5.12-21: The Macro-Structure of Paul’s Theology 
In Romans 5.12-21, Paul maps human existence around two poles: every person is 
determined by either Adam’s sin, leading to death, or Christ’s death, giving 
righteousness and life. Here, more than elsewhere, Paul reflects on the answer to sin 
through the concept of gift. While Paul’s use of gift-terms may appear to be mere 
linguistic excess and rhetorical wordplay, I will argue that Paul employs a matrix of 
gift-language with varied yet interdependent meanings to describe how God saves 
humanity in the Christ-event.114 Here again, God’s giving is Christological, incongruous 
to its recipients, and therefore drastically excessive. 
3.3.1 5.12-14: The Problem 
The basic logic of 5.12-13 is Adam introduced sin, and therefore death, to the κόσμος; 
every individual is caught in Adam’s problem and can expect Adam’s fate.115 As we saw 
in chapter 2, the sin of Philo’s Adam (with Eve) also had detrimental consequences: “the 
everlasting fountains of God’s gifts have been held back” so that they might not be 
received by the unworthy.116 Essentially, Adam creates the possibility of unworthiness; 
but this is not, as it is for Paul, an inevitability.117 Furthermore, Paul asserts that sin 
existed before the Law, showing sin to be “deeper and more pervasive, infecting even 
                                                        
114 As J.R.D. Kirk, “Reconsidering ‘Dikaiōma’ in Romans 5:16,” JBL 126 (2007): 789 notes, the 
“unbalanced” and “unpredictable” contrasts in 5.15-17 should show that the probability lies in Paul’s 
choosing words for particular purposes.  
115 F.W. Danker, “Romans V.12. Sin Under Law,” NTS 14 (1968): 427 points out that Adam is not a “new 
item” but a “summary of Paul’s earlier indictment of all humanity.” 
116 Opif. 168. 
117 Cf. Westerholm, “Anthropological ‘Pessimism’,” 96–98. 
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those who conform to the Torah.”118 Before the Law God did not charge the sins 
committed against the individual.119 For Philo, nothing comes “before” the Law, because 
the Law of Nature immutably orders the world itself. Paul’s statement contradicts 
Philo’s cosmology. Yet for Paul, although God did not make sinners accountable before 
the Law, the sin-death relationship still held true: death reigned (ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ 
θάνατος). Thus, for Paul and Philo not only is the Adamic problem different, but Paul 
does not view the Law as the solution. 
 In 5.14 Paul sets Adam and Christ into the relationship that will structure the 
argument: Adam is a “type of the one to come” (τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος). The basis for the 
positive relationship between Adam and Christ is that both are fate-defining for 
humanity: Adam to death, Christ to life. 
3.3.2 5.15-17: Adam and Christ, Gift and Trespass 
In 5.15-17 Paul explores Adam and Christ’s relationship, asserting a positive formal 
correspondence and a limitless material distinction.120 Almost all interpreters construe 
5.15a and 16a as contrastive declarative statements: “But the gift is not like the 
trespass.” However, Caragounis has argued for viewing them as rhetorical questions: 
“But is the gift not like the trespass?” 121 The implied positive answer allows 15-17 to 
follow logically from 14c and the Adam-Christ relationship. In 5.15-17 Paul thus 
develops the formal, typological relationship between Adam and Christ as two figures 
with different effects. As Caragounis notes, Paul could have constructed a simple 
contrast more straightforwardly;122 likewise, the a minori ad maius arguments (πολλῷ 
μᾶλλον) show that formal similarity is in view. Under the traditional reading, 5.15-19 is 
repetitious, even by Paul’s standards; by contrast, the positive correspondence in 5.15-
                                                        
118 Jewett, Romans, 377. By contrast, see J.C. Poirier, “Romans 5:13-14 and the Universality of Law,” 
NovT 38 (1996): 344–58. 
119 Cf. O. Hofius, “The Adam-Christ Antithesis and the Law: Reflections on Romans 5:12-21,” in Paul 
and the Mosaic Law (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 194–196. 
120 Cf. Wright, Romans, 528. 
121 C.C. Caragounis, “Romans 5.15-16 in the Context of 5.15-21: Contrast or Comparison?,” NTS 31 
(1985): 143. Cf. also S.E. Porter, “The Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a 
Difference?,” JBL 110 (1991): 673–674. 
122 Caragounis, “Romans 5.15-16,” 144. 
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17 provides 5.18-19 with something to conclude. 5.15-17 is thus an inherently 
contrastive comparison. 
3.3.2.1 5.15 
“But is the gift (χάρισμα) not like the trespass (παράπτωμα)?” The implied answer is 
“Yes” – Adam is the τύπος of Christ. Most commentators agree that παράπτωμα, like 
ἁμαρτία,123 designates “what Adam did.”124 Paul contrasts Adam’s παράπτωμα with 
Christ’s χάρισμα, although one might expect ὑπακοή or δικαίωμα to parallel Adam’s 
disobedience with Christ’s obedience (cf. 5.18-19).125 As Fee states, “Here is certain 
evidence that [χάρισμα] does not primarily mean ‘gift of the Spirit.’”126 This is amplified 
by the fact that in non-Christian usage, χάρισμα had no special meaning beyond 
“gift.”127 
 5.15a is best taken as a balanced comparison:128 as παράπτωμα refers to Adam’s sin, 
so χάρισμα refers to Christ’s act, his self-giving (cf. 5.19).129 Similarly, in 5.18 δικαίωμα 
contrasts παράπτωμα, and δικαίωμα there means “righteous act,” with its counterpart 
ὑπακοή in 19.130 Accordingly, δικαίωμα can help interpret χάρισμα, as a different way of 
saying the same thing.131 Christ’s righteous act, obediently dying on the cross – his 
δικαίωμα and ὑπακοή – is his χάρισμα, his gift.132 The terms are mutually interpretive, 
                                                        
123 Cf. e.g. Jewett, Romans, 379; Hultgren, Romans, 226–227; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 279. 
124 J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 
1992), 418. 
125 Cf. R.H. Gundry, “A Breaking of Expectations: The Rhetoric of Surprise in Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans,” in Romans and the People of God: Essays in Honor of Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday 
(ed. S.K. Soderlund and N.T. Wright; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 257. 
126 Fee, Empowering Presence, 498. Pace Jewett, Romans, 380. 
127 Cf. e.g. Leg. 3.78. Cf. Harrison, Grace, 279–280: “It is likely...that Paul borrowed χάρισμα from 
contemporary colloquial language.” 
128 Cf. D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 335. 
129 Cf. O. Michel, Der Brief an die Römer (14th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 189: 
χάρισμα “bezeichnet hier den konkreten Erweis der Gnade und Güte Gottes.” With R.H. Bell, “Rom 5.18–
19 and Universal Salvation,” NTS 48 (2002): 422, it is difficult to see here a reference to Christ’s obedient 
life or obedience to the law. Contra Cranfield, Romans, 289 and H. Lietzmann, An die Römer (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1971), 64, respectively. 
130 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 156. 
131 Cf. Dunn, Romans 1-8, 296–297. 
132 Χάρισμα thus accentuates a particular aspect of God’s gift. Cf. J. Cambier, “Péchés des hommes et 
péché d’Adam en Rom V.12,” NTS 11 (1964): 218: “L'action du Christ est exprimée par un mot central dans 
notre pericope: χάρις (v. 15 (deux fois), 17, 21), et ses synonymes et precisions: χάρισμα (v. 15, 16), 
δικαίωμα (16, 18), ὑπακοή (19); elle exprime le don du  Père apporté par Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ.” 
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showing Christ to be “a concrete enactment of grace.”133 The gift is like the trespass: 
both speak of what the progenitors have done.  
5.15b explains the effects of 15a. By Adam’s παράπτωμα the many have died; yet, “if 
by one man’s trespass the many died, then how much more did the grace of God (ἡ 
χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ) and the gift in grace by the one man Jesus Christ (ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι τῇ 
τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) abound (ἐπερίσσευσεν) unto the many.” Two 
questions arise here. 
First, are ἡ χάρις and ἡ δωρεά the same gift or two gifts?134 Käsemann argues that 
the phrase is a hendiadys: “gracious gift of God.”135 For this interpretation, however, 
one would expect anarthrous nouns. Instead, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ is God’s gift of Christ,136 
and ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι is the gift of righteousness in Christ’s self-giving. As Sanday and 
Headlam point out, “ἡ δωρεά is defined more fully below (ver. 17) as ἡ δωρεὰ τῆς 
δικαιοσύνης...”137 The relation between ἡ δωρεὰ and ἐν χάριτι reinforces this 
interpretation. As Hofius notes, ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι either means “the gift that consists 
of the grace...of the one man” or “the gift that is granted through the grace of the one 
man.”138 With Hofius, I think the former is grammatically improbable. Rather, ἐν χάριτι 
denotes the Christ-gift as the source and location of the gift of righteousness. That is, ἐν 
χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ parallels ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ, because χάρις is 
                                                        
133 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 279; cf. Fee, Empowering Presence, 498; B. Byrne, Romans (Collegeville: Liturgical 
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137 W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1895), 140. 
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both God’s gift and Christ’s self-gift.139 The result of χάρις is δικαιοσύνη, which is in the 
Christ-event (cf. 3.24; 1 Cor 1.30).140  
Second, what does it mean for a gift to “abound”? Jewett claims περισσεύω harks 
back to the “idea that the future age would reinstate the plenitude of paradise,” that 
“with the dawn of the new age, paradisal plenitude was flowing out into the world.”141 
Philo, however, could describe God’s excessive beneficence without this implication.142 
The difference is that for Philo abounding implies an abundance of gifts, where for Paul 
a singular gift abounds.143 As Byrne puts it, “Behind the act of Christ stood the 
overflowing power and generosity of the Creator.”144 Excess is primarily a result of 
incongruity, a lack of fit between Giver, gift, and recipient; the gift abounds because a 
righteous God gives to sinful humanity what it does not deserve (cf. 6.1).145 Ideas about 
eschatological fullness may lie in the background of this text, but they are unnecessary 
to explain the superfluity of grace.146 
                                                        
139 Cf. Hofius, “Adam-Christ Antithesis,” 188. Thus, U. Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (Vol. 1; 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978), 327: “Christus als Ursprung der Gerechtigkeit aller Menschen ist 
also gerade nicht Repräsentant der Menschen vor Gott, wie es Adam ist – in dem Sinne, dass er 
repräsentiert, was sie tun und sind – sondern Repräsentant Gottes vor den Menschen.” 
140 Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and Friendship,” 26: “the content of the gift was at two connected, 
but distinguishable levels. Concretely, it was the Christ event, but with regard to God’s purpose of this 
event, it was also its ultimate outcome: justification and life for human beings.” Similarly, Käsemann, 
Romans, 153. 
141 Jewett, Romans, 381. Cf. M. Theobald, Die überströmende Gnade: Studien zu einem Paulinischen Motivfeld 
(Würzburg, 1982), 94–96. 
142 See, e.g., Leg. 1.34; 3.163. 
143 J. Wobbe, Der Charis-Gedanke bei Paulus: Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Theologie (Münster, 1932), 
41 claims that Paul uses excess-terms to avoid using χάριτες. Likewise Harrison, Grace, 285 argues that 
Paul’s monotheism is the “fundamental explanation” – χάριτες “would have been all too easily confused 
with the Greek goddesses.” Harrison knows that Philo used the plural and was a monotheist, but he still 
finds this answer sufficient. Furthermore, it is “also likely” that the “singular χάρις” is used to emphasize 
the “act of God in Christ.” It seems to me that Paul uses the singular solely because he has one χάρις in 
mind. 
144 Byrne, Romans, 179. Cf. Hofius, “Adam-Christ Antithesis,” 180. 
145 Cf. Badiou, Saint Paul, 78: “This is the root of the famous Pauline theme concerning the 
superabundance of grace... Evental grace governs a multiplicity in excess of itself, one that is 
indescribable, superabundant...with respect to the fixed distributions of the law.” 
146 Likewise, I am not convinced that the reign of Augustus stands behind the text; Harrison, Grace, 
227–234. However, Harrison’s discussion is interesting; e.g., Augustus was merciful to those who “were 
politically astute enough to sue for peace after the battle of Actium.” By contrast, Christ reconciled 
enemies.  
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3.3.2.2 5.16 
Paul asks another question: “And is the gift (τὸ δώρημα) not like what happened by the 
one man’s sinning (δι᾿ ἑνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος)?” The result of actions committed is 
emphasized again. Insofar as 16b explicates 16a, δώρημα is interpreted as the χάρισμα 
that effects δικαίωμα. The relationship between 16a-b emphasizes the expected result 
of Adam’s sin and the unexpected answer to humanity’s sinfulness, and therefore the 
shape of δώρημα as indicating a gift given without precondition. Whereas 15b and 17 
are structured by πολλῷ μᾶλλον, 16b is structured by an adversative δέ. The judgment 
(κρίμα) that led from the one man (ἐξ ἑνός) results in condemnation (εἰς κατάκριμα). 
Yet, counter-intuitively, the χάρισμα comes from many trespasses (ἐκ πολλῶν 
παραπτωμάτων) and results in a righteous decree (εἰς δικαίωμα).147 Both κρίμα and 
χάρισμα come from God, but the former is a fitting response to sin and the latter an 
incongruous response to manifold sinning.148 The use of ἐκ conveys that “the gracious 
gift of God’s righteousness came not just in answer to our many transgressions, but – 
strikingly and mysteriously – through them, by way of them, out of them.”149 The 
Christ-gift is the divine response to human sinfulness as it takes place historically 
amidst that sinning. 
Consequently, δώρημα – and its explication in 16b – stresses the gift’s incongruity 
to its sinful recipients. What resulted δι᾿ ἑνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος is rigidly enforced and 
deserved; the δώρημα, however, is an unwarranted gift given without thought for the 
recipients’ worthiness – indeed, despite unworthiness.150 
                                                        
147 Most commentators understand δικαίωμα as justification; e.g. Barrett, Romans, 115; Käsemann, 
Romans, 154; Fitzmyer, Romans, 419; Moo, Romans, 338; Hultgren, Romans, 227. They argue that δικαίωμα 
was used for homoioteleuton and concede that it has different meanings in 5.16, 18.  Jewett, Romans, 382 
argues that the semantic range of the term implies a translation such as “righteous decree.” As Hultgren 
notes, however, this is not very different from justification. Kirk, “Reconsidering,” 787 has argued for 
viewing δικαίωμα as reparation: “an action performed by a convicted person that satisfies the court and 
thus justifies the defendant.” Yet would χάρισμα as Christ’s self-giving not be that act? 
148 Cf. Barth, Romans, 179. 
149 Gundry, “Breaking of Expectations,” 259. 
150 As Cranfield, Romans, 286 states, “That one single misdeed should be answered by judgment, this is 
perfectly understandable: that the accumulated sins and guilt of all the ages should be answered by God's 
free gift, this is the miracle of miracles, utterly beyond human comprehension.” 
 142 
3.3.3.3 5.17 
The protasis of 17 needs little comment, as it parallels 15a and restates verses 12-14. 
The apodosis of 17 reworks 15b, with the verb περισσεύω nominalized and the same gift 
language retained. The presence of the repeated article points towards two gifts again; 
furthermore, the parallelism and the repeated terminology justify interpreting the 
language similarly. Χάρις is again the gift of Christ, and ἡ δωρεά is explicitly 
δικαιοσύνη, which confirms the interpretation of 15b.151 Thus, as in 3.24 and 5.15, the 
gift of righteousness is a result of the Christ-event. As a divine gift, those who receive 
(οἱ λαμβάνοντες)152 do so in abundance, the effect of which is the triumph of 
righteousness and life over sin and death.153 From this sense of abundance, Paul 
concludes in 5.18-19 that as all are condemned and made sinners in Adam, in Christ all 
are justified. 
3.3.4 5.20-21: The Superabundance and Reign of the Gift 
In 5.20 Paul reintroduces the Law, which “slipped in” (παρεισῆλθεν) so that the trespass 
might increase. If Adam introduced sin, the Law makes sin worse. As Käsemann states, 
5.21 “shows that the law has no significance for the antithesis of Adam and Christ but 
only for the world of Adam.”154 For Philo, Moses in his Law guides humans to virtue, so 
they are able to live virtuously.155 But for Paul, knowledge of sin comes through the Law 
(3.20), which allows sin to work death in the individual through the Law (7.5, 8-13). 
Surprisingly, Paul does not specify that the Law caused sin to increase in Israel. Here, at 
least, Paul narrates history without referencing Israel, as it was in the Adamic κόσμος 
                                                        
151 As N.T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity? (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 98 states, “Righteousness is not an object, a substance or a gas which can be 
passed across the courtroom.” This claim, however, cannot mitigate the fact that Paul speaks about 
righteousness as a gift received; Paul “could scarcely signal more clearly the exceptional nature of this 
dikaiosness.” Cf. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 274. 
152 Pace R. Bultmann, “Adam und Christus nach Römer 5,” in Exegetica: Aufsätze zur Erforschung des 
Neuen Testaments (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), 437, οἱ λαμβάνοντες does not limit the range of “all.” 
Cf. W. Grundmann, “Die Übermacht der Gnade: Eine Studie zur Theologie des Paulus,” NovT 2 (1958): 50–
72 and esp. Bell, “Universal Salvation.” 
153 On this theme, see H. Roose, “Sharing in Christ’s Rule: Tracing a Debate in Earliest Christianity,” 
JSNT 27 (2004): 140–141. 
154 Käsemann, Romans, 158. 
155 Cf. Mos. 2.51. 
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“where sin increased” (οὗ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία).156 Yet οὗ defines more importantly 
the location not of sin’s increase but of grace’s superabounding (ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ 
χάρις). The aorist verb form of ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν – and the whole train of thought – 
points to a single event in history, such that the superabounding gift is the Christ-
event. Distinct from Philo, grace for Paul does not superabound in creation or in the 
giving of the Law; the gracious plenitude happens precisely and exclusively in Jesus.157 
Adam’s sin, humanity’s participation in it, and the Law’s intensification of sinning 
create the sphere in which God’s grace erupts. As in 3.21-26, the gift comes to “all” who 
sinned and are therefore justified “as a gift” apart from the Law. 
Verse 21 concludes: “so that just as sin reigned in death (ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν 
τῷ θανάτῳ), so also grace might reign through righteousness (ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ 
δικαιοσύνης) for eternal life through Jesus Christ (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) our Lord.” Sin’s 
reign parallels death’s reign (v. 13), just as the sting of sin is death (1 Cor 15.56); yet 
God’s gift discontinues the reign of sin, as in the Christ-event grace and life triumphed 
over death, thus establishing the reign of grace. Grace reigns “through righteousness,” 
the gift given to sinners in the Christ-event (cf. 3.24).  
3.3.5 Conclusion 
In Romans 5.12-21, Paul paints the cosmological drama with only its most important 
actors. Adam’s act polluted the cosmos with sin and death, which Moses’ Law 
aggravated; by contrast, Christ’s act results in righteousness and life for sinners. Paul 
conceptualizes his soteriology on this macro level as gift, and I have argued that Paul’s 
gift terminology here stresses three aspects of divine grace. 
 First, the gift is Christological. Paul’s gift-terminology here never refers to anything 
other than the Christ-gift and the gift of righteousness in Christ. Second, the gift is 
incongruous to its unworthy recipients. Paul makes this clear in his paradoxical 
assertion that Christ’s death came as a gift ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων. As humanity is 
marked by Adam, the gift is always incongruous; the only place for the gift to be given, 
                                                        
156 So Wilckens, Römer, 329. But cf. Hofius, “Adam-Christ Antithesis,” 203–204. 
157 J.M. Bassler, “Grace: Probing the Limits,” Interp 57 (2003): 26 argues this sense of grace abounding 
incongruously is not “incomprehensible within the framework of Jewish thought.” But excessive 
incongruity would be unfathomable to Philo, as it would question the rationality of both the created 
order and God’s justice. 
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and the site in which the gift is worked out, is where sin reigns. Third, the gift is 
excessive: it is an extravagant gift that lacks any fit with the recipient. 
 But situated between 3.21-26 and 5.1-21 is Abraham: does a Christological 
understanding of unfitting grace hold here? 
3.4 Rom 4.1-25: Abraham’s Faith and the Christ-Gift  
In Romans 4, there are two reasons for thinking χάρις should not be defined as 
unfitting grace vis-à-vis the Christ-event: Abraham lived hundreds of years before 
Christ, and 4.1-23 is ostensibly devoid of references to Christ. Yet, the phrase κατὰ 
χάριν defines both Abraham’s justification (4.3-5) and the way God gave the promise to 
Abraham (4.16), which Paul sees fulfilled in Christ. The notion of justification and 
reception of the promise κατὰ χάριν – as an unfitting gift – rather than κατὰ ὀφείλημα 
and διὰ νόμου is comprehensible only as a reading of Abraham’s story after Christ. 
Accordingly, the Christ-event becomes a retroactive hermeneutic of incongruity.158 
Abraham is justified and his family is constituted by Jews and Gentiles because God’s 
promise has always been incongruous to its recipients and directed towards its 
fulfillment in Christ. 
3.4.1 The Justification of Abraham 
For Paul, Abraham is set in a context of godlessness and is himself ungodly.159 Paul does 
not describe Abraham’s godless context like Philo does,160 but Paul sees all people on 
equal ground as sinners and thus objects of God’s judgment; and Abraham cannot be 
                                                        
158 I borrow and adapt from Badiou, Saint Paul, 57. J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I 
Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency, 149 speaks of Christ as the 
“particular moment when divine grace changes the history of the world, throwing all else, before and 
after, into a different light.” 
159 So, B. Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith in Romans 4 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 345: “Nowhere does 
Scripture call Abraham (anything like) ‘ungodly,’ yet it is impossible not to deduce from the apostle’s line 
of thought that he de facto does so.” Impossible, yes; however, N.T. Wright, “Paul and the Patriarch: The 
Role of Abraham in Romans 4,” JSNT 35 (2013): 223 argues that ἀσεβῆ is a collective noun for non-Jews. Cf. 
S.J. Gathercole, “Justified by Faith, Justified by His Blood: The Evidence of Romans 3:21–4:25,” in 
Justification and Variegated Nomism. II. The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 156 on the strangeness of understanding Abraham as ungodly in a 
Jewish context. 
160 Cf. e.g. Virt. 212-213. 
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excluded.161 Indeed, the logic of the passage demands he not be: “Abraham believed God 
and it was reckoned to him for righteousness” (Gen 15.6; Rom 4.3). The one who is 
reckoned righteous is the person whose faith is in “the one who justifies the ungodly” 
(ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ; 4.5). Since Abraham’s faith is in this God who justifies 
the ungodly, the reckoning of righteousness to Abraham is the justification of one such 
ungodly person. Paul’s use of LXX Psalm 31.1 clarifies this point.162 Paul links verse 5 to 
6 with καθάπερ, signaling that David’s testimony about God’s non-reckoning of sin 
interprets Abraham’s justification. David declares that the person whom God justifies 
apart from works (Abraham; 4.2) is blessed, for God has forgiven their lawless acts, 
covered their sins, and further, not reckoned sin.163 In this context, justification is – or 
includes – divine acquittal of the ungodly object.164 Abraham stands before God without 
works or worth, as an ungodly human whom God pardons because of his faith.165 
 But, Philo might ask, how can Abraham be without works or worth? For Philo 
Abraham’s belief in God – his “acquiring faith” (κτησάμενος πίστιν) – is the culmination 
of his development in virtue.166 Abraham “chooses faith in God as a reward” (ἆθλον).167 
Accordingly, the God who loves virtue (φιλάρετος) honors those who are godly (τοὺς 
εὐσεβείας). That is, God reckons Abraham righteous because his faith (virtue) 
corresponds to the reward; although God’s beneficence is always condescension to 
                                                        
161 Cf. also the lexical links between Rom 1 and 4; E. Adams, “Abraham’s Faith and Gentile 
Disobedience: Textual Links Between Romans 1 and 4,” JSNT 19 (1997): 48–54; O. McFarland, “Whose 
Abraham, Which Promise? Genesis 15.6 in Philo’s De Virtutibus and Romans 4,” JSNT 35 (2012): 115–120. 
162 Cf. O. Hofius, “‘Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen’ als Thema biblischer Theologie,” in Paulusstudien 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 130 n.46: “Das e0logi/sqh von Gen 15,6, und das logi/shtai von Ps 31,2 
LXX erläutern sich gegenseitig.” Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith, 314: “David witnesses for God’s dealing with 
Abraham.” 
163 Cf. Gathercole, “Justified by Faith,” 158–159. As A.A. Das, “Paul and Works of Obedience in Second 
Temple Judaism: Romans 4:4-5 as a ‘New Perspective’ Case Study,” CBQ 71 (2009): 806–807 notes, ἀνομία 
and ἀμαρτωλός cannot be restricted to Gentiles. 
164 Cf. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 308; S.J. Gathercole, Where Is Boasting? Early Jewish 
Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1–5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 247; Schliesser, Abraham’s 
Faith, 314–315. 
165 As Bultmann, New Testament, 282 states, “The paradox in ‘grace’ is that it is precisely the 
transgressor, the sinner, to whom it applies.” Cf. F. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New 
Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 263: “...the transition between ungodliness and blessedness 
occurs through an act of forgiveness on the divine side and an act of faith on the human side.” Also, 
Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and Friendship,” 29. Wright, “Role of Abraham,” 217 claims that this 
interpretation can be summarized “by saying that Abraham is justified by faith because he believes in 
justification by faith (as opposed to the justification of the godly).” This is a non sequitur. 
166 Virt. 216. Cf. McFarland, “Whose Abraham, Which Promise?,” 111–114. 
167 Praem. 27. 
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human weakness, Philo views Abraham as a fitting recipient of grace. Abraham thus 
becomes the “standard of nobility for all proselytes” (οὗτος ἅπασιν ἐπηλύταις εὐγενείας 
ἐστὶ κανών);168 Abraham broke free from ungodliness in Chaldea, and Abraham’s 
descendants can be virtuous if they live virtuously like Abraham. Accordingly, any 
human – Jew or Gentile – can be virtuous and therefore rewarded by God. As we have 
seen, worth is the condition – not cause – of divine giving, and one becomes worthy by 
living virtuously. Grace cannot be split from works because Abraham’s belief is his 
development in virtue. 
Accordingly, Paul’s line of thought – “For if Abraham was justified by works, he has 
a boast, but not with God” (4.2) – would strike Philo as odd for two reasons. How can 
faith and works be split apart? Why is boasting in works excluded (3.27)? Does Paul not 
understand that faith is a virtue one develops, and that by “working” one can – must – 
still attribute all things to God? Does Paul believe that human good works are somehow 
distinct from God’s causation?169 Paul’s argument makes sense only when justification is 
κατὰ χάριν, where grace is construed in light of the Christ-event.170 Emphatically, 
Abraham was not justified by works so that he could boast; rather, he was justified by 
faith, as the “righteousness of faith” came before he was circumcised (4.10-11). In 4.3, 
Paul thus introduces a dichotomy to distinguish faith and works as well as obligation 
and gift vis-à-vis God’s justification of the ungodly. 
To the one who works (ἐργαζομένῳ) the reward (μισθός) is reckoned according to 
obligation, not grace (κατὰ ὀφείλημα, κατὰ χάριν). Since Abraham did not work (4.2) he 
is not rewarded according to obligation. In 4.5 Paul does not continue the antithesis 
straightforwardly; rather, Paul develops the antithesis in a peculiar way.171 If one works, 
one has a reward according to obligation; but to the one who does not work but believes 
                                                        
168 Virt. 219. 
169 Cf. Das, “Paul and Works,” 797: “when Paul speaks of works in contrast to grace, he has severed 
those works or ‘works of the Law’ from their gracious context in Second Temple Judaism. Paul 
reconceptualizes grace in terms of Christ... Paul's critique of ethnocentrism flows out of his christological 
convictions, convictions that led Paul to broader conclusions regarding the justifying inefficacy of works 
in general.” 
170 For Wright, “Role of Abraham,” 216, all of 4.4-8 is “simply a secondary metaphor which Paul never 
employs in similar contexts elsewhere;” it “develops sideways” out of his primary argument and by 
happenstance “overlap[s] with one way of expounding an ‘old perspective’ view of justification” (233). It 
is telling that these verses sit uncomfortably with Wright’s proposals, which require all of the key 
terms/concepts to be redefined. 
171 For the implied logic, see Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 280 n.45. 
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in the God who justifies the ungodly, righteousness is reckoned, with κατὰ χάριν 
implied. Thus, in 4.4 Paul develops his argument from Gen 15.6 by explicating the use of 
λογίζομαι with standard economic terms about a worker receiving fitting 
compensation.172 Indeed, Paul constructs his argument such that working itself 
precludes the possibility of gift.173 In 4.5, however, Paul speaks not only of the “the one 
who does not work” but also of “the one who believes” (ὁ πιστεύων), thus assimilating 
the economic within the theological. The μισθός drops from view, and faith is placed as 
the opposite of work as gift is the opposite of pay.174 There is nothing κατὰ χάριν for the 
one who works; the reward is for the one who works, while justification is a gift to 
those who believe. 
 Therefore, Paul argues in 4.2-5 not that Abraham simply did not work, but that 
Abraham did not work yet believed; the implied logic is that as Abraham did not work, 
righteousness by faith is reckoned not κατὰ ὀφείλημα but κατὰ χάριν. Abraham has no 
reason for boasting (καύχημα) before God, which would result from being justified by 
works as compensation, because he has been justified by faith as gift.175 Thus, ἔργα and 
ἐργάζομαι result in μισθὸς κατὰ ὀφείλημα; but obligation is a negation of gift, for Paul, 
as the gift upholds no systems of worth but comes to those without worth. πίστις and 
πιστεύω, however, result in justification κατὰ χάριν. Why Paul shies away from using 
μισθός again is not explicit, but it is likely because it would not fit his argument: the 
justification of the ungodly is not a reward for anything but is rather a gift, and Paul, 
unlike Philo, seems to distinguish gift and reward, because Paul defines a gift as 
something given to the unworthy, without preconditions.176 It is not surprising that 
                                                        
172 Jewett, Romans, 313. 
173 Badiou, Saint Paul, 77 calls this Paul’s “polemic against the ‘what is due.’” 
174 Wright, “Role of Abraham,” 215 argues that μισθός in 4.4 is picks up its use in Gen 15.1 and 
therefore refers to Abraham’s promised “worldwide family.” It is striking that Paul never uses μισθός 
again after placing it on the negative side of his dichotomy. If Paul wanted to connect μισθός with any 
particularly significant referent, he did a poor job. 
175 T. Engberg-Pedersen, “Gift-Giving and God’s Charis: Bourdieu, Seneca and Paul in Romans 1-8,” in 
The Letter to the Romans (ed. U. Schnelle; Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 101: “Paul is very keen on emphasizing 
the gift character of the Christ event, e.g. in 4,2-5, where he even brings out...the difference between 
God’s act of gift and payment.” 
176 The relationship between gift and pay/reward, fitting and unfitting can be configured differently, 
a point which Paul and Philo make clear. For Paul a gift is unfitting and pay is fitting, and a gift is not pay; 
for Philo, both gift and pay are (typically) fitting, and gift can be pay. There is no inherent and necessary 
relationship between these concepts and definitions; Paul and Philo should be allowed to make their own 
configurations. More could be said on this topic, but the basic point here stands. 
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Paul elsewhere correlates “reward” with doing or working,177 whereas he never 
correlates grace and reward. Thus, in contrast to Philo, for whom faith is the 
development of one’s virtue, for Paul it is antithetical to work as the recognition of 
one’s status of ungodly and need for justification. God is the one who justifies the 
ungodly, and to quote Moxnes, the “effect when this predication is added [to] the 
antithesis between ‘work’ and ‘faith,’ is that Paul put the emphasis not on ‘faith’ per se, 
but rather on God, in whom one believes.”178     
 From the viewpoint of Philo, we can examine Romans 4 knowing that Paul has 
“stacked the deck” by defining justification over against work or any standards of 
worth:179 Abraham is justified by faith, and God is the one who justifies the ungodly 
(ἀσεβής), precisely the one who is an undeserving recipient of the gift. This move – 
making grace antithetical to work, status, virtue, etc. – has its complement in Philo in 
the way he ultimately attributes all human working and virtue to God’s causation.180 
But for Philo God works to create a fit between his gifts and the recipient to uphold the 
moral-cosmological order and to demonstrate himself a wise God; for Paul God does not 
create a fit that allows one to receive gifts. Rather, God gives despite the individual’s 
incapacity, which can then produce some measure of fit (cf. e.g. Rom 6.15, 23). 
Accordingly, although Paul would place Philo on the “works” side of his antithesis, this 
is unfair to Philo for whom grace is not viewed through the lens of the Christ-event. 
Philo would see no antithesis: God accomplishes all good things, and faith is the “most 
certain of the virtues.”181 As Philo states, “faith in God (ἡ πρὸς θεὸν πίστις) is the only 
                                                        
177 Cf. 1 Cor 3.8, 14; 9.17, 18. 
178 H. Moxnes, Theology in Conflict: Studies in Paul’s Understanding of God in Romans (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 
110. Cf. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 68. 
179 Cf. F. Watson, “Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and 
Human Agency,” in Divine and Human Agency, 108 who argues that Paul’s antithesis between salvation by 
faith or works (i.e. Hab 2.4 or Lev 18.5) makes space for others to “embody the soteriological logic that 
Paul strives to exclude.” Pace M. Cranford, “Abraham in Romans 4: The Father of All Who Believe,” NTS 41 
(1995): 72–73 who argues that a distinction between faith and works could not be intended because it 
“would be completely unintelligible to a Jewish reader.” 
180 Wright, “Role of Abraham,” 216: “the reason for the metaphor itself (‘working’ for a ‘reward’ 
which one is then ‘owed’) emerges not from an underlying implicit second-Temple Jewish soteriology of 
‘doing good works’ to earn God’s favour, an idea for which there is scant evidence.” While Philo did not 
consider himself as doing good works to earn God’s favor, he had God’s favor because by his good works 
he was worthy to receive it (as a gift). 
181 Virt. 216. Cf. Her. 91; Abr. 270. 
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true and certain good” because “it is supported by the cause of all things.”182 Paul could 
be happy with most of that statement—but only on his terms. God justifies the ungodly 
Abraham by faith, not by work; Abraham is the recipient of a gift he does not deserve. 
3.4.2 A Promise According to Grace 
Paul defines the nature of Abraham’s justification through his interpretation of Christ’s 
death as the gift of God that justifies ungodly humans, of which Abraham is one. Re-
reading Abraham’s story this way, it would be incomprehensible to other Jewish 
readers, because Abraham’s faith is specifically in the God who fulfills his promise to 
Abraham in the Christ-event (4.24-25). Paul’s reading takes Gen. 15.6 in connection with 
the promise of 17.5, which finds a pre-answer in the birth of Isaac read through and 
pointing to the death and resurrection of Jesus, the event by which Abraham’s family is 
ultimately established. As the New Perspective has rightly emphasized, a key feature of 
Romans 4 is that Abraham’s family is composed of Jews and Gentiles. It is not 
incidental, however, that Paul moves from God’s justification of an ungodly Abraham 
(4.1-8) then to the nature of the promise as being for Jews and Gentiles by faith (4.9-23): 
verse 9 is a conclusion (οὖν) from 1-8.183 The unfitting gift establishes the inclusive 
family. 
That God is the justifier of the ungodly is thus key: the promise is always received 
by faith. Faith itself is an act that points to God as subject,184 where faith does not 
correspond with righteousness but is directed at a subject who reckons righteousness 
to the ungodly by faith as an unfitting gift. This faith exists because of God’s promise, 
which both evokes faith and directs it towards what God will do and who God is. 
Accordingly, God is understood inseparably from the Christ-event in Romans 4. 
Abraham’s faith is in the God who “gives life to the dead and calls those who do not 
exist into existence” (4.17), which signals that God is defined as the one who has acted 
                                                        
182 Abr. 268. 
183 Pace Cranford, “Abraham,” 81, Paul’s point is not “somewhat obscured in the metaphors and 
citations of 4.4-8” but finally “made clear in v. 9.” 
184 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/2 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 331. Cf. also Engberg-Pedersen, “God’s 
Charis,” 103: Faith “expresses an attitude towards the giver, a recognition of him as giver through the 
acceptance of his gift.”  
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in Christ.185 Abraham’s faith is in the God who fulfills his promise in the death and 
resurrection of Jesus (4.24-25).186 The raising of Jesus, itself an act of creation, is 
prefigured by the act of creation that happens in the deadness of the aged Abraham 
and Sarah (4.19).187 Thus, Abraham’s justification is tied to God’s act of creating anew in 
the resurrection of Jesus (4.25), which was “for our justification” (διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν 
ἡμῶν), as Abraham’s faith is not simply in God but in God’s promise that Abraham would 
be the “father of many nations.” The fulfillment of the promise in Christ, and its 
foreshadowing in the birth of Isaac from deadness (4.17-20), allows Paul to recast 
Abraham’s story as a story of death and resurrection. Thus, as Gathercole argues, 
“God’s declaration of Abraham as righteous was not a descriptive word but the creative 
word of the God who calls ‘nonentities’ into being as entities.”188  
The correlate of Abraham’s being justified while ungodly is that he was justified 
before he was circumcised, i.e., before he had done anything that could make him a 
fitting recipient (4.9-10). Circumcision played no factor in his being justified. Insofar as 
Abraham was justified while ungodly, he is the father of all who believe. Thus, in 4.13 
Paul clarifies again that the promise to Abraham and his seed was not “through Law” 
(διὰ νόμου) but through the righteousness by faith. Indeed, the Law “produces wrath” – 
not worth – and accordingly the promise is by faith, so that it might be κατὰ χάριν 
(4.16). Grace in 4.16, like 4.5, retains the same shape: it is the antithesis to works and 
Law. κατὰ χάριν shows that those who receive the promise are the dead whom God 
makes alive and the inexistent whom God calls into being (4.17). From Abraham to 
Paul’s present, the promise is received by faith, apart from Law and works; that is, it is 
always received as an unfitting gift, without works or circumcision making one worthy. 
Therefore, it is received by Jews and Gentiles. If one resorts to works or the Law, one is 
                                                        
185 On the way Paul’s understanding of the Christ-event shapes his God-predicates, see esp. W. Hill, 
Paul and the Triune Identity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming), chap. 2. 
186 Therefore, J.R.D. Kirk, Unlocking Romans: Resurrection and the Justification of God (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2008), 63: “Paul’s reinterpretation of the Abraham narrative is not based on discovering a 
principle of grace but on discovering the grace of God in bringing about justification through the death 
and resurrection of Jesus.” 
187 Cf. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 281 n.47: “Faith in God (who ‘dikaiosifies the ungodly,’ 
Rom 4:5) is the only possible recourse for sinners of whom dikaiosness (which they by definition do not 
have) is demanded, just as it was the only recourse for a couple whose childbearing years were long past 
but from whom a child nonetheless had to be born.”  
188 Gathercole, Where Is Boasting?, 243. 
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not justified on those grounds; rather, faith is emptied and the promise abolished 
(4.14). As Paul sees it, the only way God works is to justify those who have no worth – 
because no one is worthy – and to seek worth is to reject God’s unfitting gift. 
Accordingly, the Christ-event is the fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham that 
constitutes the family of Abraham as both Jew and Gentile.189 There is no distinction 
between Jew and Gentile in being sinful (3.22-23), and as a result of the Christ-event – 
the manifestation of God’s righteousness - righteousness is universally available by 
faith in the God of the promise. For Philo, all could follow Abraham by living virtuously 
and thus be rewarded by God; for Paul, all are Abrahamic heirs of the promise through 
faith in the God who justifies the ungodly in the giving and raising of Jesus Christ.190 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
Many interpreters construe the interpretive options of Paul’s use of Abraham in 4.1-25 
such that he can be either an “example” of justification by faith or the father of Jews 
and Gentiles.191 Similarly, there can be either a “covenantal and eschatological scheme” 
or an “atomized system of individual sin and salvation.”192 In the preceding sections I 
have argued that this is a false and misleading either/or. I have not argued for seeing 
Abraham merely as an example of the mechanics of justification; but neither because 
Abraham is not justified nor because those after Abraham do not “follow in Abraham’s 
footsteps” (4.12). Paul insists that the promise has always been given by faith to those 
who are undeserving. Thus, Paul proclaims that God has been faithful to fulfill his 
promise to Abraham, which results in an inclusive family. But how? Abraham is father 
of Jews and Gentiles because he, like all Jews and Gentiles, received an unfitting gift (cf. 
3.21-26; 5.1-21). The justification of an ungodly Abraham and the promise going to Jews 
and Gentiles are two parts of one whole. Paul has traced the nature of the unfitting gift 
of Christ all the way back to the giving of the promise to Abraham, which he interprets 
                                                        
189 Thus, Barth, Romans, 117: “If the revelation in Jesus be no more than a particular historical 
happening ... its relative and incidental and particular character ought to become apparent when 
contrasted with an occurrence so remote as is the story of Abraham. ...if it is not the objective link 
between all then and now, and here and there; it must snap in our fingers when we say ‘Abraham.’” 
190 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 265. 
191 Cranford, “Abraham,” 88. 
192 Wright, “Role of Abraham,” 236.  
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through the incongruity of the Christ-event (κατὰ χάριν).193 Thus, as Schliesser argues, 
“The continuity between Abraham and the present believers is constituted and 
conserved by God himself, for he is and remains one and the same, the one God, who 
justifies the ungodly, who creates and gives life.”194  
 That Paul can interpret Abraham’s story through the Christ-event is significant for 
our turn to Romans 9-11 now. 
3.5 Romans 9-11: The Christ-Gift and the History of Israel 
In Romans 9-11 Paul is wrestling with the disbelief of many of his fellow Jews. The 
passage is stamped throughout by incongruous mercy – that nothing in the recipient or 
performed by the recipient makes one fitting. 195 Rather, God has always chosen Israel 
by grace and the continuance of the promised people is by mercy to the exclusion of 
human standards. The “pattern of incongruity” that shaped Abraham’s story is present 
throughout the history of Israel; and, again, this incongruous grace and mercy is 
intelligible only through a reconfiguration of divine generosity by the Christ-event. 
Paul here is treading on a problem that has a complement in Philo, and a comparison 
will focus our reading of Paul. 
3.5.1 The Logic of Election 
Paul is insistent that God’s word – his promise – has not failed (9.4-5, 6, 9); thus, Paul 
traces God’s electing activity from Abraham to the present time in which both Jews and 
Gentiles are saved by faith in Christ (10.9-13). Paul begins his argument with an 
unsettling claim: “not all who are from Israel are Israel” (9.6). While Paul does not 
dislocate ethnicity from the promise, he makes clear that election is not grounded by 
ethnicity: the “children of the promise” are reckoned for offspring (9.8; cf. 9.3-5).196 
                                                        
193 As E. Käsemann, “The Faith of Abraham in Romans 4,” in Perspectives on Paul (London: SCM Press, 
1971), 85 notes, the present tense of 4.5 demonstrates how Paul’s Christology determines the character of 
the God who justifies. 
194 Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith, 405. 
195 On Rom 9-11 as a whole, see esp. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, chap. 7; S. Westerholm, 
“Paul and the Law in Romans 9-11,” in Paul and the Mosaic Law, 215–37. 
196 Cf. Westerholm, “Paul and the Law,” 221–222. 
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Descent κατὰ σάρκα does not guarantee a place within the family of the promise.197 On 
what grounds does Paul distinguish, then? For Paul, it is clear that Abraham’s family 
depends on and is constituted by God’s promise: “For the word of the promise 
(ἐπαγγελίας γὰρ ὁ λόγος) is this: at that time (κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον) I will come and 
Sarah will have a son” (9.9). The phrase κατὰ τὸν καιρόν echoes Paul’s earlier argument 
that Christ’s death for the ungodly was κατὰ καιρόν (5.6), which begins to disclose 
Paul’s logic. Abraham and Sarah have a child because they believe in the God who raises 
the dead and who calls into existence that which does not exist (4.17); they have a child 
because God’s promises are effective (9.9).198 The promise always works with a 
destabilizing logic. 
 Philo would agree with Paul that the promise does not depend on ethnicity.199 As 
Philo states, “neither are righteous parents of benefit to unrighteous offspring (οὔτε 
τοῖς ἀδίκοις δίκαιοι γονεῖς), nor are the self-controlled for the intemperate, nor are the 
wholly good for the wicked.”200 Indeed, “kinship is not measured by blood only,” but by 
a “similarity of actions” (πράξεων ὁμοιότητι).201 Those who do not live virtuously 
negate their lineage and deserve punishment. Accordingly, Philo, like Paul, had to 
discover other grounds by which to explain why God acts favorably to some and not 
others. Thus, as we saw in chapter 1 (section 4.1), when Philo reads Gen 6.8, Philo needs 
to explain why Noah found favor without any prior working (μηδὲν πρότερον 
ἐργασάμενον).202 Noah had a “praiseworthy constitution and nature,” as his name 
means “righteous” or “rest” (δίκαιος). Accordingly, he lived righteously 
(ἐπὶ...δικαιοσύνῃ συζῶντα). Noah thus received grace not because of virtuous actions, 
but because of his virtuous nature, from which flowed virtuous actions. Paul, of course, 
                                                        
197 As S. Grindheim, The Crux of Election: Paul’s Critique of the Jewish Confidence in the Election of Israel 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 142 states, “All Israelites would agree that not all of Abraham’s and 
Isaac’s children were the elect, but Paul sharpens the point.” Cf. N.T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: 
Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 238. 
198 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, “‘I Will Have Mercy on Whom I Have Mercy’: The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy 
in Romans 9–11 and Second Temple Judaism,” EC 1 (2010): 99. 
199 As K. Haacker, “Die Geschichtstheologie von Röm 9-11 im Lichte Philonischer Schriftauslegung,” 
NTS 43 (1997): 112 states, Philo’s devaluation of physical descent has “eine andere Intention, aber doch 
eine vergleichbare Denkstruktur” to Paul. Cf. Virt. 207-210 with the claim that Abraham had many 
children (πολύπαις) but only one heir. 
200 Virt. 194. 
201 Virt. 195. See throughout 187-197. 
202 But cf. the revealing phrase: ὅσα γε εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπίγνωσιν. 
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does not use Noah, because he would not fit his argument and his promise-narrative 
begins with Abraham.203 
 Philo similarly explains that Abraham was begotten by God with an image “worthy 
of zeal” (σπουδῆς ἄξιον) and Isaac’s nature and name were “moulded and appointed 
and chosen to have the best lot before birth.” By contrast, Abraham for Paul was 
justified while ungodly (4.2-8), and Isaac’s existence is due solely to God’s faithfulness 
to the promise (9.7-9).  
 How Philo and Paul handle God’s election of Jacob over Esau is the most revealing. 
As both Philo and Paul know, despite the fact that Esau is older – Isaac’s rightful heir – 
God chose Jacob. Why? For Philo God’s foreknowledge is crucial: God the creator knows 
his works before they are finished, foreknowing their faculties, works, and passions (τὰ 
ἔργα καὶ πάθη).204 That which is a “slave by nature” (Esau) is base and irrational, but the 
virtuous man is free, rational, and good. A mere “breeze of virtue” (μικρά...αὖρα τῆς 
ἀρετῆς) signals whether one will be virtuous or wicked; and God chooses accordingly. 
By contrast, for Paul God does not choose based on foreknowing what Jacob and Esau 
will be or do; rather, God chooses before they were born precisely so that his election is 
before they had “done anything good or bad” (πραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον; 9.11). 
Indeed, God’s electing purpose (ἡ κατ᾿ ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ; 9.12) is dependent on 
occurring “not by works but by the one who calls” (οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ 
καλοῦντος).205 As Gaventa argues, the language of calling here is dependent on Rom 
4.17: God’s calling is a calling-into-being.206 Jacob’s election is not based on his actions, 
but on the God who creates by electing. Israel is a “creatura verbi Dei.”207 
 Accordingly, if Philo traces God’s rational giving back into the person’s soul-type 
and thus whether they will be virtuous, Paul undercuts any such logic. Philo is 
                                                        
203 As J.R. Wagner, Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul in Concert in the Letter to the Romans (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 47 notes, this is a “highly selective and abbreviated retelling of Israel's history.” 
204 Leg. 3.88-89. 
205 The parallel with 9.11 (as well as 4.2-5 and 11.5-6) makes the claim by J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 9-16 
(Waco: Word, 1988), 543 that ἐξ ἔργων refers to “works of law” somewhat implausible. However, as 
Westerholm, “Paul and the Law,” 223 states, Paul is “not polemicizing against human beings’ doing 
anything” – that is, the actions themselves are not critiqued “but merely declared irrelevant in the 
inscrutable selection of the objects of divine mercy.” 
206 B.R. Gaventa, “On the Calling-Into-Being of Israel: Romans 9:6-29,” in Between Gospel and Election: 
Explorations in the Interpretation of Romans 9-11 (eds. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010), 255–69. 
207 Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 153. 
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uncomfortable with the idea that God would give gifts arbitrarily; Paul insists that 
God’s election seems nothing but arbitrary, without compliance to social, moral, or 
ethnic codes. Although both ruled out ethnicity as a determinant for God’s 
favor/election, Philo insists on moral standards.208 
 Philo concludes that there are “two natures” created by God, one praiseworthy and 
one blameworthy.209 God gives to the former, not the latter. Philo quotes Moses’ prayer 
in Deut 28.12 for God to “open for us his own treasury” and to close the treasuries of 
evil things. God graciously, allows for “time for repentance and the fixing of the false 
step.” One can stop being wicked and act virtuously, and consequently receive God’s 
favor. For Philo, the question is whether God is a wise God who gives properly to the 
worthy. For Paul, the question is, since God gives without consideration of the typical 
standards of worth – ethnicity, birthright, moral standing – is there ἀδικία with God 
(9.14)? God’s response to Moses in Exod 33.19 explains Paul’s emphatic μὴ γένοιτο: “I 
will have mercy on whom I have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I have 
compassion” (9.15). For Philo, this inexplicable ἔλεος is ἀδικία; for Paul, inexplicable 
ἔλεος is the scriptural answer to the charge of ἀδικία. God is merciful, but not 
according to patterns explicable by human standards.210 The object of God’s mercy is 
indeterminate; and Paul immediately presses this inscrutable logic further: everything 
depends “not on the one who wills nor the one who runs, but on God who has mercy” 
(τοῦ ἐλεῶντος θεοῦ; 9.16). To the exclusion of anything inherent to the human, the 
promise is dependent solely on God’s choice in his creative mercy.211 
 This counter-logic explains both the creation and continuance of historical Israel as 
well as God’s calling of Gentiles in the present. Paul adapts Hosea 2.23 in 9.24-26 to 
apply it to Gentiles as the counterpart to 9.12-13. Jacob’s election was dependent not on 
works, but on God who calls (καλέω), and it is Jacob “I have loved” (ἀγαπάω). Similarly, 
Paul argues that “we” whom God has “called” (καλέω) in the present – in Christ – are 
from both Jews and Gentiles. Paul reworks the verbs in his Hosea citations so that the 
                                                        
208 Cf. Haacker, “Geschichtstheologie von Röm 9-11,” 213. 
209 Leg. 3.104-106. 
210 Cf. S.G. Eastman, “Israel and the Mercy of God: A Re-reading of Galatians 6.16 and Romans 9-11,” 
NTS 56 (2010): 377. 
211 Barclay, “Divine Mercy,” 98: “For Paul divine mercy is itself the creative agent in Israel’s history, 
not its restorative assistant. Israel is not rehabilitated by mercy so much as established by it.” 
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language of calling and love are prominent.212 “I will call (καλέω) not my people my 
people, and not beloved (ἀγαπάω) beloved.” As God chose Jacob without any explicable 
reason beyond God’s mercy, so God’s people, including Gentiles, are called and loved 
despite their nonexistence (οὐ λαόν μου) and lack of worth (οὐκ ἠγαπημένην).213 To 
unfitting objects, God promises “you are my people,” and thus “they will be called 
(καλέω) children of the living God.” Both Jews and Gentiles who receive God’s electing 
mercy are called into being by that same mercy.214  
 Thus, although Gentiles did not pursue righteousness (by the Law), they have 
attained righteousness by faith;215 Jews, however, pursued the Law of righteousness but 
did not attain it (9.30-31). Why did Jews not attain it? Because not by faith (oὐκ ἐκ 
πίστεως) but as by works (ἐξ ἔργων) they stumbled over the stumbling stone, Christ 
(9.32).216 Whatever worth comes ἐξ ἔργων, from “pursuing righteousness,” Paul insists 
that God works in election and for salvation outside of those systems.217 If it is not by 
works but by God who calls (9.12), then Israel’s pursuit of righteousness by works is 
misguided. Accordingly, Gentiles, only by God’s inexplicable mercy, have attained 
righteousness by faith; God has been found by those not seeking him (10.20). Israel, 
then, is stumbling (9.32), seeking their own righteousness while being ignorant of God’s 
righteousness (10.3), disobediently refusing God’s outstretched hand (10.21). Can it be 
the case that God has rejected his people (11.1)? Of course not: Paul is counter-evidence 
to this belief. There remains a remnant “in the now time” which is “according to the 
election of grace” (11.5). As in 3.26, ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ is the eschatological “now” of the 
Christ-event. The remnant who exists in this “now” are not those who have displayed 
their worth and have thus been the objects of God’s favor; rather, existing according to 
elective grace means election not ἐξ ἔργων, for then grace would not be grace (ἡ χάρις 
                                                        
212 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 319–321; Wagner, Heralds, 79–81.  
213 Cf. Grindheim, Crux of Election, 149. 
214 On how this relates to the olive-tree metaphor in 11.16-24, see Barclay, “Divine Mercy,” 103; N. 
Walter, “Zur Interpretation vom Römer 9-11,” ZTK 81 (1984): 177–186. For a particularly Philonic 
horticultural metaphor, see Praem. 172. 
215 Wagner, Heralds, 121 notes that this statement “encapsulates the point made more poetically by 
Hosea” in 9.24-26. 
216Cf. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness, 156; Jewett, Romans, 611. 
217 As Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 329 n.44 argues, in 9.30-10.5 “the emphasis is on the 
praxis that corresponds to the ‘privilege’ of the νομοθεσία (9.4).” 
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οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις; 10.6).218 God’s word of promise is never made effective by human 
works – whatever they may be – or anything that could establish a human as worthy, 
but because of God who calls and has mercy without thought for worth.219  
 Consequently, Paul finds the same inexplicable mercy that is operative in the 
present (9.24-33; 11.1-6) at work in God’s actions in history (9.6-18). 
3.5.2 The Introduction of the Disjunction 
The source of Paul’s disjunctive logic – not by works, Law, ethnicity, birthright, but by 
faith, grace, mercy, calling – remains his particular Christology. If when God pours his 
love out it is in Christ’s death for the ungodly (5.5-8), and the revelation and proof of 
his righteousness is the redemption of sinners in Jesus Christ (3.21-26), whom he gave 
up for trespasses and raised for justification (4.25), for Paul this is defining of who God 
is. God thus is the one who justifies the ungodly, who calls what does not exist into 
existence, and has mercy. Because of the disjunctive nature of his death – for the 
unworthy, the godless – Christ is the Lord of all (10.12). Salvation is thus only by faith, 
which results from the proclamation of the “word of faith,” the “word of Christ” (10.8, 
17). It is this assertion that grounds Paul’s antitheses in 9.32 and 11.5-6 and is displayed 
in his understanding of divine election. God has “placed in Zion the stumbling stone 
and rock of scandal,” and “the one who believes on him will not be put to shame” 
(9.33). Jesus is the Lord in whom one believes;220 and the one who believes will not be 
put to shame (καταισχυνθήσεται; 10.11).221 Since Christ is the τέλος νόμου, 
righteousness is not “by works” but is to “all who believe” (10.4). In other words, Christ 
is the end to the means by which one might seek to be a fitting object of God’s favor. 
Thus, not righteousness by Law, but righteousness by faith (10.5-6).222 Precisely because 
                                                        
218 Eastman, “Mercy of God,” 379: “because the remnant is ‘chosen by grace’ without any recourse to 
its own actions, its very existence demonstrates God’s freedom to ‘have mercy on whom I will have 
mercy.’” 
219 Badiou, Saint Paul, 76–77: Grace is “that which happens to everyone without an assignable reason.” 
220 On the identification of Jesus as κύριος here and the Christological implications, see C.K. Rowe, 
“Romans 10:13: What Is the Name of the Lord?,” HBT 22 (2000): 135–73. 
221 E.E. Johnson, The Function of Apocalyptic and Wisdom Traditions in Romans 9-11 (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1989), 127–128 argues that compound verbs of αἰσχύνω often refer to shame before God’s 
eschatological judgment. This makes sense here and in 5.5 and 9.33. 
222 That 10.5-6 are antithetically related, see P.M. Sprinkle, Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 
18.5 in Early Judaism and Paul (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 170–173; also Westerholm, Perspectives Old 
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God’s promise fulfilled in the Christ-gift comes regardless of ethnicity (9.7-9), works or 
Law (9.11-12, 16, 30-32; 10.3-6) and thus by grace (11.5-6), Jesus is the Lord of Jews and 
Gentiles – without distinction (10.12)223 – and “acts richly (πλουτῶν) towards all who 
call upon him” (10.12). 
 Consequently, if the temporary hardening of Israel is for the sake of saving Gentiles, 
and the grafting in of Gentiles for saving Jews, this is because “God consigned all to 
disobedience, so that he might have mercy on all” (ἵνα τοὺς πάντας ἐλεήσῃ; 11.30-32).224 
The duality of electing/hardening of 9.6-29 and beyond moves to a single purpose; “at 
the right time Christ died for the ungodly” (5.6). Paul’s argument would seem 
capricious to Philo. Paul revels in the fact that God’s election by grace is morally and 
culturally inexplicable because it is dependent solely on God’s willing to be merciful. 
Thus, Paul closes his argument with doxology, but Philo would have to make Paul’s 
questions real questions: how unsearchable (ἀνεξεραύνητος) are his judgments, and how 
inscrutable (ἀνεξιχνίαστος) are his ways (11.33)? Inscrutability is not a virtue for Philo: 
precisely what the universe depends on is a God whose ways are scrutable and whose 
judgments are searchable. If one finds divine favor precisely as one who is without 
worth, the moral-cosmological order is called into question; arbitrary grace runs 
counter to who God is as creator. Philo could affirm that God is the God of all, who gives 
richly to those who are virtuous, and in this sense, particularly to “Israel.” His 
understanding of giving differs from Paul not because God is less gracious but because 
God does not give regardless of moral norms; Philo could not place a disjunction 
between grace and works. For Paul, that disjunction is key to tracing the thread of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and New, 327 n.93-94, in response to R.B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: YUP, 
1989), 76. 
223 As Rowe, “Romans 10:13,” 146 notes, the lack of distinction in 10.12 is the positive corollary of 
3.22: “The correlation of the positive and negative sides of the same statement presents us with the 
picture of anthropological universality we find Paul painting fully in Rom 5:12-21: all sin, and precisely so 
there is no distinction; all find salvation in Christ, and precisely so there is no distinction. This 
anthropological assertion finds its ground in the theological universality which it assumes.” 
224 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 339 on the “different” but “symmetrical” way both Jews 
and Gentiles are objects of God’s mercy. “Christ embodies both the divine faithfulness to the promises to 
Israel and the divine mercy to Gentiles, and ultimately God’s faithfulness and God’s mercy are one and 
the same.” 
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God’s merciful election within Israel, and the ultimate salvation of Jews and Gentiles 
rests on it.225 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
God’s word has not failed (9.6), and God’s gifts to and calling of Israel have not been 
revoked (τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλῆσις; 11.29). Paul views these gifts and the calling from a 
particular perspective - ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ - and thus makes the counterintuitive claim 
that God’s gifts to Israel are not forsaken precisely because of the destabilizing logic of 
hardening, mercy, and incongruous grace.226 God hardens for the sake of saving, 
consigns to disobedience for the sake of showing mercy. What was revealed in the 
Christ-event is revelatory of the nature of God’s promise and thus of God himself. The 
Christ-event, as the event that reshapes history and effects new creation, consequently 
patterns history;227 and it is only from the vantage point of this event that Paul’s logic 
makes sense vis-à-vis his contemporaries like Philo.  
 Romans 11.33-36 is thus a concise summary and fitting conclusion of Paul’s 
argument. Paul praises the “depths of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God” 
(βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ); no human was God’s counselor, and 
none can plumb this eternal logic. Paul asks “who has given [a gift] to him beforehand 
(προέδωκεν), so that it will be given back (ἀνταποδοθήσεται) to him?” (11.35). This 
question undercuts any presumed worth before God: none have given to God 
beforehand and therefore put God in their debt. Rather, God’s working for salvation is 
due to his willing alone. Accordingly, “all who call upon the name of the Lord will be 
saved” (10.13).228 
                                                        
225 Grindheim, Crux of Election thus speaks of a Pauline “pattern of reversal of values,” which is not 
unlike the “pattern of incongruity” mentioned above. 
226 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, “Unnerving Grace: Approaching Romans 9–11 from The Wisdom of Solomon,” in 
Between Gospel and Election, 107. 
227 In the words of J.L. Martyn, “Events in Galatia: Modified Covenantal Nomism Versus God’s 
invasion of the Cosmos in the Singular Gospel: A Response to J.D.G. Dunn and B.R. Gaventa,” in Pauline 
Theology: Volume One (ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 165, Paul proclaims an 
“evangelical, cosmic, history-creating Christology.” 
228 Cf. Rowe, “Romans 10:13,” 158: “All, and not all Israel alone, who call upon the name of Jesus 
Christ will be saved. The πᾶς of Joel 3:5 is universally expanded in light of Jesus Christ.” 
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3.6 Conclusion to Romans 
As we have seen in Romans 3.21-26 and 5.12-21, for Paul the Christ-event is the 
definitive enactment of God’s grace within history, and all other gifts are given in 
relation to the Christ-event. The gift of the Spirit makes the Christ-gift present in the 
life of the believer, and the gift of righteousness is given in and as a result of the Christ-
event. Paul’s understanding of divine gift as the Christ-event plays a profound role in 
reinterpreting history: this one event shapes all history. Hence, in Romans 4 and 9-11, 
Paul interprets the stories of Abraham and Israel through the disjunctive logic of the 
Christ-event: the unfitting gift of Christ is the fulfillment of a promise that has always 
been incongruous to its recipients. The Christ-event is thus Paul’s hermeneutic for 
history as it has reshaped his understanding of who God is. 
4.  Paul,  Philo,  Christ and Cosmos 
We can now tie up some comparisons between Philo and Paul. Although perhaps the 
most pressing comparison is how exactly Paul and Philo differ on the issue of 
fitting/unfitting gifts, we will leave this comparison for the next chapter after more 
pieces are on the board. Philo and Paul are by no means identical on this point, but 
neither are they simply antithetical; finessing the actual differences is critical.  
 Three main points of comparison relating to this chapter may be noted here. 
4.1 God as Generous Giver 
For both Philo and Paul, God is abundantly generous; but each conceives of God’s giving 
differently because they look to two different places in history to understand God’s 
beneficence. Philo views the creation of the world as the fundamental outpouring of 
God’s munificence, and the result of this – creation as gifting – is that everything is gift. 
Thus, as we have seen, when Noah “finds grace” before God, what he discovers is that 
“all things are a gift of God” (χάριν ὄντα θεοῦ τὰ πάντα).229 The cause of creation itself is 
God’s goodness and graciousness; consequently, Philo interprets all reality through his 
understanding of creation as gift. By contrast, Paul never looks back to the act of 
creation for understanding God’s gift-giving activities; rather, he looks to the death and 
                                                        
229 Deus 107. 
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resurrection of Jesus Christ. There is a subtle change of emphasis: for Philo God is a 
superabundant giver, for Paul God gives a superabundant gift. The two aspects cannot 
be divorced, but the distinction is interesting. From the creation of the world Philo can 
propound how God is φιλόδωρος because he has given everything that exists; from the 
Christ-event Paul insistently emphasizes the utter grace-excess of that act. Thus, it is 
the Christ-event and righteousness that “abound” and “super-abound” (Rom 5.15-20), 
as it is in God’s gift of Jesus that believers have been “made rich in every way” (ἐν παντὶ 
ἐπλουτίσθητε ἐν αὐτῷ; 1 Cor 1.5) as God’s riches are in Jesus Christ (Phil 4.19). 
Accordingly, it is not that Paul does not emphasize God’s graciousness, but he does so 
precisely by pointing to the absurd generosity of this one gift. Indeed, for Paul the gift 
is precisely what proves God’s righteousness (Rom 3.25-26). Inversely, for Philo the 
world, properly interpreted, is evidence of God’s generosity, not its proof. 
4.2 God’s Fundamental Gift  
As point one indicates, Philo and Paul look to creation and the Christ-event not simply 
as the most concentrated instances of God’s giving, but as the gift by which God’s 
generosity is defined. Philo’s God is the beneficent creator, as the activities of creating 
and giving are located in the same Power. Paul’s God is the one who gave Jesus Christ, 
where the Christ-event is therefore not an instance of divine grace but rather its 
definitive revelation.  
 For both this primary gift has closely associated gifts that always accompany the 
main gift. Philo’s belief is that the world is the “first, greatest, and most perfect of God’s 
works” that is given because of God’s graciousness.230 The entire universe is God’s great 
gift (τὸ μέγα δῶρον θεοῦ τὸν παντελῆ κόσμον); and the gifts associated with this 
primary gift are the “particular gifts” (ἐν μέρει δωρεαί) God gives to humanity: the 
virtues and the corresponding energies (αὗται δ᾿ ἂν εἶεν ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ᾿ αὐτὰς 
ἐνέργειαι).231 Likewise, built into the cosmos are God’s Law and Logos, which structure 
the world and provide the roadmap and empowerment for virtuous living. By living in 
accordance with these gifts that accompany the world – living in accordance with Law 
                                                        
230 Deus 106-108. 
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and Logos, developing in virtue – one becomes more attuned to the cosmos itself, the 
primary gift. And by doing so, by being drawn into this first gift, one ascends to God. 
 Similarly, Paul proclaims a fundamental gift that anchors the other gifts in the 
divine economy. The event of Christ’s death and resurrection is unequivocally the 
divine gift by which the divine-human relationship is reestablished. The gift of the 
Spirit is intimately tied to this gift as the means by which one receives the Christ-gift, 
and the gifts associated with the Christ-event – that are inextricable from the Christ-
event itself – are the gifts of righteousness and reconciliation. Through justification by 
faith and the act of reconciliation, humans have peace with God and participate in the 
body of Christ – in his death and resurrection – as those who have Christ’s Spirit 
indwelling them. So for both Philo and Paul, broadly speaking, the gifts closely 
associated with the primary gift bring humans into that primary gift.232 Yet for Philo, 
God’s gifts help humans become more virtuous, while for Paul, God’s gifts presuppose 
that the recipients are unrighteous and estranged from God: new life is accomplished 
through death.  
 World history looks very different if one’s understanding of God is based either on 
the creation of an immutable moral universe or else on a crucified Jewish man. 
Creation and the Christ-event become the lenses through which Philo and Paul, 
respectively, view the world and world-history. Yet, if for Philo God’s generosity is his 
creative power, the same is true for Paul; but, differently, Paul understands God’s 
creative activity from the particular act of giving in Christ, and not vice-versa. The God 
who raised Jesus is the God who calls into existence that which does not exist. As Seifrid 
puts it, “God the Creator is to be understood in terms of his action in the cross, and not 
the cross in terms of God’s activity as Creator: crux probat omnia.”233 
4.3 The Gift as Giver  
God demonstrates his graciousness in a single gift; and interestingly, for both Philo and 
Paul that gift is also a giver. But for Philo the world qua giver is really a way of 
describing how God gives and how God has ordered the world for the benefit of 
                                                        
232 We will return to this point in chapter 5. 
233 M.A. Seifrid, “‘The Gift of Salvation’: Its Failure to Address the Crux of Justification,” JETS 42 (1999): 
684. 
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humanity. Accordingly, in whatever way Nature or the world can be considered to give 
something, it must always ultimately be attributed to God, the first and only cause. For 
Paul, however, as we have seen, the Christ-event is God’s gift of Christ but also Christ’s 
self-gift, a fact that is inherent to the particularity of the gift. Yet, unlike Philo, Paul 
makes no distinctions between God and Christ as gift-givers. Philo’s philosophical-
theological concerns with distinguishing the world from God were not entirely Paul’s 
concerns (though Paul also maintains a Creator/creature distinction), but it is salient 
that Paul felt no need to make any such distinctions on this point. 
 Two points on Christ’s relation to God in gift-giving deserve to be expanded briefly. 
 First, the Christ-gift is given equally by God and Jesus.234 The word “equally” is, of 
course, loaded, but it is difficult to think of another way to capture this phenomenon.235 
In six of seven letters, Paul begins with χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν 
καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rom 1.7; 1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2; Gal 1.3; Phil 1.2; Phlm 3); the 
other simply has χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη, but it is given to the Thessalonians who are ἐν 
θεῷ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ (1 Thess 1.1). Consequently, Paul always establishes 
that divine favor comes not from God alone, but from God and Jesus. Paul can also 
designate God or Jesus alone as Giver. God “did not spare his own son but for all of us 
gave him up” (Rom 8.32; cf. also 3.25; 4.25; 5.8; 1 Cor 1.4), and references to God’s grace 
are abundant (Rom 5.15; 1 Cor 1.4; 15.10; 2 Cor 1.12; 6.1; 8.1; 9.14; Gal 2.21). Paul speaks 
also about Christ’s self-giving: Christ is the one “who gave himself for our sins” (Gal 
1.4), who “loved me and gave himself for me” (Gal 2.20), whose χάρις is explicated as his 
“becoming poor” (2 Cor 8.9), and who was obedient unto the cross (Phil 2.6-8). 
Accordingly, references to Christ’s grace are also abundant (Rom 5.15; 16.20; 1 Cor 
16.23; 2 Cor 8.9; 13.13; Gal 1.6; Phil 4.23; Phlm 25). Thus, as Barclay states, “If the self-
giving of Christ is also, at the same time, the ‘inexpressible gift’ of God (2 Cor 9.15) – as 
                                                        
234 Pace Z.A. Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, And Conversion In The Religions Of The 
Ancient Mediterranean (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 195, it is not helpful to assert that “Jesus as broker is 
always subordinate to God as divine patron.” This move forces a model onto Paul’s gift-theology that 
cannot always make sense of the evidence. Furthermore, Crook states that the “confusion of the two for 
one is a later theological development” that would have seemed odd, if not insulting, to Paul. Crook gives 
the example of a person worshipping a priest of Asclepius rather than Asclepius, which would be an 
affront to Asclepius’ honor. However, the studies of Watson and Rowe cited in this chapter, and also the 
work of L.W. Hurtado and R. Bauckham, demonstrate that Crook’s argument is misguided. 
235 On which, cf. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 22. 
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much God’s gift of his Son (Rom 8.32) as Christ’s giving of himself (Gal 1.4; 2.20) – the 
Christ story reshapes our understanding of God.”236 Or Bockmuehl: “The gift of the Lord 
Jesus is at once the gift of God the Father: that is the acorn from which could sprout a 
wealth of subsequent Christology.”237 
 Second, Paul uses other prepositions that are important for configuring the Jesus-
God relationship: grace is from God and Jesus, but God’s grace is also given through and 
in Jesus. God is the “one God from whom are all things” (ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα) and Jesus is the 
“one Lord through whom are all things and we are through him” (δι᾿ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς 
δι᾿ αὐτοῦ; 1 Cor 8.6). Thus, God has given to believers “the victory” through Jesus (1 Cor 
15.57), God’s reconciliation occurs “through Jesus” (Rom 5.11; 2 Cor 5.18), and God will 
raise believers “through Jesus” (1 Thess 4.14). For Paul, God’s giving to humanity in 
creation and for salvation occurs always διὰ Χριστοῦ. Equally significant is that Jesus is 
the locus of God’s action, love, and favor in the world. God’s reconciling work was not 
only through Jesus, but God was “in Jesus reconciling the world to himself” (2 Cor 5.19), 
God’s grace is given in Jesus (ἐπὶ τῇ χάριτι τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ δοθείσῃ ὑμῖν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; 1 
Cor 1.4), and grace is the redemption in Jesus (Rom 3.24). Thus, it is not surprising that 
God’s “riches in glory” are “in Christ Jesus” (κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος αὐτοῦ ἐν δόξῃ ἐν Χριστῷ 
Ἰησοῦ; Phil 4.19) and God’s love from which believers will never be separated is God’s 
love in Christ Jesus (ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; Rom 8.39). 
Accordingly, the gift of the Spirit is the Spirit of God and Jesus (Rom 8.9-11). 
 Paul’s gift-theology, therefore, can have significant implications for how we 
configure the God-Christ relationship. God is not Giver apart from Christ, because God’s 
gift is also Christ’s gift and Christ’s love is God’s love: the divine and human are united 
in the gift.238 As God’s being and act are inseparable, and God’s act is an act through and 
in Christ, God cannot be abstracted from Christ.239 For Paul, Jesus is certainly the “one 
man,” but the Christ-gift has its earth-shattering and recreating power in that this gift 
                                                        
236 J.M.G. Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace: A Study of 2 Corinthians 8:1-15,” in The Word 
Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays (ed. J.R. Wagner, C.K. Rowe, and 
A.K. Grieb; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 421 n.22. 
237 M. Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians (London: A&C Black, 1997), 57. 
238 I take this point as not being unrelated to the argument of Rowe, “Romans 10:13” about the 
theological import of God and Christ both being “Lord.” 
239 Cf. Watson, “Triune Divine Identity,” 105-119 for this connection of being and agency. 
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is not simply the gift of a human; rather, only in Christ by the Spirit is God’s nature as 
gift-giver fully revealed and expressed. Paul’s theology of gift thus forces one to rethink 
who God is – in relation to Christ – by making a claim about who Jesus is and what Jesus 
as gift does. But that, unfortunately, is a question to be fully explored elsewhere.240 
 Accordingly, as we have seen with Philo, God the Existent One (ὁ ὤν) does not act 
upon the world without mediation; God only gives gifts through “God” the power (ὁ 
θεός), the “creative power” (ἡ ποιητικὴ δύναμις). For Paul, the gift is given by God and 
by Jesus Christ but also through Jesus. Paul’s concern is not to cordon God from the 
world by enlisting Jesus as the mediator of God’s giving, but rather the way he 
construes God’s giving locates it entirely in and through Jesus. As the author of 1 
Timothy declared, “For there is one God, one mediator between God and humanity, the 
man Christ Jesus, who gave himself...” (2.5-6). As Philo’s Powers bridge the divide 
between God and the world, so Jesus does for Paul—but for different purposes. The 
Powers allow God to remain ontologically distinct from and untainted by the creation; 
Jesus is the site where God and the world are reconciled, and therefore Jesus does not 
keep humanity and God separate but is rather precisely the location where the two 
come together. 
5.  Conclusion 
When we compare Paul and Philo on grace, perhaps the first question that must be 
asked is: Where is God’s grace found? Paul and Philo both speak at length about God’s 
grace, but they do so differently because, as I have shown in this chapter, their starting 
points and definitions of divine χάρις are incommensurate: Philo starts with creation as 
the perfect gift that establishes a moral order that needs to be upheld; Paul starts with 
the death and resurrection of Christ, an event that subverts all moral, ethnic, and social 
order. That is, both Paul’s and Philo’s understandings of divine generosity take shape 
from a particular event. For Philo, God creates and gives gifts in the same power, such 
that creation and subsequent giving become mutually interpretive. For Paul, God’s 
generosity is defined by the Christ-gift and is located in the person of Christ: God 
                                                        
240 For two different ways of developing these thoughts, see esp. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the 
Trinity, 1–34 and O. Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation (trans. T.H. Trapp; Grand 
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justifies the ungodly, elects without thought of worth, creates from nothing. The 
indelibly Christological shape of grace means that all of history is determined by this 
event, which becomes the pattern of God’s actions that can only be understood, for 
Paul, after the event and through faith. Divine unfitting grace in the Christ-event is 
thus the axiomatic foundation of Paul’s gift-economy.241 It is because – and only because 
– God has given Christ that one can trust that God “will also give all things to us with 
him” (Rom 8.32). Philo is separated from Paul by the particularity of the Christ-event. 
Paul’s understanding of the Christ-gift as an unfitting gift given to the unworthy 
leads us into the next chapter. As we will see, Paul presents himself as the paradigm of 
one who receives the gift despite being unworthy. Integrally tied with Paul’s reception 
of the Christ-gift is his apostleship, that he might preach the gospel of the unfitting gift 
to unworthy recipients. In Paul’s view, the gift is given to the unworthy through the 
unworthy apostle, and preaching is how the hearing of the word occurs and the gift 
given. As we have seen and will continue to see, intrinsic to the gift is that it is for the 
unworthy and must be proclaimed. The next chapter will focus on the role of the 
unworthy apostle as proclaimer of the gift of Christ to groups of unworthy individuals: 
the inseparable bond between Paul as unworthy and Paul as Apostle. 
                                                        
241 Cf. Moo, Romans, 307: “Paul never thinks of God’s love for us apart from the cross, and he never 
thinks of Christ’s dying for us apart from the Father’s giving of the Son.” 
Chapter 4:  Proclaiming and Receiving the Incongruous Gift  
 
Amor Dei non invenit sed creat suum diligibile...1 
1.  Introduction: The Root of Human Unworthiness 
For Philo, humans are unworthy to receive divine benefactions when they live 
lawlessly, without virtue, contrary to right reason. But why do humans live like this? As 
we have seen, the foundation of piety is a proper conception of God as the Cause of all 
good things.2 However, one can erroneously locate causation in oneself or in something 
created; this is the height of impiety, because it results in not giving God his due 
gratitude.3 Deviation from a proper conception of God precipitates immoral living, the 
ramification of which is retribution. Thus, the end (τέλος) for those who adopt 
“polytheistic opinions” (πολυθέοι δόξαι) – or, really, anything but proper monotheism 
– is ungodliness (ἀθεότης).4 The atheist receives no gifts. A similar picture emerges in 
Romans 1, where God’s wrath is revealed against “all ungodliness and injustice (πᾶσαν 
ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν) of humans who suppress the truth (ἀλήθεια) in unrighteousness” 
(1.18). God has revealed what can be known of him “since the creation of the world” 
(ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου; 1.20), his “eternal power and deity” (ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ 
θειότης). Humans are therefore “without excuse;” although they “know God,” they 
have not honored or given thanks to him (ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν; 1.21).5 Rather, 
they “exchanged” God’s glory for the “likeness of the image of perishable” created 
things (1.23); they worshipped the created rather than the Creator (κτίσει παρὰ τὸν 
                                                        
1 M. Luther, “Disputatio Heidelbergae Habita (1518)” (WA 1; Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883), 354. 
Translated: “The love of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it.” For commentary, see 
G.O. Forde, On Being a Theologian of the Cross: Reflections on Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, 1518 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 112–117. 
2 Cf. chapter 1, sections 2.1-4 for discussion and texts. 
3 Cf. Post. 33-39 on Cain. 
4 Praem. 162. Also, Sacr. 54-57. 
5 J.A. Linebaugh, “Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between Wisdom of Solomon 
13–15 and Romans 1.18–2.11,” NTS 57 (2011): 228: “we...learn that to be human in history is to be a rebel 
against this creational revelation.” 
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κτίσαντα; 1.25).6 Consequently, God “has handed them over”—they live immorally, not 
doing the things they should and doing the things they should not (1.24, 26, 28). They 
know what God requires (τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ), but they do things that are worthy of 
death (ἄξιοι θανάτου; 1.32).  
Broadly construed, for both Philo and Paul the root of human unworthiness is 
either ignorance of God or an improper perception of who God is as Creator and Giver, 
which results in ingratitude and dishonor.7 However, while the root problem is similar, 
the prognosis is not. If for Philo this issue can be resolved by humans following the 
path of Abraham – moving from ignorance to a sure conception of who God is – for Paul 
the problem is insurmountable. Sin and death are the inescapable reality for all who 
have been “handed over” and are unable to regain a proper perception of God to honor 
him rightly and thus act fittingly. For Philo, since God is the cause of all good things, 
including virtuous human agency, works cannot be distinguished from grace; grace 
grounds and makes possible human works that constitute one as virtuous. For Paul, 
grace is focused in Christ and human action is excluded as grounds by which one may 
be fitting to receive from God.8 If “in Christ all will be made alive,” Paul’s logic is that 
“in Adam all die” (1 Cor 15.22); and, to borrow a phrase, “the dead do not improve.”9 
The God who handed sinful humans over to their own devices (Rom 11.32; cf. Gal 3.2) is 
the God who gives an unfitting gift to those same humans. Philo’s world is the moral 
testing-ground of humans who can fittingly receive gifts from God; Paul’s sin-enslaved 
world is disrupted by the Christ-gift that is inexplicably received by those who do not 
deserve it, given by a God who gives no thought to typical canons of worth. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how three aspects of Paul’s theology 
of divine gift converge in the person of Paul himself. First, Paul’s testimony is 
paradigmatic, a concrete instantiation of the truth that all receive grace unfittingly. 
Second, Paul’s association – or identification – of grace and apostleship reveals how his 
                                                        
6 As S.J. Gathercole, “Sin in God’s Economy: Agencies in Romans 1 and 7,” in Divine and Human Agency 
in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 2008), 159 
states, “Whichever category is used, this suppression/exchange is a kind of meta-sin in Romans 1.” 
7 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in 
Divine and Human Agency, 140. 
8  Of course, Paul, like Philo, does not do away with human agency, but he removes it from the 
equation of how one receives grace; see further next chapter. 
9 J.C. Kang, The Dead Do Not Improve: A Novel (New York: Hogarth, 2012). 
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apostleship is interlocked with the Christ-gift. Paul is not merely an unworthy recipient 
of the gift but more specifically an unworthy apostle who proclaims the gift. As Satake 
states, “χάρις manifestiert sich für Paulus immer im apostolischen Dienst.”10 Third and 
consequently, Paul views apostolic proclamation of the gift as inherent in the gift itself, 
and thus the mode by which others receive the gift; the reception of the incongruous 
Christ-gift by Paul’s churches is inextricable from their apostle, for through 
proclamation one receives the Spirit and thus the gift.11 The Apostle, as the paradigm of 
the unworthy recipient, is commissioned to bring other unworthy individuals into the 
power of God’s gift in Christ. Apostolic proclamation is thus an outworking of the gift 
on the historical plane: in preaching, Paul reveals the crucified and risen Christ, and by 
the Spirit the unworthy hearers are drawn into the gift-event. 
The chapter will begin by examining those passages where Paul seems to link or 
identify divine grace and his apostleship. I will then focus on two passages – Gal 1-2; 1 
Cor 15 – where the themes of divine gift, incongruity, and apostleship are interwoven. 
In the next section I will survey 2 Corinthians 5-6 to explore how Paul coordinates 
divine gift-giving and apostolic proclamation. The chapter will close with a comparison 
with Philo on worth and gifts and how gifts are mediated. 
2.  Paul and the Unfitting Gift  
2.1 Paul’s Apostleship as Grace 
Paul does not use grace and apostleship language uniformly: he can say “grace and 
apostleship” (Rom 1.5), which implies a distinction, he can speak of receiving his 
apostleship from God (Gal 1.1), which suggests its gift-nature, or he can refer to the 
“grace of God given to me” in contexts that entail the gift is his apostleship (e.g. 1 Cor 
3.10). Consequently, given this flexibility, Satake argues that Paul could make the two 
concepts overlap – apostleship as gift12 – while Best asserts that Paul never called his 
                                                        
10 A. Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade bei Paulus,” NTS 15 (1968): 100. 
11 Space precludes attempting to map Paul onto patronage models; however, the closest to my 
argument is the “brokerage” model, which “introduces a third party into the patron–client alliance, an 
intermediary who distributes the goods of the patron to the client and likewise mediates the 
reciprocating return of the client back to the patron.” D. Briones, “Mutual Brokers of Grace: A Study in 2 
Corinthians 1.3-11,” NTS 56 (2010): 536–56, at 537. 
12 Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade.” 
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apostleship a gift.13 If the Christ-event is the gift, how could he inflate the concept to 
include his apostleship? As noted above, I will argue that the preaching of the gospel is 
for Paul an extension of the Christ-event on the historical plane. That is, the enacted-
in-the-past Christ-gift is received in the present through the Spirit (Rom 5.5), which is 
at work in proclamation by the one in whom God’s son has been revealed (Gal 1.16). 
 In Rom 1.5 Paul declares that through Jesus “we have received grace and 
apostleship (ἐλάβομεν χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν) for the obedience of faith among all the 
Gentiles.” How do the two nouns relate? A popular view is that the construction is a 
hendiadys, where the second noun is explicative: grace, that is, apostleship.14 I believe 
that this interpretation is correct; nevertheless, many scholars dissent from this 
reading, and it is worth noting why. 
 For Jewett, the problem is that the hendiadys “would then suggest that other 
apostles received their calling at the moment of conversion just as Paul had.”15 Grace 
“overcomes an insufficiency,” making apostolic service possible; but not all apostles 
would have had stories like Paul’s. Likewise, Schütz argues that grace and apostleship 
are parallel but distinct concepts, where grace is an “enabling presupposition” for 
apostleship.16 Both arguments depend on a reading of Galatians 1.15-16, according to 
which conversion (grace) is conceptually distinct from commission (apostleship), and 
they presuppose that the words “grace and apostleship” have the same referents as in 
Galatians. But what Paul says elsewhere cannot be imported here without justification. 
Furthermore, this reading implicitly assumes a Christological/soteriological referent 
for χάρις, but there is no reason why this should be the case. 
  Under the hendiadys interpretation, Paul’s apostleship is a gift from God. One 
tendency of this interpretation, however, is to disjoin this gift from Christology. Thus, 
Ehrensperger: “χάρις and ἀποστολή are intrinsically linked yet not because of the 
                                                        
13 E. Best, “Paul’s Apostolic Authority-?,” JSNT 8 (1986): 9. 
14 See e.g. E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. G.W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 
14; J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 
237; J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 1-8 (Dallas: Word, 1988), 17; D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgart: 
Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 142.; J. Wobbe, Der Charis-Gedanke bei Paulus: Ein Beitrag zur 
neutestamentlichen Theologie (Münster, 1932), 73–74.; F.J. Matera, God’s Saving Grace: A Pauline Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 20–22. 
15 R. Jewett, Romans (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2006), 109. 
16 J.H. Schütz, Paul and The Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), 147. Cf. A. Nygren, 
Commentary on Romans (London: Bloomsbury, 1958), 54–55. 
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soteriological or christological content Paul attributes to χάρις but because this is how 
Paul perceives the service he is called to do – as a gift of God.”17 By contrast, the 
interpretations of Jewett and Schütz keep the Christological referent of grace in 
relation to Paul’s apostleship, but they overload the phrase in Rom 1.5 and avoid taking 
into account Paul’s other declarations that his apostleship was a gift. Consequently, my 
argument seeks to chart a course between the two above: Paul employed the concept of 
gift for other gifts besides the Christ-event, his apostleship was one such gift, but the 
gift of his apostleship cannot be separated from the Christ-gift. Apostleship is an 
innately Christological gift: the reason that this apostleship exists is for the 
proclamation of the gospel among the Gentiles, to draw them into the Christ-event. The 
Christ-gift founds Paul’s apostleship, and his apostleship is always directed to that gift. 
There is a coordination of divine gifts in Paul’s thought, and we may distinguish 
between an explicitly or intrinsically Christological reference: Paul is not making the 
former here, but can hardly make anything but the latter, because his apostleship as 
gift exists only in relation to the Christ-event. 
 Paul states in 15.15 that he has written the community “in part to remind you,” and 
he is doing so “on account of the grace given to me by God” (διὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν 
δοθεῖσάν μοι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). The grace he received through Jesus is the grace given by 
God so that he might “be a minister of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles” (15.16).18 Paul does 
not mention his apostleship explicitly, as in 1.5, but only the grace that sanctions his 
communication. The parallel expression in 12.3 – “For I speak through the grace given 
to me” (λέγω γὰρ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δοθείσης μοι) – fills in this picture. Here Paul’s 
claim to this particular χάρις grounds his authority to admonish the community.19 
Accordingly, Paul has “received grace and apostleship” to bring about the “obedience 
of faith among all of the Gentiles” (1.5); in view of the particular gift given to him, 
which is distinguished from the gift(s) received by all (12.6), he instructs the 
                                                        
17 K. Ehrensperger, Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-
Movement (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 91. 
18 K. Kertelge, “Das Apostelamt des Paulus, sein Ursprung und seine Bedeutung,” in Grundthemen 
Paulinischer Theologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), 29: “Die Betonung der Gnade...entspricht dem 
Grundcharakter seiner Verkündigung: Was der Christ ist, das ist er aus Gnade. Das gilt auch und in 
besonderer Weise für die ἀποστολή, die Paulus daher einfach als die ihm ‘gegebene χάρις’ bezeichnen 
kann.” 
19 On this text, see chapter 5. 
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community (12.3); and this same gift is the reason why he is a minister to the Gentiles 
(15.15-16). It makes little sense to interpret χάρις in these passages as the Christ-gift, 
because this would provide Paul no more authority than those who received the letter 
would have; rather, it is his apostleship,20 which is distinguishable, but not separable, 
from the Christ-gift. 
 Similarly, in 1 Cor 3.10 Paul declares that he has laid the church’s foundation, which 
is Jesus Christ (3.11). This activity is “in accordance with the grace of God given to me” 
(κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι). Here again, χάρις cannot be exclusively or 
explicitly the Christ-event but Paul’s apostleship, which provides the authority for such 
building. As Thiselton states, “Foundational work is apostolic work in Paul.”21 In 
Galatians, Peter, James, and John give Paul the right hand of fellowship because they 
see “that I had been entrusted with the gospel for the uncircumcision” (2.7) and 
perceive “the grace given to me” (γνόντες τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι; 2.9). As de Boer 
notes, by “grace” Paul is referring not solely to his apostolic commission but also to his 
gospel for the Gentiles;22 the two cannot be separated, because the latter is the content 
of Paul’s apostolic proclamation (cf. 2.2).  
 To conceptualize how Paul’s apostleship relates to the Christ-event, we may 
contrast two views. Schütz states: the “unrepeatable founding event is reflected in the 
new creation it inaugurates; but it is not repeated in [a] constitutive sense. Paul does 
not repeat what Christ has done. He reflects what Christ has done. In him the account of 
that action is made manifest.”23 Schütz’s argument seems to be formulated in response 
to Bultmann, for whom a “merely ‘reminiscent’ historical account referring to what 
happened in the past cannot make the salvation-occurrence visible. ...the salvation-
occurrence continues to take place in the proclamation of the word.”24 For Bultmann, it 
is key that Paul’s apostolic work occurs in the now time of salvation (2 Cor 6.2). Thus, for 
                                                        
20 Cf. Ehrensperger, Dynamics of Power, 89. 
21 A.C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 309. Cf. D.E. Garland, 1 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 114; R.B. Hays, 
First Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 54; G.D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 137–138. Contra Best, “Apostolic Authority,” 9.  
22 M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 122. 
23 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 206. 
24 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume 1 (trans. K. Grobel; London: SCM Press, 1956), 
302. 
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Schütz Paul reflects the Christ-event, and for Bultmann Paul continues the salvation-
occurrence.  
 Both views respect the fact that the Christ-event occurred in the past, but that 
present proclamation is how the gift is received - Schütz emphasizes the past, 
Bultmann the present – and that the two must be related. As Schütz argues, it is true 
that Paul does not repeat the Christ-event, as if it were repeatable; but if in the gift-
event individuals die with Christ to live to God (e.g. Gal 2.18; Rom 6.3-5), then what 
happens through apostolic proclamation cannot be limited to reflecting the Christ-
event. As Bultmann emphasizes, it is important to stress that the Christ-event does 
have its effect in the present: that the “now time” or the “but now” is truly the present, 
that Paul does not say, “but at that point in history.” However, the concern with 
Bultmann’s formulation is that it can disconnect the Christ-event from its particularity 
and singularity as an historical event. It does seem that the Christ-event as gift 
transcends time while being an event in time; that is, the event is not subject to typical 
metaphysical construals of events because it is a gift-event, the reception of which 
effects participation in the event.  
 The strength of Bultmann’s formulation over Schütz’s is that Schütz is speaking of 
the Christ-event, while Bultmann is speaking of the totality of God’s salvific action, 
making the Christ-event and proclamation inseparable. As we will see below, Paul 
views his apostolic work as a constitutive element of God’s work of reconciliation. It is 
not that Paul himself contributes to salvation per se, but that God’s grace is at work in 
his apostolic activity whereby his proclamation is received not as the “word of 
humans” but as the “word of God” (1 Thess 2.13). Thus, with Bultmann, proclamation, 
in a sense, makes the past present, allowing the singular and particular event to invade 
the present and reconfigure the lives of its recipients.25 But different from Bultmann, 
and with Schütz, I want to avoid the language of “continuing” by parsing the 
relationship between the elements of the “salvation-occurrence” carefully. Paul’s 
apostolic proclamation is an act of embodying the Christ-event in the present: just as 
                                                        
25 Cf. C. Landmesser, “Rudolf Bultmann als Paulusinterpret,” ZThK 110 (2013): 20: “...so begegnet Jesus 
Christus nur in der christlichen Verkündigung, im christlichen Kerygma. Das für Paulus in Tod und 
Auferstehung des Christus sich manifestierende Heilshandeln Gottes werde nach Paulus im ‘gepredigten 
Wort’ vergegenwärtigt.” 
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Paul received his apostolic commission through the revelation of Christ that occurred 
“in me” (ἐν ἐμοί; Gal 1.16), so he reveals Christ to the Gentiles through proclaiming the 
event that has transformed him (Gal 2.18-20; 3.1-5). Accordingly, where the Christ-
event is the event in which Jesus became poor so that humans might become rich in his 
poverty (2 Cor 8.9), Paul understands apostles as “being poor but making many rich” 
(ὡς πτωχοὶ πολλοὺς δὲ πλουτίζοντες; 2 Cor 6.10). Indeed, God reveals through the 
apostles the “smell of the knowledge of Christ” in every place (2 Cor 2.14-15). Thus, the 
apostles are those sent “from God” to speak “before God in Christ” (ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ 
κατέναντι θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ λαλοῦμεν; 2. Cor 2.17). The apostle’s work is therefore 
patterned after the Christ-event as indeed the apostle reveals the crucified and risen 
Christ:26 there is a dialectic of embodiment and enactment, whereby the fact that Christ 
lives in Paul and is revealed in Paul (embodiment) makes possible the death and new 
life of those who hear and believe his proclamation (enactment). Ultimately, what Paul 
proclaims is that the Christ who died and was raised is the living Christ who is at work 
in believers through the Spirit: the historically singular event can be made effective in 
the present because, for Paul, Christ is alive and received in the gospel. The believer’s 
life is “in Christ,” shaped by the grace manifested in the subversive event of death and 
resurrection. 
There is much more that could be said about apostolic proclamation, but to 
substantiate this argument, we turn to Galatians 1-2 and 1 Corinthians 15.1-11, where 
the issues of Paul’s apostleship and proclamation, God’s grace, and the incongruity of 
grace are to the fore.27 For Paul there is a unity of grace: the grace he received is the 
grace at work in his life, and it is this grace that he proclaims. 
2.2 Unfitting Grace and Apostleship: Galatians 1-2 
As we saw in the last chapter, in Galatians Paul paints a picture of human sinfulness 
with broad strokes: humanity exists in “this present evil age” (1.4) and scripture has 
                                                        
26 The basic sense of Käsemann’s notion that “Christ is the prototype for the apostle” is provocative 
and, I think, a helpful description; this wording comes from D.V. Way, The Lordship of Christ: Ernst 
Käsemann’s Interpretation of Paul’s Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 86, commenting on E. 
Käsemann, “Die Legitimität des Apostels: Eine Untersuchung zu II Korinther 10-13,” ZNW 41 (1942): 33–
71. 
27 Cf. Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 84 on the centrality of these two texts for discussions of Paul’s 
apostleship. 
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imprisoned all “under sin” (3.22). While Gentiles are “sinners by nature” (2.16), the 
imprisoning scripture is Jewish scripture, the law given to the Jewish people “on 
account of their transgressions” (3.19), which also lays a curse on those under it (3.10-
14; 4.4-5). The Gentiles were previously enslaved to the “weak and impotent stoicheia,” 
just like Jews were “enslaved under the stoicheia of the world” (4.3-4). Paul is part of this 
humanity, thus his use of first-person plurals: Jesus gave himself for our sins (ἁμαρτιῶν 
ἡμῶν) to rescue us (ἡμᾶς; 1.4); Christ redeemed us (ἡμᾶς) by becoming a curse for us 
(ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν; 3.13); we (ἡμεῖς) were enslaved (4.3); and Christ set us (ἡμᾶς) free (5.1). 
Paul’s identification with sinful humanity constitutes him as unworthy of divine 
beneficence; but Paul also narrates his own story to portray concretely what it means 
to be an unfitting recipient of grace.28 
 In 1.13-14 Paul speaks about his “former way of life in Judaism.”29 This narrative 
depicts Paul’s erstwhile ἀναστροφή with three imperfect verbs. Paul was 1) “excessively 
persecuting the church of God;” 2) “trying to destroy her;” and 3) “advancing in 
Judaism” beyond his contemporaries due to his zeal.30 These “three interrelated 
activities” were “all of them far removed from a willingness to receive the gospel or to 
learn it from another human being.”31 Paul’s opposition to the church – the community 
that exists through reception of God’s gift – is opposition to the gospel itself. Paul says 
as much in 1.23: the Judean churches heard that “the one who was formerly 
persecuting us now proclaims the faith (νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται τὴν πίστιν) he was formerly 
trying to destroy.” The “gospel proclaimed by me” was the object of Paul’s attack.32 This 
                                                        
28 I am not claiming that Paul’s “former life in Judaism” was simply an aspect of “this present evil 
age” which is marked by human agency, demonic powers, etc. Rather, Paul explains in 1.13-23 both that 
he had been set apart before birth and that he was unworthy of the Christ-gift. 
29 It is common to understand ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ as Paul was speaking about Judaism as it self-defined 
itself during the Maccabean struggle; cf. e.g. J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1998), 347–349. Yet, a few points relativize the significance of this argument: 1) Paul uses ἐν 
τῷ γένει μου to situate his advance ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ; 2) Paul’s advance is according to a general standard 
that should characterize all Jewish people (“ancestral traditions”); 3) Paul makes clear that neither 
Jewish nor Gentile ethnicity is a means of being worthy to receive grace. 
30 On Paul’s zealotry, see N.T. Wright, “Paul, Arabia, and Elijah (Galatians 1:17),” JBL 115 (1996): 683–
686. 
31 de Boer, Galatians, 85. On the relation of gospel and tradition, see M. Winger, “Tradition, Revelation 
and Gospel: A Study in Galatians,” JSNT 1994 (1994): 65–86. 
32 L.J. Lietaert Peerbolte, Paul the Missionary (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 168 argues that Paul “presents 
himself here by means of the literary motif of the unworthiness of the one called.” Cf. e.g. Judg 6.15; 1 
Sam 9.21. 
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sets the context in which Paul receives the gift, and no one deserves to receive a gift 
one is seeking to destroy. Yet, for Paul, God’s grace is grace precisely because it 
subverts common understandings of gift-giving by negating socio-cultural and 
religious norms, ethnicity, and “progress” as necessary means for being a fitting 
recipient. As one cursed and dead, unable to be made alive by Law – indeed, as one who 
was progressing in opposing grace – Paul received the justifying gift by faith, which re-
creates the unworthy recipient. Apart from the old ways of measuring value – “neither 
circumcision, nor circumcision” – Paul now is καινὴ κτίσις (6.14-15).33 
Consequently, we arrive at the question of whether Paul was “called” or 
“converted.” The former stresses continuity: Paul was misguided but changed 
directions at the revelation of Christ from persecutor to proclaimer; the latter stresses 
discontinuity: Paul “changed religions” from Judaism to Christianity. The argument 
hinges largely on the interpretation of καλέω. Stendahl set the debate by arguing that 
in 1.15 Paul was purposefully echoing prophetic language and thus his experience must 
be interpreted as a calling to a vocation.34 Paul had always served the same God, who 
had set him apart before his birth for this particular task, and if we speak of Paul’s 
conversion then we must also say the prophets were converted; since that is nonsense, 
we should not speak of Paul’s conversion.35 
Stendahl allows Paul’s allusions to overshadow how καλέω functions in Paul’s 
argument; Paul may structure his statements around the prophetic claims, but he is not 
reusing the accounts of Jeremiah and Isaiah.36 According to Chester, who has provided 
                                                        
33 For an anthropological and not cosmological reading of 6.14-15, see M.V. Hubbard, New Creation in 
Paul’s Letters and Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 222–229. Alternatively, see T.R. Jackson, New Creation in 
Paul’s Letters: A Study of the Historical and Social Setting of a Pauline Concept (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 
83–114. 
34 K. Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles - and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 7–22. 
Much of Stendahl’s argument was an attempt to overcome a Protestant history of interpretation: “...we 
all, in the West...cannot help reading Paul through the experience of persons like Luther or Calvin. And 
this is the chief reason for most of our misunderstandings of Paul.” Luther was defined by despair at the 
thought of satisfying God, Paul by contrast was a “very happy and successful Jew” (12). S. Chester, “Paul 
and the Introspective Conscience of Martin Luther: The Impact of Luther’s Anfechtungen on His 
Interpretation of Paul,” BibInt 14 (2006): 508–36 has demonstrated that Stendahl’s contention that Luther 
projected his guilt onto Paul is simply not true. 
35 Stendahl, Paul, 10. 
36 As S. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian 
Church (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 156 notes, if Paul used the prophetic accounts stringently, it would 
imply that his calling was before he was born, which would undermine Stendahl’s argument that calling 
refers to Paul’s reception of a vocation. 
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an important rebuttal to Stendahl’s argument,37 the background for Paul’s use of καλέω 
is the LXX designation of God as Creator; God is ὁ καλῶν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (Rom 
4.17).38 On these grounds, Chester questions the reliance on prophetic call narratives, 
noting that “there is a severe shortage of prophets who are themselves said to have 
been called.”39 Instead, Paul uses the prophetic language to stress “the quality of God’s 
grace” and “the invincibility of God’s purpose,” which existed prior to Paul’s birth and 
despite his persecuting activity.40 Calling itself speaks to the “divine dimension of 
conversion” where the Creator God calls nonentities into existence—and some to 
particular purposes that are intrinsic to that creative work.41  
I will aim here to strengthen Chester’s argument with two points: first, that Paul 
creates a rhetorical and theological identification with the Galatians through his use of 
καλέω and χάρις in 1.6 and 15: this relationship is decisive for construing Paul’s 
experience (and the Galatians’) rather than the prophets, who play an ancillary role.42 
Second, where Chester explains that calling language does not specify the event of 
calling itself,43 I will argue that Paul modifies his calling language with “in grace” (1.6) 
for the Galatians and “through grace” (1.15) for himself to specify this event. Calling is 
primarily a matter of divine creation in the Christ-event, and for Paul, to a particular 
task.44 
                                                        
37 See Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 59–112. 
38 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 64–70. Cf. B.R. Gaventa, “On the Calling-Into-Being of Israel: Romans 
9:6-29,” in Between Gospel and Election: Explorations in the Interpretation of Romans 9-11 (ed. F. Wilk and J.R. 
Wagner; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 255–69. 
39 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 158. Of course, in Isa 49.1, God “called my name from my mother’s 
womb” (ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου ἐκάλεσεν). The question, however, is whether we should allow this to 
interpret the verse contrary to the interpretation necessitated by the connection between 1.6 and 15 and 
Paul’s use of καλέω/χάρις. 
40 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 157–158. J.M.G. Barclay, “Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony,” in 
Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 139: “The 
reference to being ‘set apart from my mother’s womb’...echoes, of course, prophetic call narratives, but it 
also expresses...the conviction that God’s fashioning of history is independent of the normal channels of 
human causation.”  
41 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 85. 
42 For a fuller version of this argument, see O. McFarland, “‘The One Who Calls in Grace’: Paul’s 
Rhetorical and Theological Identification with the Galatians,” HBT (forthcoming). 
43 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 61. But note 109: Paul “appl[ies] the concept of calling to the event of 
coming to be in Christ.” 
44 Cf. Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade,” 107: “Paulus sieht gerade in seiner Berufung zum Apostel seine 
Berufung zur Verheißung des Heils.” 
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Paul’s astonishment that the Galatians so promptly turned “from the one45 who 
called you in grace” (ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι [Χριστοῦ])46 has a complement 
only nine verses later, in that Paul was “called through [God’s] grace” (καλέσας διὰ τῆς 
χάριτος αὐτοῦ).47 Paul’s  phrasing is intentional: it creates an identification between the 
Galatians and Paul, an essential move for Paul’s presentation of himself as a paradigm.48 
Yet, if καλέω means calling to a vocation for Paul, it cannot mean this for the Galatians. 
The Galatians’ calling is mentioned three times: they were “called in grace” (1.6), 
“called for freedom” (ἐπ᾿ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε; 5.13; cf. 5.1), and the “persuasion” 
currently thwarting them from “obeying the truth” is “not from the one who calls you” 
(ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος; 5.8).49 For the Galatians, calling is set in opposition to “turning...to 
another gospel” and slavery through law-observance. The Galatians are gentile sinners 
(2.15) whose lives before Christ were defined by serving false-gods (4.8-9). Yet, the 
Gentiles enter a story where the law has come to an end because of the Christ-event 
(2.18-20; 3.23-26).50 Thus, the problem Paul addresses is that the Galatians are trying to 
                                                        
45 Cf. G. Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel: An Exposition of Galatians (trans. D. Green; Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985), 46: “Paul can omit the word ‘God’ because in his usage the participial ὁ καλέσας or ὁ καλῶν 
is a standard term for God (Rom. 4:17; 9:12; Gal. 1:15; 5:8; 1 Thess. 2:12; 5:24). For Paul, ‘calling’ is a 
fundamental element of God’s nature.” Some older interpreters, such as Luther and Calvin, understood 
Christ as the subject of the calling; but to my knowledge, no modern interpreters seem to take this 
approach. 
46 G.D. Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007), 227 n.61 
argues that Χριστοῦ is the original reading: “it is hard to imagine the circumstances in which a scribe 
would have added ‘Christ’...in a sentence where God is the acting subject.” Yet, as J. B. Lightfoot, St. Paul’s 
Epistle to the Galatians (reprint; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999), 76 states, “the passage seems to gain in force 
by the omission.” The manuscript evidence can allow for either reading; cf. B.M Metzger, A Textual 
Commentary on the Greek New Testament (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), 520–521. 
47 Both J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2003), 277–278 and G. Walter Hansen, “Paul’s Conversion and His Ethic of Freedom in Galatians,” in The 
Road from Damascus: The Impact of Paul’s Conversion of His Life, Thought, and Ministry (ed. R.N. Longenecker; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 213–214 rightly connect calling/grace in 1.6 and 15. 
48 For this view, see Cf. G. Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1982); B.R. Gaventa, “Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm,” NovT 28 (1986): 309–26; P.E. 
Koptak, “Rhetorical Identification in Paul’s Autobiographical Narrative: Galatians 1.13-2.14,” JSNT 40 
(1990): 97–115; B.W. Longenecker, The Triumph of Abraham’s God: The Transformation of Identity in Galatians 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 148–150; B.J. Dodd, Paul’s Paradigmatic “I”: Personal Example as Literary 
Strategy (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999); Barclay, “Paul’s Story.”  
49 R.A. Bryant, The Risen Crucified Christ in Galatians (Atlanta: SBL, 2001), 196 speaks of a “rhetorical 
cord of the One who calls in the grace of Christ” that runs through Galatians. 
50 S. Grindheim, “Not Salvation History, but Salvation Territory: The Main Subject Matter of 
Galatians,” NTS 59 (2013): 106: “Paul’s purpose is to show the Galatians that their own history means that 
their identity has changed.” 
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return to that past, without recognizing that by participating in Christ’s death and 
resurrection, they, too, have died to the Law. 
Accordingly, what makes this turn – or return – to the Law problematic is the 
Galatians’ calling in grace.51 As we have seen, this phrase receives a more definite shape 
in 2.18-21.52 Although Paul here speaks of the Christ-event’s effect in the life of the “I”, 
the Galatians are not excluded; rather, Paul includes them within the experience of the 
paradigmatic “I”.53 The Galatians had been called in grace and are therefore 
reconstituted through the death and resurrection of Christ as those for whom Law-
observance is now invalid. Every calling in grace is a co-crucifixion with Christ, a death 
through and to the Law. To turn from the “one who calls in grace” means “fleeing from 
the sphere wrought by Christ’s death, from the sphere of grace itself.”54 What does this 
mean for the interpretation of Paul’s calling through grace? 
 Separating the concept of “calling” from the (admittedly loaded) term “conversion” 
makes our understanding of Paul’s experience problematic; if Paul has died with Christ 
for the purpose of proclaiming the gospel – if he is a “new creation” – then neither 
“call” nor “conversion,” as traditionally construed, adequately capture Paul’s 
experience. As Chester has demonstrated, Paul’s calling language includes the notions 
of call as creation and commission, with the latter dependent on the former. When we 
read that God called Paul “through his grace,” this is not a timeless benevolence but the 
Christ-event.55 Paul’s calling is not a change of direction or reception of a new task,56 
                                                        
51 As Fee, Pauline Christology, 228 notes, when ἐν is used with a verb of “calling” (e.g. 1 Thess 4.7; 1 Cor 
1.15, 18, 20; etc.), it is always locative. Cf. Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 117: “ἐν is less causal than 
instrumental, less instrumental than locative, indicating the place ‘where’ the Galatian Christians were 
called by God and in which they, as those called, stand.” 
52 Cf. de Boer, Galatians, 40. 
53 Cf. Gaventa, “Autobiography as Paradigm,” 318; Barclay, “Paul’s Story,” 142; S. Schauf, “Galatians 
2.20 in Context,” NTS 52 (2006): 91; H.D. Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in 
Galatia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 122; B. Lategan, “Is Paul Defending His Apostleship in 
Galatians? The Function of Galatians 1.11-12 and 2.19-20 in the Development of Paul’s Argument,” NTS 34 
(1988): 427–428; similarly, D. Hunn, “Christ Versus the Law: Issues in Galatians 2:17-18,” CBQ 72 (2010): 
547–548. 
54 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 116. Also, 134: “Being called into grace is being called into the 
εὐαγγέλιον; that is the presupposition of 1:6.” 
55 Pace B. Eastman, The Significance of Grace in the Letters of Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 89, for 
whom the call is the “call to preach to the Gentiles” and God’s grace stresses simply the graciousness of 
his divine commission; but cf. 111 n.24. Differently, T. Engberg-Pedersen, “Self-Sufficiency and Power: 
Divine and Human Agency in Epictetus and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency, 129–130 argues that Gal 
1.11-17 is concerned with the “imparting of knowledge,” and therefore χάρις is the revelatory vision – 
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but rather, as Badiou puts it, “a thunderbolt, a caesura...a conscription instituting a new 
subject.” It is a happening that “mimics the founding event.”57 As Gaventa notes, “The 
reversal [Paul] describes in Chapter 1 finds another expression in [2.]19-20: Paul died to 
the Law and to his advancement in Judaism so that Christ might live within him (1:15-
17).”58 The “I” of 2.18-20 that has died to the law to live to God in Christ is, first and 
foremost, Paul, and “the death of the ‘I’ is the precursor to its reconstitution.”59 Thus, 
Paul is re-created “through grace” in order to receive the “grace” of proclaiming the 
Christ-event. 
This disruption-by-revelation comes as a gift.60 It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
here and in 2.7-9 Paul closely identifies gospel, grace, and apostleship, because they 
were indivisible in his life.61 
 Paul’s use of χάρις in 2.7-9 “encompasses all of what Paul had received from God.”62 
χάρις here is not so broad that it includes literally everything Paul had been given (e.g. 
1 Cor 4.7); rather, χάρις denotes Paul’s gospel and his apostleship, for Paul’s apostleship 
is the vocational embodiment of the Christ-gift which is active in proclaiming the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
new cognition – of Christ. Similarly, Z.A. Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, And 
Conversion In The Religions Of The Ancient Mediterranean (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 171. 
56 Stendahl, Paul, 9. It is certainly not “a recall to a proper understanding of the grace-character of 
Israel’s calling”; J.D.G. Dunn, The Epistle to The Galatians (London: A&C Black, 1993), 63. 
57 A. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (trans. R. Brassier; Stanford: SUP, 2003), 17. 
Besides the fact that participial tense-forms do not designate time, it is unlikely that καλέσας is 
contemporaneous with ἀφορίσας, designating a calling before Paul’s birth. The parallel construction 
alone does not link ἀφορίσας and καλέσας temporally. Instead, καλέσας should be taken as parallel with 
ἀποκαλύψαι—especially since viewing καλέσας as a pre-natal summoning would run contrary to Paul’s 
normal use of the term, the use of the term to describe the experience of the Galatians, and his normal 
use of the concept of grace. As K.O. Sandnes, Paul - One of the Prophets? A Contribution to the Apostle’s Self-
Understanding (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 60 argues: “The call came by way of God revealing His Son 
to Paul. God’s act of setting Paul apart ‘from his mother’s womb’ is therefore an act prior to that.” The 
reference to being set apart before birth stresses rather “the quality of God’s grace, and the invincibility 
of God’s purpose, which not even Paul’s decision to persecute the church could deny or overcome” 
(Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 157). 
58 Gaventa, “Autobiography as Paradigm,” 318. 
59 J.M.G. Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” in Redefining First-Century 
Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders (ed. F.E. Udoh et al.; Notre Dame: UND 
Press, 2008), 379. 
60 Crook, Conversion, 249 claims that the “why of Paul’s conversion has always vexed scholarship.” Yet 
Crook’s answer is that, in “the simplest terms possible, Paul converted because of a benefaction...he 
received in the vision,” which seems what most other scholars have claimed. 
61 Cf. F. Hahn, “Paul’s Conception of Mission,” in Mission in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 
1965), 98. 
62 Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 1535, Chapters 1-4 (LW 26; St. Louis: Concordia, 1963), 104. Cf. 
Zeller, Charis, 142. 
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gospel. 2.7-9 contains a number of common terms that hark back to 1.15-16: εὐαγγελίζω 
in 1.16 and εὐαγγέλιον in 2.7, ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν in 1.16 and εἰς τὰ ἔθνη in 2.8-9, χάρις in 
1.15 and 2.9, and the participial designations for God in 1.15 and 2.8. The overlap is 
significant in tying together the two passages in a stronger way than is sometimes 
argued. If 1.15-16 speak to Paul’s reconstitution through the gift for the purpose of 
being an apostle, 2.7-9 elaborate further that Paul’s apostleship and gospel exist to 
proclaim the gift; they are inextricable from the Christ-gift. 
 2.7: ἰδόντες ὅτι πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας... 
2.8: ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας Πέτρῳ ... ἐνήργησεν καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, 
 2.9: γνόντες τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι... 
2.7 and 9 are in synonymous parallelism:63 ἰδόντες and γνόντες overlap semantically, 
and the χάρις entrusted to Paul is τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας. Paul was “entrusted” 
(πεπίστευμαι) and grace was “given” (δοθεῖσαν), both divine passives that point to 
God’s activity in 2.8.64 Schütz argues against this reading, stating that “[Paul] segregates 
the two ideas into separate participial phrases.”65 But this argument is not sound, 
because both participial phrases describe the Pillars’ coming to a right understanding 
(perception, sight) of God’s singular work in Paul. The parallelism of 2.7 and 9 results in 
viewing χάρις as the gospel for the uncircumcision—Paul’s ἀποστολή.66 
 The progression of 2.7-9 also helps to understand what concepts are in view. In 2.7 
Paul emphasizes unity: both Paul and Peter have been entrusted with the one gospel for 
Jews and Gentiles, because God worked in both apostles (2.8). The gift-language in 2.9 
illuminates the nature of Paul’s apostleship. Indeed, it is a paradoxical expression of 
Paul’s gospel: the leaders of the church Paul was likely persecuting in his former life 
(1.13, 23) now perceive that this persecutor has received as a gift from God the vocation 
of taking abroad the message of the crucified and risen Messiah. Perception of the 
                                                        
63 Cf. de Boer, Galatians, 122. 
64 It is typically argued that although Paul does not use ἀποστολή in 2.8 for himself as he does for 
Peter, the construction is elliptical and ἀποστολή is presupposed; cf. B.H. McLean, “Galatians 2.7-9 and 
the Recognition of Paul’s Apostolic Status at the Jerusalem Conference: A Critique of G. Luedemann’s 
Solution,” NTS 37 (1991): 69. W.O. Walker, “Galatians 2:8 and the Question of Paul’s Apostleship,” JBL 123 
(2004): 323–27, however, points out that 2.8 is not syntactically parallel to 2.7. Given the connection 
between gospel and apostleship and the focus on Paul’s apostleship throughout Gal 1-2, the debate seems 
unimportant. Cf. F. Mussner, Der Galaterbrief (2nd ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 116–117 n.91. 
65 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 148. 
66 Contra Best, “Apostolic Authority,” 9. 
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grace given to Paul is perception of the gospel that transformed Paul, which he now 
proclaims.  
So why did Paul use χάρις in 2.9 rather than ἀποστολή? As Martyn states, χάρις 
summarizes what Paul knew to be at stake in the meeting (and what he sees 
to be now at stake in Galatia). The issue...was not whether there would be a 
mission to the Gentiles... The issue...was the fundamental character of that 
mission... Paul wants the Galatians to see, therefore, that the 
presuppositionless character of God’s gracious good news in Christ was the issue 
at the conference.67 
Thus, in Gal 1-2 Paul uses χάρις for the Christ-gift and for apostleship; both are 
unfitting gifts, and Paul stresses the inextricable relationship between participation in 
the event and apostolic proclamation of the event. God is at work in both and both 
stem from the same event. God calls and gives, but as an apostle Paul is intimately 
wrapped up in this divine gift-giving. 
Paul does not say that the Galatians are turning from the gospel to another gospel, 
but from the God who calls (1.6). As Schütz argues, “the one who called in grace” is 
identical with the gospel, but by putting the argument this way, Paul stresses that the 
“defection is not from Paul who preaches, but from God who calls.”68 This is a subtle 
move, for if God’s calling is identical with the gospel, then God’s calling is an implicit 
reference to Paul’s proclamation.69 But Paul here subordinates himself and all others 
who would preach to God’s work in the gospel; the harm is not in departing from Paul, 
but from the God who calls. Yet it was Paul specifically who preached the gospel to the 
Galatians, and they had begun by the “hearing of faith” (3.1-4).70 The gospel 
proclamation that creates faith through the Spirit designates the role Paul played in 
Galatia.71 Through Paul’s preaching the Galatians received the Christ-gift, that is, were 
                                                        
67 J.L. Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New Haven: Doubleday, 
1997), 203–204. 
68 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 118. Cf. Ebeling, Truth, 46–47; differently Lategan, “Defending,” 417–422. 
69 As S.G. Eastman, Recovering Paul’s Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2007), 41 states, “the Galatians’ calling is the fruit of God’s revelation to Paul, and he himself 
was the human agent through which that gracious calling came.” Cf. also the relationship between 
calling and proclaiming in 1 Thess 2.12-13. 
70 For the various interpretive possibilities for this phrase, see de Boer, Galatians, 174–175; S.K. 
Williams, “The Hearing of Faith: AKOH ΠІΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3,” NTS 35 (1989): 82–93. Cf., differently, R.B. 
Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 128–132. 
71 Cf. G.D. Fee, Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996), 86: “Although it does 
not fit our logical schemes well, the Spirit is...both the cause and the effect of faith.” See also E. Jüngel, 
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called in grace—and thus co-crucified with Christ. There is a concursus between divine 
calling and human proclaiming.72 
Paul’s belief is that God called him in order to “reveal his son in me” (ἐν ἐμοί) so 
that he might proclaim him (1.16). As Fee states, “revelation...has taken place in Paul in 
such a way that both the gospel of Christ and Paul’s apostleship should be visible to 
others as the revelation of the Son takes place in him.”73 This revelation of Jesus is 
interpreted precisely as the event of Paul’s own co-crucifixion with Christ and new 
cruciform life in Christ to God (2.20). Thus, Hays argues that “Paul’s twin affirmation 
that ‘Christ lives in me’ and that ‘I live by...the faith of the Son of God’ may be taken as a 
hermeneutical key” for many odd statements in the letter;74 construed this way, it is 
not surprising that Paul could say the Galatians received him as “angel of God, as Christ 
Jesus” (4.13-14) and could understand his suffering as bearing “the marks of Jesus in my 
own body” (6.17). Paul’s person and proclamation are wrapped together, because Christ 
is revealed in both. Thus, Schütz: Paul “identifies gospel with apostle. He makes the 
apostle the paradigm of the gospel he proclaims. Both the message and the messenger 
proclaim grace and both embody grace, grace as event.”75  
Accordingly, in his letter, Paul’s objective was to dissuade the Galatians from 
rebuilding what had been torn down (2.18) and to persuade them to recognize their 
new identities as those who have been “called into freedom.” Paul thus states, “Become 
as I, for I also as you” (4.12): the Galatians should imitate Paul, because Paul has learned 
to subordinate all things – law-observance, ethnicity, gender, social standing – to his 
new identity in Christ.76 Paul and the Galatians are united in the language of calling and 
grace: both were reconstituted as new creation in Christ, and Paul, in particular, was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith (trans. J. Cayzer; London: T&T Clark, 2001), 251: “Believers come 
into being as recipients. Those who start to believe have already received...faith is always a receiving 
faith.” 
72 Cf. Winger, “Tradition,” 81–82. 
73 Fee, Pauline Christology, 221–222. Cf. Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 134–135: “‘Revelation’ is the 
anthropologically oriented event (grace-event) which functions as interpretation and appropriation of 
the ‘sending’ of the Son (4:4).” 
74 R.B. Hays, “Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ,” CBQ 49 (1987): 281. 
75 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 134. 
76 On this text, see esp. Eastman, Paul’s Mother Tongue, 25–62. Cf. Gaventa, “Autobiography as 
Paradigm,” 321; Hubbard, New Creation, 229: “Paul’s rejection of ‘circumcision’ and ‘uncircumcision’ on 
the basis of his own Christocentric re-creation (2.20) provides the apostolic model which the Galatians 
are expected to embrace as their own.” Also, Koptak, “Rhetorical Identification,” 108. 
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called to be the agent of the Galatians’ calling.77 Both have received the same unfitting 
gift, and Paul hopes to bring the Galatians back in line with that gift. 
 Three main themes circle inextricably here around the Christ-gift: incongruity, 
apostleship, proclamation. To every person the Christ-gift is incongruous; apostleship 
is the gift Paul receives for proclaiming the Christ-gift; and proclamation is the medium 
by which God’s gift is received in the Spirit. The vocation of the unworthy apostle is 
inherent to the reception of the gift by his unworthy church, for proclamation is the 
enactment of the Christ-event in history by the Apostle who embodies the gospel. 
2.3 Grace and Unfitting Apostleship: 1 Corinthians 15.1-11 
To repair the Corinthians’ mistaken beliefs about the resurrection, in 15.1-11 Paul 
draws the Corinthians back into the basics of the gospel he proclaimed and they 
believed, which interprets the tradition that goes back to the very beginning of the 
movement.78 As in Galatians, Paul roots his understanding of the gospel he proclaims in 
the event of incongruous grace that interrupted his life and has claimed theirs.79 
 The verb forms Paul uses in 15.1-2 are notable. Paul “makes known” (γνωρίζω) to 
the Corinthians the gospel he preached (εὐηγγελισάμην), to which the Corinthians are 
described as having a three-fold relationship. First, the Corinthians “received” 
(παρελάβετε) the gospel, the aorist tense likely referring to their hearing the gospel in 
the past. Second, it is the gospel “in which” the Corinthians stand (ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἑστήκατε). 
The perfect links to the aorist: the Corinthians heard the gospel, and it is the reality in 
which they stand from beginning to end. This phrasing parallels Rom 5.2, where 
believers stand “in this grace” (εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν); such a parallel 
demonstrates the identification Paul makes between grace and gospel and the nature of 
hope as grounded in the acceptance of an unfitting gift. Third, the gospel is the power 
or event “through which” the Corinthians “are being saved” (δι᾿ οὗ καὶ σῴζεσθε). As the 
                                                        
77 Cf. Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 83: “...one might point to that [apostolic] ministry as itself 
providing a vital human mediation of divine calling. By responding obediently to their own calling, the 
apostles make possible the calling of others.” Chester notes that “apostleship is the only task in relation 
to which [Paul] uses the language of calling” (107). Cf. Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade,” 100. 
78 Cf. Fee, Corinthians, 718. 
79 K. Kertelge, “‘Durch die Gnade Gottes bin Ich, was Ich bin’ (1 Kor 15,10): Die Bekehrung des 
Apostels Paulus und der Heilsweg der Christen,” in Grundthemen Paulinischer Theologie (Freiburg: Herder, 
1991), 19: “Die Bekehrung ist für ihn die Berufung, und zwar Berufung zum Apostolat.” 
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Corinthians have stood in the gospel since they heard it, from now until the end the 
Corinthians should continue to do so; but they can also believe “in vain” (15.2). 
Accordingly, these verbs signify three aspects of one whole: the gospel’s total claim on 
the person’s existence. This gospel is what Paul preaches, and the preaching of the 
gospel sets loose the grace of God in the life of the hearer. Thus, in 15.1-2 Paul has laid 
out the relationship between the gospel he preached and the Corinthians’ reception of 
that gospel; the reception of the gift cannot be split from its apostolic proclamation. 
In 15.3-4 Paul sets forth a creedal formulation of the gospel tradition.80 Paul 
connects the  formulation to its historical manifestation in Jesus’ appearances to the 
apostles in 15.5-7. Paul uses his position as the last person to whom Jesus appeared to 
explain the working of grace in his life and thus the grounds of his apostleship. This 
digression in 15.5-8 shows that all apostles – including Paul – exist on the same level, 
for all have received the singular gospel to which all are subordinate. Thus, it matters 
not which apostle proclaims the gospel but that it is proclaimed and believed (15.11).  
In relation to the other apostles, Paul is the least worthy to be an apostle; but in 
relation to the other apostles, Paul’s apostolic activity far outstrips theirs. What makes 
sense of both sides of this statement is divine giving in a context of abject 
unworthiness. Paul describes the incongruity of the gift in ways that relate both to his 
life in general and to his apostleship in particular. Paul was ἔκτρωμα, a persecutor of 
the church, and thus οὐκ ἱκανός. The meaning of ἔκτρωμα is disputed, but a common 
interpretation is “miscarriage” or “abortion.”81 Premature death is the end of an 
abbreviated existence.82 A passage in Philo provides an interesting parallel here. 
Interpreting Numbers 12.12, Philo states: 
But being in labor, it never gives birth. For the soul of the wicked person 
does not beget to bring to perfection anything fruitful. But whatever is 
                                                        
80 For a thorough study of the link between gospel and tradition in this text, see Schütz, Apostolic 
Authority, 84–113. Also, Winger, “Tradition.” 
81 Cf. H.W. Hollander and G.E. van der Hout, “The Apostle Calling Himself an Abortion: 1 Cor. 15:8 
Within the Context of 1 Cor. 15:8-10,” NovT 38 (1996): 224–36. Differently, M.W. Mitchell, “Reexamining 
the ‘Aborted Apostle’: An Exploration of Paul’s Self-Description in 1 Corinthians 15.8,” JSNT 25 (2003): 
469–85. 
82 As M. Schaefer, “Paulus, ‘Fehlgeburt’ oder ‘Unvernünftiger Kind’? Ein Interpretationsvorschlag zu 
1Kor 15,8,” ZNW 85 (1994): 208 states, “eine Fehl- ist eine Totgeburt. Sie stirbt bei oder vor ihrer ‘Geburt.’” 
Note, however, that Schaefer prefers “Spätgeburt” based on an allusion to Hos 13.13. But the Hosea 
reference is weak, and “Spätgeburt” is lexically doubtful. 
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brought forth is found to be premature and abortive (ἀμβλωθρίδια, 
ἐκτρώματα). ...Therefore, Aaron...asks the divinely loved Moses to 
heal...Miriam, so that her soul might not give birth to evil things. Therefore, 
he says, ‘Let her not become as equal to death, as an abortion (ἔκτρωμα) 
going forth from her mother’s womb...’83 
For the LXX translator, as for Philo and Paul, ἔκτρωμα implied death; and both Paul and 
Philo drew a correspondence between this understanding of metaphorical death with 
unworthiness.84 As Schütz states, “Num 12:12 (LXX) preserves a peculiar nuance of the 
idea of death in the midst of life itself, or life in the midst of death.”85 Both Philo and 
Paul drew on this term to denote a particular state of being, which is deadness in life, 
immorality and unworthiness. The γάρ in 15.9 shows that the following phrases cannot 
be dislodged: the dead Paul is the “least of the apostles,” is even “unworthy to be called 
an apostle,” because he persecuted the church. The four parts of 15.8-9 are in parallel: 
ἔσχατον δὲ πάντων ὡσπερεὶ τῷ ἐκτρώματι ὤφθη κἀμοί 
Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστόλων  
ὃς οὐκ εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς καλεῖσθαι ἀπόστολος  
διότι ἐδίωξα τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ 
These verses paint a bleak picture of Paul’s life and the insufficiencies of his apostolic 
qualifications into which God’s grace enters in Christ’s appearance. Paul is unfit to be 
an apostle because Paul is dead and Paul persecuted the church. As in Galatians, the 
solution to Paul’s problem is a gift that reconstitutes Paul and commissions him to his 
apostleship.86 Apostleship is the main emphasis here, but Paul’s logic demands both re-
creation and commission to work.87 For Paul to be an apostle, God must address the 
fundamental problem of Paul’s deadness, the sin that manifested itself in persecuting 
the church, by calling him as an act of creation.88 “But by the grace of God I am what I 
am.” As Barclay states, “‘what I am’...can only be attributed to the grace of God.”89 By 
                                                        
83 Leg. 1.76. 
84 Cf. G. Dorival, ed., Les Nombres (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1994), 305: “Philon développe une 
interprétation morale de notre verset.” 
85 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 104. 
86 Cf., with differences, G.W.E. Nickelsburg, “An Ἔκτρωμα, Though Appointed from the Womb: Paul’s 
Apostolic Self-Description in 1 Corinthians 15 and Galatians 1,” HTR 79 (1986): 204. 
87 Cf. Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade,” 107: “Daß er zum Apostel berufen wird, heißt für ihn, daß 
ihm...die Verheißung des Heils gegeben wurde.”  
88 On calling language in 1 Cor, see Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 77–112 and Eastman, Significance of 
Grace, 37–38. 
89 Barclay, “Transformation,” 377. 
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divine gifting Paul is an apostle; but Paul also is alive.90 Paul’s transformation from a 
miscarried persecutor of the church to its ἀπόστολος occurs through χάρις, Christ’s 
dying and rising κατὰ τὰς γραφάς.91   
 Consequently, the passage necessarily includes both Paul’s call to belief and call to 
apostleship; Paul could unlikely have distinguished them. Paul speaks of grace here in 
three related ways. First, “by the grace of God” Paul has his new existence as apostle, 
overcoming deadness in spite of unworthiness. Second, this grace that is “for me” (ἡ 
χάρις αὐτοῦ ἡ εἰς ἐμέ) works not in vain – rather, it has effects in his apostolic work.92 
Schütz notes the correspondence between verses 1-2 and 8-10: The Corinthians are 
saved by the gospel “if they have not believed in vain,” and the grace of God which came 
to Paul “has not been in vain.”93 Likewise, as God’s grace has not worked in vain in Paul, 
Paul states that those to whom “God gives...the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ,” 
which is victory over sin, death and the Law—“your labor is not in vain in the Lord” 
(15.56-58). As Chester states, “If their labour can be effective because Christ has given 
them victory over the power of sin that is the law, then presumably the same is also 
true of Paul.”94 That is, there is a double correspondence: for both their work is not in 
vain because of God’s grace, and for both God’s grace overcomes sin, death, law. Third, 
although Paul exists as an agent – the gift does not nullify the fact that Paul acts – Paul 
                                                        
90 Cf. Thiselton, Corinthians, 1211. O. Glombitza, “Gnade, das entscheidende Wort: Erwägungen zu I. 
Kor. XV I-II, eine exegetische Studie,” NovT 2 (1958): 287: “Die benutzten Worte lassen erkennen, welches 
Gewicht dies Wort für Paulus hat: Es handelt sich um die neue Schöpfung, das neue Sein.” 
91 Pace Mitchell, “Reexamining,” 485: “It would...be a mistake...to theologize this short reference into 
a sermon-like statement on God’s bountiful grace towards an unworthy wretch, particularly when 
another equally plausible, less theologically and lexically burdensome explanation is available.” Mitchell 
proposes that ἔκτρωμα refers to Paul’s discarded status among the apostles, though, among other 
difficulties, that would make what he says in 15.11 peculiar. Also, as Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 97 notes, 
if Paul were seeking to demonstrate his place among the apostles, “[w]hy should Paul use a phrase like 
τοῖς ἀποστόλοις πᾶσιν”? It is more problematic to remove ἔκτρωμα from the context of an argument 
where Paul calls himself unworthy and then describes the activity of God’s grace in his life. Mitchell is 
concerned to avoid interpretations of ἔκτρωμα that extrapolate from its lexical meaning (“abortion”) to 
something like “monstrous” or “wretched,” which we need not do to see a description of Paul’s lack of fit 
with divine grace. Furthermore, the temporal issue – that a miscarriage “is something that arrives before 
its appointed time, not after, and certainly not lastly” (477) – is only problematic if one coordinates 
ἔσχατον with ἔκτρωμα, which, again, is unnecessary. We do not need to read temporality into ἔκτρωμα; 
cf. P. von der Osten-Sacken, “Die Apologie des Paulinischen Apostolats in 1 Kor 15 1-11,” ZNW 64 (1973): 
250. Some commentators do not even view ἔσχατον chronologically; cf. e.g. R.F. Collins, First Corinthians 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 537. 
92 Contra Best, “Apostolic Authority,” 9. As noted by Nickelsburg, “Apostolic Self-Description,” 202–
203, this phrase in 15.10 echoes Isa 49.4.  
93 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 111. 
94 Chester, Conversion at Corinth, 170. 
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does not attribute his activity to himself but to “the grace of God with me” (ἡ χάρις τοῦ 
θεοῦ [ἡ] σὺν ἐμοί).95 Paul exists and acts by and with the grace in him as the apostle 
who has labored harder than all of the other apostles. Yet it is not Paul’s strenuous 
labor that overcomes his insufficiencies but God’s gift in the revelation of Christ.96 
 Thus, in this text we see a number of themes also present in Galatians: Paul the 
unworthy recipient of the gift, the relation between apostleship and gift, and therefore 
the relation between grace, gospel, and proclamation. Paul received the gift given by 
God to unworthy individuals; and Paul now plays a role in that giving through his 
apostolic proclamation of the gospel.97 Paul, Peter, or James could preach the gospel 
and the Corinthians receive the gift – the apostle is subordinate to the gospel – but the 
Corinthians received the gift through Paul’s proclamation. The gift that gave life to 
Paul is what he preached and the Corinthians received. 
2.4 Conclusion: Gift and Apostleship, Paul as Paradigm and Proclaimer 
Paul’s apostleship cannot be separated from the Christ-gift: Paul’s apostleship exists 
only in relation to the gift, to proclaim the gift, and is therefore always directed 
towards it. Because of this inextricable relationship, apostleship is an unfitting gift: the 
Paul who becomes an apostle is the Paul who is crucified and made alive in the Christ-
event. Divine gift exists and works within insufficiency and inability. 
 This thought is expressed most famously in 2 Cor 12.9. There Paul explains that a 
“thorn in the flesh was given to me” (ἐδόθη μοι) so that he might not exalt himself. 
Where Paul seeks the removal of weakness – and thus, power – the Lord responds, “My 
grace is sufficient for you, for power in weakness is made perfect.” Grace is effective in 
weakness—not by removing weakness but by working through it. χάρις and δύναμις are 
paralleled, with the connecting γάρ showing that grace and power have to be 
                                                        
95 See esp. Barclay, “Grace and Agency,” 151. As Barclay notes, “Philo would have been dismayed to 
find that...the prepositions are inconsistent (εἰς ἐμέ...σὺν ἐμοί).” That is, Paul does not delineate precisely 
how God’s grace is at work. See further Barclay, “Transformation,” 378: “Paul seems to be anxious to 
insist that grace is...an agent within his ongoing life, but the precise relationship between divine and 
human agency is hard to deduce.” See further next chapter. 
96 Cf. Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 99: “Paul specifically refuses to ground his ἱκανότης in the 
resurrection appearance given him... Paul does not regard his sufficiency as grounded in a resurrection 
appearance at all, but in the surpassing ‘grace’ of God manifested in his missionary labors.” 
97 Cf. Glombitza, “Gnade,” 290: “Gnade ist das entscheidende Wort im Leben und im Werk dieses 
Mannes.” 
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interpreted together, because God’s grace is his power at work in Paul’s weakness. In 
13.4 both weakness and power show up again as ways of speaking about participating in 
Christ’s death and resurrection. Paul states that Christ is “not weak for you but is 
powerful in you.” Even Christ was crucified ἐξ ἀσθενείας but lives by the power of God 
(ζῇ ἐκ δυνάμεως θεοῦ). The apostles therefore are weak in Christ but “will live with him 
by the power of God” (ζήσομεν σὺν αὐτῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως θεοῦ) for the Corinthians. As 
Schütz states, the “gospel itself is weakness and power, grounded as it is in the event of 
Christ. In his ministry Paul reflects this same weakness and power. Not only does he 
experience it alongside all Christians, he makes it visible in himself.”98 Weakness is 
identification with Christ’s death in self-abnegation, foregoing the thought that one’s 
own power is sufficient and relying on God’s life-giving power in Christ.99 
From his testimony of unworthiness, Paul formed his understanding of how God 
gives to all. Paul is the paradigm of every individual who receives the incongruous gift. 
Paul never states that his experience shaped this understanding,100 but given that he 
tells his story as an example of what he sees happening with all, it seems likely that his 
own story is a key influence from which he gained his peculiar understanding of the 
nature of divine generosity. Thus, two main points about divine gift-giving converge in 
Paul’s story: the gift is given to the unworthy and those who are unworthy receive it 
through the apostle. Paul’s apostleship is a gift that proclaims the gift, and through his 
work God calls into existence communities of gift-recipients. I will turn to 2 Cor 5-6 
now to examine further how apostolic proclamation relates to the reception of the gift. 
3.  Apostolic Proclamation and Reconciliation 
In 2 Cor 6.1 Paul urges the Corinthians “not to receive the gift of God in vain” (μὴ εἰς 
κενὸν τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ δέξασθαι ὑμᾶς). Wrapped together indissolubly in 5.14-6.2 are 
explanations of this gift as Christ’s death and resurrection (5.14-15), God’s act of 
                                                        
98 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 245. 
99 Cf. P. Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 572. 
100 Some scholars view the core of Paul’s theology as being nearly fully formed after Paul’s 
Christophany; e.g., S. Kim, The Origin of Paul’s Gospel (2nd ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1984); M. Hengel 
and A.M Schwemer, Paul Between Damascus and Antioch: The Unknown Years (Nashville: Westminster John 
Knox, 1997). While I do not substantially disagree, I believe A.F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and 
Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven: YUP, 1992), 70 is correct: “We shall never know Paul’s 
experience. But we can see how Paul reconstructs it.”  
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reconciliation in Christ (5.18-19, 21), and Paul’s apostolic proclamation of this saving 
act (5.18-20; 6.1). Each of these aspects – christology, theology, proclamation – 
constitute this χάρις and how it should be received.101  
 In 5.14-15 Paul states that Christ’s love (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Χριστοῦ) controls us, because 
Paul has discerned “that one died for all, therefore all died” (εἷς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, 
ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον). Christ died for all “so that those who live might no longer live 
to themselves but to the one who died for them and was raised” (τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν 
ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγερθέντι). Parallel to Gal 2.19, dying with Christ enables one to live to 
another. As Barnett states, there is a “double dying” – the one died that all might live, 
all die to themselves to live to Christ.102  
In 5.16-17 Paul draws epistemological conclusions from 5.14-15. The νῦν of 5.16 
correlates with the νῦν of 6.2, designating the time created by the Christ-event,103 
whereby those “in Christ” are καινὴ κτίσις.104 As Martyn states, 5.16-17 “establish an 
inextricable connexion between eschatology and epistemology” that is grounded in 
Christ’s death and resurrection (5.14-15).105 Those who are living in the “day of 
salvation” know others through the cross rather than the flesh. Accordingly, in 5.14-15 
and 5.16-17, Paul explains that the Christ-event effects the death and new life of the 
person,106 thus also killing off the old way of knowing and creating a new epistemology 
in Christ. After this rupture in history, believers should have a different way of 
interpreting all reality that corresponds to the reality of their new existence. 
 In 5.18-19 the God from whom all things exist (τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ) – both τὰ 
ἀρχαῖα and τὰ καινά – as creator and redeemer is now defined with a number of 
participles: 
ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ  
                                                        
101 Cf. O. Hofius, “‘Gott hat unter uns aufgerichtet das Wort von der Versöhnung’ (2 Kor 5,19),” ZNW 
71 (1980): 19: “Beide Momente — Versöhnungstat und Versöhnungswort —sind in ihrem differenzierten 
Zusammenhang das eine Heilsgeschehen der rettenden Zuwendung Gottes zu dem der Sünde 
verfallenen, gottfeindlichen Menschen.” 
102 Barnett, Corinthians, 291.  
103 Cf. Rom 3.21, 26; 5.6; 9.9, etc. 
104 On “new creation” here, see esp. Hubbard, New Creation, 177–183. 
105 J.L. Martyn, “Epistemology at the Turn of the Ages,” in Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 92. Cf. Fee, Pauline Christology, 197. 
106 Cf. R.H. Bell, “Sacrifice and Christology in Paul,” JTS 53 (2002): 9: “By participating through faith in 
Christ’s death and resurrection, the believer is made a new creation.” 
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(1) τοῦ καταλλάξαντος ἡμᾶς ἑαυτῷ διὰ Χριστοῦ  
καὶ  
(2) δόντος ἡμῖν τὴν διακονίαν τῆς καταλλαγῆς 
(1a) ὡς ὅτι θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ,  
 μὴ λογιζόμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν  
(2a) καὶ θέμενος ἐν ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον τῆς καταλλαγῆς 
 God is identified by two main acts with aorist participles, with two further 
explanations. First, God reconciles himself to “us” – Paul and, in light of the following 
verse, the Corinthians – and, more expansively, to the world.107 God’s reconciling work 
is cosmic in scope yet individually so.108 Insofar as God has reconciled “us” to himself, 
he has done this by “not reckoning to them their trespasses” (μὴ λογιζόμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ 
παραπτώματα αὐτῶν; cf. 5.21; Rom 4.3-8). Paul uses two prepositions (διά, ἐν) to convey 
Christ’s role in this reconciliation, which is more fully explained in 5.21. The phrase διὰ 
Χριστοῦ is interpretable as “through Christ’s death and resurrection” (5.14-15),109 
showing that God reconciled himself to us through the Christ-event by which humans 
die to themselves to live anew.110 
The phrase θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ is predictably much debated about how it should be 
translated and what its theological weight is. For example, Barnett thinks “in Christ” is 
functionally equivalent to “through Christ,” thus clarifying that reconciliation occurs 
in the Christ-event.111 Martin and Lambrecht make stronger claims that this verse 
speaks of God’s becoming in Christ “one of our human race”112 and “God’s presence in 
                                                        
107  K. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and The Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 
1: “In establishing the world in relationship to Godself, God’s intent is to communicate...gifts to us.”  M.E. 
Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: I-VII (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1994), 434 takes κόσμος to refer to the “human world” with no broader cosmic connotations, 
because she thinks the pronouns in 5.19 further define the term. Similarly, Hubbard, New Creation, 181; 
Hofius, “Versöhnung,” 8. By contrast, Jackson, New Creation, 136–147. 
108 For an overview on reconciliation in scholarship, see C. Constantineanu, The Social Significance of 
Reconciliation in Paul’s Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 25–42. 
109 Hofius, “Versöhnung,” 5. 
110 As C. Breytenbach, Grace, Reconciliation, Concord: The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 171 notes, the use of καταλλάσσω “to denote a change in the relationship between 
humans and God” is “so rare that it can safely be regarded as a metaphorical mapping of non-religious 
terminology onto a religious domain.” 
111 Barnett, Corinthians, 306. Cf. Eastman, Significance of Grace, 40. 
112 R.P. Martin, Reconciliation: A Study of Paul’s Theology (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1981), 99. 
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Christ.”113 Christ is the locus of God’s reconciling activity, making an inextricable 
connection between God’s salvific act and the being of Christ.114 The ἐν Χριστῷ 
intensifies διὰ Χριστοῦ just as reconciling the κόσμος deepens reconciling ἡμᾶς. Bell 
has shown that the interpretation “God was in Christ—reconciling the world to 
himself” is grammatically preferable and theologically coherent within Paul’s letters.115 
It shows that “Soteriology depends on Christology.”116 
The argument climaxes in the independent statement in 5.21. The “not reckoning” 
of 5.19 finds its counterpart in God’s making Christ sin so that “we might become the 
righteousness of God in him.”117 There have been two main ways of interpreting Christ’s 
being made sin: 1) understanding ἁμαρτία through Rom 8.3, as a “sin-offering;118 or 2) as 
Christ’s identifying with sinful humans. Most commentators note that since Paul does 
not use περὶ ἁμαρτίας and ἁμαρτία parallels δικαιοσύνη, the first interpretation is ruled 
out.119 Rather, Paul explains in 5.21 that in “some unfathomable way Christ is identified 
with what is opposed to God.”120 Christ identified with humanity by exchanging 
                                                        
113 J. Lambrecht, “‘Reconcile Yourselves...’: A Reading of 2 Cor. 5,11-21,” in The Diakonia of the Spirit (2 
Cor 4:7-7:4) (ed. L. de Lorenzi; Rome, 1989), 184. 
114 Cf. Fee, Pauline Christology, 198. Pace Eastman, Significance of Grace, 40, this view does not stress 
revelation to the neglect of the passage’s soteriological concerns. 
115 Bell, “Sacrifice and Christology,” 11. Fee, Pauline Christology, 196: “here we find plainly expressed 
what we must recognize as presuppositional elsewhere: who it is who dies for us is absolutely crucial.” As 
R.W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, The Triune God (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 185 notes, the NT does not 
give a “theoretically developed answer” of how God’s reconciling in Christ works; rather, “[t]hat it works 
is assumed from the Old Testament.” 
116 Cf. the parallel in Col 1.19 and 2.9. 
117 The reading of N.T. Wright, “On Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5:21,” in 
Pauline Theology, Volume II (ed. D.M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 200–208, that the phrase 
means to “become God’s covenant faithfulness,” seems strained. First, the parallel between 5.17a and 21 
(as noted by Hubbard, New Creation, 178) suggests a soteriological interpretation (however construed), as 
well as the explicatory relation between 5.19 and 21. Second, Wright’s argument works only if ἁμαρτία is 
understood as “sin-offering,” which seems implausible. And on this point, Wright’s argument is circular: 
he uses the “sin-offering” reading to support his argument, which then supports his understanding of 
ἁμαρτία. Third, he must restrict the pronouns in 5.21 to refer to Paul (and other apostles) rather than the 
Corinthians as well. Fourth, Wright’s argument relies on asserting that the traditional reading views 
5.14-15, 17, 21 as detached statements, as “mere snippets of traditional soteriology” (205); “[t]his verse is 
not an abstract, detached statement of atonement theology.” We do not have to find a specific reference 
to Paul’s apostleship in 5.21 to establish that 5.14-21 is important for Paul’s understanding of his 
apostleship; indeed, the interwoven nature of Paul’s understanding of reconciliation and apostleship lay 
the grounds for his appeals to the Corinthians. 
118 Cf. R.P. Martin, 2 Corinthians (Dallas: Word, 1986), 157. 
119 Cf. e.g. Thrall, 2 Corinthians I-VII, 440–441; Bell, “Sacrifice and Christology,” 13. 
120 M.D. Hooker, “Interchange in Christ,” JTS 22 (1971): 353. 
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sinlessness for sinfulness – “for us.”121 And one “becomes the righteousness of God” in 
Christ through reception of the gift.122 Thus, God reconciles humanity to himself by 
giving Jesus to be sin for humanity, who in turn become righteous; the basis of 
reconciliation, then, is the gift of righteousness in Christ, which is nothing other than 
an unfitting gift.123 The gift is given to, and is purposed specifically for, sinners. 
Interpreters are correct, of course, to note that 5.21 is a uniquely worded statement; 
but it is not substantially different from what Paul says elsewhere, as we have seen. 
Sinful humans are justified in the revelation of God’s righteousness in the Christ-event 
(Rom 3.21-24); they are therefore righteous (cf. also Gal 2.16-21).124 Sinful humans 
receive the gift of righteousness and thus will reign in life, just as Christ’s righteous act 
leads to the justification of life (Rom 5.15-19). Paul’s gift-righteousness language is 
flexible, and 2 Cor 5.21 fits perfectly: God, in the Christ-event, gives to unworthy 
humans, who through – and only through – the gift, are righteous in Christ (cf. also Phil 
3.10).125 God justifies sinners in Christ; in Christ sinners become the righteousness of 
God. 
Paul’s depiction of God’s reconciling activity sits strikingly alongside Philo’s 
understanding of reconciliation with God. In Praem. 162-171, Philo has concluded his 
discussion of the “curses and punishments” which those who disobey the “Laws of 
righteousness and piety” justly receive (ἄξιον). Yet if these people change their minds, 
reproach their deceitful selves, confess their sin, and purify their tongues, then they 
will receive the goodwill of “God the merciful savior” (τοῦ σωτῆρος καὶ ἵλεω θεοῦ). 
Turning to virtue, these people are guided by a vision more divine than human by 
                                                        
121 Thrall, 2 Corinthians I-VII, 444 argues that the interpretation of “interchange” (Hooker) is correct 
but eschews “imputation” because she says the exchange happens “in Christ” – therefore, it is not an 
“alien righteousness.” This displays a misunderstanding of how imputation works for Reformation 
theologians, for whom the imputation of Christ’s righteousness could never be split from union with 
Christ. Cf., e.g., S. Chester, “It Is No Longer I Who Live: Justification by Faith and Participation in Christ in 
Martin Luther’s Exegesis of Galatians,” NTS 55 (2009): 315–37. 
122 As Hooker, “Interchange,” 353 notes, this “exchange” is not straightforward: Christ becomes sin, 
humans become righteousness in Christ. 
123 Cf. similarly Zeller, Charis, 153. 
124 Cf. Jüngel, Justification, 80: “the biblical expression ‘God’s righteousness’ speaks of an event on the 
basis of which ungodly humanity can live together with God. This presupposes God’s coming, with his 
righteousness, into the context, the real life context, of human beings – in Jesus Christ.” 
125 Cf. S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 365. 
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which they may be reconciled to God (πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καταλλαγῶν).126 However, the 
enemies of the repentant will “receive the wages of their cruelty” (κομίζεσθαι τὰ 
ἐπίχειρα τῆς ὠμότητος) in curses. To summarize the logic of this passage sharply: 
repenting precedes reconciliation, which precedes receiving gifts from God. In other 
words, God gives to those who are worthy, virtuous. As Breytenbach notes, for Philo, if 
anyone is a reconciler, it is Moses who reconciles the sinful people to God, not God 
reconciling himself to sinful people.127 With scriptural warrant, Philo explains that 
Moses as “mediator and reconciler” (μεσίτης καὶ διαλλακτής) supplicates and prays for 
God to forgive the sins of the people.128 Thus, for Philo “the mediator attempts to 
change God after the people have repented. In Paul’s case the hostile enemies are 
reconciled.”129 Both Paul and Philo stress God’s mercy, but differently so. For Philo, God 
does not reconcile himself to sinners, just as he does not give gifts to them; the two 
phenomena are intimately related. For Paul, God reconciles sinners by giving an 
unfitting gift. 
Yet how is this gift received? This question points to the second major aspect of 
5.18-20: apostolic proclamation. As Barnett states, “God’s ‘gift’ of a ‘ministry (diakonia) 
of reconciliation,’ to whom he has entrusted his ‘word of reconciliation,’ must be seen 
as part of God’s gift to the world and to history.”130 God achieved reconciliation in 
Christ just as God “gave to us the ministry of reconciliation” (δόντος ἡμῖν τὴν 
διακονίαν τῆς καταλλαγῆς; 5.18).131 Paul is reconciled and receives the vocation of 
being a “minister” of that reconciliation for others.132 Likewise, God is identified as the 
one who reconciles in Christ by not reckoning trespasses and who “placed in us the 
                                                        
126 While God does not initiate reconciliation with the ungodly, this divine or semi-divine vision still 
draws humans to God. 
127 Mos. 2.166. 
128 Cf. Spec. 2.196. 
129 Breytenbach, Grace, 179. 
130 Barnett, Corinthians, 300. 
131 As S.E. Porter, “Paul’s Concept of Reconciliation, Twice More,” in Paul and His Theology (ed. S.E. 
Porter; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 136–141 argues, the participial tense-forms in 5.18-19 do not “index” past and 
present actions; thus, one cannot argue for a straightforward reference to Paul’s Christophany. Pace S. 
Kim, “2 Cor. 5:11-21 and the Origin of Paul’s Concept of ‘Reconciliation’,” NovT 39 (1997): 360–84. 
132 Cf. S.J. Kraftchick, “Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium,” in Pauline Theology, Volume II, 
167: “the shape of [Paul’s] ministry is defined by its founding event, and God’s appeal for reconciliation is 
extended through this ministry.” 
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word of reconciliation” (θέμενος ἐν ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον τῆς καταλλαγῆς; 5.19).133 The 
parallel “Tat- und Wort-Aspekt”134 of 5.18-19 is significant for exhibiting how the divine 
act of reconciliation is made effective in the lives of people in history through the act of 
proclamation. To borrow from Bultmann, the “word which makes this proclamation is 
itself a part of this event.”135 Thus, God reconciles in Christ and Paul is the minister of 
this reconciliation, appointed to proclaim the saving event. The inseparable pairing of 
reconciliation with apostolic proclamation in 5.18-19 grounds Paul’s appeal in 5.20: 
Paul’s apostolic ministry is included within the “scope of the divine work,” and it is on 
this basis that Paul appeals to the Corinthians as God’s “co-worker” (συνεργέω; 6.1).136 
 There are three parts to Paul’s appeal.137 First, Paul claims authoritative standing as 
one who serves ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ. Paul uses the political term πρεσβεύω to describe 
apostolic activity.138 Paul and the other apostles serve as ambassadors on behalf of and 
in the place of Christ: to “ignore Paul at this point would have been to ignore the Christ 
on whose behalf he spoke.”139 Second, Paul states that God speaks through him: he 
serves as “God appeals through us” (ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παρακαλοῦντος δι᾿ ἡμῶν). The 
correspondence of God and Christ here is significant: Paul serves on behalf of Christ, 
while God speaks through him. “Christ is thus extended through his ambassadors.”140 
Consequently, third, Paul appeals to the Corinthians: “Be reconciled to God.” Being 
reconciled to God means being reconciled by the God who reconciles;141 the parallel 
between 5.20 and Rom 5.11 where reconciliation is “received” (τὴν καταλλαγὴν 
ἐλάβομεν) through Christ points to the gift-nature of the divine passive in 2 Cor 5.20. 
                                                        
133 On possible LXX backgrounds to this phrase (e.g. Ps 77.5; 104.27), see Hofius, “Versöhnung,” 10–18. 
134 Hofius, “Versöhnung,” 6. 
135 Bultmann, New Testament, 306. 
136 Thrall, 2 Corinthians I-VII, 436. 
137 Cf. Barnett, Corinthians, 309. 
138 Philo uses πρεσβεύω in similar ways; see, e.g., Plant. 14 (angels); Her. 205-206 (Logos); for political 
uses, see Flacc. 105; Legat. 192, 240, 242, 302. On Paul’s ambassadorial language, see esp. Breytenbach, 
Grace, chap. 8 and A. Bash, Ambassadors for Christ: An Exploration of Ambassadorial Language in the New 
Testament (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 1–80. 
139 Barnett, Corinthians, 310. 
140 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 181. 
141 This is not to claim that humans are merely passive – Paul is appealing to them to do something, of 
course – but that the stress of this verb is receptivity. However, for a discussion of the different 
translation possibilities, and an argument for a reflexive meaning, see R. Bieringer, “‘Reconcile 
Yourselves to God.’ An Unusual Interpretation of 2 Corinthians 5:20 in Its Context,” in Jesus, Paul, and Early 
Christianity: Studies in Honour of Henk Jan de Jonge (ed. R. Buitenwerf, H.W. Hollander, and J. Tromp; Leiden: 
Brill, 2008), 11–38. 
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Reconciliation is a gift.142 Thus, the ministry (διακονία) and word of reconciliation (ὁ 
λόγος τῆς καταλλαγῆς) are both present, where that ministry is active in speaking 
reconciliation, proclaiming what God has done in Christ and appealing for believers not 
to forsake this gift. Paul’s apostolic activity and the Christ-gift proceed from the same 
divine Giver, who is at work in both gifts such that neither can be separated from the 
other.143 Yet the apostolic work does not end with the reception of the gift, as Paul’s 
letters make clear. As their apostle, Paul labors in the hopes that the Corinthians 
receive this gift rightly, such that they live in line with it until the end. Paul seeks a 
congruence between the event, Paul’s proclamation, and the Corinthians’ life. 
Importantly, the Corinthians have already received this gift: Paul urges them not to 
receive the gift, but not to receive it “in vain” (εἰς κενὸν τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ δέξασθαι 
ὑμᾶς). As Barnett states, “the ‘grace of God’ is Paul’s terse caption for the grand vista 
that he has just painted portraying God’s eschatological salvation by which God 
reconciled the guilty to himself through the death of the Innocent One.”144 In 6.2 Paul 
quotes Isaiah 49.8 and applies it to the present context, explaining that in the Christ-
event a new καιρός has been inaugurated, a “day of salvation.”145 For the Corinthians 
living in this “now time,” the decision is whether they will receive the gift and live in a 
way consonant with the gift: living not to themselves but to Christ (5.15), perceiving all 
reality from the new vantage-point from the cross, the site of God’s cosmic 
reconciliation (5.16-17), and therefore being reconciled with God (5.20). Intrinsic to the 
reception and living out of this gift is the apostle whose charge is the preaching and 
ministering of the word of reconciliation. Paul is Christ’s ambassador to the 
Corinthians, and in this case, without Paul there is no gift, for the apostle is the divinely 
chosen agent of God’s beneficence. Paul is fundamental to what it means to speak about 
                                                        
142 Cf. Constantineanu, Reconciliation, 71: “Reconciliation has grace as its starting point.” 
143 Thus, we might say with Hofius, “Versöhnung,” 19 that “als ‘Versöhnung’ beschriebene 
Heilshandeln Gottes in Jesus Christus schließt demnach für Paulus zwei konstitutive Momente in sich.” 
144 Barnett, Corinthians, 316. 
145 Cf. Bultmann, New Testament, 307: “...the proclaimer, the apostle...belongs to the eschatological 
occurrence.” 
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divine gift: to reject God’s gift of Christ – or to receive it in vain – is to reject both God 
and apostle.146 
4.  Paul and Philo 
4.1 Paul and Philo, Unfitting and Fitting Grace 
We have returned repeatedly to the issue of the relation between grace and worth, and 
we can now summarize our conclusions. Philo believes humans can be worthy to 
receive gifts from God, and God gives to the worthy; Paul believes humans cannot be 
worthy to receive the gift from God, and God gives to the unworthy. While it is 
tempting to leave the comparison as a stark antithesis, my basic argument has been 
that Paul and Philo are not identical but they are also not simply antithetical. We need 
to ask how grace functions in relation to worth and why God gives. For both Philo and 
Paul, divine giving is explicable only by the character of God. Philo traces everything 
back to divine causation, and human worth must be understood in that context; Paul 
points to the utter unworthiness of humans because God is the one who gave Jesus to 
defeat sin and death.  
 (A) Adam and the “human problem”: Philo states that Adam was originally created 
without virtue or vice but allowed himself, with Eve and the Serpent, to fall into vice.147 
Adam and Eve preferred a “brief and mortal – not life – but time of wickedness” (οὐ βίον 
ἀλλὰ χρόνον κακοδαιμονίας); consequently, God set for them their due punishment.148 
“When evil began to flourish more than virtue,” Philo states that “the everlasting 
fountains of God’s graces were held back” (αἱ ἀέναοι πηγαὶ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χαρίτων 
ἐπεσχέθησαν) in the present time (νυνὶ δέ - !) so that they might not supply the 
unworthy (ἵνα μὴ ὡς ἀναξίοις χορηγῶσιν).149 Thus, Adam introduces the possibility of 
human unworthiness.150 Paul’s story is less nuanced: “death came through man” and “in 
Adam all die” (ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνῄσκουσιν; 1 Cor 15.21-22). As Paul emphatically 
                                                        
146 Cf. B.R. Gaventa, “Apostle and Church in 2 Corinthians: A Response to David M. Hay and Steven J. 
Kraftchick,” in Pauline Theology, Volume II, 195–196; J.M. Gundry, Paul and Perseverance: Staying In and Falling 
Away (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 278–279. 
147 See chapter 2, sections 3.1-2. Leg. 2.53. 
148 Opif. 156. 
149 Opif. 168. 
150 As Philo acknowledges, humans can choose good or bad, but often choose the latter; Conf. 178. 
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maintains in Rom 5.12-21, Adam introduced sin, and therefore death, to all people, 
because of his disobedience. Because of Adam, all stand under God’s judgment. Thus, 
Adam obliterates the possibility of human worthiness. 
 (B) Worth as Cause and Condition: For Paul, because no human is worthy, nothing 
inherent to humans can cause God’s giving or be its condition. God gives because God is 
inexplicably merciful and loving towards the undeserving. Thus, God gives an 
unconditioned gift: it does not require that standards – moral, ethnic, or social – be met 
by its recipients to receive it. Likewise, for Philo human worth does not cause God to 
give: God gives because his nature is gracious and abundant, and only God is Cause. 
Both Philo and Paul believe in a “free” gift in that God gives without being coerced or 
prompted; God is sovereign and cannot be forced to act by humans. Yet, for Philo worth 
becomes a condition of giving: God’s generosity is like an overflowing fountain, and 
human worth provides the proper direction to the flow of gifts.151 In a sense, human 
worth is magnetic: it attracts God’s gifts for their fitting use, while the unworthy repel 
gifts through rejection or misuse. “God rejoices in giving,” Philo states, “whenever they 
who receive are worthy of the gift” (διδοὺς γάρ, ὅταν ἄξιοι χάριτος ὦσιν οἱ 
λαμβάνοντες, εὐφραίνεται).152  Accordingly, human worth is never a cause for giving – 
God gives because God is a giver – but for Philo it is a condition. If human worth were 
not a condition for Philo, God would be irrational and morally questionable; if human 
worth were a condition for Paul, then God could not give. Thus, both have their own 
ways of placing the cause of divine giving outside of humanity. 
 (C) The Asymmetry of Divine Giving: Since neither Philo nor Paul makes worth a cause 
of divine giving, they both also stress in their own ways the asymmetry of the divine-
human relationship. Asymmetry is seen in the priority of divine giving, though each 
nuances this differently. Paul stresses the asymmetry of human unworthiness; Philo 
stresses asymmetry as a product of God’s perfection.153 What is important is that for 
both this divine asymmetry restricts the importance of worth in the equation of divine 
giving. Paul, of course, does this by insisting straightforwardly that no one is worthy. 
                                                        
151 For this imagery, see e.g. Cher. 86; Ebr. 31-32. Similarly, Post. 143-145. 
152 Somn. 2.175-177.  
153 Chapter 1, section 3.2. For a general statement of God’s superiority to humanity in gift-giving, see 
Spec. 1.43-44. Cf. also Zeller, Charis, 21: “Die Gunst dagegen kommt aus der hohen Stellung dessen, der 
nichts bedarf.” 
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Philo’s underlining of human worth is relativized – or properly contextualized – by his 
stringent belief in divine omni-causality and the wide umbrella of generosity 
(everything is gift). Divine giving always stands behind and constitutes human worth; 
that is, Philo insists that the constitution of worth cannot be considered outside of the 
ambit of divine generosity itself. God creates the virtues and causes them to grow, gives 
humans their natures, provides direction through the Logos – in short, God causes all 
good things.154 Thus, when Philo asks why Noah or Abraham found favor before God, it 
is because God created their virtuous nature.155 In essence, then, when Philo asks why a 
human is worthy to receive gifts, he points to God.156 For both Philo and Paul, humans 
are always in need of divine grace. 
 (D) The Content and Function of Divine Gifts: All of these subtopics are related to two 
questions: what is grace and what does it do? For Philo, grace is cosmological and 
causative. “Why did he create that which did not exist? Because he was good and loves 
to give” (ὅτι ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόδωρος ἦν).157 God’s paradigmatic act of giving is the 
creation of a well-ordered world as God’s fundamental gift is the cosmos;158 the purpose 
of all successive gifts is to bring the recipient into step with the structures of the 
cosmos (Law, Logos),159 so that one becomes virtuous and ascends to the visio Dei. Since 
God has created all things, he owns all things; and therefore everything is gift.160 A 
person’s worth is constituted by how well they use God’s gifts to live in accordance 
with the first gift. In the act of creation, all are granted a baseline of gifted existence 
and capabilities, yet not all properly appropriate that existence and direct it towards 
God.161 The worthy – those who are progressing – have God as their guide to virtue and 
thus disregard their own abilities, knowing that God’s gifting enables their progress. 
Yet Philo has no anxieties over the junction of divine and human agency in the 
construction of worth, because human agency that produces virtue exists within the 
domain of divine causation. Again, God is the source and cause of all things—
                                                        
154 Cf. Opif. 75; Mut. 31. For virtue, see Leg. 3.10 and the other texts in chapter 2, section 3.1. 
155 Cf. Leg. 3.77-78, 83-84, 104. See also Abr. 54 for the patriarchs as soul-types gifted to individuals. 
156 See esp. Leg. 3.136; Post. 154-157; Det. 114. 
157 Mut. 46. 
158 Cf. e.g. Ebr. 117-119, Deus 106-108, Leg. 3.78, Mut. 46, Somn. 1.243. 
159 Chapter 2, sections 2.2-3. 
160 Her. 102-103. 
161 Leg. 1.34. Cf. Mut. 225; Opif. 23. 
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everything, even human worth and virtuous actions must be attributed to God.162 Thus, 
those who live virtuously through use of reason receive good things; but those who do 
good things only do so through divine gifting and empowerment. To speak of human 
agency in relation to worth is to point back to divine gifting, for grace causes one to 
move towards cosmos and God. Consequently, it is not simply worth that makes one 
worthy to receive from God; rather, in part, it is the recognition that worth itself is 
caused by God, and thus being worthy, while being a condition for the reception of 
gifts, is never one’s own accomplishment.163 Worth does not preclude one’s 
accomplishments, but rather they exist concurrently, in the asymmetrical relation of 
divine causation. Worth and virtue precede receiving from God, but God’s implanting 
virtue within the soul and arousing it towards perfection precede being virtuous. Grace 
causes grace.164 
For Paul, grace is Christological and creative. God’s grace is manifested supremely in 
the Christ-event, by and in which humans are re-created from death to new life. Worth 
is not the presupposition of divine giving because God gives specifically to the 
unworthy, who are unable to honor God. Thus, God gives an unfitting gift without 
thought for ethnicity, social standing, or morality. Since Paul believes that God gives to 
the unworthy, he removes human agency from the question of receiving the Christ-
gift. Accordingly, God justifies the ungodly apart from works (Rom 4.4-8), elects before 
one has done good or bad (Rom 9.11), and gives to Gentiles without the Law as to Jews 
with the Law. The question of why God gives is never directed at the gift-recipients 
except to point out their status as ungodly or sinful (e.g. Rom 5.6-8; 2 Cor 5.21; Gal 1.4). 
Since the recipients are ungodly and unrighteous, it is impossible to conceive of them 
doing or being anything that could create or increase their fit with divine gifts. Unlike 
Philo, Paul never traces the logic of God’s giving to something an individual has done or 
will do. Thus, the Christ-gift effects the destruction of the sinful person and the re-
creation of the human in Christ. Where Philo can speak of a human’s worth or 
virtuousness, even though this still points to divine causation, Paul emphasizes not 
                                                        
162 Indeed, not even one’s body can be considered one’s own possession; cf. e.g. Cher. 117-119; Sacr. 97. 
163 Cf. Sacr. 54-57; Her. 33; Congr. 130. 
164 To borrow a saying that can apply to Philo: ὅστις γὰρ ἔχει, δοθήσεται αὐτῷ καὶ περισσευθήσεται· 
ὅστις δὲ οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὃ ἔχει ἀρθήσεται ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ (Matt 13.12). 
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human worth or virtue but unworthiness, weakness, and inability: all worth (or 
righteousness) is constituted and found in Christ. The basis of this generosity is divine 
love. 
 The differences between a cosmological/causative or Christological/creative 
understanding of divine grace are undeniably significant. But as we have seen, in both 
of these construals there is an element of a lack of fit between giver, gift, and recipient. 
For Paul this lack of fit is simple: because no human is worthy, whatever God gives 
cannot be congruent with its recipient. Rather, the gift has an effect: it creates 
something that does not exist—the unrighteous is justified, the enemy is reconciled, 
the foolish receive the Spirit. For Philo, the lack of fit is more slight and subtle, relating 
to: 1) Divine causation: God created only because he was gracious, and his beneficence 
is a function of his creating power.165 The “creation and arrangement of the world” 
demonstrates that God wills to bring order from disorder (τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας), harmony 
and fellowship from disharmony and disunity, light from darkness. Why is this so? 
Because God “is always anxious to remodel with his beneficent powers” (ἀεὶ γάρ ἐστιν 
ἐπιμελὲς αὐτῷ καὶ ταῖς εὐεργέτισιν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεσι) the bad into the good, to 
“rearrange it into a better state.”166 Any good thing a human does is the utilization of 
gifts received before doing any good thing; prior gifts always precede receiving gifts. 2) 
Divine perfection: God necessarily restrains and shapes his giving so that humans can 
receive without being killed, but insofar as God’s gifts set humans in relation to himself, 
there is never a fit. 3) Human piety: Philo’s insistence that humans should never 
consider themselves worthy is striking, for it signals more than humble piety. As Philo 
asks, how great must a person be “who will be judged worthy of grace (τὸν ἄξιον 
χάριτος) before God?” Philo is doubtful that even the perfect cosmos is worthy 
enough.167 In relation to God’s perfection, humans are only worthy because God 
considers and makes them so. 
 Luther’s statement – “the love of God does not find, but creates, that which is 
pleasing to it” – is an accurate encapsulation of Paul’s understanding of divine 
                                                        
165 Chapter 1, section 2.2. Cf. e.g. Fug. 66; Leg. 3.78. 
166 Spec. 4.187. Cf. Leg. 3.105. 
167 Deus 106. 
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generosity. We can rephrase Luther to fit Philo: “the love of God finds that which is 
pleasing to it because God has created it.” 
 (E) Conclusion: Philo and Paul speak of grace enough, in different contexts though 
with general consistency, that one can always find one more comparison to make. The 
differences between Philo and Paul are important, but why they are different is more 
important. Philo and Paul conceive of different gifts for different kinds of humanity. 
Philo’s understanding of grace presumes a humanity that can be worthy – progress in 
virtue – through the use of the tools God has provided. Paul’s understanding of grace 
presumes a humanity that has been “given up” and are consequently unworthy. As 
Philo states, the godless person “fails to attain the goal (ὁ ἄθεος ἀτυχεῖ τοῦ τέλους), so 
that he might be in more pain (ὀδυνᾶται),” and no strength is added to his actions but 
it is rather taken away (τοὐναντίον δ᾿ ὑφαιρουμένης).168 Philo stresses the causation 
and graciousness of God to an extreme, such that living an immoral life is pure 
rejection of God’s gifts. Why would God continue to give to such a person when he 
already has given, his gifts are still on offer, and yet are refused? At this point, 
“scandalous and foolish” is the proper description of Paul’s understanding of grace: God 
targets as his beneficiaries precisely those who should not receive it. Yet, to repeat, 
even for Philo to an extent God’s gifts are ultimately unfitting, both because God is 
incomparably perfect (humans are not) and because divine causation means that 
everything good (everything that makes one fitting to receive) must be attributed to 
God (not to the human). God does not give unfitting gifts, because God – as Creator – 
makes them fit. Accordingly, it may be better to say that for Philo God’s gifts are wholly 
fitting because God is overly gracious, while for Paul God’s gifts are wholly unfitting yet 
God is overly gracious. The location of divine grace in the cosmos or Christ results in 
dissimilar convictions about why and to whom God gives. 
4.2 Mediation and the Structure of the Gift 
Paul asks in Romans 10.14-15, “How are they to call on one they have not believed in? 
And how are they to believe in one they have not heard of? And how are they to hear 
without one preaching? And how are they to preach if they are not sent?” According to 
                                                        
168 Det. 114. 
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Paul, Christ had sent him to proclaim the gospel (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι; 1 Cor 1.17) just as God 
had revealed Christ in him so that he might proclaim him (εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτόν; Gal 
1.16). Preaching is necessary for salvation; indeed, it was by God’s wisdom that God 
chose to “save those who believe through the foolishness of preaching” (κήρυγμα; 1 Cor 
1.21). Thus, Paul’s gospel was not of human origins but was received through a 
revelation of Christ (Gal 1.11-12), for it is “the power of God for salvation” (Rom 1.16; 1 
Cor 1.18). Paul asserts that his proclamation sets him in an important relationship with 
his churches: “we preached...you believed” (κηρύσσομεν...ἐπιστεύσατε; 1 Cor 15.11).169 
Paul believes, therefore he speaks;170 and therefore his churches believe (cf. 2 Cor 4.13). 
Paul’s churches receive his proclamation not as human words but as God’s words, 
because it is God who calls believers into his kingdom and glory (1 Thess 2.12-13; 5.24; 
cf. also 1 Thess 1.5; Gal 3.2-5).171 Accordingly, faith is always divine initiative and gift (cf. 
Phil 1.29: ὑμῖν ἐχαρίσθη τὸ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ...τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύειν). 
 To say that proclamation of the gospel is important to Paul is an understatement. As 
we have seen, Paul believed that he played an important role in divine gift-giving, 
because the gift is received through proclamation. As Winger states, “Good news is not 
good news if it is not announced.”172 And as Litfin explains, commenting on 1 Cor 1.17, 
“Paul viewed his preaching as an assignment from Christ himself. This preaching 
constituted his apostolic calling.”173 The apostle is wrapped up in God’s work of calling 
humanity into salvation, because apostleship is a matter of embodying the gospel in life 
and enacting the gospel in proclamation. Paul’s proclamation is only significant and 
effective if it is accompanied by power and the Spirit,174 if it is actually God’s word and 
not his own;175 and Paul believed this to be the case. 
                                                        
169 Thus, Paul can employ familial language for this relationship (e.g. 1 Cor 4.14-15; 2 Cor 12.14; Gal 
4.19-20). On which, see B.R. Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007). 
170 Cf. T.B. Savage, Power Through Weakness: Paul’s Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 Corinthians 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 180: “it is faith which moves Paul to preach.” 
171 Winger, “Tradition,” 68 thus states that “call reveals to us the meaning of received the gospel.” 
172 Winger, “Tradition,” 75. 
173 D. Litfin, St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1994), 188.  
174 G.D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 
853: “for Paul both the understanding of the gospel and the event of preaching, including the hearing that 
leads to faith, are the work of the Spirit.”  
175 Cf. Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 239: “Preaching the gospel fully is inaugurating those powers whose 
origin is beyond Paul, but which are manifested in what he says and what he does.” 
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 There is no straightforward comparison in Philo’s writings. That a human could 
play an integral role in divine gift-giving is out of the question for Philo, because the 
ability of humans to give gifts is limited;176 God does that. Rather, gifts are not given by 
God himself – the Existent One – but by a series of mediators who are really themselves 
extensions of God’s own being, or are different ways of speaking about God (the Logos, 
θεός the Power).177 God can bless other humans through the generosity of a righteous 
person,178 but humans exist primarily as recipients of God’s bountiful generosity. One 
created thing that does play an important role in giving is the cosmos, which mirrors 
God as a gift-giver through natural provisions (rain, produce, etc.); but this is due to the 
presence of the Logos in the world and God’s working through his created reality. 
 Paul’s explicit role is anomalous.179 To quote Schütz, “In Paul’s whole apostolic life 
one sees the manifestation of God’s same act which one sees in the gospel itself.”180 If 
we look from Philo’s viewpoint, one could say that Paul so concentrates divine gift-
giving in Christ and the Spirit that he cannot really speak of creation as grace in any 
specific way. There are hints of this – of creation as gift and the gift-nature of all things 
– in verses such as 1 Cor 8.6, Rom 11.36, but it remains a latent possibility or extension 
of Paul’s thought. In this way, Philo might consider Paul’s gift-theology strangely 
myopic and insufficient; he would no doubt be troubled that the Christ-gift seems 
incompatible with creation, as it effects “new creation.” At issue, then, is the structure 
and mediation of divine gifts: Paul is separated from Philo by the particularity of the 
Christ-gift. That is, for Paul, the gift is an historical event that happened in a specific 
time and place; its particularity necessitates its mediation or announcement through 
apostles. For Philo, the individual exists within God’s greatest gift and in direct relation 
to God the giver who gives all good things. Grace as the world and as part of the cosmic 
order need not be mediated: gifts come directly from God, and a human mediator 
would only – to an extent – get in the way. Paul and Philo therefore conceive of God’s 
                                                        
176 On human gift-giving in Philo, see next chapter. 
177 For a helpful discussion of God’s immanence in Philo, see P. Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of 
Alexandria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 57–88.  
178 See esp. Migr. 121; Spec. 4.74. 
179 As Briones, “Mutual Brokers,” 548–552 shows, the relationship between Paul and his church is 
“one reciprocal relationship,” where not only Paul’s churches receive gifts from God through Paul, but 
Paul receives from God through his churches. 
180 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 246. 
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gifts as different kinds of things, which means they are necessarily given in different 
ways. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that three aspects of Paul’s understanding of divine gift-
giving converge in the person of Paul himself. First, Paul is a paradigm for receiving the 
incongruous gift. As Paul presents his testimony, he is an unworthy recipient of divine 
beneficence—and as with Paul, also with the rest of humanity. God is fundamentally 
one who gives to those who are unfitting to receive. Second, Paul considers his 
apostleship to be a gift inseparable from the Christ-gift. This close relationship exists 
because Paul traces the origin of both gifts to the same event, and because his 
apostleship exists to proclaim the Christ-gift. Third, Paul thus acts as a mediator of the 
gift – as an ambassador who proclaims and makes possible the reception of the gift. 
Paul does not give the gift – God, Christ, and the Spirit are the active agents of giving – 
but insofar as reception of the gift occurs through hearing the word, apostolic 
proclamation is indispensable. Paul as apostle is bound up with the gift such that 
rejection of the gift is rejection of Paul. 
What these three aspects of the divine gift effect is the creation of new 
communities that overturn commonly held social and ethnic norms. The gift is given in 
Paul’s proclamation to unworthy individuals who, by receiving the gift, enter a new 
kind of community. In the gospel, God calls humans “into the fellowship of his son Jesus 
Christ our Lord” (1 Cor 1.9). The next chapter will explore this more fully, showing that 
the theological foundation for Paul’s understanding of community is that each member 
of the community has received the incongruous Christ-gift. The creation of 
communities in Christ creates a new theological and social reality, in which individuals 
are bound together through material and spiritual giving. 
Chapter 5:  The Gift  and the Creation of Gift-Communities 
 
1.  Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I argued three main points about Paul’s theology of grace: 
the Christ-event is the primary gift within a complex of divine gifts; this gift is given to 
the undeserving, who are reconstituted through participation in the event; and Paul, as 
apostle, has a vital role in this giving, because he proclaims the gift. This chapter will 
tie together these points by contending that the result of this giving is the creation of 
communities that are bonded together by the reciprocal giving of material and spiritual 
support. In a strong sense, Paul’s theology of gift requires community for its 
instantiation. Individual gift-recipients enter communities that participate in and are 
conformed to the Christ-gift, and communal life thus takes a particular gift-shaped 
form. For Paul, proper human life, individually and communally, is gift-shaped, both in 
receiving and giving gifts, all as an aspect of God’s generosity.  
 God gives to the unworthy; but that does not mean unworthy recipients simply 
remain unworthy. Indeed, they are no longer unrighteous because they are now 
righteous in Christ, and their new Christocentric life should issue forth in new forms of 
living: the Christ-gift refashions humans to live new life.1 One receives the gift as an 
unfitting recipient, but insofar as the gift effects new creation, one cannot continue 
walking according to old ways and patterns of life (e.g. 2 Cor 5.16-17; Rom 6). Much like 
Philo, for Paul the question is: will you receive this gift, and receive it properly, not in 
vain? If the gift is received well, the rest of human life falls into place, because the 
unfitting Christ-gift founds and funds human life and action. This is the starting point 
for Paul’s moral vision. 
                                                        
1 Helpful discussions of Paul’s ethical vision can be found in V.P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul 
(reprint; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009); J.P. Sampley, Walking Between the Times: Paul’s Moral 
Reasoning (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991); R.B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A 
Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 16–59. 
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 This chapter explores one aspect of this vision: how God’s unfitting generosity sets 
its recipients free to be beneficent to others, in community.2 Thus, what we are 
examining – from one angle – is the Pauline claim that individuals in Christ are not 
simply set free, but set free to love others (cf. Gal 5.13). For Paul, the gift that 
individuals receive is structurally social: those reconstituted in Christ are reconstituted 
socially in relation to others.3 Significantly, when one is called in grace, one is called 
“into the fellowship of his son Jesus Christ our Lord” (1 Cor 1.9). Being “in Christ” 
means living relationally not only towards Christ but also towards others in Christ. The 
embodiment-enactment dialectic that I proposed in the previous chapter also shapes 
Paul’s ecclesiology: Paul’s churches, and the individual members, embody the gospel as 
the “body of Christ” and enact the gospel through giving in their intra-ecclesial and 
social relations.4 
 Accordingly, sections two (Rom 12; 1 Cor 12) and three (2 Cor 8-9) will consider how 
gifts function in creating and uniting communities, how human giving relates to the 
Christ-gift, and thus how divine gift-giving issues in human gift-giving and structures 
communal life. The final section will then compare Paul and Philo on three interrelated 
topics: human giving, thanksgiving, and community. 
                                                        
2 While it would be interesting to compare Philo’s notion of progress in virtue with Paul’s 
understanding of the life of the believer – from reception of the unfitting gift to the presentation of 
believers to God as “blameless in holiness” (1 Thess 3.13) – this route is preferable for two reasons: 1) 
examining how believers progress (or do not) in fittingness deserves far more space than is available 
here (and the seeds of an answer have been given in the previous chapters); and 2) the theme of human 
generosity is more explicitly related to what has come before conceptually and lexically (i.e. Paul uses 
gift language and concepts). For an exploration of the other theme in Paul, see J.M.G. Barclay, “Believers 
and the ‘Last Judgment’ in Paul,” in Eschatologie - Eschatology: The Sixth Durham-Tübingen Research 
Symposium: Eschatology in Old Testament, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. H.-J. Eckstein, C. 
Landmesser, and H. Lichtenberger; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 195–208. 
3 This theme could be developed further – for example, through the relation between body and 
member language in Rom 6 and 12, but the fact that Paul believed communities were necessary and 
integral to the shape of his theology (see esp. Hays, Moral Vision, 32–36) is so readily accepted that it 
seems superfluous. 
4 Thus, J.M.G. Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” in Redefining First-Century 
Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders (ed. F.E. Udoh et al.; Notre Dame: UND 
Press, 2008), 388 n.34: “The agency of believers may...be crucially linked to their participation in 
Christian community as well as to their participation in Christ: in a community where believers are 
channels of divine grace to one another, agency is constituted by mutual interdependence as well as 
direct dependence on the Spirit.” 
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2.  Gifts and Community 
In Romans 12.3-8 and 1 Corinthians 12.4-31, Paul makes arguments about the nature of 
Christ’s body and the gifts God gives to individuals; but where Romans stresses 
primarily the gift-nature of existence and service in the body, 1 Corinthians emphasizes 
the “solidarity and difference” that constitutes the diverse members of the 
community.5 Both set forth the vision that the community is the body of Christ, 
embodying and enacting Christ’s self-giving on individual and social levels, as their life 
together is defined and united by Christological generosity: first in receiving and then 
in giving.6 
2.1 Gifts According to the Gift: Romans 12.3-8 
In Romans 12.1-2, Paul exhorted the Roman believers to have a transformed mind so as 
to know the will of God; this provides the basis for his appeal in 12.3 not to have an 
overly-high self-opinion. Paul grounds his appeal διὰ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δοθείσης μοι. I 
have already argued that this formula refers to Paul’s apostleship, and we need not 
repeat the argument here.7 Paul has received a particular gift that designates his role as 
apostle within the community. 
Yet although χάρις designates Paul’s apostleship in 12.3, it does not do so in 12.6, 
where Paul states, “We have gifts (χαρίσματα) according to the gift (χάρις) that was 
given to us that differ.”8 The common feature of every gift given to community 
members is that each is κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν. Ultimately, we must ask two 
interrelated questions: First, what common χάρις have Paul and the Roman believers 
received in 12.6? On any reading, the referents for χάρις in 12.3 and 6 should be 
different. Second, what referent for χάρις best makes sense of the relationship 
designated by κατά when the χαρίσματα are the services listed in 12.6-8?  One could 
                                                        
5 D.G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 
2005). 
6 Cf. G. Bornkamm, Paul (trans. M.G. Stalker; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971), 195: “Only in this 
context of the effects and gifts of grace does the apostle utilize the ancient world’s figure of the one body 
and the variety of its members.” 
7 See chapter 4, section 2.1. 
8 For this translation, see K. Berding, “Romans 12.4-8: One Sentence or Two?,” NTS 52 (2006): 435.  
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view χάρις in 12.6 as generic Christian ministry, essentially in parallel to its use in 12.3.9 
Yet, if χαρίσματα are the services listed in 12.6-8, then it does not make sense to read 
χάρις in 12.3 and 6 similarly; Paul’s χάρις is his service. Χάρις in 12.6 is related to the 
χαρίσματα of 12.6-8, of course, but they are also distinguished: for example, one is 
singular, the other is plural, one is “given,” the other is “had.” And while it could be 
argued that the “grace given” formulae typically refer to ministry assignments, so it 
would seem natural for the same to hold here, this is not always true (see 2 Cor 8.1), and 
when it is true, they refer to Paul’s apostleship, not to general ministry.10 
Accordingly, as Fitzmyer states about 12.6, “All others partake in the gift that is 
Christ Jesus. Yet there are other charisms that Christians are endowed with, and of 
these Paul speaks here.”11 The one body relates to the one χάρις as the many members 
relate to the diverse χαρίσματα. The χάρις of 12.6 is the true root of the χαρίσματα of 
12.6, as well as Paul’s χάρις in 12.3. Paul’s χάρις qua apostleship in 12.3 is different from 
χάρις in 12.6 because it is related to the Christ-gift as the gift that communicates the 
Christ-gift to others, instantiated in particular services performed by the individual 
members of the body. Differentiation and relation mark the connection between χάρις 
in 12.3 and 6 and χαρίσματα and χάρις in 12.6. Accordingly, I concur with Satake: we can 
question 
ob mit χάρις hier...die Gnade des Dienstes gemeint ist. Paulus erwähnt im 
gleichen Satz auch χαρίσματα, also die Gaben zum Dienst, und schreibt der 
χάρις die Funktion zu, diese Charismen zu begründen. Χάρις und Charismen 
sind also nicht ganz identisch. Vor allem ist aber zu beachten, daß Paulus für 
die χάρις das Partizip Aorist δοθεῖσα wählt, für die Charismen das 
präsentische ἔχοντες. Das weist darauf hin, daß er mit großer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit bei χάρις an die Bekehrung der Römer denkt. Das alles 
                                                        
9 Cf. J.K. Goodrich, “‘Standard of Faith’ or ‘Measure of a Trusteeship’? A Study in Romans 12:3,” CBQ 
74 (2012): 759. 
10 The exception is 1 Cor 1.4. Here, as D. Zeller, Charis bei Philon und Paulus (Stuttgart: Verlag 
Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 186 states, “Diese sich so ausdifferenzierende Gnade ist nicht mehr 
einfach die Heilstat Gottes in Christus, sie wird aber doch durch eine präpositionale Wendung wie ἐν 
Χριστῷ damit in Verbindung gebracht.” The “einfach” is key: the language of “spiritual gifts” is wrapped 
up with the “Heilstat Gottes,” and there is a interdependent relationship of χαρίσματα to χάρις, which is 
stated more clearly in Rom 12.6. Phil 1.7 is also an interesting case, as the Philippians participate in Paul’s 
apostolic ministry; see J.H. Schütz, Paul and The Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), 
161–165. 
11 J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 
1992), 646. Cf. B. Eastman, The Significance of Grace in the Letters of Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 144. 
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legt nahe, daß er χάρις hier soteriologisch im engern Sinne versteht, also als 
diejenige Gnade, die die Römer einst zum Glauben führte.12 
Therefore, once again, it is better to view χάρις as the Christ-gift, or more broadly as life 
in Christ, the gift which generates community (cf. also Rom 5.2). Paul’s use of χάρις in 
12.3-6 places the entire community under the rubric of divine gift, while also signaling 
Paul’s apostolic relationship to this gift and the community. For Paul, there is one body 
of Christ and one common χάρις, but within that body – and springing from that χάρις 
– are many χαρίσματα.13 As Käsemann states, a χάρισμα is “the concretion and 
individuation of grace;”14 or similarly, Fitzmyer calls χαρίσματα “the specific 
participation of individual Christians in grace.”15 The κατά of 12.6 does theological work 
by Christologically defining and circumscribing the nature of χαρίσματα, thus giving 
criteria to understand what is and is not a gift from God, as well as what is and is not a 
proper use of such a gift.16 Those who receive a χάρισμα and use it in service participate 
in the Christ-gift, life in Christ, for their individual gifting is an instantiation of Christ’s 
generosity towards humanity.17 Human self-giving in service imitates Christology as 
Christology funds human giving.  
 So why does Paul not use χάρισμα for his apostleship? The answer is not explicitly 
presented, but given the argument of the last chapter, it is reasonable to argue that 
Paul understands his apostleship as integral to the communication of the Christ-gift 
and how it affects humans. Χαρίσματα are the outworking of the Christ-gift, but they 
                                                        
12 A. Satake, “Apostolat und Gnade bei Paulus,” NTS 15 (1968): 101. Similarly, P. Stuhlmacher, Der Brief 
an die Römer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 173. Satake’s point stands without reading 
strict temporality into Paul’s participles or a strong reference to conversion. 
13 On χαρίσματα generally, see E. Nardoni, “The Concept of Charism in Paul,” CBQ 55 (1993): 68–80; 
G.D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 32–35.  
14 E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. G.W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 333. 
15 Fitzmyer, Romans, 646. Cf. Fee, Empowering Presence, 607. 
16 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 333: “...the power of grace is limited christologically. This rules out in 
advance non-Christian modes of behavior.” 
17 Cf. J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 559: “For Paul the 
archetypal charisma was the gracious act of Christ on the cross.” E.g. Rom 5.15. There is no reason to 
delve into the specifics of the gifts in 12.6-8. As Fee, Empowering Presence, 605 states, “The first four 
primarily reflect the community gathered for worship, while the final three single out various ‘care 
givers’ within the community.” Additionally, we should note that most interpreters view 12.6 as starting 
a new sentence and therefore the different gifts have an imperatival force; see, e.g., C.E.B. Cranfield, A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 618. However, 
Berding, “Romans 12.4-8” has argued convincingly that 12.4-8 forms one sentence; consequently, the 
gifts/services are illustrative of Christian community. See also J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 9-16 (Waco: Word, 
1988), 725; R. Jewett, Romans (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2006), 744. 
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only exist because of the faith received via apostolic proclamation. What is clear in 1 
Corinthians, however, is that apostleship can also be set alongside other χαρίσματα – 
though Paul makes no strong or clear connection between χάρισμα and his own 
apostleship18 – and that Paul himself received other χαρίσματα common to the 
community.19 Paul modulates his presentation to fit the argument. 
 Another question: why did Paul employ gift terminology rather than something like 
πνευματικά? Käsemann argued that Paul directed this passage against “enthusiasts” 
and thus removed the focus from ecstatic gifts; note that the Spirit is not explicitly 
present, and the gifts listed are not particularly flamboyant.20 While this theory 
certainly stretches the evidence here, Käsemann accurately noted that Paul believes 
“heavenly gifts do not explode into the earthly sphere and produce radical disorder in 
the community.”21 Paul used gift-language to speak to the unity, order, and harmony 
(that should be) created by gifts in community.22 For Käsemann, as for Paul(!), gifts 
work against autonomy, because χαρίσματα enable one to serve, and each person’s gift 
is only realized in serving or edifying others.23 These gifts do not promote autonomy 
but being-for-the-other.24  
 Accordingly, life in Pauline communities starts from proper recognition of one’s 
place within the community, not a grab for personal honor.25 Paul’s appeal in 12.3 
                                                        
18 So, Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 251: “Paul never explicitly ties the apostolic role to the notion of 
charisma, but the apostle seems to be an important instance of what he regards as charismatic.” 
19 Cf. Eastman, Significance of Grace, 144: “In 12:3 especially, it is evident that Paul can use χάρις in a 
way that overlaps with χάρισμα.” As K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (trans. E.C. Hoskyns; 6th ed.; 
Oxford: OUP, 1968), 439 states, “The grace that was given him constitutes the peculiarity of his position 
and the paradox of his apostolate. He has been ‘commissioned and seconded to be a scout in the highest 
service’ (Kierkegaard). Yet he assumes that his hearers are similarly placed.” 
20 Käsemann, Romans, 332–333. 
21 Käsemann, Romans, 334. 
22 As B.C. Dunson, “Faith in Romans: The Salvation of the Individual or Life in Community?,” JSNT 34 
(2011): 34–35 notes, at the beginning of the letter Paul states his desire to impart a χάρισμα πνευματικόν 
to the Romans so that they might be strengthened (1.11); this is done precisely for the “mutual 
encouragement” (συμπαρακληθῆναι) of both the Romans and Paul. In 12.3-8 Paul is returning to a theme 
already mentioned: how gifts bind together Christian community. 
23 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 334. 
24 As A.J. Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 450 notes 
about 12.6-8, for each gift “Paul adds a notation about making use of it for the sake of others.” On the 
relation of individual and community in Romans, see B.C. Dunson, Individual and Community in Paul’s Letter 
to the Romans (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 
25 On this theme, see H. Moxnes, “The Quest for Honor and the Unity of the Community in Romans 12 
and in the Orations of Dio Chrysostom,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; 
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begins with a call for individuals to view themselves with σωφροσύνη according to the 
μέτρον πίστεως God has measured (ἐμέρισεν) to each. Scholars are divided on the 
phrase “measure of faith,” with the majority interpretation being the faith that all 
believers exercise equally.26 However, Goodrich has argued convincingly that the 
phrase “should be interpreted as a reference to the individual ministry, or charismatic 
function, distributed to each believer.”27 Accordingly, “every renewed person in the 
church has been privileged to receive a ‘trusteeship’ (πίστις) from God.”28 One has 
different gifts according to one’s own μέτρον πίστεως. Grace is thus both generative 
and evaluative of community and of the individual’s place within it. As Oakes states, 
“Paul is not calling for realistic assessment of oneself on the usual scales of status and 
intellect.”29 The ultimate criterion for assessment is incongruous gifting, which 
undercuts honor, social status, etc. 
 Paul’s statements about the community as one body build on the appeal in 12.3b. 
Paul does not elaborate the body metaphor as in 1 Corinthians 12 but the basic idea – 
every body has many parts, and these parts do not all perform the same function – is 
present. One becomes a member of the community through being in Christ (ἐν Χριστῷ; 
12.5). The body does not then fuse into homogeneity, but rather all in Christ are 
“individually members” of his body.30 This simple unity-in-difference grounds Paul’s 
elaboration of various gifts/functions in the community in 12.6-8, as the body of Christ 
functionally embodies and enacts Christ’s beneficence by each member’s looking 
towards another’s needs (cf. Phil 2.5ff.). Only on this basis of communal harmony does 
Paul address how the community relates both to those inside and outside of it in 12.9-
15. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 203–30; J.R. Harrison, “Augustan Rome and the Body of Christ: A 
Comparison of the Social Vision of the Res Gestae and Paul’s Letter to the Romans,” HTR 106 (2013): 14. 
26 Cf. esp. C.E.B. Cranfield, “ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ in Romans XII.3,” NTS 8 (1962): 345–51; Dunson, “Faith 
in Romans,” 35–37. 
27 Goodrich, “Romans 12:3,” quoting at 771. Similarly, J.C. Poirier, “The Measure of Stewardship: 
Πίστις in Romans 12:3,” TynB 59 (2008): 145–52. See also Fee, Empowering Presence, 609–610. 
28 Goodrich, “Romans 12:3,” 772. 
29 P. Oakes, Reading Romans in Pompeii: Paul’s Letter at Ground Level (London: SPCK, 2009), 100. 
30 Cf. A. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (trans. R. Brassier; Stanford: SUP, 2003), 106: 
“Differences, like instrumental tones, provide us with the recognizable univocity that makes up the 
melody of the True.” 
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 In sum, Paul’s gift-theology in Romans 12.3-8 speaks to a community that has its 
existence and unity precisely through its existence in the gift (ἐν Χριστῷ) and through 
the new life of each individual as givers. The Christological derivation and nature of 
χαρίσματα is essential for defining the nature of the community. Individuals within the 
community remain individuals with diverse abilities for service, but these gifts draw 
them into a community that is defined by generosity. 
2.2 The Solidarity of Gifts: 1 Corinthians 12.3-31 
In 1 Corinthians 12, Paul asserts that the confession that demarcates the Christian 
community – Jesus is Lord – occurs by the Holy Spirit (12.3). The subsequent sections of 
chapter 12 use this base to expound the working of the Spirit in diverse, yet 
interdependent, individuals within the community; here, as throughout the letter, Paul 
exhorts the Corinthians so that “there may be no schisms among you” (1.10).31 
 The note of unity-in-diversity is sounded prominently in 12.4-11, where Paul speaks 
about χαρίσματα and πνεῦμα, gifts and Giver.32 12.4-6 function as a heading of sorts for 
this theme: there are diversities of gifts (διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων), but the same Spirit (τὸ 
αὐτὸ πνεῦμα); diversities of services (διαιρέσεις διακονιῶν), and the same Lord (ὁ αὐτὸς 
κύριος); and diversities of activities (διαιρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων), but the same God (ὁ 
αὐτὸς θεός) who works all things in all. The gifts, services, and activities cannot be 
distinguished neatly, which suggests that divine gifts are actions (services) directed 
towards others.33 Likewise, the activity of the Spirit, Christ, and God cannot be split. 
While the Spirit is the primary agent in 12.7-11, Paul sets the Spirit’s working within 
the context of triune divine operations. The one Spirit works within the diverse 
members of the body, enabling and empowering divine gifting.34 
 In 12.7, Paul sets forth three important facets of these gifts. First, gifts are given to 
individuals within the community, as individuals (ἑκάστῳ δίδοται). Second, these gifts 
                                                        
31 Cf. M.M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and 
Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991), 1. 
32 Cf. R.F. Collins, First Corinthians (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 452. 
33 Dunn, Theology of Paul, 554 states that the three items are the same thing “alternatively expressed.” 
Cf. also Fee, Empowering Presence, 161. Differently, S. Schatzmann, A Pauline Theology of Charismata 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1987), 34. Cf. further Nardoni, “Concept of Charism,” 73. 
34 As Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 253 states about Paul’s pneumatology more broadly: “The spirit is not 
merely gift, it is also norm. It is not merely enabling, it is also regulative.” 
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are given for the mutual benefit of all (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον).35 The beginning and end of 
the sentence emphasize both the individual and the community and how the 
individual’s gifts relate to the community.36 As Schütz states, “supplying the goal 
provides Paul with the criteria for discrimination among spiritual gifts.”37 Third, gifts 
are pneumatological: Paul states that what is given to each is a “manifestation of the 
Spirit” (ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος), but then says one gift is given “through the 
Spirit,” another “according to the same Spirit,” another “in the same Spirit,” and closes 
the section by saying that it is the Spirit that parcels out specific gifts to whomever the 
Spirit desires (12.11).38 Accordingly, the Spirit is gift, Giver, and the agent at work in the 
manifestation of the gift. Diverse gifts for diverse individuals have their unity in the 
Spirit, who works the gifts πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον of the community. 
 The repeated notes of unity-in-diversity – of gifts in 12.4-11 and of members in the 
body in 12.12-13 – precede the discussion of the interdependence of the diverse 
members in 12.14-26, which stresses the point more emphatically than anywhere else 
in Paul’s letters.39 The many members are one body in Christ because – in God’s 
generosity – “in one Spirit” (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι) they all were baptized into one body (εἰς 
ἓν σῶμα) and drank the one Spirit (ἓν πνεῦμα). For Paul, since a body is necessarily 
made up of many parts, there can be neither “inferiority complexes” (14-20) nor 
“superiority complexes” (21-25).40 While some members have more honor than others 
(or appear to), God gives greater honor to those members that lack it (22-23). 
 Why should the community remain a united group while its members are so 
strikingly different? The short answer, for Paul, is that God wills it so: “But now God 
appointed (ἔθετο) the members, each one of them in the body as he willed” (ἠθέλησεν; 
                                                        
35 Zeller, Charis, 189 notes the parallel with Virt. 189, in which God’s δωρεαί given to individuals are of 
common benefit (κοινωφελεῖς) to all. 
36 Cf. R.B. Hays, First Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 210–211. 
37 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 256. 
38 Cf. Collins, Corinthians, 453: “No substantial difference in meaning appears to result from Paul’s use 
of different prepositions. ...The various prepositions in Paul’s list of charisms provide the list with 
stylistic variation.” Of course, Philo would need a full treatise to unravel Paul’s prepositions here. 
39 For background to Paul’s body analogy, see D.B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: YUP, 
1995); D.G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 
1 Clement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 178–179; Mitchell, Rhetoric, 157–160.  
40 Cf. Schatzmann, Charismata, 46. 
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18). God chooses to create community from and in diversity.41 Paul does not think this 
social reality works because humans make it so; rather, the body is unified because God 
makes it so through the Spirit. God accomplishes this by giving different gifts to 
individuals, and through these gifts each individual plays a necessary role in the 
operation of the body. Additionally, God establishes parity throughout the body 
through uneven dispersals of honor: “God united the body (ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν τὸ 
σῶμα) by giving excessive honor to what was lacking” (25). The result of God’s working 
in this two-fold way should be that the community exists without schism and therefore 
all of the members care for the same thing in behalf of one another (τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ 
ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη; 25). Everything drives towards this unity of purpose: the 
body functions in such a way that even the suffering or rejoicing of one member causes 
all members of the body to suffer or rejoice. As Horrell summarizes, “What Paul’s use of 
the body image reveals then...is his intention to engender not merely a form of 
corporate solidarity, but specifically – as in 1 Cor 1.10-4.21 – a form of solidarity 
constructed through reversing the conventional positions of high and low, wise and 
foolish, honourable and dishonourable, and fostering instead a mutual and egalitarian 
other-regard.”42 
 Hays states that 12.7 “contains in a nutshell the burden of Paul’s teaching in 
chapters 12-14,”43 and chapter 12 – as encapsulated in 12.7 – does indeed provide the 
foundation for chapters 13-14. The topic of unity-in-diversity naturally flows into Paul’s 
discussion of love, in chapter 13, as the “greater gift” the community should pursue. 
Then, in chapter 14 Paul discusses the role of gifts insofar as they both build up the 
community and help those outside it. When divine gifts are being properly exercised, 
the community is edified and those outside are reached.44 Accordingly, 1 Cor 12 and 
                                                        
41 As Horrell, Social Ethos, 180 notes, “Paul's insistence that the members are assigned to their 
position by divine appointment...could form an element in a conservative ideology which legitimated a 
social hierarchy by appealing to divine ordering. Yet it seems clear...that his concern here...is not to 
legitimate any kind of hierarchy within the body, but only to legitimate its diversity.” Cf. also Martin, 
Body, 94. 
42 Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 124. 
43 Hays, Corinthians, 211. 
44 Cf. Käsemann, Romans, 339: “Christ takes possession of every status, every present capacity and 
weakness of his members. He uses the most divergent forms of discipleship symbolically to penetrate the 
world instead of withdrawing from it.”  
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Rom 12 play a similar role in Paul’s argumentative flow: a discussion of intra-communal 
relations precedes discussing how the community relates to the world. 
2.3 Conclusion 
For Paul, divine gifts create community and sustain solidarity within those 
communities. The single, unfitting gift of Jesus Christ effects the transformation of 
individuals, which occurs “in Christ” — and the result of being “in Christ” is community 
with other believers, Christ’s body. Through the activity of the Holy Spirit – a gift 
inseparable from the Christ-gift – believers embody their benefactor on both individual 
and communal levels: each individual serves through their gifts, and the result is that 
the corporate “body of Christ” is constituted by beneficent members, and is thus the 
body of Christ to the world. The community is created by a single gift and sustained by 
many gifts. As Horrell puts it, “The basis for solidarity, for the construction of 
community...is found in Paul’s Christology: as believers make the story of Christ their 
own, participating in his death and new life, so they leave behind the old world, and 
become members of one body, in Christ.”45 
These two texts focus on gifts that are considered special endowments from God, 
which the individual puts into practice in and for the life of the community. A whole 
range of acts is implied by gifts: from the mundane tasks of administration and service, 
charitable acts of almsgiving and encouragement, to the extramundane works of 
tongues and healing. They have a wide socio-theological bearing, and they inculcate a 
particular kind of Christian existence: in community, in loving service towards the 
other. We shall now turn to 2 Corinthians 8-9, to explore further Paul’s belief that 
divine giving effects human giving, and particularly material giving. 
3.  God’s Grace and Human Giving 
In 2 Corinthians 8-9,46 Paul admonishes the Corinthians to provide financial support for 
the Christians in Jerusalem.47 As we have already noted, for Paul, the gift’s location in 
                                                        
45 Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 132. 
46 The unity of 2 Corinthians remains an open debate. For a collection of letters, see G. Bornkamm, 
“The History of the Origin of the So-Called Second Letter to the Corinthians,” NTS 8 (1962): 258–64; N.H. 
Taylor, “The Composition and Chronology of Second Corinthians,” JSNT 44 (1991): 67–87. For unity, see 
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and effect on the community cannot be restricted to a spiritual realm; indeed, the 
revolutionary character of God’s gift in Christ is the total claim it makes on the lives of 
its recipients.48 Grace founds and funds the action of believers: the Christ-gift is 
generative of human giving, and in giving humans are drawn into the dynamic of God’s 
gift-economy. A distinctive note on reciprocity is sounded here: grace is received to be 
given, and in the giving and receiving of gifts, relationships are created and sustained. 
As Ogereau states, the collection “represented an act of charity...that...was intended to 
transcend geo-political, socio-economic, and ethnic distinctions in a revolutionary way, 
as well as redefine the social foundations of the emergent Christ-believing 
communities.”49 Our examination will focus on four issues: how humans can give, the 
manner in which humans give, what human giving accomplishes, and how giving 
relates to thanksgiving. 
3.1 How can humans give? 
Paul’s appeal for the Corinthians to give is not straightforward. For Paul, it seems that 
the ability to give is not possessed by virtue of merely being human.50 Rather, Paul 
grounds human giving in an account of divine giving, in which key concepts such as 
generosity, wealth, and poverty find new meanings. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
J.D.H. Amador, “Revisiting 2 Corinthians: Rhetoric and the Case for Unity,” NTS 46 (2000): 92–111; P. 
Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 15–25. Although the unity of 
the letter does not affect the argument here, I follow F. Watson, “2 Cor. X-XIII and Paul’s Painful Letter to 
the Corinthians,” JTS 35 (1984): 324–46 in viewing 2 Cor 10-13 as the “painful letter” and 2 Cor 1-9 as one 
subsequent letter. The unity of chapters 8-9 could, however, affect my reading. For a sustained argument 
against unity, see H.D. Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9: A Commentary on Two Administrative Letters of the Apostle 
Paul (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). However, S.K. Stowers, “Peri Men Gar and the Integrity of 2 Cor. 
8 and 9,” NovT 32 (1990): 340–48 has convincingly demonstrated that “the only argument for 
[disunity]...subject to verification” – that περὶ μὲν γάρ cannot connect chapter 9 to 8 – is incorrect. See 
further V.P. Furnish, II Corinthians (New Haven: YUP, 2005), 41–44, 420-433. 
47 On Paul’s collection, see D. Georgi, Remembering the Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1992); K. Nickle, The Collection: A Study in Paul’s Strategy (Naperville: Allenson, 1966); 
Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9; B. Beckheuer, Paulus und Jerusalem: Kollekte und Mission im theologischen Denken des 
Heidenapostels (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997); S. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and 
Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); and now esp. D.J. Downs, The 
Offering of the Gentiles: Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem in Its Chronological, Cultural, and Cultic Contexts (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 
48 F. Young and D.F. Ford, Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians (London: SPCK, 1987), 166–185 provide an 
interesting discussion of the economic metaphors that run throughout 2 Corinthians.  
49 J.M. Ogereau, “The Jerusalem Collection as Κοινωνία: Paul’s Global Politics of Socio-Economic 
Equality and Solidarity,” NTS 58 (2012): 361. 
50 This is also the case for Philo; see section 4.1 
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 Paul discloses “the grace of God” given in the churches of Macedonia (8.1). But, 
significantly, Paul next explains not divine giving but the giving of the Macedonians, 
whose charity presents an inversion of conventional wisdom. The context of their gift 
was a “severe trial,” and it was not great riches that “abounded unto the riches of their 
generosity” but rather deep poverty (ἡ κατὰ βάθους πτωχεία) and abundant joy (8.2).51 
Precisely what could fund material giving was absent. This logic indicates that 
“abundance” and “wealth” do not have their typical meanings. Rather than having 
resources from which to give, their resource is poverty, which amounts to “rich 
generosity” when coupled with “abundant joy.” The Macedonians gave beyond their 
means, willingly pursuing the chance to contribute to Paul’s collection. 
 The poverty of the Macedonians is linked with the poverty of Christ (8.9); and 8.9 
also harks back to 8.1: “you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ” (γινώσκετε τὴν 
χάριν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ). God’s gift is Christ’s self-gift. The language of 
knowing creates a further link: whereas the Corinthians know (γινώσκετε) Christ’s 
grace, Paul is seeking to “make known” (γνωρίζομεν) God’s grace. The problem is not 
that the Corinthians are ignorant of God’s grace but that they need an accurate 
perception of it, an understanding of its effects on their lives. Paul’s appeal to Christ’s 
generosity does just that. As Barclay puts it, “The Christ event is..., for Paul, the key 
enactment and the focal expression of the cascade of divine grace, from God, in Christ, 
through believers, to others.”52 
 The χάρις τοῦ Χριστοῦ is Christ’s movement from being rich to poverty, for the 
Corinthians’ sake.53 Interpretive issues are abundant. For example, interpreters largely 
agree that πλούσιος ὤν refers to Christ’s preexistence,54 though a minority believes it 
                                                        
51 The economic level of early Christians is debated; for discussion, see W.A. Meeks, The First Urban 
Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: YUP, 1983), 51–73; J.J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty, and 
Survival (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); B.W. Longenecker, Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-
Roman World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010). 
52 J.M.G. Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace: A Study of 2 Corinthians 8:1-15,” in The Word 
Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays (ed. J.R. Wagner, C.K. Rowe, and 
A.K. Grieb; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 410. 
53 For an interesting reading of 8.9 in light of the “impoverished benefactor motif” as well as the 
“rhetorical topos of the enslaved leader,” see J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman 
Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 250–268. 
54 Cf. e.g. G.D. Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007), 
163–165. See also M.E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: 
VIII-XIII (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 533–534. 
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refers to Christ’s earthly self-giving.55 In short-form this phrase likely refers to the 
totality of Christ’s self-giving, from preexistence through death. And although most 
read the participle as a concession – although Christ was rich, he became poor – one 
could also interpret it causally – because Christ was rich, he became poor. For Paul, as 
for all Jews, giving is the character of God’s engagement with the world as revealed 
throughout history, not a concession.56 This translation “immediately signal[s] that 
‘rich’ is here used in a paradoxical sense, sending readers to the literary context to find 
that wealth here means ‘wealth-as-generosity.’”57 Believers are not made rich through 
Christ’s revocation of possessions but through Christ’s self-giving generosity. For Paul, 
wealth is not the polar opposite of poverty. Christ becomes poor in his generosity, and 
“Christ has made them rich in precisely what is required of them here, rich in 
generosity and thus in generous contribution to the collection.”58 Perhaps counter-
intuitively, one’s wealth is located in one’s generosity, and human giving thus takes its 
distinctive shape from Christ’s giving. The Macedonians paradoxically gave out of their 
“deep poverty” and the Corinthians do not have enough possessions for giving not to 
be burdensome (cf. 8.13). Yet God’s grace abounded to believers so that they could 
“abound in every good work,” as Christ’s giving funds and provides the model for 
human giving.59 
That divine giving enables and funds human giving is also evident in 9.8-11. After 
stating that one should give as he or she has determined in the heart, for “God loves a 
cheerful giver” (cf. Prov 22.8 LXX), Paul steps back again to explain the source of one’s 
giving. “Now God is able to make every gift abound (πᾶσαν χάριν περισσεῦσαι) to you” 
(9.8). Presumably the need for this statement, beyond its correctness, is that the 
                                                        
55 Esp. J.D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the 
Incarnation (2nd ed.; London: SCM Press, 1989), 121–123; Dunn, Theology of Paul, 290–292. 
56 Cf. similarly the causative interpretation of ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων in Phil 2.6: M. Bockmuehl, The 
Epistle to the Philippians (London: A&C Black, 1997), 133–134; and the paradoxical ἐλεύθερος ὤν in 1 Cor 
9.19: W. Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther 2, 1 Kor 6,12-11,16 (Zürich: Benziger, 1995), 338–339. 
57 J.M.G. Barclay, “‘Because he was rich he became poor’: Translation, Exegesis and Hermeneutics in 
the Reading of 2 Cor 8.9,” in Theologizing in the Corinthian Conflict: Studies in the Exegesis and Theology of 2 
Corinthians (eds. R. Bieringer et al.; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 331-344. 
58 Barclay, “‘Because he was rich.’” 
59 Cf. D.G. Horrell, “Paul’s Narratives or Narrative Substructure: The Significance of ‘Paul’s Story’,” in 
Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2002), 166: “This paradigm of self-giving...provides a fundamental motivation and pattern for Pauline 
ethics.” 
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Corinthians either do not have much to give or giving what they have will put them in 
θλῖψις. Yet the πᾶσαν χάριν cannot be delimited; it includes anything the Corinthians 
could need to live out their identities in Christ. The next statement makes clear that 
God’s giving has an other-directed purpose (as always): God will give “so that in every 
way at all time (ἐν παντὶ πάντοτε), being self-sufficient, you might abound in every 
good work (περισσεύητε εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν).” God gives gifts so that the Corinthians 
might abound in good works – not so they might abound in possessions of which they 
can give some to the saints, but so that they might abound in the good works of 
generosity. The emphasis in the passage is striking: God gives all gifts so that at all times 
they may abound in every good work.60  
In 9.9 Paul quotes Ps 111.9 for support. The subject is debatable: who exactly is 
“scattering seed” and “giving to the poor?”61 In the Psalm, the subject is the “man who 
fears the Lord.” Paul has just described how the Corinthians would abound in good 
works, and the specific work in view is giving to the poor (ἔδωκεν τοῖς πένησιν). 
Although a righteousness that lasts “forever” would typically refer to God’s 
righteousness, the Psalm refers to human righteousness. Furthermore, in 9.10, which 
parallels 9.8, Paul continues the agricultural metaphor of Psalm 111, stating that 
whatever seed is scattered comes from God. The quotation of Isaiah 55.10 reinforces 
that God is “the one who supplies seed for the sower and bread for food” and therefore 
God will “supply and increase your seed and cause the products of your righteousness 
to grow.” This fits clearly with the Psalm: the human scatters seed that God has 
provided, and gives to the poor as a result of God’s causing their righteousness to 
increase. The gift of the Corinthians is a giving made possible by God’s generosity; 
divine and human giving cannot be uncoupled, and their interrelation is what makes 
possible Christian generosity. Accordingly, the subject in 9.9 could be human, with 9.8 
and 10 providing the grounds for human agency in 9.9. Yet, God is the subject of 9.8 and 
                                                        
60 Thus, B.B. Bruehler, “Proverbs, Persuasion and People: A Three-Dimensional Investigation of 2 Cor 
9.6-15,” NTS 48 (2002): 216 rightly notes that αὐτάρκεια “is no longer a virtue of freedom and stable 
independence, but a gift that promotes interconnectedness through giving out of one’s God-given 
resources.”  
61 For the human as subject: Thrall, 2 Corinthians VIII-XIII, 580–583; Joubert, Benefactor, 196; Bruehler, 
“Three-Dimensional,” 216–217. For God as subject: Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 111–112; Furnish, II 
Corinthians, 448–449; Barnett, Corinthians, 440. 
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10: God gives, causes to abound, and supplies. Since there is no explicit marker that the 
agency of the subject has switched,62 it might be natural to assume that God’s provision 
is referenced in the quotation – a proof of Paul’s statements. There are thus reasons to 
take this passage either way. I strongly favour the interpretation that human giving is 
in view, but the ambiguity in the subject’s identity is significant itself. For Paul, to 
speak of human giving is to speak of divine giving – the latter can occur by itself, but 
the former requires the latter – yet this does not nullify the fact that humans do then 
give. Human giving is embedded in and is an extension of divine giving, with Paul 
seeing them neither in tension nor in competition.63   
Paul states next that “in every way [you are] being made rich [by God] unto all 
generosity (πλουτιζόμενοι εἰς πᾶσαν ἁπλότητα; 9.11).” In the paradoxical manner seen 
in the witness of the Macedonians and ultimately in Christ, being rich is inextricably 
linked with generosity, because wealth is manifested in giving, not having. In simplest 
terms, God gives to humans so that they can give, where giving is determined less by 
possessions and more by willingness. This account of the relation between divine and 
human giving can make sense of Paul’s manifold use of gift-language – specifically 
χάρις – throughout these two chapters. Underlying the diverse use of χάρις is a relation 
within the economy of gift-giving.64 For example, in 8.1, 9, and 9.8, χάρις refers to divine 
giving on the part of God or Christ; in 8.4, 6, 7, 19, and 9.14 it refers to the collection, 
human work and giving; and finally, in 8.16 and 9.15, χάρις is thanks rendered to God. 
The first meaning, divine gift, makes possible the second, human giving. And as we will 
see below, divinely-empowered human giving is inseparable from thanksgiving. 
                                                        
62 However, it is curious that Paul switches δίδωμι for ἐπιχορηγέω in the Isa 55.10 citation, which 
may signal a distinction in agencies between verse 9, where δίδωμι is used. If 9.9 and 10 used δίδωμι, it 
would be much more difficult to argue for a human subject. 
63 Cf. Barclay, “Transformation,” 382: “What is interesting is that both interpretations can claim 
strong support from the context, for the good reason that the generosity in view can be said to involve 
both divine and human agency.” 
64 Cf. Barclay, “Circulation of Grace,” 419–420: “It does not strain Greek to use this term for [God’s 
grace and the collection], but the combination can hardly be accidental.” 
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3.2 In what way are humans to give? 
The context for Paul’s account of human giving and how it occurs vis-à-vis divine 
giving is, of course, his admonition of the Corinthians to give.65 In the collection, the 
cultural dynamics of gift, counter-gift, obligation, and gratitude are all present; but 
Paul subtly reinterprets them around the Christ-gift, thus giving new focus to each 
aspect.66 The Corinthians are being reluctant to give – to fulfill their promise that they 
would give – and Paul, without simply commanding them to give, places both social 
(reciprocity) and theological (identity in Christ) pressure to give. That is, Paul’s 
discussion displays both the freedom and obligation in relation to the gift that 
characterized all antique gift-giving. Both sides of this dichotomy can be seen clearly, 
and the paradox (for us, not Paul) is that they do not stand in tension.  
The example of the Macedonians illustrates the freedom of giving that should 
characterize believers. They gave “of their own volition” (αὐθαίρετοι), begging Paul for 
the χάρις and κοινωνία of ministering to the saints (8.3-4). Thus, Paul advises the 
Corinthians to give “each as he has decided in his heart, not grudgingly or from 
necessity” (μὴ ἐκ λύπης ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; 9.7).67 Paul wants to make clear that he is not 
                                                        
65 For a reading of 2 Cor 8-9 strictly through the lens of patron-client relations, see M.A. Jennings, 
“Patronage and Rebuke in Paul’s Persuasion in 2 Corinthians 8-9,” JGRChJ 6 (2009): 107–27. According to 
Jennings, “By failing to be...obedient in giving to the collection, the Corinthians would be violating the 
social cohesion of this patronal network” (113). For a general overview, see J.H. Neyrey, “God, Benefactor 
and Patron: The Major Cultural Model for Interpreting the Deity in Greco-Roman Antiquity,” JSNT 27 
(2005): 465–92; and esp. D.A. DeSilva, “Patronage and Reciprocity: The Context of Grace in the New 
Testament,” ATJ 31 (1999): 32–84. 
66 Joubert, Benefactor, 138 states that the Christ-gift “places all believers in debt” to God. Paul, of 
course, does not say this; in Paul’s interpretation, giving is less in response to debt than it is the natural 
action of the person reconstituted in Christ. However, Joubert’s point is well taken; Paul reshapes ancient 
reciprocity around the Christ-gift rather than somehow “transcending” it. Young and Ford, Meaning and 
Truth, 178 capture this point, even if it is somewhat overstated: “In the face of what this God gives, 
calculations of reciprocity are pointless: one simply gives freely in the spirit of the God who does 
likewise.” But see also 179: “Vis-à-vis Hellenistic reciprocity, what seems to have happened is that the 
inexhaustible generosity of God places everyone in the position of his clients and therefore owing him 
thanks; but among the clients themselves there is no basis for anything other than equality or 
uncalculating generosity, and so all patron-client relationships are relativized.” Or as S.C. Mott, Biblical 
Ethics and Social Change (2nd ed.; Oxford: OUP, 2011), 27 states, “The benefactor’s charis is a gift; the 
recipient’s charis is gratitude. But we have more than reciprocity. Grace in these chapters remains God’s 
power. God’s grace flows into them and emerges as their grace toward the poor.”  
67 As Jennings, “Patronage and Rebuke,” 117 notes, “There existed an interesting tension in that even 
though grace was an act of expected reciprocal exchange, it also required no hint of obligation in order 
to maintain its essence as a virtue.” Consequently, Harrison, Grace, 313 might be too strong in saying that 
“[p]erhaps Paul’s secret fear was that the Corinthians might ultimately...fulfill their promised 
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forcing the Corinthians to give: in 8.8 he states, “I am not speaking in the manner of a 
commandment” (οὐ κατ᾿ ἐπιταγὴν λέγω), and in 8.10 he says that he is giving his 
“opinion” that it would be beneficial for them to give. The Corinthians should give 
without goading, for “God loves a cheerful giver” (ἱλαρὸν γὰρ δότην ἀγαπᾷ ὁ θεός). 
Paul reminds the Corinthians of their promise to give, which provoked the 
Macedonians to their own generosity (9.2).68 The Corinthians should now fulfill 
(ἐπιτελέω)69 their original promise by connecting their “willing” with “doing” (8.10-12). 
Being gifted by God, the Corinthians abound in faith, speech, knowledge, zeal and love 
for Paul and his companions; consequently, they should also abound “in this gift” (ἐν 
ταύτῃ τῇ χάριτι περισσεύητε; 8.7). However, to put further pressure on the Corinthians, 
Paul reminds them of the potential shame hanging over his head until they give. If they 
do not give, Paul’s boast about them would be in vain (9.3-4). The final point Paul makes 
in this regard is one of obedience. If the Corinthians prove themselves in this ministry, 
others will glorify God because of “the obedience of your confession to the gospel of 
Christ and generosity of community” (ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον 
τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἁπλότητι τῆς κοινωνίας; 9.13-14).70 This tension (from our view) is 
helpfully summarized in Paul’s note that he sent the brothers to arrange their gift – 
thus, they had to give! – so their giving would be “as a willing gift, not as an extraction” 
(9.5). 
The actions of the Corinthians affect others: their promised giving provoked the 
Macedonians to give,71 their potential unwillingness to give could shame Paul, and their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
contribution, not because of any sense of gratitude for the divine grace revealed in the impoverished 
Christ (2 Cor 8:9), but more due to the silent demands of the Graeco-Roman reciprocity system.” 
68 Harrison, Grace, 312 draws attention to Dio Chrysostom’s Or. 40.3-4: “...For there is nothing more 
weighty, no debt bearing higher interest, than a favor promised. Moreover, this is the shameful and 
bitter kind of loan, when...because of tardy payment the favor turns into an obligation... For nothing has 
such power to remind those who owe you such obligations as your having utterly forgotten them.” 
69 On this term, see R.S. Ascough, “The Completion of a Religious Duty: The Background of 2 Cor 8.1-
15,” NTS 42 (1996): 584–99 who suggests that ἐπιτελέω was used in the context of religious duty, which is 
important for how Paul displays the collection not as an “administrative task.” 
70 Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 122–123 argues that ἡ ὑποταγὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν should be 
interpreted as “the donors have entered into a contractual agreement (ὁμολογία) by means of their 
donation, the substance of which is their submission (ὑποταγή) to Jerusalem.” But see Thrall, 2 Corinthians 
VIII-XIII, 598–590 who maintains that the evidence favors viewing ὁμολογία as “confession.” 
71 On the potential rivalry between the Corinthians and Macedonians, see Harrison, Grace, 314–321, 
who argues that Paul “promotes a rivalry in beneficence...by employing the zeal terminology of the 
honorific inscriptions” but without using “the inscriptional terminology of competition.” See also 
Joubert, Benefactor, 173–176. 
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eventual giving would aid the saints. Consequently, Paul urges the Corinthians to give 
in a manner that neither allows them not to give (they need to give) nor forces them to 
give (they need to give willingly). This is the simple shape of all gift-giving relationships 
in antiquity: all gift-giving contains this tension, the non-legal obligation that arises 
and exists within prior relationships. Yet, another – more significant – part of this 
tension between freedom and compulsion, and therefore obedience itself, results from 
Paul’s understanding of human giving. Receiving the gift of Christ, and therefore 
existing in Christ, reconstitutes and enables a person to give; not giving is inconsistent 
with one’s identity in Christ.72 The character of gift-giving should be a kind of 
unprovoked giving, stemming from God’s giving to the unworthy. Hence, where we see 
a tension between Paul rhetorically and theologically coercing the Corinthians to give 
and an ideal of freely giving, Paul – and his contemporaries – saw no tension. The rules 
of ancient benefaction apply, except here the relationship with Christ also enables 
giving and provides its distinctive shape, which necessarily modifies the benefaction 
system. 
3.3 What does human giving accomplish? 
As Paul assures the Corinthians, they do not give to be thrown into θλῖψις and the 
saints into rest; rather, their giving is for equality (ἰσότης).73 While the Corinthians 
                                                        
72 Thus, Barclay, “Circulation of Grace,” 420: “The Corinthians are being invited not just to imitate 
God’s dynamic of grace toward the world but to embody it, to continue and extend it in their own giving 
to meet the needs of others.” 
73 As Ogereau, “Collection,” 365–366 argues, Paul’s notion of equality is seen in his use of Exod 16.18, 
where, in its original context, the issue is “proportion to [one’s] need.” Thus, not a strict leveling of 
resources, but a “relative, proportional equality by restoring a certain balance between need and 
surplus.” Cf., somewhat similarly, L.L. Welborn, “‘That There May Be Equality’: The Contexts and 
Consequences of a Pauline Ideal,” NTS 59 (2013): 73–90. 
Philo’s understanding of equality can make for an interesting comparison with Paul. H. Windisch, Der 
zweite Korintherbrief (reprint; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 259 proposed that Paul and 
Philo drew on the same tradition, since, for example, they both used Exod 16.18 to explain ἰσότης (cf. Her. 
191; 2 Cor 8.15); on the use of this text in Philo and Paul, see Barclay, “Circulation of Grace.” Where Philo 
reads Exod 16.18 as evidence of God’s providential ordering for equality (each receives what is 
appropriate), Paul transforms the verse into a statement about how “the one who has much” and “the 
one who has little” are related in giving. As Barclay states, “Paul appears to have combined with the 
manna narrative, or superimposed upon it, a model of gift exchange and mutuality in surplus 
distribution that is not already implicit in the text but is brought to it from elsewhere, apparently from 
his understanding of the Christ event and its social implications” (413). Accordingly, the attempt of 
Georgi, Collection, 84–92 to read a Philonic concept of ἰσότης into Paul, such that ἰσότης is a 
circumlocution for God, has not been received well by commentators. 
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currently have an “abundance” (περίσσευμα), the saints have a lack (ὑστέρημα). The 
abundance meets the lack, and equality results. When the situation is reversed the 
saints will likewise give from their abundance (8.14b).74 Since God was the source of the 
gift, when the Corinthians would give to the saints a hierarchical relationship was not 
created but one of mutuality and interdependence where each gives to fulfill a need 
(8.13-4). However, where we would expect for the saints to reciprocate to the 
Corinthians for their gift, such is not the case.75 The saints would indeed “long for you 
and pray for you, because of the surpassing grace of God upon you” (9.14), but they 
would not reciprocate materially – what could they give? The normal cycles of 
reciprocation are necessarily modified here: God provides for the Corinthians who can 
then give to the saints, who give thanks to God, but do not give to the Corinthians (cf. 
9.11-14). Gratitude, however, constituted a form of reciprocity, and Paul states that the 
Corinthians would further be “enriched in every way for all your generosity” by God 
(9.11). All gift-giving cycles in which humans participate come from, through, and to 
God; no step occurs independently. 
But if the Corinthians give to the saints in Jerusalem but the saints do not give back, 
what sort of relationship is there? This one-way leveling of surplus and lack does not 
necessarily create any long-lasting connection. The three-way movement from God to 
the Corinthians to the saints (and back to God) needs also to run from the saints to the 
Corinthians. Paul makes it clear that this is indeed the case: in the Corinthians’ gift the 
saints glorify God because of the “generosity of [your] contribution” (ἁπλότητι τῆς 
κοινωνίας) which was given “for them and for all.” Although the perhaps dominant 
understanding of κοινωνία views it as a reference to a concrete monetary 
contribution,76 Ogereau, following on the work of Peterman,77 shows that it never 
                                                        
74 As D.J. Downs, “Redemptive Alsmgiving and Economic Stratification in 2 Clement,” JECS 19 (2011): 
499 notes, it is inappropriate to read Rom 15.26-27 into 2 Cor 8-9; in the former text, Paul speaks of an 
exchange of material goods for spiritual blessings, while in the latter, “Paul envisions a situation in 
which the Corinthians might someday require financial assistance from believers in Jerusalem.” On the 
collection in Romans 15, see further D.J. Downs, “‘The Offering of the Gentiles’ in Romans 15.16,” JSNT 29 
(2006): 173–86. 
75 See Barclay, “Circulation of Grace,” 422: “the language of debt and obligation is completely absent 
here, and in its place is a system for the mutual sharing of surplus.” 
76 This has been the case, with regard to Paul, since esp. H. Seesemann, Der Begriff ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ im Neuen 
Testament (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1933). 
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means concrete monetary contribution.78 Rather, as Ogereau states, κοινωνία means 
“some kind of partnership or association with socio-political ramifications,” which 
would result in financial contributions.79 Thus, in essence, it points to the “fellowship” 
caused by the gift. Immediately after this phrase, Paul explains how this κοινωνία is 
also upheld by the saints: they pray for the Corinthians and long for the Corinthians on 
account of God’s gift which was given to the Corinthians (9.14). Additionally, the 
Corinthians’ generosity will eventually result in a counter-gift from the saints to assist 
the Corinthians, if this is ever needed (8.14). This gift-giving thus creates relationship 
and strengthens ties, while also serving  the ends of worshipping God. Accordingly, 
“Paul’s rhetorical appeal to ἰσότης and κοινωνία...suggests that he had very concrete 
objectives in mind. His intentions seem to have extended beyond the mere alleviation 
of poverty by means of charitable giving. Indeed, he appears to have aimed at 
reforming the structural inequalities of Graeco-Roman society that were also becoming 
apparent in the early church, by fostering socio-economic ἰσότης between Jews and 
Gentiles and by establishing a global, socially and ethnically inclusive κοινωνία among 
them.”80 
3.4 Giving as/and Thanksgiving 
As noted above, human giving also effects thanksgiving to God. In 9.6-15, Paul brings to 
the fore the place of thanksgiving in gift-giving. Thanksgiving is a result of receiving 
from God as well as receiving gifts from God through humans. In 9.11, Paul states that 
God is “in every way enriching” the Corinthians “unto all generosity,” which is, of 
course, for the purpose of contributing to the needs of the saints.  But their generosity 
has another effect: it “produces through us thanksgiving to God” (κατεργάζεται δι᾿ 
ἡμῶν εὐχαριστίαν τῷ θεῷ).81 The “us” here is undoubtedly Paul and his co-workers in 
the collection, and through them the Corinthians’ generosity results in thanksgiving. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
77 G.W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian Giving (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1997). 
78 Ogereau, “Collection,” 368. 
79 Ogereau, “Collection,” 371. 
80 Ogereau, “Collection,” 377. 
81 Cf. Downs, Offering, 143: “What is striking about 2 Cor 9.11-12 is...[Paul’s] affirmation of God as the 
sole object of thanksgiving. ...one would perhaps expect Paul to remind the Corinthians that their 
support of the offering for Jerusalem will result in ‘thanksgiving to you.’” 
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Likewise, in 9.12, Paul states that the collection not only fulfills the needs of the saints, 
but also “abounds through many thanksgivings to God” (περισσεύουσα διὰ πολλῶν 
εὐχαριστιῶν τῷ θεῷ; cf. 4.15). Material giving is intimately linked to thanksgiving, as 
the former results in the latter. In a related manner, Paul remarks that the 
Macedonians gave themselves first actually to God and Paul and his coworkers: “their 
surprising generosity is a direct result of their dedication of themselves to the Lord.”82 
Thanksgiving is not only the proper response to God’s giving, but seems to be, for Paul, 
coterminous with human giving. Every act of giving issues in thanksgiving to God, and 
every act of giving is predicated on a prior thanksgiving for God’s gift. Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that the passage ends with thanksgiving for God’s “indescribable gift” 
(Χάρις τῷ θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγήτῳ αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ; 9.15).83 
3.5 Conclusion 
For Paul, God’s gifts not only generate communities but bind them together, the latter 
specifically by enabling humans within those communities to give to one another and 
to those in other communities.84 Human giving meets the needs of others and upholds 
community, as all meet together in thanksgiving through participation within the 
divine gift economy. Pauline communities are established and defined by God’s 
generosity, with each individual member receiving gifts and thus being enabled to give. 
 Three interesting points of contact with Philo now come into view – on human 
giving, thanksgiving, and community – and the rest of this chapter will clarify further 
the positions of Paul and Philo through comparison. 
                                                        
82 Barnett, Corinthians, 399. As Thrall, 2 Corinthians VIII-XIII, 526 notes, the emphatic position of 
ἑαυτούς in 8.5 suggests that πρῶτον contrasts the Macedonians’ giving of themselves before their 
material giving, rather than their giving to God before Paul. 
83 Hence, Jennings, “Patronage and Rebuke,” 119 states that “Paul comes extremely close to 
Sophocles’ maxim in 2 Cor. 9.15” – “Grace is always giving birth to grace” (Ajax 522). 
84 Cf. Mott, Social Change, 27: “God’s benevolent act does not merely ‘inspire’ the response, it actually 
creates the ability to respond—it is both the reason and the power for the response.” 
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4.  Philo and Paul 
4.1 Human Giving 
For Paul, human giving follows straightforwardly from divine giving.85 For Philo, 
human giving can be a theological problem when placed in relation to divine giving.86 
As Philo remarks, “it is the most appropriate work for God to give benefits, and for 
created beings to give thanks” (οἰκειότατόν ἐστιν ἔργον θεῷ μὲν εὐεργετεῖν, γενέσει δὲ 
εὐχαριστεῖν).87 Humans cannot truly give because all things are God’s; they can only 
give thanks. This problem arises particularly when Philo thinks explicitly about God’s 
“most appropriate” work being gift-giving. Cher. 120-123 provides an example of this 
extended logic.88 Philo explains that when humans are compared to each other, they 
are all equally citizens of the earth; but God views them as visitors, whose brief time on 
earth is a divine gift. That God is the only true citizen (μόνος κυρίως ὁ θεὸς πολίτης 
ἐστί) is an “exceedingly wise dogma” (δόγμα πάνσοφον). Only by a misapplication of 
terms (κατάχρησις) are humans called citizens vis-à-vis God. The same is true of typical 
human interactions that pose as gift-giving: “all who are said to give (χαρίζομαι) are 
actually selling (πιπράσκω) rather than giving gifts (δωρέω), and those whom we think 
to receive gifts (λαμβάνειν χάριτας) are in truth buying (ὠνέομαι).” Since the sellers 
are looking for repayment though “praise or honor,” they are actually “seeking a 
return for the gift” (ζητοῦντες χάριτος ἀντίδοσιν); consequently, the exchange is a gift 
only in name, while the essence is a sale. Likewise, the recipients of the gifts “pay back 
by repaying at the right time” (ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ καιρὸν ἀποδιδόντες), and thus they 
are purchasers. 
In contrast, Philo says “God is not a cheap market seller, but a giver of all things 
(δωρητικὸς δὲ τῶν ἁπάντων), pouring forth everlasting springs of gifts (ἀενάους 
χαρίτων πηγὰς ἀναχέων), not desiring recompense. For he is neither needy nor is any 
                                                        
85 Cf. K. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and The Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2001), 70: “Our agency is part of the gifts God gives in imitation of God’s own dynamic life.” 
86 Accordingly, although the issue of human generosity was raised in chapter 1, section 3.1.1, I 
reserved fuller discussion until now because 1) Philo’s position comes out most clearly when compared 
to Paul; and 2) unlike Paul, human generosity is not an essential facet of Philo’s concept of gift-giving. 
Therefore, this discussion could be detached from the Philo chapters. 
87 Plant 130. 
88 See also Migr. 40. 
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created thing able to repay him a gift.” God does not sell because God is one who gives: 
the distinction between giving and selling allows Philo to define God’s nature as a giver 
in opposition to humans, because God is a perfect being who needs nothing but rather 
has everything and thus gives without thought of receiving anything back. Philo is thus 
more anxious than Paul to preserve a gap between God and humans – in causation, in 
resources, in quality of giving, and so forth. He wants God’s agency always beyond, and 
before, human agency. This transcendence/difference represents a philosophical anti-
Stoic anxiety to keep God separate from the world and humans. Accordingly, God does 
not “hawk his wares” (ὁ θεὸς οὐ πωλητὴρ ἐπευωνίζων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κτήματα) like 
humans, but is a gracious fountain pouring forth unending gifts. Humans are not givers 
because they always stand in need of something else. Thus, when it is said that humans 
“take and give” (λαμβάνομεν καὶ δίδομεν), Philo believes it is accurate that we take, but 
that we give is said only by a “misuse of language” (καταχρηστικῶς).89 Properly defined, 
giving is an action allocated to God exclusively such that humans cannot be said to 
give.90 
This logic suggests a straightforward contrast with Paul: for Paul, humans can give 
because God gives, for Philo, humans cannot give because God gives. But Philo’s 
thought is more nuanced than that – and necessarily so, because humans, in practice, 
do give and, according to Law, should give. What seems inconsistent – humans cannot 
give, but they do give – can be presented in a consistent manner, leaving us with an 
interesting, if less straightforward, comparison with Paul. 
Philo speaks of human gift-giving positively for two main reasons. First, and 
perhaps shockingly, humans imitate God by giving.91 As Philo remarks, “humans never 
                                                        
89 Her. 124. 
90 Harrison, Grace, 131–132 makes much of Philo’s “unabashed criticism of an institution which was 
viewed in a positive light.” While I agree that Philo does negatively portray the benefaction system here, 
I am not claiming that Philo is merely critiquing it because of its understanding of reciprocity. For Philo, 
the major problem is not reciprocity but that humans, vis-à-vis God, are unable to give gifts. Thus, their 
activities that pose as gift-giving are not actually so. In this sense, Philo is not simply trying to purify 
gift-giving by removing reciprocity but making an anthropological statement. 
91 Humans resemble God as givers clearly in the parent-child relationship. Although God is the 
ultimate cause of childbirth (e.g. Congr. 130; Deus 5-7), parents should be honored as “representations and 
imitations of divine power” (ἀπεικονίσματα οὗτοί γε καὶ μιμήματα θείας δυνάμεως), for they have 
“brought into existence things that did not exist” (τοὺς μὴ ὄντας εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγόντες; Spec. 2.2-3). 
They are benefactors and rulers appointed by nature (ὡς εὐεργέτας καὶ...ὡς ὑπὸ φύσεως κατασταθέντας 
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more closely resemble God than in giving” (παραπλήσιον οὐδὲν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ δρῶσιν ἢ 
χαριζόμενοι). What could be better than for humans to “imitate the eternal God” 
(μιμεῖσθαι θεὸν γενητοῖς τὸν ἀίδιον)?92 Consequently, the prosperous should not hoard 
their wealth but ease the “hard life of the needy.” All should “honor equality” (ἰσότητα 
τιμήσας);93 indeed, those who have “drunk from the fountains of wisdom” have 
banished envy from their spirit, and therefore they look favorably on those who are 
well off and act beneficently towards those in need. If God is gracious to humans, 
despite their inferiority, Philo asks why we should not act the same way to those who 
come “from the same elements” (ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων) as us?94 God has provided 
humans with life as a gift, and humans should therefore use their life to live in 
communion, harmony, equality, philanthropy (κοινωνία, ὁμόνοια, ἰσότης, 
φιλανθρωπία), and every other virtue.95 
Virtuous humans also serve as vehicles of divine giving. The “just man” is the “prop 
of the human race,” because he uses all of his possessions for the benefit of all (ὅσα μὲν 
αὐτὸς ἔχει...ἐπ᾿ ὠφελείᾳ).96 He is a gracious giver, and if he lacks something, he 
supplicates God who “opens heaven” to overflow gifts, which are then spread abroad. 
To the virtuous man God gives gifts and because of him God gives to others (δι᾿ αὐτοὺς ὁ 
θεὸς ἑτέροις εἴωθε χαρίζεσθαι).97 As channels for divine giving, humans have to follow 
particular rules in giving. Anything a person receives from another person has to be 
attributed to God.98 Furthermore, humans should give only what the person needs, and 
nothing more or different: “the quantity in gift-giving is defined by proportion” (τὸ 
ποσὸν ἐν ταῖς χάρισιν αὐτῷ παρείληπται διὰ συμμετρίαν).99 You do not give oars to a 
farmer or a plow to a sailor; rather, as God gives suitable gifts to the deserving, so also 
humans give what is needed to the worthy.100 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ἄρχοντας). Parents cannot be properly thanked nor repaid, but they should receive gratitude and honor. 
Those who withhold gratitude are unworthy (Spec. 2.234). 
92 Spec. 4.73-75. Cf. Virt. 166-170. 
93 See also Spec. 2.204. 
94 Spec. 1.294-295. 
95 Cf. further esp. Contempl. 16. 
96 Migr. 121; see 120-127. 
97 Migr. 127. 
98 Cf. e.g. Ebr. 106-107. 
99 Post. 142. 
100 Indeed, giving to unfitting recipients can be harmful to the giver; cf. Legat. 60; Ios. 99. 
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Second, humans should give because the Law commands it. When Philo expounds 
the Law in Virt. 80-90, after having proved the φιλανθρωπία καὶ κοινωνία of Moses, the 
first Law Philo explains is the one against usury, for one should not receive “offspring” 
from money. But this does not mean people should be slow to give to those who ask 
(χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς δεομένοις). Instead, rather than receiving interest from the loan, 
repayment comes in the form of gratitude. If this makes a person unwilling to give (εἰ 
δὲ μὴ βούλοιντο δωρεῖσθαι), they should at least still lend (κιχράναι γοῦν) without 
expecting anything beyond the principal. This admonition allows the poor not to 
become poorer and keeps the giver from injustice. Compared against virtue, even the 
richest ruler seems poor, and in this respect Philo says we should look upon the riches 
of moneychangers and usurers as poverty. This is the inverse of Paul in 2 Cor 8-9, where 
generosity is “wealth.” For Philo, possessions are important, but riches without virtue 
count for nothing; riches with virtue result in charity. Those under the Mosaic Law 
must avoid usury and uncharitable ways. 
Philo remarks elsewhere: “Is it not right, then, to love these laws, which are full of 
such great mercy? By them rich people are taught to impart and share what they have, 
and the poor are comforted.”101 Some Laws admonish those who received gifts to make 
recompense for the gifts (εἰς χαρίτων ἀμοιβάς), and those who have given gifts not to 
seek restitution as if they had given a loan.102 On the seventh year the Law ordains a 
remission of debts (χρεωκοπία), which helps the poor and summons the rich to 
philanthropy (τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίαν προκαλούμενος).103 The rich give from 
their abundance to those in need, looking forward to the potential time that they may 
be in need and receive from others (cf. 2 Cor 8.13-15!). Even the created order 
demonstrates the virtue of giving: the sun gives light to the moon, which then has its 
own beauty to display – a clear teaching on kindness and philanthropy (διδασκαλία 
χρηστότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας).104 In imitation of the heavenly bodies, humans should 
not grudge to give to those who are deserving (χαρίζονται τοῖς ἀξίοις). Those who 
“show mercy to the poor” (πένητας ἐλεῶν), “give benefits to friends” (φίλους 
                                                        
101 Spec. 2.105-207. 
102 Decal. 167. Cf. also QE 2.3. 
103 Spec. 2.71-78. 
104 Spec. 2.141. 
 232 
εὐεργετῶν), and those who “pay attention to the common rules of justice towards all 
humans” are pleasing to their fellow humans as well as God.105 
There is ample evidence in Philo’s writings that humans should give to imitate God 
and follow the Law.106 Naturally, these are really a single motivation. The Law 
commands that humans imitate God in giving because the Law is the instantiation of 
God’s will in creation. Appropriately, being beneficent is perhaps the utmost way in 
which humans live in accordance with the Law-sustained order of the cosmos, and 
therefore imitate God. God does not give gifts to humans for their exclusive possession, 
but so that they might invite others also to enjoy them.107 Progress in virtue means also 
growth in charity. Accordingly, humans are expected to give to the poor around them, 
as an ethical duty central to their piety. Where Philo can sometimes see God’s exclusive 
ownership of all things as problematizing human giving,108 it can also provide an 
impetus for holding one’s gifts with a loose grip.109 Giving is linked to piety, and 
therefore when one gives, one may receive back from the recipient, but the rewards 
one receives from God are greater. But, again, insofar as God himself is the perfect 
giver, humans cannot actually give but rather they do something that is analogous to 
giving. Thus, the tension: humans should give because God gives and commands giving, 
but God’s giving is so perfect that it is incomparable with human giving, in reflection of 
the gap between the transcendent God and earthly creatures. Philo’s insistence that 
human giving vis-à-vis divine giving is not actually giving is only a way of stressing the 
perfection and uniqueness of God’s generosity. Everything always has to be set in the 
context of God’s ultimate causation of all things.  
Accordingly, the contrast between Philo and Paul is not as simple as originally 
stated. For Paul, human giving takes its distinctive shape from Christ’s giving: the 
ultimate instance of divine generosity is at the same time the ground, motivation, and 
blueprint for human giving. Humans can give because God gave, and they should give 
                                                        
105 Mut. 40. 
106 For further discussion, see, e.g., Mos. 1.133; Spec. 2.80-85; on Moses, Mos. 1.51-60; 2.242; on 
Abraham, Abr. 175-177 (cf. Ios. 229-231), 273; on Joseph, Ios. 45-46, 99, 157, 240-241, 249; Legat. 158, 268, 
287; Flacc. 61; Praem. 97. See also Mos. 2.233-242, which can make for an interesting conversation partner 
with Romans 4. 
107 See also Fug. 28-29. 
108 As in Cher. 120-123. 
109 Her. 103-105. 
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because giving is part-and-parcel of their reconstituted existence in Christ. Divine 
giving creates humans as givers; and in this manner, human giving cannot be pitted 
against divine giving, because divine giving enables and works in human giving.110 In 
this sense, we might say that the “location” of the giver is fundamental to the 
difference between Philo and Paul. Whereas Philo must stress the transcendent gap 
between God and humanity, Paul does not share this concern, but in fact wishes to 
stress the co-location of divine and human gifts without collapsing the difference 
between them. He achieves this through viewing believers as reconstituted in Christ, 
existing within the gift, indwelled by God’s own Spirit; and therefore human existence 
is defined by gift and is reshaped to be Christ-like in generosity. For Philo, human 
giving is a way of reflecting God’s generosity and drawing nearer to the transcendent 
giver, as well as living in line with the cosmos.111 Because of divine causation – and 
God’s perfect beneficence – divine and human giving can (or must) be pitted against 
each other, at least occasionally, even though Philo is quick to emphasize that humans 
can give because God has given (has provided gifts to give) and that is the reason why 
they should give (the Law). Yet since Philo perfects divine gift-giving – God is the 
perfect giver who looks for no material return; God is the only one who has something 
of his own to give – he necessarily critiques human gift-giving in comparison to divine. 
God is transcendent, his agency is prior to and beyond human agency, his resources are 
inexhaustible, and the quality of his giving is perfect. Simply put, God is other than his 
creation; and since giving is an activity proper to God, it cannot simply be a proper 
human activity. The oddity, of course, is that virtuous human giving is caused by God, 
and therefore the two cannot be played off each other. Thus, when one asks about 
human gift-giving in Philo, the next question must be: from what viewpoint? By 
contrast, Paul does not emphasize the perfection of God in his giving (in Philo’s sense of 
                                                        
110 On this theme, cf. esp. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 67–95. For the non-competitive 
relationship of divine and human agency, see the longer discussion in K. Tanner, God and Creation in 
Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
111 Cf. G.E. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues’: Piety in Philo of Alexandria,” StPhA 18 (2006): 123: 
“The aspiration of Philo was to encounter God directly. Even though a human cannot experience the 
being of God, it is possible to experience God’s presence directly. This experience, even the desire for the 
experience, affected the moral life. It is not that we imitate God to experience God, but that our 
understanding and experience of God shape our virtue or impiety.” 
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perfection) but rather the incongruity and abundance of the gift; thus, he need not 
critique human gift-giving that springs from that incongruous and abundant gift.  
Consequently, for both Philo and Paul, humans give gifts because God gives gifts, 
but for each the relationship between divine and human giving is different. For Philo 
God’s causation paradoxically both effects human giving and is also the reason why it 
must be criticized. Philo has to balance the dual issue of wanting to safeguard God’s 
transcendence and difference from humanity but also that by progressing in virtue 
humans become more and more like God. By contrast, for Paul human giving is located 
with and within divine agency and not in competition to it.  
4.2 Thanksgiving 
A related point of distinction-in-similarity is Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of how 
thanksgiving relates to gift-giving. To quote Seneca: “Not to return gratitude for 
benefits is a disgrace, and the whole world counts it as such.”112 Both Philo and Paul 
would agree: thanksgiving is a necessary aspect of gift-giving. But the way this 
relationship is parsed, unsurprisingly, is different.  
 For Philo, thanksgiving is humanity’s proper response to God’s proper act of 
giving.113 Every human should thank God, in whatever way makes the most sense, for all 
that God has given: the eloquent person through speech, the philosopher through 
philosophy, the farmer through harvest, and so forth.114 Every aspect of life should 
result in thanksgiving to God.115 In fact, humans cannot fully give thanks to the God 
who has created and given all things;116 yet it remains their duty to bring to God 
suitable honor in thanksgiving for all things.117  
                                                        
112 De Ben. 3.1.1. 
113 Cf. Plant. 130. J.M.G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and 
Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. 
Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 2008), 142: “Philo emphasizes thanksgiving so often that it becomes one 
of the most characteristic features of his religious philosophy.” On this theme, see esp. J. LaPorte, 
Eucharistia in Philo (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1983); J. Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 175–189; also, C.W. Larson, “Prayer of Petition in Philo,” JBL 65 (1946): 
185–203. 
114 Mut. 219-223. 
115 Cf. e.g. Congr. 96; Virt. 165; Sobr. 58; Spec. 1.272; Virt. 72; Spec. 2.180, 187;  
116 Cf. Leg. 3.10. 
117 Cf. Ebr. 116-118. On sacrifice, a primary way of thanking God – and of supplicating God for more 
gifts – see Spec. 1.283-285. 
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How does thanksgiving relate to the specific act of human gift-giving, if at all? One 
point of relation is that the person who is righteous enough to give thanks to God will 
not neglect to be generous to those in need.118 In piety, giving thanks to God and giving 
gifts to humans in need are integrally related. Thanksgiving is thus related to gift-
giving in three primary ways: 1) as a response to God’s gifts; 2) in some sense distinct 
from gift-giving, because giving is proper to God and thanksgiving proper to humans; 3) 
and yet those humans who give thanks will also give gifts to humans. In any act of 
human giving, ultimately God should receive thanksgiving as the cause. Philo can both 
intimately link giving and thanksgiving, as one would expect, while also distinguishing 
them in an effort to preserve God’s perfect beneficence. 
Since, for Philo, everything is gift, thanksgiving can be rendered for everything; 
therefore, thanksgiving is a matter of properly perceiving God’s causation, of not 
forgetting God’s gifts.119 Differently, for Paul, thanksgiving is a matter of whether one 
has received the gift. There is a fundamental divide: one belongs to Adam or to Christ, 
living in the flesh or the Spirit, and so forth. Unsurprisingly, then, a chief mark of sinful 
humanity in Rom 1.18-21 is that “although knowing God, they did not glorify him as 
God or give thanks (ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν) to him.” For those in Christ, however, 
thanksgiving is the manner in which they address God: “in all things by prayer and 
petition with thanksgiving (μετὰ εὐχαριστίας) let your requests be made known to God” 
(Phil 4.6). Likewise, God’s will in Jesus for believers is that they “give thanks in all 
things” (ἐν παντὶ εὐχαριστεῖτε; 1 Thess 5.18). Paul thus gives thanks for God’s gifts (2 
Cor 9.15; cf. Rom 7.25), for the gift given to his churches (1 Cor 1.4; 1 Thess 2.13), and for 
the churches themselves and their faith (Rom 1.8; 16.4; Phil 1.3; 1 Thess 1.2; Phlm 4). 
Within the church there are different practices of worship but all give thanksgiving 
(Rom 14.6), and proper worship is important because worship is thanksgiving, and 
thanksgiving may prompt a response from outsiders (cf. 1 Cor 14.16-18).  
As noted above, the generosity God creates in the Corinthians for the collection 
produces thanksgiving to God through Paul and his co-workers. The ministry itself 
serves two purposes: fulfilling the needs of the saints and “abounding through many 
                                                        
118 See Spec. 2.171-174. 
119 Cf. e.g. Sacr. 54-57; LaPorte, Eucharistia, 42–43. 
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thanksgivings to God” (9.11-12; cf. 4.15). God effects human giving, which results in 
humans giving thanks to God. Thanksgiving occurs in response to gift-giving and every 
human gift results in an act of thanksgiving. This is not altogether different from Philo, 
of course. But the main dissimilarity is that Paul does not find it necessary to 
distinguish sharply divine generosity from human generosity. Consequently, he also 
does not worry about the same issues as Philo when discussing thanksgiving; human 
giving itself effects thanksgiving to God. In at least one place, however, Paul does sound 
mildly Philonic: in 1 Thess 3.9, Paul asks, “what thanksgiving are we able to render back 
to God...?” (τίνα γὰρ εὐχαριστίαν δυνάμεθα τῷ θεῷ ἀνταποδοῦναι).120 For Paul, too, 
there is no thanksgiving worthy of what God has given; but nevertheless Paul, like 
Philo, still gives thanks. 
Philo’s and Paul’s understandings of thanksgiving differ as a result of their different 
views on how divine and human giving relate. Because – at least on a basic level – Philo 
can put divine and human giving in contradiction at times (when viewing their relation 
from a particular angle), he does not connect human giving to thanksgiving in a strong 
sense. Paul, on the other hand, views human giving as an act and cause of thanksgiving 
to God. For Philo, the proper work of God is to give and for humans to give 
thanksgiving; for Paul, the proper work of God is to give and for humans – as recipients 
– to give and give thanks. The difference should not be pressed too far, because of the 
reasons noted above; but the basic difference separates Philo and Paul. 
4.3 Gifts and Community 
A final point of comparison is how Philo and Paul relate gift-giving to community.121 For 
Philo, the Law clearly commands humans to give to one another, to support each other 
in need,122 and to live in harmony and community with each other. Despite his negative 
                                                        
120 Harrison, Grace, 270–271 suggests that “the Pauline thanksgivings fall within the ambit of the 
honorific inscriptions.” But one of the differences he notes is that in the inscriptions “the epithets ἀξία 
and καταξία...often accompanied χάρις,” whereas for Paul “the return of thanks...cannot be measured 
against the infinite generosity of the divine Benefactor.” 
121 For Philo, see esp. the nuanced work of D.T. Runia, “The Idea and the Reality of the City in the 
Thought of Philo of Alexandria,” JHI 61 (2000): 361–79. Cf. also D.T. Runia, “Polis and Megalopolis: Philo 
and the Founding of Alexandria,” Mnemosyne 42 (1989): 398–412. 
122 On the theme of human philanthropy in Philo, see M.D. van Veldhuizen, “‘Philanthropia’ in Philo 
of Alexandria: A Scriptural Perspective” (PhD, University of Notre Dame, 1982), 112–122. 
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statements about human gift-giving, Philo has no desire to contradict the Law on this 
matter.123 In fact, Philo can point out exemplary communities where humans live in 
interdependence and with the shared purpose of pursuing virtue. The Essenes are 
devoted servants of God who live communally, growing in obedience together through 
study of the Law.124 There are no slaves and no hierarchy within the members, because 
that would destroy equality (ἰσότης). The community shares all property and 
possessions with each other, and the sick and elderly – those who cannot contribute  - 
are cared for by others. The Essenes are examples of a “practical” way of life and are 
worthy of praise. Likewise, Philo praises the Therapeutae, who follow the “speculative” 
way of life, always aiming to see God.125 They meditate on the Laws and practice virtue 
all day; but they spend six days in isolation and only come together on the seventh.126 
Like the Essenes, theirs is a simple existence – materially – so as not to interfere with 
their contemplative lifestyle, and they keep no slaves, thinking slavery to be “contrary 
to nature.”127 Those who serve do so freely, of their own volition. Accordingly, human 
communities do exist that conform to and embody the Mosaic legislation, and Philo 
believes these are noble groups. 
 Yet Philo’s desire was often to escape society and to be alone, in contemplation. All 
evidence indicates that Philo was deeply involved in the political (and social) life of 
Alexandria,128 particularly as a representative for the Jewish citizens there.129 In the 
social engagement that world entailed, Philo – somewhat spectacularly – reminisced on 
a time when he was devoted simply to philosophy and contemplation on the world and 
the things in the world (θεωρία τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ).130 At that time, Philo 
feasted on divine thoughts (θείοις λόγοις), never thinking on material considerations. 
                                                        
123 See e.g. Migr. 89-93. 
124 See Prob. 75-90. 
125 Contempl. 11; and passim. 
126 Cf. Contempl. 30. 
127 Contempl. 70. 
128 On Philo’s politics, see esp. R. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics. Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism,” 
in ANRW 2.21, 417–553. 
129 Cf. Runia, “Reality of the City,” 361: “There can be no doubt that the city occupied a central 
position in his own life. As an inhabitant of Alexandria he was thoroughly immersed in a highly 
urbanized form of life.” Furthermore, T.E. Phillips, “Revisiting Philo: Discussions of Wealth and Poverty 
in Philo’s Ethical Discourse,” JSNT 24 (2001): 113: “no debate exists on the question of Philo’s economic 
status. ...Philo was extremely wealthy.” 
130 Spec. 3.1; see 1-6 for this paragraph. 
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He was wholly consumed by associating (συμπεριπολέω) with heaven and all the 
universe. Removed from the contradictions, distractions, and evils of normal life, Philo 
was happy. Unfortunately, the “worst enemy,” envy, was waiting for Philo, and it 
dragged him back into the life of mortals – into the “open sea” of politics. Philo longs 
for an unexpected time when he might again have respite from the troubles that arise 
from society. Then he will rise up and float, being carried by the “breezes of 
knowledge” and escaping his “pitiless masters,” by which he means not only his fellow 
humans but also the affairs that schedule his days. For the time being, he gives thanks 
to God that he has not drowned.  
For Philo, cities in general are disruptive of contemplation and drag one down into 
vice.131 Cities are not simply communities, so that the vices of cities can be transferred 
to communities; but the city is often a petri dish of vice, and the city is where humans 
live (but not, significantly, the Essenes and Therapeutae).132 Additionally, when Philo 
fantasizes about escaping the daily grind – and his dealings with people – he envisions 
solitude in contemplation by himself, not in a community like the Therapeutae.133 And 
even further, the Therapeutae, Philo’s favorite group, spend most of their time not with 
each other; they are not a community in the typical sense, but more like a collection of 
individuals. 
There is at least an impetus towards individualism in Philo,134 which relates to the 
way that divine generosity is universalized (everything is gift) and can be perceived as 
such by all people if only they would utilize their God-given reason. The quest towards 
virtue is the individual’s quest. The teacher of the Law,135 the fellow Jew who lends to 
you in need, and so forth, can help you in this quest; but ultimately it is your 
responsibility. This should not be exaggerated, however, for we have already produced 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate Philo’s belief in the necessity of communities, both 
                                                        
131 Cf. Prob. 63. 
132 But cf. Runia, “Reality of the City,” 366: “Philo reveals a positive attitude towards the classical 
Greek conception of the polis as the ideal and ‘natural’ structure for human living, constructed and 
organized in such a way as to ensure the well-being and concord of its citizens.” Yet as Runia notes, Philo 
understood that there was a considerable distance between the ideal polis and what he experienced daily; 
cf. e.g. Virt. 119-120. 
133 But see the contrary statement in Leg. 2.85. 
134 It should be noted that this is not a value judgment. 
135 If G.E. Sterling, “‘The School of Sacred Laws’: The Social Setting of Philo’s Treatises,” VC 53 (1999): 
148–64 is correct, Philo actually ran his own school. 
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hypothetical and actual: almost every negative statement about cities and human 
society can be matched by an equally positive statement, even if the final analysis has a 
negative tint.136 The Law assumes the existence of and need for community, and Philo is 
not eager to contradict this. In some sense, communities are a necessary hindrance: 
they are unavoidable, and often those in them can help you on your way. But 
eventually, escaping from society – whether the city itself, or taking respite from 
members of your community – is the best thing for your soul. By contrast, for Paul, gifts 
establish individuals within community,137 and the function of gift-giving in 
communities is to build up the community through mutual help by and for individuals. 
By receiving the Christ-gift, you become a member of Christ’s body. No dichotomy 
between individual and community is sustainable: the gifts and giftings of the 
individual have a community-directed focus, as each contributes to the wellbeing of the 
other and the common good of all. The impetus in Paul’s theology is thus the 
movement of diverse individuals into and within community. Accordingly, for both 
Philo and Paul, gift-giving is a bond of community, and communities are important. But 
while Philo can imagine an individual’s success without community, for Paul the gift 
can only be experienced – and practiced – within community, in relation to others. For 
Philo, gifts are indifferent to social structure – one can receive within or without 
community. For Paul, the gift is structurally social. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that in Paul’s theology divine gifts create community and 
form its particular shape; and that these gifts make possible human gift-giving, which 
functions as the bond of community. In every respect, Christian communities, as the 
body of Christ, are defined by gift. Accordingly, I then examined how Paul coordinates 
divine and human giving – particularly how humans contribute to the edification of the 
community through participation in and imitation of divine giving. To discuss human 
                                                        
136 Runia, “Reality of the City,” 377–378 makes the accurate judgment that “the problem is not too 
little evidence...but rather too much. Philo's written remains are so copious that it is easy to make him 
say whatever one wants.” 
137 Cf. Sampley, Moral Reasoning, 37: “We have no evidence that Paul ever conceived of a solitary, 
isolated believer. ...he thinks of believers as called together in Christ. ... The community is, after all, the 
matrix within which individual lives of faith are nurtured and maintained.” 
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giving and community in Paul is to discuss divine giving, because human giving is an 
extension of divine giving, and the sustaining acts of divine and human generosity 
cannot be separated. 
The discussion of Paul set up a comparison with Philo on human giving, how human 
and divine giving relate, the purpose of thanksgiving, and how giving relates to 
community. It was demonstrated that, again, Philo and Paul are neither identical nor 
simply opposites. The difference ultimately lies in this question: What is the most 
important of God’s gifts and what does this gift do? For Paul, it is the Christ-gift, which 
re-creates its recipients, transforming them into Christ-shaped givers. For Philo, that 
gift is the cosmos, which has Laws built into its foundation that command generosity. 
The aim of human existence is to live in accordance with the cosmos, and by doing so, 
to ascend in virtue. Philo’s cosmos and Paul’s Christ necessarily lead to different 
conclusions on who God is and how God acts for humanity, and therefore what 
humanity is and how it responds. 
Conclusion 
 
1.  Conversing on Grace 
Conceding that neither Philo nor Paul can be present to discuss grace with us, the task 
of this thesis has been one of interpreting Philo’s and Paul’s writings and imagining 
how such a discussion might go, by pinpointing where Philo and Paul differ and in what 
ways they do so. My argument throughout has been that Philo and Paul both 
understand God as one who gives gifts, but their understandings of that divine 
generosity are different – again, not antithetical, but also not commensurate – because 
they each understand God’s grace as instantiated in radically different ways, in one 
case, in creation, and in the other, in the Christ-event.1 In this way, I have sought to 
contribute to the reframing of the discussion of how Paul relates to Judaism on the 
topic of grace, by focusing on Paul’s relationship to one particular Jewish author.  
 Throughout the final three chapters of this thesis I have drawn conclusions about 
how Philo and Paul relate. What I will do now, then, is summarize the argument of each 
chapter, and then distill the conclusions about how Philo and Paul relate, in order to 
bring this work to a close. 
2.  Summary of the Thesis 
Part One set forth Philo’s understanding of divine generosity, which is cosmological and 
causative. In chapter one, I argued that the main facets of Philo’s concept of God make 
possible and impel his notion of God as one who gives gifts. When Philo reflects on the 
question of why God created, his answer is that God is one who gives: he was “good and 
bounteous” (ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόδωρος).2 Indeed, creating is not simply something God 
does but is part of who God is. God’s perpetual creative activity can never be separated 
from his generosity: God creates because he is φιλόδωρος and both his creating and 
                                                        
1 It should be mentioned again that the assumption of this thesis has been that Philo’s and Paul’s 
theologies of divine generosity were formed not in isolation from but within their social settings and 
practical purposes. Thus, for Paul, the incongruous shape of the Christ-gift became clear particularly 
through both his own experience and the fact that this gift was given by the God of the Abrahamic 
promise to Gentiles. 
2 Mut. 46. 
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giving occur in his beneficent power. Accordingly, as ἴδιον θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν, so also θεοῦ 
τὸ εὐεργετεῖν ἴδιον.3 God’s nature is thus one of hyper-generosity, and everything is a 
gift from a God whose generous being overflows into the world like a fountain.  
 I then traced how Philo makes sense of God as one who gives according to a rational 
order (giving to the worthy) and incommensurately (according to God’s immeasurably 
generous being). Philo upholds both that humans who are worthy receive gifts from 
God, but that no human is simply worthy coram Deo nor should they consider 
themselves worthy. What bridges the gap is the belief that God, not humans, 
constitutes humans as worthy to receive. Such constitutive work is an aspect of God’s 
creative generosity, that God loves to give—specifically for the betterment of humans.4 
Any movement from unworthy to worthy must be attributed to divine grace, because 
God is the cause of all good things. The asymmetry of the divine-human relationship 
thus means that God’s generosity cannot be explicated by human standards: human 
worth can be a condition of God’s giving, but never its cause. Accordingly, since all 
good things have their source from this creative divine generosity, God’s giving to the 
worthy is always predicated on a prior creational provision to the unworthy: God’s 
overflowing generosity makes possible his discriminate giving to the worthy. 
 In chapter two, I focused on how human worth is constituted. I began by arguing 
for a particular construal of the relationship between divine and human agency that 
tried to respect that 1) God is the cause of all good things, and 2) humans who do good 
things are virtuous. Virtuous human agency exists, as it were, within or is constituted 
by divine agency; accordingly, virtuous human action is, in its essence, the use and 
enjoyment of divine beneficence. For Philo, the God who graciously created the world 
has placed humanity within a context ordered for their benefit: Nature, Law, and Logos 
order the world such that it reflects divine generosity, while also specifying the 
standards for virtue. Humans who live virtuously are worthy of God’s gifts. Yet as Philo 
makes clear, it is God who gives virtue to humans as well as the love of virtue: “For God 
caused all virtue to exist.”5 Furthermore, God gives to humans actions in accordance 
                                                        
3 Cf. Cher. 77 and Mut. 129. 
4 Cf., e.g., Spec. 4.187; Opif. 23. 
5 Leg. 3.10. 
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with the virtues.6 God has thus ordered the human soul such that humans should do 
good, and virtue results from the congruence of the orderings of the soul and cosmos. 
Humans as moral agents live in a world woven together with moral fabric. Accordingly, 
God gives gifts not to those who reject his gifts and choose vice, but to those who are 
worthy. But as I demonstrated, we must let Philo define worth and place it in relation 
to other aspects of his thought. Worth in Philo’s theology is only explicable as an aspect 
of Philo’s theology, not as a preconceived notion that can be applied to Philo. 
Accordingly, for Philo, life is grace all the way down. The only proper response is faith 
and thanksgiving, an attribution of all good things to God and not to the self. 
 Part Two of the thesis turned to Paul’s understanding of grace, which is 
Christological and creative. In chapter three, through exegesis of Gal 1-2 and Rom 3 and 5, 
I traced how Paul identifies divine grace as Christ’s death and resurrection for the 
ungodly, a saving event which effects new creation and new life for its recipients. For 
Paul, it is key both that the Christ-event is a gift that undercuts any form of social, 
ethnic, gender, or moral worth, precisely because it goes to the unworthy, a category 
that, for Paul, encompasses all humans. Thus, as I argued, when Paul discusses grace 
and justification by faith, his main concern is not ethnocentrism; rather, he sees any 
obligatory criteria of worth as undercutting the nature of the gospel itself. Paul thus 
insists that the Christ-gift is χωρὶς νόμου and δωρεάν, given to all without distinction. 
God does not give Christ in spite of human unworthiness, but because of it. For Paul, 
divine giving is nothing if not Christological, incongruous to its recipients, and thus 
excessive. Accordingly, I turned to Rom 4 and 9-11 to explore how Paul understands 
God’s grace when treating persons and histories before Christ. I argued that the Christ-
event for Paul is so revelatory and defining of who God is that it becomes a retroactive 
hermeneutic of incongruity. From Abraham, through the history of Israel, God has 
given according to a promise that is granted without thought for the recipient’s works 
(Abraham, Jacob), line of descent (Isaac), or ethnicity (Gentiles). The promise takes this 
incongruous shape for Paul because it was always directed towards fulfillment in 
Christ. The character of the promise, for Paul, is constant and Christologically 
explicable. The Christ-gift both effects new creation and patterns history. 
                                                        
6 Cf. Ebr. 119. 
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 In chapter four I argued that three main facets of Paul’s understanding of divine 
gift-giving converge in Paul himself. First, Paul is the paradigmatic unworthy 
beneficiary of the Christ-gift. Second, Paul understands his apostleship as a gift that is 
interwoven with the Christ-gift itself. Third, apostolic proclamation is inherent to the 
Christ-gift itself, as the manner in which the gift is received. Thus, in Gal 1-2 and 1 Cor 
15, Paul presents himself as one who was called in grace – re-constituted in the Christ-
event – despite the fact that he, as part of humanity under sin, had persecuted the 
church. Inherent to this call was his apostolic assignment to enact and embody the 
gospel in proclamation to the Gentiles. Accordingly, Paul’s understanding of the gospel 
he proclaims is rooted in his own story of receiving an incongruous gift that 
interrupted his life. Paul is both paradigm and proclaimer, and his apostleship exists 
only in its relation to the gospel. Then, in relation to 2 Cor 5-6 I focused more closely on 
the nature of apostolic proclamation as intrinsic to the reception of the gift. The 
apostle, as God’s chosen ambassador, is vital to the logic and outworking of the divine 
gift: to reject or receive God’s gift of Christ is to reject or receive both God and the 
apostle, because faith comes from hearing. 
 Finally, in chapter five, I explored what, for Paul, is the result of divine giving: the 
creation of communities that exist and are sustained by divine and human gifts. For 
Paul, as for Philo, life takes a particular gift-shaped form; but for Paul this form is that 
of the justified individual within the body of Christ, while for Philo the gift-shape of life 
is related to community more ambiguously. Through examining Rom 12 and 1 Cor 14, I 
demonstrated how Paul understands the body of Christ not only as a community 
created by divine gift, but also as one that remains sustained in unity through grace. 
Individual and communal life is defined by receiving and giving gifts (always in that 
order). And these gifts underscore both the diversity of the body’s individual members 
and their common life in Christ. In 2 Cor 8-9 I then focused particularly on how divine 
giving enables and funds human giving. Believers give gifts to others as the expression 
of their new identity and re-constituted location in Christ. 
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3.  Comparative Questions and Answers 
We may draw together the main points of the comparative conclusions about Philo and 
Paul through the following questions: 
 
Who is God and What has God Given? 
For both Philo and Paul, God is without question a generous giver. Yet, importantly, 
they construe God’s identity differently because they each look to dissimilar places as 
the promise of God’s gracious being. The questions of “Who?” and “What?” are, for 
Philo and Paul, inextricable.  
 For Philo, God is generous because he is Creator, and all of Philo’s universal gift-
theology flows from that proposition. Created in and as God’s grace, the protological 
order of the cosmos is upheld and supported by God’s Logos; in other words, God’s first 
and greatest gift is not only cosmic, but it is also marked by divine order, one which 
provides the context and matrix for humans to live – hopefully virtuously. Accordingly, 
for Philo, God is generous, rational and morally explicable, which is reflected in his 
well-structured cosmos. 
 For Paul, God is not understood via creation; rather, creation is understood through 
the Christ-event that effects new creation. As noted in chapter three, there is a subtle 
shift of direction in Paul: where Philo places the emphasis first on who God is and then 
explains what God does, Paul places the stress primarily on what God has done in Jesus. 
If Philo’s God is bountiful, Paul’s God has given this abundant gift. Both claims – the who 
and what – are reciprocally influencing, of course, but the distinction is that Philo 
prizes God’s generosity and Paul prizes God’s gift. Philo’s God is the Creator who gives 
gifts in and because of his perfection, Paul’s God is the one whose power and wisdom 
are revealed in Christ’s death. One raises God’s generosity to cosmic proportions, the 
other claims that the cosmos is undone by a single gracious event in history. 
 Accordingly, for Philo, creation as an act of divine grace both points to who God is 
and provides a pattern for his subsequent gifts; for Paul, the Christ-event is not one gift 
among many but is the ultimate revelation of God’s grace, according to which every 
other gift is understood and towards which every other gift is directed. 
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To whom has God given? 
The question of who receives God’s grace flows logically from the identity of God and 
his gifts. As already noted, the temptation is to leave the answer to this question as a 
stark antithesis: Philo’s God gives to the worthy, Paul’s God gives to the unworthy. And 
while this is a true and important antithesis, it does not tell the whole story. 
 For Philo, human life unfolds in one of two directions: either one enjoys and uses 
God’s gifts and consequently progresses in virtue, or one rejects and abuses God’s gifts 
and consequently lives in vice. The human condition permits each individual to go 
either way. Yet God gives to those on the path of virtue, for worth is a condition for 
receiving divine generosity. It is not then the case that human worth causes God’s 
giving, or that God’s giving mechanistically responds to human worth. Worth is always 
subordinate to the priority of divine giving, which corresponds to the asymmetry of 
divine-human relations: worth is constituted by virtuous living, which is itself caused 
by God. In any case of divine giving, Philo can probe behind the text to elucidate why 
that specific person received a gift: and the answer, briefly stated, is that God created 
the person to be worthy. Thus, to say that God gives to the worthy is to say that God 
gives to those who have received his gifts, thus upholding a rational order. 
 For Paul, the question is more straightforwardly answered: God gives to the 
unworthy. Rom 5.8 may stand as a nice encapsulation of Paul’s thought: “But God 
demonstrated his love for us, in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us.” 
Throughout his letters, Paul is unequivocal about the identity of humanity outside of 
Christ: under the power of sin, enemies of God, godless, weak, immoral, and unwise. In 
a reversal of ancient (and modern) values, Paul claims that God gives to those who do 
not deserve his gift. 
 Thus, to the worthy, to the unworthy. There is obviously a discrepancy here. On a 
basic level, the similarly between Philo and Paul is that both insist humans are utterly 
dependent on God’s grace. The overriding difference is that, for Philo, God gives to 
those whom he has made worthy, where, for Paul, God simply gives to those who are 
unworthy. In both cases, God does not give because humans are inherently worthy or 
lovable; but in each case, God does not give to the same kind of humans. Paul would 
have found Philo’s belief that humans can be worthy through virtuous living 
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detrimental, as it would undercut his notion of gift; Philo would have found Paul’s 
belief that humans cannot be worthy hopeless, as it would undercut the possibility of 
receiving divine gifts. 
 
What do God’s gifts do? 
Again, this question follows logically from the preceding question. 
 For Philo, following God’s paradigmatic gift of the creation of an ordered cosmos, all 
subsequent gifts bring the worthy recipient further into step with the structures of the 
cosmos (Law, Logos), so that one becomes virtuous and ascends to the visio Dei. That is, 
God’s gifts ground and reaffirm the human recipient in the moral order of creation, 
creating further congruence between the order of soul and cosmos. Gifts to the 
virtuous thus empower the virtuous to live—virtuously. Accordingly, God’s gifts effect a 
changed relationship between the human and God (drawing near to God) and among 
humans (virtue can and should be expressed socially). But as I argued, Philo places the 
stress on the former; communities can both hinder and help the individual. 
 For Paul, God’s gift of Christ justifies and reconciles the ungodly human and effects 
new creation, where gift-recipients live a new life in Christ indwelled by the Spirit. The 
main aspect of Paul’s moral vision I examined was his concept of God’s gifts as creating 
communities of individuals who have received the gift of Christ. God’s gifts thus effect a 
changed identity and being in Christ (righteous, new creation) and a new social order 
(the body of Christ). 
 In Philo, the worthy become more worthy, and in Paul, the unworthy are remade in 
Christ. 
 
Why are Philo and Paul similar but ultimately different? 
To come full circle: on the one hand, Philo’s and Paul’s gift-theology are, in many ways, 
structurally similar because they both stress God’s grace to extreme degrees. Philo’s 
God is so gracious that he overflows with gifts, and Paul’s God is counter-intuitively and 
counter-culturally gracious to the ungodly. But they are different because their 
understanding of who God is and what God has given is different and irreconcilable. 
Accordingly, in generalities they are alike; but the particularities of their thought 
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everywhere separate them. They configure divine grace in an incommensurate fashion 
because each believes God has given different gifts. Cosmos or Christ makes all the 
difference. 
4.  In conclusion: Philo and Paul within and against Paradigms 
In the introduction to this thesis I set forth two different and dominant paradigms for 
understanding how Paul relates to Judaism on the topic of divine grace. Briefly put: in 
the first, Judaism is a religion of works and not of grace like Paul; in the second, both 
Judaism and Paul are religions of grace. What has been demonstrated throughout this 
thesis is that Philo and Paul both thought of God’s interactions with the world in terms 
of divine generosity—they both speak of divine gifts frequently and in formally similar 
ways while making substantively dissimilar theological judgments in the framework of 
their historical settings and theology. Consequently, Philo and Paul resist simple 
contrasts, because their relationship fits neither of the paradigms set forth in the 
introduction. Paul is not different from Philo because he speaks about divine grace, or 
because he is rather insistent about the importance of grace; Philo does both. Rather, 
what separates Paul from Philo is his insistence that the event of Christ’s death and 
resurrection for the ungodly is the ultimate instantiation of divine grace in the world, 
and that from and through this event all reality – including history – is to be 
interpreted. And what separates Philo from Paul is his insistence that in the act of 
creation God has established a protological order that makes fitting gifts possible. The 
lack of simple antithesis or identity presented an opportunity to paint a nuanced, 
specific picture of one aspect of the Paul and Judaism debate, because, in the end, 
precisely what separates Philo and Paul are the particularities of their thought and the 
resulting configurations of grace. Both paradigms make  the mistake of not letting Philo 
define grace on his own terms, which misconstrues his relationship with Paul. 
 Accordingly, even if both figures speak of divine grace, I have contended that that 
in itself tells us very little. Paul likely would not have read Philo’s writings and thought 
that he did not believe in grace. Rather, he would have assumed that he was woefully 
misinformed. Philo’s configuration of grace with works and virtue – in the context of 
divine causation – would have run counter to Paul’s belief in the unfitting gift, and 
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Paul’s unfitting gift would have seemed to Philo to call into question God’s wise 
ordering of the world. This is not the place to make general claims about Paul and 
Judaism; rather the claim is about Paul and Philo. But if Paul and Philo can fit neither of 
the dominant paradigms for understanding Paul and Judaism, perhaps the paradigms 
need to be left behind. Paul and Philo both believed that God was a God who gives; but 
their understandings of divine generosity, while not antithetical, are ultimately 
incommensurate. The broad space between identity and antithesis is precisely the 
important terrain that this thesis has attempted to chart. 
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